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EXECUTORS' ACCOUNTS

SECOND EDITION

— BY —

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Judge of the Surrogate Court of the County of Grey;

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"Words and Terms Judicially Defined"

"Surrogate Court Practice"

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Since the Devolution of Estates Act the practice that formerly obtained in administration actions has become almost obsolete. With the passing of this form of action the growing practice of obtaining judicial approval of executors' and administrators' accounts by an audit in the Surrogate Court has become of much more importance. That no work, either English or Canadian, covers just the ground I have attempted in this volume is some reason for its appearance.

No apology is necessary for the number of American cases referred to, more especially in the chapters dealing with testamentary expenses and allowances to and the liabilities of executors and administrators. Much of the law in this respect is grounded on habits and customs of life, and, in many respects, our habits and customs assimilate more closely to those of Americans than to those of Britons. Apart from this the decisions of the American courts, more especially those of the Eastern and South-Eastern States, are deservedly held in high repute.

I had hoped to be able to incorporate in the Appendix the new Surrogate Court Rules, but these appear to be no nearer promulgation now than a year ago.

C. H. WIDDIFIELD.

Owen Sound, April, 1916.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Since the first edition of Executors' Accounts was published the new Rules regulating the practice and procedure in Surrogate Courts have come into force, and these rules and forms, in so far as they affect the practice on audits of executors' and administrators' accounts, will be found in the Appendix. Rule 38 requires that the accounts shall contain, *inter alia*, "An account shewing of what the original estate consisted." It will be noticed that neither the form of the Petition nor the form of the Affidavit verifying the accounts filed makes any reference to this account. In the form of Affidavit printed in the Appendix an additional paragraph has been inserted to remedy this, and a suggested form of this account has been provided for.

At the last session of the Legislature the Trustee Act was amended by substituting a new section for section 28. The amendment came too late for incorporation in the text, but appears in the Addenda.

To Chapter XI. has been added what is virtually a new chapter on claims by relatives for personal services to the deceased. Claims of this nature are being constantly presented for adjudication, and, as far as the writer is aware, this is the first attempt made in Ontario to collect the decisions on this somewhat troublesome subject.

The chapter on Advancements is wholly new, and the other chapters have all been revised and materially added to.

Owen Sound, May, 1919.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A. C.	Appeal Cases (1875-1890).
A. C. ()	Appeal Cases from 1891.
A. & E.	Adolphus & Ellis K. B. Reports (1834-41).
Ab. Eq. Ca.	Equity Cases Abridged.
Abb. N. Cas.	Abbot's N. Y. Sup. Ct.
Abbott	New York Reports.
Add. Ecc.	Addam's Ecclesiastical Reports.
Ala.	Alabama Reports.
Allen	Allen's Massachusetts Reports.
Allen, N. B.	Allen's New Brunswick Reports.
Am. St. Rep.	American State Reports.
Amb.	Ambler's Chancery Reports.
Anstr.	Anstruther's Exchequer Reports (1790-7).
A. R.	Ontario Appeal Reports (1877-1900).
App. Div.	Appellate Division.
Atk.	Atkyn's Chancery Reports.
Atl.	Atlantic Reporter.
B. & Ad.	Barnwell & Adolphus K. B. Reports (1831-4).
B. & B.	Ball & Beatty's Irish Ch. Reports.
B. C. R.	British Columbia Reports.
Barb.	Barber's Chancery Reports, New York.
Baxt.	Baxter's Reports, Tennessee.
Bay	Bay's South Car. Reports, Bay's Reports, Missouri.
Beav.	Beaven's Rolls Court Reports (1839-66).
Bro. C. C.	Brown's Chancery Cases.
Burr.	Burrows' K. B. Reports.
C. & J.	Crompton & Jervis' Exchequer Reports (1831-2).
C. & M.	Crompton & Meeson's Exchequer Reports (1833-5).
C. M. & R.	Crompton, Meeson & Roscoe's Exchequer Reports (1834-7).
C. P.	Upper Canada Common Pleas (1850-1880).
C. P. D.	Common Pleas Division Reports (1875-1880).
C. & P.	Carrington & Payne's Nisi Prius Reports (1823-41).
Cal.	California Reports.
Cas. t. Lee	Cases tempore Lee-Phillimore.
Ch. App. Cas.	Chancery Appeal Cases (1865-1870).
Ch. Cham.	Chancery Chamber Cases, Ontario.
Ch. Div.	Law Reports, Chancery Division (1875-1890).
Ch. Div ()	Chancery Division from 1890.
C. L. J.	Canada Law Journal.
C. L. T.	Canada Law Times.
Cl. & Fin.	Clark & Finnely's H. L. Cases (1831-45).
Coll.	Collyer's Chancery Cases (1844-6).
Colo. App.	Colorado Appeals.
Comber.	Comberback's King's Bench Reports.
Connoly	New York Surrogate Reports.
Cooper	Cooper's Chancery Reports (1846-8).
Cox	Cox's Chancery Reports (1874-90).
Cr & Ph.	Craig & Phillip's Chancery Reports (1846-8).
Cranch	Cranch's U. S. Supreme Court Reports.
Ct. Sess.	Court of Sessions, Scotland.

Cush.	Cushing's Massachusetts Reports.
Curt.	Curtis' U. S. Circuit Reports.
D. & S.	Drewry & Smale's Chy. Reports (1860-5).
Dr. & Sim.	
D. & War.	Drury & Warren's Irish Chy. Reports.
D. L. R.	Dominion Law Reporter.
Daly.	Daly's N. Y. Common Pleas Reports.
Dec.	Decisions.
D.F. & J.	DeGex, Fisher & Jones' Chy. Reports (1859-62).
D. & J.	DeGex & Jones' Reports (1857-60).
D. J. & S.	DeGex, Jones & Smith's Chy. Reports (1862-5).
Dow.	Dow's House of Lords Cases (1813-18).
Drew.	Drewry's Chancery Reports (1852-9).
E. & A.	Upper Canada Error & Appeal Reports (1844-66).
East.	East's King's Bench Reports (1810-12).
Edw. C.	Edward's Chy. Reports, N.Y.
Eq. Ca. Ab.	Equity Cases Abridged.
Exch. D.	Exchequer Division Reports (1875-80).
Exch. R.	Exchequer Reports, Canada.
F.	Federal Reporter.
Ga.	Georgia Reports.
G. Coop.	G. Cooper's Chancery Reports (1810-15).
Giff.	Gifford's Chancery Reports (1858-65).
Gill & J.	Gill & Johnson's Maryland Reports.
Gill.	Gill's Maryland Reports.
Gr.	Grant's Ontario Chancery Reports (1849-81).
Grav.	Gray's Massachusetts Reports.
H. L.	House of Lords.
H. & M.	Hemming & Miller's Chy. Reports (1862-5).
Hagg.	Haggard's Ecclesiastical Reports.
Hare.	Hare's Chancery Reports (1841-53).
Harp. Eq.	Harper's Equity Reports, S. Carolina.
Hardw.	Cases temp. Hardwick, by Lee.
Harr.	Harrington's Reports, Delaware.
Heisk.	Heiskell's Tennessee Reports.
Hill.	Hill's Reports, S. Carolina.
How.	Howard's U. S. Supreme Court Reports.
Hun.	Hun's N. Y. Supreme Court Reports.
Ill.	Illinois Reports.
Ill. App.	Illinois Appeal Reports.
Ind.	Indiana Reports.
Ir. L. R.	Irish Law Reports (1879-93).
Ir. R. Eq.	Irish Reports Equity (1866-78).
Ired. L.	Iredell's N. Carolina Law Reports.
J. & H.	Johnson & Hemming's Vice-Chancellors' Reports (1859-62).
J. & W.	Jacob & Walker's Chancery Reports.
Joh.	Johnson's Chancery Reports (1856-60).
Jones Eq.	Jones' N. Carolina Equity Reports.
K. B.	Law Reports K. B. Div. from 1901.
K & J.	Kay & Johnson's Vice-Chancellors' Reports.
Keen.	Keen's Rolls Court Reports (1836-9).
Ky.	Kentucky Law Reports.
Kulp.	Kulp's Legal Register (Penn.).
L. J. Ch.	Law Journal Reports, Chancery, from 1831.
L. R.	Law Reports (1866-75).
L. R. App.	Law Reports, Appeal Cases (1875-1790).
L. R.; C. P.	Law Reports, Common Pleas (1866-75).
L. R.; C. P. D.	Law Reports, Common Pleas Division.
L. R. Ch.	Law Reports, Chancery Appeal Cases (1866-75).
L. R. Ch. D.	Law Reports Chancery Division (1875-91).
L. R. Eq.	Law Reports, Equity (1866-75).
L. R. Exch.	Law Reports, Exchequer (1866-75).
La.	Louisiana Reports.

La. Ann.	Louisiana Annual Reports.
Lee.	Lee's Ecclesiastical Reports.
Leigh.	Leigh's Virginia Reports.
Lev.	Levitnz's King's Bench Reports.
L. T.	Law Times Reports.
L. T. N. S.	Law Times Reports, New Series, from 1860.
M. & G.	Manning & Granger's C. P. Reports.
Madd.	Maddock's Chancery Reports (1815-22).
Mac. & G.	Macnaghtan & Gordon's Chy. Reports.
Man. R.	Manitoba Reports.
Marsh.	Marshall's Kentucky Reports.
Mass.	Massachusetts Reports.
McCord Eq.	McCord's S. Carolina Equity Reports.
McClel.	McClelland's Exchequer Reports.
Md.	Maryland Reports.
Me.	Maine Reports.
Mer.	Merivale's Reports (1815-17).
Metc.	Metcalf's Kentucky Reports.
Mich.	Michigan Reports.
Misc.	New York Miscellaneous Reports.
Miss.	Mississippi Reports.
Mo.	Missouri Reports.
Mod.	Modern Reports.
Moll.	Molloy's Irish Chancery Reports.
Mon.	Monroe's Kentucky Reports.
Mosley.	Mosley's Chancery Reports.
Munf.	Munford's Chancery Reports.
My. & K.	Mylne & Keen's Chancery Reports.
My. & Cr.	Mylne & Craig's Chancery Reports (1835-41).
Myr. Prob.	Myrick's Probate Court Reports, California.
N. B. R.	New Brunswick Reports.
N. B. Eq. Ca.	New Brunswick, Equity Reports.
N. C.	North Carolina Reports.
N. H.	New Hampshire Reports.
N. J.	New Jersey Reports.
N. J. Eq.	New Jersey Equity Reports.
N. R. (or New)	New Reports (1862-5).
N. S. R.	Nova Scotia Reports.
N. W.	North Western Reporter.
N. Y.	New York Reports.
N. Y. S.	New York Supplement.
N. Y. Sup.	New York Supplement Report.
Northam.	Northampton Law Reporter (Penn.).
Ohio	Ohio State Reports.
Ohio Dec.	Ohio Decisions.
Ont R. (or O. R.)	Ontario Reports (1881-90).
O. L. R.	Ontario Law Reports (since 1890).
O. W. N.	Ontario Weekly Notes.
O. W. R.	Ontario Weekly Reporter (1902-15).
Or.	Oregon Reports.
P.	Probate, Pacific Reporter.
P. R.	Ontario Practice Reports (1850-1900).
P Wms.	Peere Williams Chancery Reports.
Pa. (Penn.)	Pennsylvania Reports.
Pa. Co. Ct.	Pennsylvania County Court Reports.
Pa. Dist.	Pennsylvania District Court Reports.
Pa. St.	Pennsylvania State Reports.
Pac.	Pacific Reporter.
Paige.	Paige's N. Y. Chancery Reports.
Pars. Eq. Ca.	Parsons' Equity Cases (Pa.).
Peake.	Peake's Nisi Prius Reports (1790-7).
Phill.	Phillimore's Ecclesiastical Reports.
Pick.	Pickering's Massachusetts Reports.
Prec. Chy.	Precedents in Chancery.
Pitts. L. J.	Pittsburgh Legal Journal.
Price.	Price's Notes of Practice, Exchequer Cases.

Que. P. R.	Quebec Practice Reports.
Q. B.	Queen's Bench Reports (1866-75).
Q. B. D.	Queen's Bench Division (1875-1900).
R. R.	Revised Reports.
R. I.	Rhode Island Reports.
Redf.	Redfield's N. Y. Surrogate Reports.
Rett.	Rettie's Crawford & Melville's Scottish Sess. Cases.
Rich. Eq.	Richardson's S. Car. Equity Reports.
Russ.	Russell's Chancery Reports (1823-9).
R. & My.	Russell & Mylne (1829-31).
S. C.	South Carolina Reports.
S. C. R.	Supreme Court of Canada Reports.
S. E.	South Eastern Reporter.
S. J.	Solicitor's Journal.
S. & R.	Sergeant & Rowle's Penn. Reports.
S. & S.	Simon & Stuart.
S. W.	South Western Reporter.
Sch. & Lef.	Schoales & Lefroy's Irish Chancery Reports.
Schouler	Schouler on Wills, 5th ed.
Sc. L. R.	Scottish Law Reporter.
Sim.	Simon's Reports (1826-50).
Stark. N. P.	Starkie's Nisi Prius Reports (1814-23).
Sm. L. C.	Smith's Leading Cases.
Sm. & G.	Smale & Giffard's Reports (1852-7).
So. Rep. (or So.) . . .	Southern Reporter.
Sw.	Swanston's Chancery Reports (1818-9).
Sumn.	Sumner's U. S. Circuit Court Reports.
T. R.	Term Reports, Dunford & East.
Tam.	Tamlyn's Rolls Court Reports (1829-30).
Tenn.	Tennessee Reports.
U. C. R.	Upper Canada Queen's Bench (1844-81).
U. S.	United States Reports.
Vern.	Vernon's Chancery Reports.
Va.	Virginia Reports.
Ves.	Vesey's Chancery Reports.
Ves. Jr.	Vesey Junior (1810-18).
Ves. & B.	Vessey & Beames' Chancery Reports (1812-14).
Vt.	Vermont Reports.
W. & S.	Watts & Sergeant's Penn. Reports.
W. L. R.	Western Law Reports.
W. N.	Weekly Notes, London.
W. R.	Weekly Reporter, London.
W. Va.	West Virginia Reports.
Walk.	Walker's Penn. Reports.
Wash.	Washington Reports.
Watts	Watts' Penn. Reports.
Whart.	Wharton's Penn. Reports.
Woodw.	Woodward's Reports, Penn.
Winch	Winch's Common Pleas Reports (English).
Y. & C.	Younge & Collyer's Exch. Reports (1836-42).
Younge	Younge's Exch. Reports (1830-32).
Y. & J.	Younge & Jervis' Exch. Reports (1826-31).

ADDENDA

P. 15—*Partner Not a Trustee*: But see *Gordon v. Holland*, 10 D. L. R. 735.

P. 78—*Claims Against the Estate*: A claim for money loaned and goods sold to the deceased based solely on the parol evidence of the claimant, and not corroborated by any entry or writing in any book or document, nor corroborated by any facts *aliunde* or by any testimony of other persons, cannot be allowed. *McKinnon v. Shanks* (1916), 28 D. L. R. 77. The judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal contains a critical review of the authorities on evidence in support of such claims.

P. 111—*Claims by Relatives*: The father of a woman voluntarily living away from her husband cannot recover from his son-in-law the monies he disbursed for the board and lodging, travels and medical attendance of his daughter, even though the husband knew thereof and had visited his wife at her father's residence. *Gladstone v. Slayton*, 3 D. L. R. 28; *Robin v. Robin*, 11 Rev. de Jur. 503.

P. 185—*Annuities*: Where a will declares that annuities thereby created shall be paid, some as a first charge, others as a second charge, etc., on the income of an estate, any abatement incident to a deficiency of income must be borne in the order of priority stated in the will and not *pro rata* as between the various annuitants.

The surplus income of an estate for one year, after the payment of all the annuities for that year chargeable thereon, is available for the payment of deficiencies in previous years. *Re Irwin* (1912), 3 O. W. N. 936; 4 D. L. R. 803.

P. 216—*Solicitor*: A majority of the executors or administrators are entitled to change the solicitor from time to time. *Re Solicitor*, 1 D. L. R. 899, 3 O. W. N. 647.

P. 256.—*Investments*: A testator directed his executors "to sell and convert all the real and personal estate, and the proceeds to invest in the Savings Bank Department of the Dominion Bank or in the Government Savings Bank." Macdonald, J. (B.C.), following *Re Burke* (1908), 2 Ch. 248, held that as negative words were not used the executor had power to invest the

trust funds in securities authorized by the statute. *Re McCormick* (1915), 25 D. L. R. 735.

P. 255—*Investments*: At the recent session of the Legislature (1919), the Trustee Act was amended, as follows:

1. This Act may be cited as *The Trustee Act, 1919*.

2. Subsection 1 of section 28 of *The Trustee Act* is repealed and the following substituted therefor:—

28.—(1) A Trustee having money in his hands which it is his duty, or which it is in his discretion to invest at interest, may invest the same in the debentures, bonds, stock or other securities of, or guaranteed by, the Government of the Dominion of Canada, or of or guaranteed by any Province of Canada, or of the Government of the United Kingdom, or of any municipal corporation in Canada, including debentures issued for public school purposes or guaranteed by any municipal corporation in Ontario, or secured by or payable out of rates or taxes levied under the law of any Province of Canada on property situated in such province and collectible by or through the municipality in which such property is situated, in the same manner and with the same rights of enforcing payment, as in the case of general municipal taxes in such municipality, or in securities which are a first charge on land held in fee simple in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta or British Columbia, provided such investments are in other respects reasonable and proper, or he may entrust the same to a trust company incorporated or licensed under the laws of Ontario to invest as his agent in any of the above mentioned securities in the manner contemplated by sub-section 2 of section 17 of *The Loan and Trust Corporations Act*, provided that in the case of a company licensed under the laws of Ontario it has been approved by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.

P. 264—*Liability of Trustees*: It is not open to a trustee, where there has been a breach of trust and a loss has followed, to tender evidence that if he had strictly followed the directions of the trust an equal or a greater loss might have taken place. *British-American Elevator Co. v. Bank B. N. A.*, 20 D. L. R. 944.

P. 285.—*Investments*: A testamentary direction to retain investments made by the testator does not amount to an implied

authority to make similar investments on behalf of the estate. *Re Fulford* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 375.

It is the duty of executors, when obliged to realize on shares, to exercise a sound discretion, and not to hastily and imprudently throw them upon the market. *Ib.*

P. 300.—*Costs*: When an executor is justified in bringing an action in the High Court, having regard to the information in his hands before action, he is entitled to have his costs out of the estate, as between solicitor and client, upon the High Court scale, although the amount recovered in the action is within the County Court jurisdiction. *Little v. Hyslop*, 4 O. W. N. 285, 7 D. L. R. 478.

P. 363.—*Income*: Accretions to shares of stock received by executors on the exercise of an option incident to such shares, are not to be treated as income, but as belonging to the capital. *Re Fulford* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 375.

P. 385.—*Compensation to Trustees*: *Re Church*, followed in *Re Wilson*, 4 O. W. N. 906, 9 D. L. R. 634.

P. 394.—*Compensation to Trustees*: Where the will limits the executors' investments, to be made from the proceeds of sales of lands to mortgages, on real estate, an allowance for procuring and passing the loans may be made to the executors in addition to the agent's commission, where the loan is brought in through an agent; and where the agent's commission was one per cent. on five-year loans, an additional one per cent. may properly be allowed the executors in addition to all proper disbursements for examining and passing the loans, excluding, however, mortgages taken back for balance of purchase money. *Re Paterson Estate* (Man.), 17 D. L. R. 46.

EXECUTORS' ACCOUNTS

CHAPTER I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.

The Surrogate Courts of the Province are invested with the authority and jurisdiction over executors and administrators, and the rendering by them of inventories and accounts, conferred in England on the Ordinary under 21 Henry VIII., ch. 5, except in so far as the same may have been revoked by subsequent legislation or rules. Rule 36 of the Surrogate Court Rules of 1916 and section 72 of the Surrogate Courts Act, R. S. O. 1914, ch. 62, seem to bring the practice back to the practice under the ancient statute of Henry VIII. According to the modern practice under this statute neither the executor or administrator, in general cases, exhibited any inventory unless he was cited for that purpose at the instance of a party interested: Williams on Executors, 9th ed., 841. In *Phillips v. Bignell* (1811), 1 Phill. 239, the practice is thus stated by Sir John Nichol: "The Statute (21 Hen. VIII. ch. 5, sec. 4), requires executors and administrators to exhibit inventories as part of their duty, without any proceedings to call upon them to do so. The modern practice, however, is certainly not to render an account unless it shall be called for; but the executor must remember that he has bound himself by his oath to render a just account when he is by law required."

It is not only the duty of the executor or administrator to file an inventory and render an account when duly called upon to do so, but it has always been his privilege to do so voluntarily in any case in which he

is liable to be called upon, and in order to exonerate himself from liability it is always a most prudent thing for him to do. See *Kenney v. Jackson* (1827), 1 Hagg. Ecc. 105.

Not only is the executor or administrator himself liable to be called upon, but so also is his personal representative, although not at the same time the representative of the first testator or intestate, upon a reasonable presumption being raised that any part of the effects of the first testator or intestate has travelled into his hands: *Ritchie v. Rees* (1822), 1 Add. at p. 153. And this is so even where there is a surviving executor of the original testator. *Gale v. Lutteral* (1824), 2 Add. 234. It follows that being liable to be called upon, he may voluntarily undertake to render the inventory and account. *Cunnington v. Cunnington* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 511.

But at this starting point of jurisdiction we are confronted with a conflict of authorities which remained unsettled up to the time when the jurisdiction of the Courts Christian in matters testamentary was transferred in 1857 to the Courts of Probate in England. And it is therefore no easy matter to define the jurisdiction of the Ordinary as exercised in and after the days of Henry VIII. in this particular.

The older cases in the common law courts hold that an inventory may be falsified at the instance of a legatee, but not on the application of a creditor. That is stated in *Hinton v. Parker* (1723), 8 Mod. 168, and the reasons for the distinction are given by Holt, C.J., in *Archbishop of Canterbury v. Willis* (1708), 1 Salk. 251, and more fully at page 315. The same distinction is marked in *Catchside v. Ovington* (1766), 3 Burr. 1922, and applied in a more modern case of *Henderson v. French* (1816), 5 M. & S. 406, but with the general intimation that the duties of the Ordinary in dealing with the inventory were merely ministerial. This case was followed in *Griffiths v. Anthony* (1835), 5 A. & E. 623, which extended apparently the same restriction to the case of a legatee. The case is

loosely reported, and the point of the decision may be that there was an excess of jurisdiction in the reception of *viva voce* evidence, as suggested by Williams in a note. But the whole situation was reviewed in a masterly judgment by a civilian of great ability and learning, Sir John Nichol, in a case subsequent to *Henderson v. French*, in 1824, which is, strangely, not at all referred to in *Griffiths v. Anthony*; Sir John Nichol maintaining that the duties of the Ordinary are not merely ministerial, but that objections to the inventory may be entertained, though adverse evidence ought not to be received so as to falsify the inventory, though it may be amended upon the confession or admission of the executor: *Telford v. Morrison* (1824), 2 Add. Ecc. 319. The reasons given for not proceeding upon adverse evidence are of somewhat technical character, and may not prevail against the rule of court upon the Surrogate Judges of Ontario in respect of assets at the time of the death come to the hands of the executor.

Thus the law stood on the broad question of jurisdiction down to 1904, when the question came before a Divisional Court in *Re Russell* (1904), 8 O. L. R. 481. Upon the passing of executors' accounts before the Surrogate Judge the residuary legatee objected that a certain sum of money, not included in the executors' inventory of assets of the estate, should have been included. The widow of the testator, who was one of the executors, claimed the same as a gift from the testator in his lifetime. The Court held that the Surrogate Judge had no jurisdiction to pass upon the question thus raised; that all he could do was to report that a claim was made that there was another asset, stating what it was, which he was unable to investigate, and could therefore only approve of the rest of the accounts submitted to him. Meredith, J., delivered a forcible dissenting judgment.

In consequence of the judgment in *Re Russell* the Surrogate Courts Act was amended by 5 Edw. VII., ch. 14, by adding the provisions now found in sub-

sections 3 and 4 of section 71. As the Act now stands the Surrogate Judge has "jurisdiction to enter upon and make full inquiry and accounting of and concerning the whole property which the deceased was possessed of or entitled to, and the administration and disbursement thereof in as full and ample a manner as may be done in the Master's Office, and for such purpose, may take evidence and decide all disputed matters arising in such accounting subject to an appeal under section 34." See *Oke v. Oke*, 8 O. W. N. 180, 182.

Although this language is very wide it was not intended that power should be given on an audit, or passing of accounts, to call in the creditors of the estate and adjudicate upon their claims, and, practically, administer the estate. As the Act now stands a Surrogate Judge has no jurisdiction to call upon a creditor of the estate to prove his claim and to adjudicate upon such claim, and allow it or bar it. *In re McIntyre* (1906), 11 O. L. R. 136.

There is no difference between a payment to another creditor and a retainer by an executor to pay his own claim; and the Surrogate Judge has power to investigate the claims of an executor, as between the executor and the estate, and to adjudicate upon them. *Shaw v. Tackaberry* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 490; *Union Trust Co. v. Bensley*, 12 O. W. R. 336, 1069.

Con. Rule (1913), 523 (formerly Con. Rule 642), does not apply to Surrogate Courts, but the Surrogate Judge, acting as the Surrogate Court, has inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order which he has been induced to make by the fraud of the party who has obtained it, and also to set aside or vary an order which he has made by mistake, though not, however, to correct errors which he has made in the judicial determination of any question upon which he has actually passed. The acts of the Surrogate Judge in passing the accounts are those of the Court, and not of the Judge as *persona designata*. *In re Wilson and Toronto General Trusts Corporation* (1907), 13 O. L. R. 82.

That the Surrogate Courts are not statutory courts having only those powers which are in terms conferred upon them by the Surrogate Courts Act, follows from the decision of the Court of Common Pleas in *Grant v. Great Western Ry. Co.* (1858), 7 C. P. 438, and that of the Court of Appeal in *Cunnington v. Cunningham*, 2 O. L. R. 511. See also *Gibson v. Gardner* (1906), 13 O. L. R. 521, and *Brick's Estate* (1862), 15 Abbott's Prac. 12.

Section 69 of the Surrogate Courts Act does not confer upon the Judge of the Surrogate Court power to adjudicate upon a claim to moneys of a deceased person upon an alleged *donatio mortis causa*. The "claim or demand" referred to in sub-section 1, when that sub-section is read in the light of sub-sections 4 and 5, is clearly a claim or demand against the estate by a creditor for payment of a money demand. The claim of a person seeking to establish a *donatio mortis causa*, where something has to be done by the executor or administrator to perfect the title, such as indorsing a cheque, or giving a receipt to a bank for moneys in a savings bank account, is not only to have it declared that the property upon the death of the donor ceased to be part of his estate and became the property of the donee, but that the executor or administrator is a trustee for the donee to make the gift effectual. *Re Graham* (1912), 25 O. L. R. 5.

By ch. 22, 8 Geo. V., The Surrogate Courts Act is amended by adding the following subsection to sec. 2: "Claim or demand" shall include not only claims or demands of creditors, but also claims or demands by or against other persons as to the ownership of personal property not exceeding in value \$800.

An executor's right to apply any part of the assets of the estate to the payment to himself of the indebtedness of the partnership firm, of which he and the deceased were members, may be determined on the audit of the executor's accounts. *In re Drummond's Estate* (1917), 165 N. Y. S. 78.

CHAPTER II.

THE POWERS OF A MASTER.

Although, as pointed out in *Re McIntyre, supra*, sub-sections 3 and 4 of section 71 of the Surrogate Courts Act were not intended to make an audit of trustees' accounts an administration of the estate, the powers of the Surrogate Judge have been considerably extended by these provisions. The powers of a Master on a reference, and the practice thereunder, are defined by the Consolidated Rules of 1913, and are as follows:

410. Under an order of reference, the Master shall have power:

- (a) To take the accounts with rests or otherwise;
- (b) To take account of money, rents and profits received or which, but for wilful neglect or default, might have been received;
- (c) To set occupation rent;
- (d) To take into account necessary repairs, and lasting improvements, and costs and other expenses properly incurred otherwise or claimed to be so;
- (e) To make all just allowances;
- (f) To report special circumstances;
- (g) And generally, in taking the accounts, to inquire, adjudge, and report as to all matters relating thereto, as fully as if the same had been specifically referred.

411. The Master may cause parties to be examined, and to produce books, papers and writings, as he thinks fit, and may determine what books, papers and writings are to be produced, and when and how long they are to be left in his office; or in case he does not deem it necessary that

such books and papers or writings should be left or deposited in his office, he may give directions for the inspection thereof by the parties requiring the same, at such time and in such manner as he deems expedient.

417. Where an account is to be taken, the accounting party, unless the Master otherwise directs, shall bring in the same in debit and credit form, verified by affidavit. The items on each side of the account shall be numbered consecutively, and the account shall be referred to by the affidavit as an exhibit, and shall not be annexed thereto.

418. The Master may direct that in taking accounts, the books of account, in which the accounts required to be taken have been kept, or any of them, be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the truth of the matters therein contained.

419. Before proceeding to the hearing and determining of the reference, the Master may appoint a day for the purpose of entering into the accounts and inquiries, and may direct the production and inspection of vouchers, and if deemed proper the cross-examination of the accounting party on his affidavit, with a view to ascertaining what is admitted and what is contested between the parties.

420. A party seeking to charge an accounting party beyond what he has in his account admitted to have received, shall give notice thereof to the accounting party, stating as far as he is able the amount sought to be charged and the particulars thereof in a short and succinct manner. The Master may direct any party who seeks to falsify an account to deliver particulars of the item objected to. The particulars shall refer to the item by number.

The last rule, providing for a surcharge and falsification of the accounts, is one not generally acted upon on an audit of accounts in the Surrogate Court, but it is often of great value in narrowing the issue

in case of disputed accounts. . A surcharge is shewing an omission for which there ought to be a credit; a falsification is shewing an item on the debit side of the account to be either wholly false or in some part erroneous.

In *Sculthorpe v. Burn* (1866), 12 Gr. 427, it was held that by the General Order of 1853 the Master had been given a greater discretion as to the conduct of references before him than that given to the Masters of the English Court of Chancery. And in *Carpenter v. Wood* (1863), 10 Gr. 354, it was held that the General Order applied to all cases where accounts were directed to be taken before the Master.

The settled practice appears now to be in England, as it has long been established here under the General Orders (now Con. Rules 409 and 411), that under a judgment or order to account the Master may inquire into, adjudge and report upon settled accounts—and this whether the judgment is by consent or otherwise, and whether the matter is referred to in the pleadings or not. That convenient practice is firmly grounded by the Court of Appeal in *Holgate v. Shutt* (1884), 27 Ch. D. 111, 28 Ch. Div. 111, and *Edinburgh Life Assurance Co. v. Allen* (1876), 23 Gr. 230, and has been recently approved of in *Gibson v. Gardner* (1907), 13 O. L. R. 521.

On a reference to a Master he always had power to go into the dealings between the executrix and her husband (the testator) before his death, and decide whether she was entitled to be paid for her services. *In re Bagwell, Anderson v. Henderson*, 17 P. R. 100.

In *Stewart v. Fletcher*, 18 Gr. 21, it was held that the Master, under the ordinary administration decree in respect of the testator's estate, had power to take an account of timber cut by the executrix on the land devised to minor children, contrary to the provisions of the will.

An executor sold real estate by auction for \$800. On passing the accounts the Probate Judge (New

Brunswick) found that the property was really sold to the executor, and that the value of the property was \$1,800. Held, that the Probate Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the sale, but it had power to charge the executor with the additional \$1,000. *Re Daly, Daly v. Brown*, 39 S. C. R. 123.

A subpoena may issue, as of course, to secure the attendance of a witness before the Master. *Hannum v. McRae*, 17 P. R. 567; 18 P. R. 185. A Master may make an order for the issue of a commission to take the evidence of witnesses out of the jurisdiction. *Horlock v. Eschweiler*, 11 O. L. R. 140; *Townsend v. Hunter*, 3 C. L. Times 310. But he cannot make such an order *ex parte*. *McLennan v. Helps*, 3 Chy. Ch. 193. He cannot order a witness or a party out of the jurisdiction, to come within the jurisdiction to be examined as a witness. *Connolly v. Connor*, 12 O. L. R. 304.

A party who is to be cross-examined on his affidavit is entitled to notice of the items on which he is to be cross-examined. *Re Lord*, L. R. 2 Eq. 605; *Re Curry*, 17 P. R. 379. It is not sufficient to inform him that all the items except one are objected to. *McArthur v. Dudgeon*, L. R. 15 Eq. 102.

Under Rule 417 the affidavit verifying the account and the production of the vouchers is *prima facie* evidence sufficient to warrant a Master in passing the accounts, and where voluminous accounts have been passed under this Rule, the pointing out of one or two items as objectionable was held insufficient to warrant the re-opening of the account. *In re Curry*, 17 P. R. 379; 25 A. R. 267.

CHAPTER III.

DUTY TO KEEP PROPER ACCOUNTS.

It is the bounden duty of an executor, or other trustee, to keep clear and distinct accounts of the property which he is bound to administer. If, therefore, he chooses to mix the accounts of the estate with his own accounts, he cannot thereby protect himself from accounting, and from producing the original books in which any part of the accounts may be inserted. It is a more difficult question, as between an executor bound to produce, and his partner in trade: but if the partners have permitted him to mix the accounts, it seems they cannot afterwards object to the production; clearly they cannot do so, in a case where the executor admits having lent to his firm part of the trust property, and that the firm has been dealing with it. *Freeman v. Fairlie*, 3 Mer. 43, 17 R. R. 7.

It is the first duty of an accounting party, whether an agent, an executor, an administrator or guardian (for in this respect they are all in the same situation) to be constantly ready with his accounts. *Pearse v. Green*, 1 J. & W. 133, 20 R. R. 258.

In *Killins v. Killins*, 29 Gr. 472, the administratrix was disallowed her costs up to the hearing where she had not kept proper books of account of matters pertaining to the estate, although no loss had resulted therefrom. Proudfoot, V.C., said: "I think that this negligence in not keeping accounts, and where the matters of the estate are left to rest to some extent in her memory, and on scattered memoranda, is sufficient to justify the institution of the suit, and therefore that the defendant (the administratrix) must pay the costs to the hearing." See also *Smith v. Roe*, 11 Gr. 311.

Executors must never forget that their accounts are subject to the closest and most rigid examination, and

that the only way to avoid suspicion of dishonesty is to be able to shew at any time each and every transaction accurately. *Re Stanton*, 41 Misc. (N.Y.) 278..

But where the accounts are in fact accurate, the form of them will not subject the trustee to liability for costs, unless the confusion has been designed, or has been such as to necessitate proceedings by action or otherwise. *McMillan v. McMillan*, 21 Gr. p. 379. And an executor who discharges his duty honestly, but owing to want of business training keeps his accounts loosely and inaccurately, will not be deprived of his costs. *Hoover v. Wilson*, 24 A. R. 424. In this case the Court points out that the executor was well known to the testator, whose agent he had been for seven years before the testator's death. It is doubtful if the judgment would have been as favourable to the trustee had he been an administrator, or other volunteer trustee. See also *Smith v. Cremer*, 24 W. R. 51.

On a reference to take an account of a trustee's dealings with an estate, the Master omitted to ascertain the amount of the trustee's charges, costs, etc., and reported that the trustee had failed to keep any regular set of books shewing a debtor and creditor account of his dealings with the estate, but not stating that for that reason he had been unable to ascertain the amount. Proudfoot, V.C., held this was not a sufficient reason for omitting to find the amount. *Life Assurance of Scotland v. Walker*, 24 Gr. 293.

It is the further duty of the trustee at all reasonable times, at the request of the *cestui que trust*, or other beneficiary, to give full and accurate information as to the amount and state of the trust property; and permit him, or his solicitor, to inspect the accounts and vouchers and other documents relating to the estate. *Sanford v. Porter*, 16 A. R. 565.

And such information must be given although the *cestui que trust* is only a reversionary legatee expect-

tant on the death of a tenant for life. *In re Dartnell* (1895), 1 Ch. 474.

Where executors refused to furnish the solicitor for a residuary legatee with an account, although they offered to permit the plaintiff herself or a professional accountant to inspect the accounts, the Court ordered them to pay the costs of an administration suit. *Kemp v. Burn*, 4 Giff. 348, 141 R. R. 224.

If a trustee omits that paramount duty of a trustee, which is to have his accounts ready and open for inspection at all times, and to give the fullest information to all who are interested in the trust, whenever they require it, that is conduct which the Court will not tolerate. If the trustee complies with his duties the Court will protect him, but if he fails in them the Court will make him pay the costs. *Talbot v. Marshfield*, L. R. 4 Eq. p. 673.

But a trustee is not bound to render accounts on demand—only to have them ready for inspection. *Smith v. Roe*, 11 Gr. at page 323. If the beneficiary requires a copy of the accounts or documents he must pay the necessary expense himself, for it is not fair that such costs should be saddled on the estate, and the trustee is not bound to incur the expense personally. *Ottley v. Gilby*, 8 Beav. 602, 68 R. R. 218. The rule is the same where one of the executors is a solicitor. *Re Bosworth*, *Martin v. Lambe*, 58 L. J. Ch. 432. In *Randall v. Burrows*, 11 Gr. 364, Mowat, V.C., held that it was the duty of a trustee to render his accounts within a reasonable time after demand.

Where a trustee is required to furnish accounts, he is entitled to have the costs of doing so paid or guaranteed before complying with the request. *Re Bosworth*, *supra*.

In *Taylor v. McGrath*, 10 O. R. 669, executors were allowed a sum paid to a professional accountant for making up an account delivered to the *cestui que trust* on his demand.

In re Tillott, Lee v Wilson (1892), 1 Ch. 86, Chitty, J., said: "A trustee is bound to give his *cestui que trust* proper information as to the investment of the trust estate, and where the trust estate is invested on mortgages, it is not sufficient for the trustee merely to say, 'I have invested the trust money on a mortgage,' but he must produce the mortgage deeds, so that the *cestui que trust* may thereby ascertain that the trustee's statement is correct, that the trust estate is so invested. The general rule, then, is what I have stated, that the trustee must give information to his *cestui que trust* as to the investment of the trust estate."

The neglect or refusal of a trustee to give proper information, or to keep proper accounts, may deprive him of his costs when the accounts are being passed, and in some cases may even subject him to the payment of costs. See under "Costs of the Audit."

An executor who refuses to give an account, or to pass his accounts when called upon to do so, may be removed from his trust. *Re Beaird*, 4 O. W. N. 720.

In a case where proceedings for administration were rendered necessary by the gross and indefensible neglect of trustees to deliver accounts, Farwell, J., ordered the defaulting trustees to pay all the costs, including the costs of taking and vouching the accounts. He also held that the rule laid down in *Hewett v. Foster*, 7 Beav. 348, 64 R. R. 98, that trustees are always allowed their costs, does not represent the modern practice. *In re Skinner* (1904), 1 Ch. 289.

A trustee who is illiterate and incapable of keeping an account should employ an agent for that purpose. *Wroe v. Seed*, 4 Giff. 425, 429.

CHAPTER IV.

WHO OBLIGED TO PASS ACCOUNTS.

Rule 36 of The Surrogate Court Rules, 1916, provides that "Executors, administrators, trustees under a will and guardians of infants may voluntarily pass their accounts, or they may be called upon to do so on the application of any person interested therein."

The provision for the passing of his accounts by a trustee, other than a trustee under a will, will be found in section 25 of The Surrogate Courts Act.

Section 72 of The Surrogate Courts Act is as follows:—

(1) Neither an executor nor an administrator shall be required by any Court to render an account of the property of the deceased, otherwise than by an inventory thereof, at the instance or on behalf of some person interested in such property or of a creditor of the deceased, nor shall such executor or administrator be otherwise compellable to account before any Judge.

(2) This section shall apply notwithstanding any provision to the contrary of any bond or security heretofore given by the executor or administrator.

In *Murdy v. Burr* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 310, it was held that the Judge of a Surrogate Court had no power to pass the accounts of the guardian of an infant appointed by such Court. Section 71 of the Surrogate Courts Act now provides for the audit of such accounts, and the decision is now of no effect.

It was formerly held that an executor who was also a trustee under the will, could not be required to pass his accounts in the Surrogate Court of his dealings as trustee as distinct from his dealings as executor. This is also now provided for in section 70 of the Act.

But "trustee" in this Act, and in section 67 of the Trustee Act, applies only to an express trustee. For instance, the position of a surviving partner imposes certain obligations and duties which are in their nature fiduciary; but it is not every one who is subjected to these obligations and restraints who can claim to be a trustee and entitled to the privileges of a trustee. *Livingstone v. Livingstone* (1912), 26 O. L. R. 246.

The representatives of a deceased administrator may be compelled to account at the instance of an administrator *de bonis non*. *McLennan v. Heward*, 9 Gr. 178. But an administrator *de bonis non* cannot compel the representatives or sureties of a predecessor, whose office terminated by death, to account with him. *Bliss v. Seaman*, 165 Ill. 422; *Douglass v. Day*, 28 Ohio St. 175. But see *Jones v. Wooten*, 49 S. E. 915.

The right to compel an account is not an absolute right, regardless of the circumstances, but is within the sound discretion of the Court. *Matter of Withers*, 23 N. Y. App. Div. 404. The Court has a discretion to grant or refuse an order, and, when executors are doing their best to realize the assets and are in no default, the application will be refused. *In re O'Connor*, 12 Man R. 325.

If an executor named in the will has taken possession of the estate and dealt with it as executor, he is entitled to have his accounts passed before being compelled to deliver up the estate, if probate of the will is afterwards refused to him. *Gilbert v. Bartlett*, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 555. So where the defendant was appointed executor under a will, which, after he had obtained probate and had collected debts, paid legacies, etc., was set aside for want of due execution. *Randall v. Delap*, 6 C. L. T. 144.

An administrator *pendente lite* may be required to pass his accounts on the termination of the litigation which was the occasion of his appointment. *Webb's Estate*, 20 N. W. C. (Pa.) 275.

In *Kenny v. Jackson*, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 105, an account was ordered at the instance of a residuary legatee who had given a release to the executor, the Court saying it could not try the validity of the release, though it might be tested in the temporal courts, and that the account might be the means of discovering an unfair settlement. The liability of an executor to account to a legatee is not discharged by the written receipt of a nominal sum in full of all demands. And although in *Kenny v. Jackson* the Ecclesiastical Court refused to try the validity of a release, leaving that to the temporal courts, in *Harris v. Ely*, 25 N. Y. 138, Denio, J., said: "I do not doubt that with us the Surrogate would have power to determine a defence of that character, which might be set up against the payment of a legacy, as the jurisdiction of that officer is different in some respects from that possessed by the Spiritual Courts in England." And see *Bard v. Wood*, 3 Met. (Mass.) 74.

An executor is not relieved from liability to account by the fact that he did not join in making any inventory of the estate, and that no part thereof has come into his hands, and that he has taken no part in its management. *Re Campbell's Estate*, 21 Misc. 133; 47 N. Y. Supp. 29.

Nor can the obligation to account be evaded by the fact that the personal representative has paid out all the moneys of the estate come into his hands. *Lockard's Estate*, 10 Pa. Dist. 192. Nor by his contention that there is no balance in his hands and that the estate is really indebted to him. *Re Bagwell*, 17 P. R. 100.

Where an illegitimate child dies intestate without a widow or issue or next of kin, the Crown takes the estate beneficially and is accountable to no one. *Dyke v. Walford*, 5 Moo. P. C. 434; 70 R. R. 75. But where the Crown takes administration in the absence of the next of kin, it takes only as trustee and must account

to those beneficially entitled. *Kane v. Maule*, 23 L. J. Ch. 638.

In *Ritchie v. Rees* (1822), 1 Add. Ecc. 158, it was held that the representatives of a deceased administrator with the will annexed, although not at the same time those of the first testator, were liable to be called upon for an account, upon a reasonable presumption being raised that any part of the effects of the first testator had reached their hands. And this without administration *de bonis non* being granted.

So the executors of a deceased executor are compellable to pass the accounts of the estate of the original testator. *Gale v. Lutterell* (1924), 2 Add. Ecc. 234.

An attorney who takes administration in the name of another may be called upon to pass his accounts at the instance of the latter. *Bailey v. Bristowe*, 2 Robert, 145. So an administrator *durante minoritate*, although his administration has expired. *Taylor v. Newton*, 1 Lee, 15.

A cessate or secondary administrator may call upon the original administrator to pass the accounts. *Botherton v. Hellier*, 2 Lee, 131.

One of two executors may be called upon to pass his accounts at the instance of a co-executor who is also a residuary legatee. *Paul v. Nettleford*, 2 Add. Ecc. 237. There seems to be no reason why one of two or more executors might not submit his own dealings with the estate for approval, independently of the other or others. Per MacLennan, J.A., in *Cunnington v. Cunningham* (1901), 2 O. L. R. p. 516. But separate accountings by different executors should not be encouraged. *In re Smith's Estate*, 81 N. Y. S. 1035.

An executor who is a minor cannot be compelled to account. The interference of an infant named as an executor is spoken of in some cases as a wrong; but the weight of authority is against his being liable to account. In *Whitmore v. Weld*, 1 Vern. 326, a testator

appointed an infant son to be executor upon coming of age. - The Lord Keeper said that he could not, until he became of age, commit a devastavit.

In *Hindmarsh v Southgate*, 5 Russ. 324, letters of administration were granted to the widow, irregularly, she being under age. The letters were recalled, and after she became of age were again granted to her regularly. In directing an account the Court distinguished between what came to her hands before, and what after she became of age. These cases were followed in *Nash v. McKay*, 15 Gr. 247, and it was held that the executor having been a minor his estate was not liable to account for the estate come to his hands. The same rule applies to an infant executor *de son tort*. *Young v. Purvis*, 11 Ont. R. 597.

The fact that the executrix is entitled to the whole estate for her life does not excuse her from failure to ascertain the amount of the estate by an accounting that will fix the charges against her and the allowances to her, and settle between all parties in interest just what corpus the life-tenant is to be responsible for. *Maxwell v. McCreery*, 57 N. J. Eq. 287.

A testator appointed his widow executrix and gave her all his personal property and a sum absolutely, with the right to sell real estate and use whatever she might need, and gave the residue after her death to A. and B. The widow filed no account of her administration, and it was held that her personal representative could be cited to account by A. and B. *Manville's Estate*, 8 Kulp, 407.

In Kansas it was held that the Probate Court has power to compel an executor who has resigned, been removed, or whose letters have been revoked, to pass his accounts. *Hudson v. Barratt*, 61 P. 737. So an administrator whose appointment has been revoked because of the discovery of a will may be required to account. *Jenkins v. Jenkins*, 76 Law T. Rep. 164.

Sureties on the bond of an administrator cannot compel an accounting by their principal. *Dunnell v.*

Providence, 9 R. I. 189; *McIlroy v. Hatheway*, 44 Mich. 399.

An executor *de son tort* may be compelled to account. *Damouth v. Klock*, 29 Mich. 289; *Pace v. Pace*, 73 N. C. 119; so an executor or administrator who resigns or has been removed from office. *Dunford v. Weaver*, 84 N. Y. 445.

Where an executor or administrator dies without having passed his accounts, it is for his own representatives, and not for the administrator *de bonis non*, to settle the accounts of the deceased representative. *Nowell v. Nowell*, 2 Me. 75; *In re Clark*, 119 N. Y. 427.

Although an executor may be entirely relieved from his obligation to account by the terms of the will (*Maurer v. Bowman*, 169 Ill. 586), he is not so relieved merely because the will gives him absolute discretion as to the management of the estate (*Harrison's Estate*, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 388), or allows him a specific time in which to settle the same. *Young's Estate*, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 513.

By The Charities Accounting Act, 1915, ch. 23, 5 Geo. V., where under the terms of a will or any instrument in writing any property, or any right or interest therein or the proceeds thereof, are given to or vested in any person as executor or trustee for any religious, educational, charitable or public purpose, he is required to give notice thereof to the Attorney-General and to the Official Guardian, and to the persons, if any, designated in the will or instrument as the beneficiary under the bequest or gift, or as the person to receive the same from the executor or trustee.

The Act applies to wills executed before the passing of the Act as well as to wills subsequently executed. The notice above referred to, in the case of a gift by will, is to be given within one month after the death of the testator, and shall state the nature of the property coming into the possession or under the control of the executor and shall be accompanied by an attested copy of the will.

Whenever required to do so by the Attorney-General or the Official Guardian the executor shall submit the accounts of his dealings with the property coming to his hand to be passed and examined and audited by the Judge of the Surrogate Court of the county or district in which he resides or in which probate was granted. If the executor refuses or neglects to comply with the provisions of the Act, or misapplies or misappropriates any such property, or fails to apply it in the manner directed by the will, the Attorney-General or the Official Guardian may apply to a Judge in Chambers for an order against the executor as set out in section 6 of the Act.

Section 7 authorizes the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to make rules respecting practice and procedure upon passing the accounts of an executor under the Act, and the tariff of fees to be applicable thereto. Except as otherwise provided by the Rules the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court, and of the Surrogate Courts, shall respectively apply to proceedings under the Act. (a)

It will be noticed that the Act applies where any property or any right or interest therein, or the proceeds thereof, are given to or for any (1) religious purpose, (2) educational purpose, (3) charitable purpose, or (4) public purpose.

In *Ottawa Y. M. C. A. v. City of Ottawa* (1910), 20 O. L. R. 567, the meaning of the word "purposes" was discussed. By the plaintiff's incorporating Act their buildings were exempt from taxation "so long as the same are occupied by and used for the purposes of the association." It was urged that "purposes" was synonymous with the word "object" used in the preamble of the Act. Riddell, J., said: "The words 'object' and 'purpose' are not etymologically or

(a) Up to the present time no rules have been made by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council pursuant to this section, and the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court and Surrogate Courts will apply in proceedings under this Act.

otherwise synonymous, and they are not terms of art. I see no reason for holding that the phrase 'for the purposes' means the same as 'in furtherance of the object' or 'for the work.' There is no case that I can find which restricts the meaning of 'purposes;' while such cases as *Inverarity v. County Council of Forfarshire* (1904), 41 Sc. L. R. 434, affirmed in Dom. Proc. (1906), A. C. 354, shew how far the meaning of the word may extend. *In re Sutton* (1901), 2 Ch. 640, may also be looked at. In the ordinary acceptation of the words, anything done for or by a corporation in the interest of the corporation is done for the purposes of the corporation; and I do not think that the meaning here is any more restricted."

RELIGIOUS PURPOSES.

A building for the sessions of a Sunday-school and religious lectures is for "religious purposes" although occasionally used for fairs and other benevolent purposes. *Craig v. First Presb. Church*, 88 Pa. St. 48.

Within an exemption law a young men's Christian association was held not to be a religious corporation. *Matter of Fay*, 37 Misc. (N.Y.) 532.

When religious books or reading are spoken of, those which tend to promote the religion taught by the Christian dispensation must be considered as referred to, unless the meaning is so limited by associated words or circumstances as to shew the writer had reference to some other mode of worship. *Simpson v. Welcome*, 72 Me. 500, 39 Am. Rep. 349.

An examination of the English law will be found to establish that Christianity in general, and not simply the tenets of particular sects, is a part of the Common Law of England. *Pringle v. Napanee*, 43 U. C. R. 285.

In *Reg. v. Dickout*, 24 O. R. 250, the Court held that the Church of Latter Day Saints is a "religious denomination within the meaning of sec. 2 (a) of the Marriage Act. "The statute does not say 'Christian' but 'religious.' If it said 'Christian' it would exclude

Jews. The fundamental law of the Province makes no distinction between church or denominations."

A bequest of a sum of money to be paid to N. W. for the use of a named church, the sum to be expended by him in the best manner calculated to advance the principles of the church, was held to be a good charitable bequest for the advancement of religion. *Re Johnson* (1903), 5 O. L. R. 459.

A statute exempting buildings erected and used for religious purposes from taxation, does not exempt a parsonage, *Church of Redeemer v. Axtell*, 41 N. J. Law, 117.

See the recent case of *Re Orr* (1917), 40 O. L. R. 567, where a will provided for a number of charitable and religious gifts and the law is fully discussed.

EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES.

A statute exempted property used or appropriated for educational purposes. It was held that a farm upon which was a school, the scholars in addition to attending school being required to work on the farm, and the products of the farm being applied to the maintenance of the school, was exempt. The Court said: "The purpose of the plaintiffs' incorporation was the education of boys. Education is a broad and comprehensive term. It has been defined as the process of developing and training the powers and capabilities of human beings. To *educate*, according to one of Webster's definitions, is to prepare and fit for any calling or business, or for activity and usefulness in life. Education may be particularly directed to either the mental, moral or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it relates to them all." *Mt. Hermon Boys' School v. Gill*, 145 Mass. 146.

It is doubtful if "educational" is here used in the broad meaning of this definition. "If that were the meaning I think the exemption would be carried to almost any conceivable institution which taught any-

thing conducing to education; and it is very difficult to imagine, if such a definition were adopted, what institution would be excluded. Nearly all lawful institutions teach something or other which may be advantageous to education. An institution for teaching people to make shoes, for instance, would be within the exception, because it is possible that the making of shoes extremely well would in a remote way aid the purpose of some portion of education." *Per Lord Coleridge, C.J. In re Civil Engineers, post.*

A testatrix gave to her executors the income of certain property to provide an annual treat or field-day for the school children of T. or as many of the children as the same would provide for. Eve, J., said that the gift could be supported as a good charitable gift as tending to the advancement of education. The annual treat or field day, besides allowing the children an opportunity of seeing objects of nature about which they had been taught in school, would, through the desire of the children to participate in the lists of selected participants, prove an incentive from an educational point of view by encouraging regularity in work and habits of promoting industry. *In re Mellorody* (1917), W. N. 354; (1918) 1 Ch. 228.

A private boarding school for girls, kept and maintained by the defendant, who employed divers teachers, and had an average attendance of 85 scholars, was held to be an "educational institution" within the meaning of an exemption statute. *Dame Mary Wylie v. Montreal*, 12 S. C. R. 384. And see *Re City of Ottawa and Grey Nuns* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 568.

The English Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885, imposes a duty upon property, subject to an exemption in favour of property which, or the income or profits whereof, shall be legally appropriated and applied "for the promotion of education, literature, science or the fine arts." The property of the Society of Writers to the Signet in Scotland was proposed to be assessed, and it was objected to on the ground that

the Society was for the purpose of education. It was held that the property did not come within the exemption. "The maintenance of a body of professional men with recognized privileges . . . and the object which the Society has in view is not education, literature or science, but that he shall become a member of the Society in order to practice his profession as a writer to the Signet." *Society of Writers to the Signet v. Commissioners Inland Revenue*, 14 Rett. (Sc.) 34.

This was followed in *In re Civil Engineers*, 19 Q. B. D. 610, 20 Q. B. D. 621, where it was held that the property of the Institution of Civil Engineers was not entitled to the benefit of the exemption, because it was property appropriated and applied not for the purpose of general education, but for the promotion of a particular branch of knowledge in order to enable the members of the institution to practice with more success the profession of a civil engineer.

In any satisfactory system of education it is necessary to provide for both the mental and bodily occupation of the students, and a gift to the governing body of a school for organized games as a part of the daily routine of the scholars is a good charitable bequest for educational purposes. *In re Mariette*, 1915, 2 Ch. 284.

"I think that the three conditions stated by counsel for the heir in the *O'Hanlon case*, at p. 257 (*O'Hanlon v. Logue* (1906), 1 I. R. 247), still apply to a charitable use in this province: (1) it must be for the public or some section of the public; (2) it must be one as to which the Court can decide on legal evidence that it will confer the benefit on the public which the donor believed it would confer; and (3) it must be enforceable by the Court." *Per Hodgins, J.A.*, in *Re Zeagman* (1916), 37 O. L. R. 536.

A Women's Welcome Hostel, an institution for the purpose of assisting immigrant girls, was held a charitable institution. *Re Fitzgibbon*, 11 O. W. N. 71.

CHARITABLE PURPOSES.

In its present usage the term charitable purposes is so broad as to include almost everything which tends to promote the physical or moral welfare of men, provided only the distribution of benefits is to be free and not a source of profit. In respect of gifts and devises, charitable uses and purposes may include not only the relief of the poor by alms-giving and the relief of the indigent sick and of homeless persons by means of hospitals and asylums, but also religious instruction and the support of churches, the dissemination of knowledge by means of schools and colleges, libraries, scientific academies and museums, the special care of children and of prisoners and released convicts, the benefit of handicraftsmen, the erection of public buildings, and reclamation of criminals in penitentiaries and reformatories. Hence the word "charitable" in this connection is not to be understood as strictly equivalent to "eleemosynary," but as the synonym of "benevolent" or "philanthropic." *Beckworth v. Parish*, 69 Ga. 569; *Price v. Maxwell*, 28 Pa. 23.

In *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 9 Ves. 399, 7 R. R. 232, Sir William Grant, M.R., said: "Do purposes of liberality and benevolence mean the same as objects of charity? That word in its widest sense denotes all the good affections men ought to bear towards each other; in its most restricted and common sense, relief of the poor. In neither of these senses is it employed in this Court. Here its signification is derived chiefly from the Statute of Elizabeth, 43 Eliz. ch. 4. Those purposes are considered charitable, which that statute enumerates, or which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment; and to some such purpose every bequest to charity generally shall be applied. But it is clear liberality and benevolence can find numberless objects, not included in that statute in the largest construction of it."

The Statute of Elizabeth enumerates the following kinds of charity: The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people, maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities; repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways; education and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock, or maintenance of houses of correction; marriages of poor maids; supportation and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; and aid or ease of any poor inhabitants, concerning payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes.

The word "charity," as found in our decisions and statutes, is not to be taken in its widest sense denoting all the good affections which men ought to bear to each other, nor in its restricted and usual sense signifying relief to the poor, but is to be taken in its legal signification as derived chiefly from the Statute 43 Eliz. c. 4. Those purposes are deemed charitable which are enumerated in that Act, or which by analogy are deemed within its spirit and intendment. *Maine Baptist Church v. Portland*, 65 Me. 92. In accordance with a well established series of authorities, beginning at least as early as *James v. Allen* (1817), 3 Mer. 17, a gift for benevolent purposes is bad, because such purposes go beyond the legal definition of charities—a word which, in the construction of wills, has always possessed a limited and technical meaning. It is far too late to question the soundness of these authorities at the present day. It may well be that in the minds of people unversed in the subtlety of legal phrases "benevolent" and "charitable," are equivalent terms. But in the Courts the meaning of "charitable" has been influenced by the preamble to the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4, and charitable purposes have been deemed those the statute enumerates, or which by analogy are deemed within its spirit and intendment. *Attorney-General for New Zealand v. Brown*, 1917, A. C. 393.

The use of the words "aged," "impotent" or "poor," is not necessary to a good charitable gift: *Att.-Gen. v. Comber*, 2 S. & S. 93; and a gift to persons "not under fifty years of age" was held to be a good charitable gift within the meaning of the statute. *Re Wall*, 42 Ch. D. 510.

"Fifteens," or fifteenths, was a tribute or imposition of money anciently laid generally upon cities, boroughs, etc., throughout the whole realm; it amounted to a fifteenth of that which each city or town was valued at, or of every man's personal estate.

A collection of English cases shewing what are, and what are not, charitable gifts, will be found in Williams and Jarman.

A devise of real estate to a bishop for the use of his diocese is not a devise to a charitable use, because it may be applied to objects that are not charitable. *Re McCauley*, 28 O. R. 610. Nor is a direction to executors to dispose of an estate as the ministers of a certain church may see fit. *Vancott v. Reid*, 3 U. C. R. 244. See also *Re Kinney* (1903), 6 O. L. R. 459.

But gifts for religious purposes are within the term "charitable use" in the Mortmain Act. *Re Barrett* (1905), 10 O. L. R. 337.

A devise of land to the trustees of a school section, on which a teacher's residence might be erected, or that might be rented for the benefit of the school funds, is for charitable purposes. *Sills v. Warner*, 27 O. R. 266. So a bequest to be expended in luxuries for the members of a county House of Refuge: *In re Brown*, 32 O. R. 323; and a bequest of money to a municipality for the benefit of poor boys and girls between 6 and 11 years of age. *Re Battershall*, 10 O. W. R. 933.

A bequest of money to promote temperance legislation, being for a lawful public and general purpose and not contrary to morality, is a good charitable legacy. *Farewell v. Farewell*, 22 O. R. 573. And a gift to promote and protect citizens of African descent

in the enjoyment of their civil rights is a gift for charitable purposes. *Lewis v. Doerle*, 28 O. R. 412; 25 A. R. 206.

The plaintiffs were incorporated for the purposes of promoting the permanent preservation "for the benefit of the nation" of lands and buildings of beauty or historic interest, and for the preservation of the natural aspect of such lands, etc. Held, that these purposes were charitable purposes. *In re Verrall* (1916), 1 Ch. 100.

A gift for the maintenance of a temporary house of residence for ladies of limited means is a good charitable trust. *In re Gardom* (1914) 1 Ch. 662. The fact that the parties to be benefited by residence in such a home are not wholly destitute makes no difference. *Trustees of Mary Clark Home v. Anderson* (1904), 2 K. B. 655.

A charity in the legal sense is not confined to mere alms-giving or the relief of poverty and distress, but has a wider signification which includes the improvement and promotion of mankind. A gift to a Young Men's Christian Association was held to be a gift for charitable purposes: *Little v. Newburyport*, 210 Mass. 414.

A masonic lodge is not a charitable institution. *City of Bangor v. Rising*, 73 Me. 428; but see *Morrow v. Smith*, 45 Iowa, 514.

The following have been held to be charitable purposes: A public hospital. *Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Assn.*, 85 Ohio St. 90; *Noble v. Hahnemann*, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 663. A home for aged women, requiring a fee for admittance, but not managed for profit: *Carter v. Whitcomb*, 74 N. H. 482.

An orphan's home "for the friendless poor of all denominations:" *Kemmerer v. Kemmerer*, 84 N. E. 256. A gift for the purpose of erecting a drinking fountain for horses: *In re Graves Estate*, 242 Ill. 23.

A trust to establish for the benefit of the public an art gallery for the advancement of education in art: *Mason v. Bloomington*, 237 Ill., 442.

Executors were "to retain \$500 to be deposited in a chartered bank or invested in sound securities, the yearly interest devoted to the case of my grave." It was held this did not create a charitable trust. *Re Jones* (1917), 13 O. W. N. 405. Legislative sanction is, however, given to this particular form of perpetual trust by The Cemetery Act, R. S. O. 1914, c, 261, s. 14.

PUBLIC PURPOSES.

"Public" and "general" are sometimes used as synonymous. Public is applied strictly to that which concerns all the citizens and every member of the State, while general includes a lesser, though still a larger portion of the community: 1 Greenl. Ev. 128. In the law of taxation, eminent domain, etc., this is a term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage, the government is to provide, from those which, by the like usage, are left to private interest, inclination, or liberality. *People v. Salem*, 20 Mich. 485.

The word "public," as used in this connection, refers to the purposes and intent of the trust as being for the benefit of the public in general, or of some object so general and indefinite in its character as to be deemed of common benefit, and not to the method of its execution.

It may be laid down as a universal rule that the law recognizes no purpose as charity unless it is of a public character; that is to say, a purpose must, in order to be charitable, be directed to the benefit of the community or a section of the community. The distinction between a public purpose and one which is not public, is often fine. If the intention of the donor is merely to benefit specific individuals, the gift is not charitable, even though the motive of the gift may be to relieve their poverty or accomplish some other

purpose in reference to these particular individuals which would be charitable if not so confined; on the other hand, if the donor's object is to accomplish the abstract purpose of relieving poverty, advancing education or religion, or other purpose, charitable within the meaning of the Statute of Elizabeth, without reference to any particular individuals and without giving any particular individuals the right to claim the funds, the gift is charitable. Tudor on Charities and Mortmain, 4th ed. 37.

Paving, lighting, widening and improving streets in a town are public purposes. *Atty.-Genl. v. Eastlake*, 11 Hare 205; 90 R. R. 648. To build barracks would be a public purpose, but not charitable. *Per Jessel, arg. Dolan v. McDermot*, 3 L. R. Ch. 676.

A charter of a water company was granted in consideration of water to be supplied by the company for *public purposes*. It was held that water supplied for the Mayor's office, city hall, etc., was not water supplied for public purposes. The Court held that by the term *public purposes*, as thus used, was meant for the universal public and not for only a portion of it. *Commercial Bank v. New Orleans*, 17 La. Ann. 190.

In *Frankfort v. Com.* (Ky. 1904), 82 S. W. Rep. 1008, it was held that the term "for public purposes" meant the same as "for governmental purposes."

By a special Act the defendant company was bound to supply water for domestic purposes at a minimum rate, which should not include a supply of water for baths, wash-houses or *public purposes*. Held, that the supply of water to the guardians of a workhouse was not a supply for "public purposes." *Liskeard Union v. Liskeard Waterworks Co.*, 7 Q. B. D. 505.

A hospital carried on by two medical practitioners, and used chiefly by patients paying fees, though to some extent by indigent persons, and in receipt of a

government grant, was held to be a public hospital. *Struthers v. Sudbury*, 30 O. R. 116; 27 A. R. 217.

The maintenance of the poor is a public purpose. *R. v. Wallingford Union*, 10 A. & E. 259.

The following are further instances of "public purposes":

An Act giving a gratuity of \$125 to each veteran of the civil war, not as a bounty or payment, but as a testimonial for meritorious services. *In re Opinion of Justices*, 211 Mass. 608.

The issuance of county bonds to aid in the establishment of a training school for teachers. *Cox v. Commissioners*, 146 N. Car. 584.

A tax levied to raise a fund to provide industrial insurance and benefits to injured employees in extra hazardous occupations of coal mining. *Cunningham v. Northwestern*, 44 Mont. 180.

CHAPTER V.

WHO ENTITLED TO AN ACCOUNT.

By section 72 of the Surrogate Courts Act neither an administrator nor an executor shall be required by any court to render an account of the property of the deceased, otherwise than by an inventory thereof, unless at the instance or on behalf of some person interested in such property or of a creditor of the deceased. And see Rule 36, S. C. Rules, 1916.

The right to compel an account is not an absolute right regardless of the circumstances, but is within the sound discretion of the Court. *Re Withers*, 23 N. Y. App. Div. 204. And in *Re O'Connor*, 12 Man. 325, the order was refused where it was shewn the executors were doing their best to realize the assets and were in no default. Where the funds of the estate were involved in pending litigation the executor was relieved from a present accounting. *Smyth's Estate*, 11 Pa. Dist. 441; *Kelly's Estate*, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 175.

The personal representative of a residuary legatee has sufficient interest within this section to demand an account. *Winchlow v. Smith*, 1 Lee, 417.

So the next of kin as being entitled in distribution. *Bouverie v. Maxwell*, 1 P. & D. 272.

The appearance of an interest is sufficient: *Phillips v. Bignell*, 1 Phill. 241; *Gale v. Luttrell*, 2 Add. Ecc. 236; or a probable or contingent interest: *Salter v. Sladen*, Perrog. M. T. 1792; *Myddleton v. Rushout*, 1 Phill. 244; *Reeves v. Freeling*, 2 Phill. 57; *Burgess v. Marriott*, 3 Curt. 424. But in *Keene's Appeal*, 60 Pa. St. 504, it was held that a bare possibility under a will, depending on the death of the first taker without issue, is not a sufficient interest.

A creditor who swears to certain sums due from the deceased to him is entitled to an account, although

his debt is contested. *Smith v. Price*, 1 Lee, 569; *Hackman v. Black*, 2 Lee, 251.

So it has been held that a creditor of a legatee or heir, who has attached his interest, may by virtue of such attachment, cite the executor or administrator to an account: *Raeder's Estate*, 10 Pa. Dist. 282; but a judgment creditor of a legatee who has not attached his interest cannot demand an accounting. *Greener's Estate*, 2 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 292.

An assignee in bankruptcy was held entitled to an account notwithstanding that the Statute of Limitations was set up as a defence. *Phillipson v. Harvey*, 2 Lee, 344. So where the alleged debt is founded on a bond the validity of which is disputed. *Gale v. Luttrell*, 2 Add. Ecc. 234.

A stockholder in a corporation has no standing to apply for an accounting because the deceased was indebted to the corporation, even though the corporation has refused to demand an audit. *Re Huntingdon*, 39 Misc. 477.

The Probate Act of Nova Scotia provides that "on the petition of any creditor or other person interested in any estate," an application may be made to settle the estate. Held, that B., who had been removed from the office of administrator, and who had certain claims against the estate for moneys expended, personal services, etc., was a "creditor" or "person interested" within the statute and entitled to have the accounts taken. *Re McRae*, 28 N. S. R. 20.

But a creditor of the executor for services rendered him *qua* executor, is not entitled to compel an account where the debt is denied, until the liability is settled by a judgment. *Ashoff's Estate*, 14 Pa. Dist. 333.

Where the applicant is not a creditor the judge may examine into the question whether he is interested in the estate. *Re St. John*, 104 N. Y. App. Div. 460.

In New York it was held that an undertaker who holds a claim for funeral expenses cannot maintain a petition for a compulsory accounting by an executor or administrator, since he is not a person interested in the estate, and is not a creditor of the estate. His claim is primarily against the executor or administrator or the person to whom he gave credit. *Re Shultz's Estate*, 57 N. Y. Supp. 952; 26 Misc. 688. And in Nova Scotia the ruling is the same. *Re Cunningham*, 31 N. S. R. 264.

Where the executor or administrator admits sufficient assets to pay all the creditors' claims, or the specific legacies, and interest thereon and the costs of the action to recover the same, the Court may, in its discretion, refuse an order to bring in the accounts. *Fleet v. Holmes*, 2 Lee, 101.

And in *Boon's case*, Sir T. Raym. 470, where a legacy was to be paid in three payments, and the executor having made two payments and tendered the third, was cited by the legatee to bring in an inventory, it was held there was no need of an inventory at his instance.

In *Re Merritt's Estate*, 35 App. Div. 337, 54 N. Y. Supp. 955, it was held that the Surrogate properly denied a petition for an order requiring an executor to account where an appeal was pending from a judgment recovered by the petitioner against the executor, and he had no other interest in the estate.

In *Root's Estate*, 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 223, it was held that an accounting will not be granted against executors after the estate has been distributed under a family settlement by which all parties released the executors, at the instance of an execution creditor of one of the devisees.

The representatives of a person who has made a valid assignment of his interest in the estate of the deceased, is not a "person interested" therein, and the application to compel an accounting was denied. *In re Trainor's Estate* (1918), 171 N. Y. S. 955.

On the death of an executor and the appointment of an administrator *de bonis non*, such administrator is the proper person to compel an account from the representatives of the deceased executor. *Jones v. Wooten*, 49 S. E. 915. But a surviving executor may compel the executors of a deceased co-trustee to account. *Re Kreisher*, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 313.

An order to compel an audit was refused on an application at the instance of an attaching creditor of a legatee whose legacy was contingent on his attaining thirty years of age, and then to be paid if, in the judgment and discretion of the executors, he "shall have acquired such habits of industry and business qualifications as will render it prudent to trust" him with it. *In re Locher's Estate* (Pa.), 18 Lanc. Law Rev. 6.

A legatee in remainder may require an executor to pass his accounts. *In re Albertson's Estate*, 1 W. N. C. 188.

One named in a will as a *cestui que trust* in a clause which is void under the statute against perpetuities, is not an "interested person" entitled to compel an account. *Re Wood*, 15 N. Y. St. 722.

But a remainderman whose rights in the estate are vested is so interested therein as to be entitled to apply to compel an executor to account, even though the owner of the life estate be living and be entitled to make a similar application. *Re Hunt*, 8 N. Y. App. Div. 159; *Campbell v. Purdy*, 5 Redf. Sur. (N.Y.) 434.

A person having merely a contingent interest is entitled to an audit. *Sloan's Estate*, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 363.

A remainderman is entitled to an account from one who is both executor and life-tenant. *Heath's Estate*, 10 Pa. Dist. 281; 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 258.

The assignee of a legatee may obtain an audit. *Citizens, &c. v. Toplitz*, 113 N. Y. App. Div. 73.

A guardian of an infant legatee has a right to apply for an audit. *Buffalo Loan Co. v. Leonard*, 154

N. Y. 141. So the guardian of an infant creditor. *Beddow v. Wilson*, 90 S. W. 228.

A citation order is the proper proceeding for compelling an executor or administrator to bring in and pass his accounts. The order is obtained on filing the necessary affidavits shewing the facts entitling the applicant to have the accounts passed. The Surrogate Judge then issues a citation to the executors or administrator to bring in and pass the accounts. This order may be obtained *ex parte*. Rule 55, S. C. Rules, 1916. Forms of affidavit to obtain the order, and of order to bring in accounts, will be found in the appendix. P. 493

in the case of the estate of the late John J. Wilson

CHAPTER VI.

WHEN AUDIT ORDERED.

Neither the Surrogate Courts Act nor the Trustee Act fixes any time within which a trustee must pass his accounts, or places any limitation on the time within which an interested party can demand an accounting. In ordinary cases the trustee must have had sufficient time, having regard to the nature of the estate and the difficulties in realizing it, to get in the assets. As a legacy, bequeathed generally, is not payable until the expiration of a year from the death of the testator, such a legatee can not, without shewing special circumstances, demand an accounting until after the expiration of the year.

In New York it was held that an executor will not be compelled to account within twelve months after his appointment unless special circumstances are shewn, and special reasons given therefor. *Matthews v. Studley*, 17 App. Div. 303, 45 N. Y. Supp. 201.

In many cases where there has been a great lapse of time between the death of the testator and the time of citation, the Court has refused the order. In *Ritchie v. Rees*, 1 Add. Ecc. 144, it was held that the lapse of forty-five years afforded a reasonable presumption that the estate had been fully administered.

In *Pitt v. Woodham*, 1 Hagg. 247, where twenty-four years had elapsed after the death of the intestate, and eleven years after the youngest child attained his majority, the Court refused an application for administration and account, where facts were shewn from which it might fairly be presumed that the applicant had received his distributive share of the estate.

In *Scurrah v. Scurrah*, 2 Curt. 919, an application to compel an administrator to exhibit an inventory after the lapse of eighteen years was refused. See also *Higgins v. Higgins*, 4 Hagg. 242.

But an executor, obtaining possession of property as such, should not be permitted to acquire title thereto by failure of those interested to require him to account, unless there is no avenue of escape from such an inequitable result. If there be no doubt about the facts, then the better practice is to grant the order. *Re Irvin*, 68 N. Y. App. Div. 158; *Re Meyer*, 98 N. Y. App. Div. 7.

In *Walmsley v. Bull*, 15 Gr. 210, where the estate was small and the executor had allowed the widow to receive and expend the moneys of the estate in support of herself and family, and the plaintiff had allowed fifteen years to elapse after coming of age before bringing action, the Court held the executor was not excused from accounting, but said the Master should act liberally on the rule of the Court that gives him a discretion as to the mode of vouching the accounts in his office.

A provision in a will fixing the time for accounting is binding upon the beneficiaries under the will, but not upon creditors. *Linthecum v. Fowel*, 80 S. W. Rep. 1090; 26 Ky. L. R. 221.

Where the funds of the estate are involved in litigation as yet undetermined, the executor will not be compelled to have an audit of his accounts. *Smyth's Estate*, 11 Pa. Dist. 441; 27 Pa. Co. Ct. 170. Nor where the executor is doing his best to realize the assets and is in no default. *In re O'Connor*, 12 Man. R. 325.

An executor must have a reasonable time to collect and pay over rents before the Court will compel an accounting. *Cox's Estate*, 8 Mon. Co. Rep. (P.) 161.

In *Ditmar v. Bogle*, 53 Ala. 169, it was held that, after the lapse of seven years from the grant of administration, a final settlement should not be deferred at the instance of the administrator, because of outstanding debts or unsettled accounts.

CHAPTER VII.

DUTY OF AN EXECUTOR—REALIZING ASSETS.

The first duty of a trustee, whether an executor, an administrator or a guardian, is to acquaint himself, as soon as possible, with the nature and circumstances of the trust property; to make a complete inventory thereof; to obtain, where possible, the possession or control of the trust property to himself, and, subject to the provisions of the will, get in the trust money invested on insufficient or hazardous security. Underhill on Trusts, 4th ed., 250.

Persons who become trustees are bound to inquire of what the trust property consists and look into the trust documents and papers to ascertain the condition of the estate. *Hallows v. Lloyd*, 39 Ch. D. 691.

“ Within a convenient time after the testator’s death, or the grant of administration, the executor or administrator has a right to enter the house of the deceased in order to remove the goods of the deceased; provided he do so without violence; as, if the door be open, or at least the key be in the door; and, although the door of the entrance into the hall and parlour be open, he cannot therefore justify the forcing the door of any chamber, to take the goods contained in it; but is empowered to take those only which are in such rooms as are unlocked, or in the door of which he shall find the key. He also has the right to take the deeds and other writings relative to the personal estate out of a chest in the house if it be unlocked, or the key be in it; but he has no right to break open even a chest. If he cannot take possession of the effects without force, he must desist, and resort to his action. On the other hand, if the executor or administrator, on his part, be remiss in removing the goods within a reasonable time the heir may distrain them *damage feasant*.” Wms. Exors., 9th ed., 796.

In an old case of *Stodden v. Harvey*, Cro. Jac. 204, a life-tenant of land died and his executors allowed his cattle to remain on the land at pasture for six days after his death. In an action of trespass against the executors they justified for that time, averring that in the space of six days they could not procure any other land whereon to put the cattle. The case went off on demur on another point, but the Court inclined to the opinion that six days was but a convenient time for removing the cattle under the circumstances.

An executor's discretion is not that of an absolute owner; it is limited by the duty of bringing the assets into a proper state of investment within a reasonable time, and the onus is upon the trustee to shew that he acted *bona fide* and exercised a reasonable discretion. *In re Brogden*, 38 Ch. D. p. 571.

In deciding whether a reasonable discretion was exercised or not, the Court will look into all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature of the investments, the confidence the testator had in the investments, the efforts made by the executor to realize, the state of the market, and of course as an important ingredient, the length of time which has elapsed since the testator's death.

The rule in England is, that if the executor fails within a reasonable time to convert investments which require conversion, the end of a year is, in the absence of circumstances pointing to a different date, to be taken as the time for ascertaining the value which he ought to have got. *The Heirs Hiddingh v. De Villiers Denysen*, 12 A. C. 624.

It is the duty of an executor to get in all the testator's estate, whether it is specifically bequeathed or otherwise; and the expenses incurred in doing so must be paid out of the general estate. *Perry v. Meddowcroft*, 4 Beav. 204.

In *Sculthorpe v. Tipper*, L. R. 13 Eq. 232, a testator gave his estate to trustees upon trust to sell immediately after his decease, or so soon thereafter as to

them might seem proper. The personal estate comprised shares in a limited banking company, which was of high standing and repute at the time of the testator's death. The trustees retained these shares for twenty-seven months, when the bank suspended payment and there was a heavy loss. Malins, V.C., said: "It was in my opinion, the duty of the trustees to sell within a reasonable time, and I am unable to fix any other time than that which is settled by the case of *Grayburn v. Clarkson*, L. R. 3 Ch. 605, which is within one year after the testator's death. It is true the words were different in that case; there the direction was to 'convert the estate with all convenient speed.' Here the direction is to sell 'immediately or so soon as the trustees shall think fit to do so.' " In the judgment it is pointed out that in the case of shares in an unlimited company the duty to sell as soon as possible is always urgent.

A somewhat similar case was recently before our own Courts, and many of the earlier cases are discussed in the judgments, and the effect of section 37 of the Trustee Act is considered. There a testator died leaving shares in the Ontario Bank. The estate was given to executors "upon trust to invest the proceeds thereof in such manner as they shall deem most advisable." The executors retained these shares for four years and there was a big loss. It was held that the will authorized the retention of the shares, and that the executors acted in good faith, and their decision to retain the shares was an honest exercise of the discretion given by the will; and their abstaining from selling, hoping for a better price, was fairly justified. After the expiration of the four years the stock was reduced by one-half, but the executors continued to hold it for many years without an attempt to realize on it, and the Court held the executors liable, following *Sculthorpe v. Tipper*. *Re Nicholls*, *Hall v. Wildman* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 206.

Notwithstanding a clause in a will declaring that the trustees may postpone the sale and conversion of any part of the estate so long as they may deem proper, it is their duty to sell and convert into money as soon as they reasonably can to realize a fund which would be immediately distributable in cash, using the power of postponement to obtain a better return, but not for mere purposes of accumulation where there is no direction for accumulation in the will. *Re Caswell Estate*, 1 D. L. R. 497, 20 W. L. R. 469.

Executors will not be charged with losses caused by their delay in selling lands under a power which left the time of sale to their discretion, or be disallowed the amount paid for taxes during the delay, if they acted in good faith, and the mistake in delaying the sale was one which a prudent business man might have made. *Re Horsford*, 27 N. Y. App. Div. 427.

While the Court will not exact more from trustees than such conduct as a prudent man would pursue in the management of his own business, yet it requires from them full explanations of all their dealings, and the causes why outstanding assets were not collected, or property of the estate had disappeared; and a trustee who cannot satisfactorily account for the one or the other will be chargeable with them. *Chisholm v. Bernard*, 10 Gr. 479.

Generally speaking, it is the duty of executors to get in debts due to the estate; but it is not a necessary part of their duty to realize mortgage securities of their testator not wanted for the payment of funeral and testamentary expenses, and debts and pecuniary legacies. *Orr v. Newton*, 2 Cox 274; *In re Chapman* (1896), 2 Ch. 763.

The selection by the executors of securities to be converted into money for the payment of debts calls for intelligent and honest action; and their action cannot be criticized if characterized by good faith and reasonable discretion. *Re Fidelity T. & G. Co.*, 23 Misc. 211; 51 N. Y. Supp. 1124.

The executor is not obliged to advance funds to pay the debts of the estate in order to avoid the necessity of an immediate sale of the securities of the estate, nor to continue advances made for that purpose: *Ib.* Nor are executors bound at their own expense to take proceedings for the recovery of trust property not lost by their own default. *Tudball v. Medlicott*, 59 L. T. 370; 36 W. R. 886.

An executor cannot be held liable for loss resulting from the necessity, owing to a lack of available money, of selling the assets of the estate at a time of financial depression. *Owen v. Potter*, 115 Mich. 556.

It is the duty of trustees to press for payment of the trust funds owing to them, and if they are not paid within a reasonable time to enforce payment by legal proceedings. And it is especially their duty to take action promptly, if by the terms of the trust, payment has been deferred to the expiration of a specified time. The only excuse for not taking action to enforce payment is a well founded belief on the part of the trustees that such action would be fruitless, and the burden of proving the grounds of such belief is on the trustee. *In re Brodgen*, 38 Ch. D. 546.

In *Clack v. Holland*, 19 Beav. 272, Lord Romily goes a step further, and says, if the trustee "has taken no steps at all to obtain payment, but it appears that if he had done so, there would have been, or there is reasonable ground for believing they would have been ineffectual, then he is exonerated from all liability."

But when it is shewn that a debt was owing to the deceased and formed part of the assets of the estate, the executor or administrator will be charged with the amount unless he shews that the debtor was insolvent; but until that is proved, the law assumes the fact to be the other way. *Stiles v. Guy*, 16 Sim. 230, 30 R. R. 58; *Zimmerman v. Wilcox*, 35 C. L. J. 691, 19 C. L. T. 337.

Compare *East v. East*, 5 Hare. 348, where the contrary seems to have been assumed.

In *Matter of Harsford*, 27 N. Y. App. Div. 427, the Court said: "To excuse the executors from failing to institute legal proceedings to collect this note, they were compelled to shew on the accounting that the note could not have been collected had an action been commenced thereon. It is not enough for them to produce evidence from which we might guess that legal proceedings would have been useless. They should have produced testimony which left no reasonable doubt in that regard."

But a personal representative is not chargeable with assets without reference to the fact whether they were good, doubtful or desperate at the time when he assumed the trust, nor in any case, aside from the question of delinquency or culpable neglect on his part in realizing their value or procuring them according to the means at his disposal. *Cook v. Cook*, 29 Md. 538. An executor or administrator is not bound to sue a worthless debt, but ordinary care and prudence is the true criterion of his duty. *Smith v. Collamer*, 2 Dem. 147. In cases of doubt he is justified in taking professional advice as to whether he should expend money in litigation, or how far. *Schouler*, 1277.

Executors are guilty of negligence or careless administration where they sell or dispose of the assets at less than their value. In *Re Semple's Estate*, 28 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 434, a stock of goods were inventoried at \$78,000 and sold by the executors at private sale for \$30,000. It was held that the evidence as to value was not sufficient to overcome the *prima facie* evidence of the inventory.

Where trustees were directed to sell an estate as soon as convenient after the testator's death, and offered it for sale by auction, and an offer was made of £6,600, and refused by the desire of one of the parties interested, and some time afterwards the trustees sold it for £3,000, the Court charged them with the loss. *Taylor v. Tabrum*, 6 Sim. 281; 38 R. R. 115

An executor is not called upon to waste the estate in attempts to collect bad debts, or where it is clear a perfect defence exists, but he must act in the utmost good faith to the estate. *Egan v. Clark*, 87 Ill. Rep. 246.

Where an executor receives money in his trust capacity from a person who is indebted to the estate, and also indebted to the executor personally, the law will apply the payment to the debt due to the estate. *In re White*, 13 Pa. Sup. Ct. 201.

Where a part of the assets of the estate consisted of a note, the maker of which was insolvent, but the indorser was solvent, and the executor granted the indorser an extension of time and the note was lost to the estate, the executor was charged with the amount. *Foster v. Foster*, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1396.

Executors ought not, without great reason, to permit money to remain upon personal security longer than is absolutely necessary. *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 844.

If by unduly delaying to bring an action the executor or administrator has enabled a debtor of the deceased to avail himself of the Statute of Limitations, the executor or administrator will be personally liable. *Haywood v. Kinsey*, 12 Mod. 573.

Where the testator had loaned money to his solicitor on a promissory note, and the maker was in good circumstances at the time of the testator's death, but died two years afterwards insolvent, it was held that it was the duty of the executor to call in the amount due on the note, and, if necessary, to take legal proceedings for the recovery of the amount due on the note, and the loss must fall on the executors. *Caney v. Bond*, 12 L. J. Ch. 484.

And it makes no difference that the executor can realize a larger rate of interest for the estate by allowing the note to remain outstanding. *Re Gabourie*, 15 O. R. 635.

The difficulty of collecting arrears of rent does not excuse executors for not collecting them, without some evidence that in fact they could not have been recovered. *In re Alexander*, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 137; *Chisholm v. Bernard*, 10 Gr. 479.

In considering whether evidence is sufficient to relieve an executor in respect of uncollected debts, the lapse of time and the smallness of the debt are proper to be taken into account. *McCarger v. McKinnon*, 17 Gr. 525. A delay of ten months, which resulted in the loss of a debt, was held to require explanation. *McCarger v. McKinnon*, 15 Gr. 361.

Delay in selling lands, which by the will are saleable for the payment of debts, will render the executors liable for rents and profits. *Emes v. Emes*, 11 Gr. 325.

Part of an estate consisted of oil lands, and the executor delayed selling until the oil was exhausted, and he was charged with the inventoried value. *Re Semple's Estate*, 28 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 434.

Part of a testator's estate consisted of a note of £100, made by five persons as joint makers. The interest on this note was paid for several years, by whom did not appear. The executor then took a new note for the amount, on which nothing was subsequently paid, and it became barred by the Statute of Limitations. It was held that the taking of the new note was equivalent to payment of the first note, and the executor was charged with the amount thereof. *Sparkes v. Restal*, 22 Beav, 587, 111 R. R. 496.

It has been held that an executor or administrator, instead of receiving payment in money, may in the exercise of good faith and due prudence, settle with the debtor by accepting other security or property. *McCarger v. McKinnon*, 17 Gr. 525; *Gardiner v. Calender*, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 374; *Stark v. Hunton*, 3 N. J. Eq. 300.

But where assets of the estate are being sold by the executor or administrator, payment should be

accepted in money only. *Columbus Insc. Co. v. Humphries*, 64 Miss. 258; *Powers v. Powers*, 48 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 389.

Where the solicitor of the deceased during his lifetime, and of the executor after his death, is a debtor of the estate, the executor must seek independent advice in order to shield himself behind legal advice. *Carr's Estate*, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 369.

An executor or administrator is not chargeable with assets situate outside of the jurisdiction of the Court granting probate or letters of administration, unless such assets voluntarily come to his hands.

In the absence of any restriction by statute or by the will, a sale of the assets of the estate is generally for cash, but it may be on reasonable credit in the discretion of the executor or administrator, provided proper security is taken, though it is usually safer to sell for cash. *Bradshaw v. Cruise*, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 260; *Mickle v. Brown*, 4 Baxt. 468.

The duty of an executor or administrator in respect of the security for the price of goods sold by him on credit is not performed by simply taking the purchaser's notes with sureties. He must act honestly for the estate, exercising the same degree of care in obtaining sureties of financial ability that a prudent man would exercise in his own affairs. *Davis v. Marcum*, 4 Jones Eq. 189. If he accepts insolvent sureties when he might, by the exercise of due care, have ascertained their condition, such dereliction renders him personally liable. *Lindley v. State*, 116 Ind. 235. But he is not liable if the sureties were solvent when they became security, but became insolvent before the security matures, if he exercised due diligence in ascertaining their sufficiency. *Searcy v. Holmes*, 45 Ala. 225. But it must appear that the insolvency occurred or was discovered after the note was given, and the executor cannot discharge himself from liability for the amount of the note merely by shewing that the parties thereto "proved insolvent." He must

also shew that they were either solvent or reputed to be solvent when the note was given. *Stewart v. Stewart*, 31 Ala. 207; *Curry v. People*, 54 Ill. 263.

An executor is guilty of gross negligence who sells the trust property on credit and takes no other security than the note or bond of the purchaser. *Roseman v. Pless*, 65 N. C. R. 374. Where an executor sells part of the estate of the testator on credit and without security he is chargeable with the whole amount of the purchase money on the ground that he is guilty of negligence in parting with the estate without payment or security. *King v. King*, 3 Johns Ch. 352; *Orcutt v. Orms*, 3 Paige 464; *Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck*, 27 N. Y. 185.

If the executor or administrator takes the purchaser's note payable to himself or order, this in law amounts to a receipt of the price and makes him chargeable with the property as an asset in possession. *Macbeth v. Macbeth*, 26 U. C. R. 549.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT CONSTITUTE ASSETS.

In this connection it may be proper to consider what are, and what are not, assets of the estate for which an executor or administrator is chargeable. The general rule is thus stated in Touchstone:

“All those goods and chattels, actions and commodities, which were of the deceased in right of action or possession as his own, and so continued until the time of his death, and which after his death the executor or administrator doth get into his hands as duly belonging to him in the right of his executorship or administratorship, and all such things as do come to the executor or administrator in lieu or by reason of that, and nothing else, shall be said to be assets in the hands of the executor or administrator to make him chargeable to a creditor or legatee.”

In an accurate and legal sense, all the personal property of the deceased which is of a saleable nature, and may be converted into ready money, is deemed assets. But the word is not confined to such property; for all other property of the deceased which is chargeable with his debts or legacies, and is applicable to that purpose, is, in a large sense, assets. 1 Story Eq. Jur. 531.

It is generally held that an executor or administrator is not obliged to include in his inventory assets which are in a foreign jurisdiction, but that he is responsible only for the property within the jurisdiction where his letters were granted. *Raymond v. Von Watteville*, 2 Lee. 554; *Normand v. Grogard*, 17 N. J. Eq. 425.

But property never vested in the deceased may be assets, in the hands of the executor or administrator. Thus, if a lease is made to one for life with remainder

to his executor for years, such remainder will be assets in the hands of the executor, though it were never in the deceased. *Wms. Exors.* 1519.

Money received by an executor for the good-will of a public house is assets in his hands. *Worral v. Hand, Peake* 74. So where an administratrix sold the good-will of the intestate's business as a surgeon, it was held that although she was not bound to sell such good-will, yet having done so the proceeds were assets for which she must account. *Christie v. Clark*, 27 U. C. R. 21.

The testator was a surgeon-dentist at the time of his death. His widow, one of the executors of the will, entered into an agreement with one P. whereby she sold him the testator's instruments at a fixed sum and the furniture at a valuation. The agreement further provided that P. was to pay the widow £100 a year for five years for the good-will of the business; and she agreed to give her personal services to enable P. to retain the testator's practice. P. said he relied on the personal exertions of the widow, and if these were not given he should resist payment of the annuity. In an administration action the Master refused to charge the widow with this £500. On appeal the Court held that either the whole or a part of the sum must be considered assets of the estate, and it was referred back to the Master to ascertain and report what portion of the £500 was attributable to the personal exertions of the widow under the agreement. *Smale v. Graves*, 19 L. J. Ch. 157; 14 Jur. 662.

In *McGovern's Estate*, 2 Northam L. R. (Pa.) 194, it was held that the good-will of a liquor business did not constitute assets of the owner's estate, where he had no business at the time of his death, but simply a claim to the return of his business after a certain debt, for which it was pledged, had been paid.

The good-will of an inn is local and does not exist independently of the building in which it is carried on, and therefore where a husband kept an inn in a

house owned by his wife, and she continued it after his death, the good-will was held not to be assets of his estate. *Elliott's Appeal*, 60 Pa. St. 161.

But if a deceased innkeeper had a leasehold in the building, the good-will of the leasehold is assets in the hands of the administrator, and he is chargeable with a price offered for such good-will and refused. *Wiley's Appeal*, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 244; *Coppel's Estate*, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 378.

If an executor or administrator carries on the business of the deceased without authority, he is chargeable with the value of the good-will as a part of the assets. *Re Randall*, 2 Connolly (N.Y.) 29; *Emeret's Estate*, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 195.

It was formerly a disputed question whether the good-will of a business conducted by a commercial partnership survives, on the death of a member of the firm, to the survivors, or whether the interest of the deceased partner therein was assets of his estate; but it is now generally held that the deceased partner's interest is assets, unless the partnership articles or agreement provides otherwise.

In *Hammond v. Douglass*, 5 Ves. Jr. 539, it was held that in the case of commercial partnerships the good-will survives to the survivors; but the propriety of that decision was doubted by Lord Eldon in *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 Ves. Jr. 227; and in *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 22 Beav. 84, it was held that the good-will of a partnership business did not survive to the surviving partners on the death of a partner unless it was so provided by the partnership agreement. And see *Platt v. Platt*, 42 Conn. 347, where it was held that the good-will of the business, if continued, is to be valued in estimating the deceased's interest.

After the decease of one of two partners in a bank the surviving partner sold the business for £10,000. Held, that the estate of the deceased partner was entitled to a share of so much of the purchase money as was attributable to the good-will, having regard to the

fact that the partnership premises belonged to the survivor, and that he had the right to carry on the same business in the same locality, and that the sole right of issuing notes, under the Bank Charter Act, belonged to him. *Smith v. Everett*, 27 Beav. 450; 122 R. R. 484.

Partnerships between professional persons stand on a different footing, and the good-will, on the death of one of the partners, survives to the surviving partner or partners. And this is the case though the deceased partner may have paid a large sum on entering into the partnership. *Farr v. Pearce*, 3 Madd. 78.

A note payable to the deceased "or his heirs," belongs to the personal representatives, and is assets. *Doak v. Robinson*, 12 New Bruns. 278.

In *Bradshaw v. Lancashire Ry. Co.*, 10 C. P. 189, it was held that where a passenger on a railway was injured by an accident, in consequence of which he afterwards died, his executrix could recover for breach of contract against the railway company the damages to his personal estate arising, before his death, from medical expenses and losses occasioned by his inability to attend to his business. But in *Pulling v. Great Eastern Ry. Co.*, 9 Q. B. D. 110, it was held that such recovery could not be had where the deceased was injured by being struck by a locomotive at a railway crossing, since the injury in such case did not involve a breach of contract, but was tortious.

In *Noble v. Cass*, 2 Sim. 343, 29 R. R. 115, there was a devise to trustees and their heirs during the life of A. in trust for A., and after her decease to B. During A.'s lifetime the trustees recovered damages for breach of covenants in a lease granted by the testator in his lifetime and still subsisting. It was held that these damages belonged to the life-tenant and not to the inheritance.

A claim for injury to the rental value of land during the lifetime of the owner is personal and vests in the executor or administrator. *Paret v. New York El. Ry.*, 60 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 441.

An administrator obtained in his own name a renewal of a charter for a ferry owned by the deceased, and it was held he was bound to account for the value thereof as assets of the estate. *Huson v. Wallace*, 1 Rish, Eq. (S. Car.) 1.

Rents accruing due during the lifetime of the owner of the demised premises go to his personal representatives as assets of the estate. And, in the absence of any testamentary disposition, rents of real estate which accrue after the death of the owner, pass to the devisee of the real estate and are not assets in the hands of the executor. By the Apportionment Act (R. S. O. ch. 156) rent is now considered as accruing from day to day, and is apportionable accordingly. *Broadwell v. Banks*, 134 F. 470.

Rent payable in advance accrues at the time specified for its payment, and on the death of the lessor after that time, and within the period for which the rent is reserved, it passes to the lessor's personal representatives. *Re Weeks*, 5 Dem. (N.Y.), 194; *Miller v. Crawford*, 26 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 396.

As between the personal representatives and the devisees, compensation awarded for land taken for public purposes is personal property and belongs to the executor or administrator, if the land was taken before the testator's death; but if it was taken after his death it is real estate and passes to the devisee. *Welles v. Cowles*, 4 Conn. 182; *Neal v. Knox*, 61 Me. 298; *Boynton v. Peterborough*, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 467.

Where land is expropriated by a municipal corporation under authority of the Municipal Act, such land is "taken" from the date of the passing of the by-law of expropriation. *Re MacPherson and Toronto*, 26 O. R. 559; *Re Davies and James Bay Ry. Co.* (1910), 20 O. L. R. 534. Where lands are taken for railway purposes they are "taken" from the date of the warrant of possession, and not from the time the

owner knows he had to give up the land. *Re Clarke and T. G. & B. Ry. Co.* (1909), 18 O. L. R. 628.

As against the heirs the personal representatives are entitled to the crops growing on the lands of the deceased at the time of his death. But crops growing on lands devised by the testator pass to the devisees as against the personal representatives. The authorities are all agreed that this is the rule, but they do not seem to be able to account for the difference between the right of the personal representative as against the heir and as against the devisee. *Spencer's Case*, Winch. 51; *Cox v. Godsalve*, 6 East, 604, 8 R. R. 570; *West v. Moore*, 8 East, 339, 9 R. R. 460.

In *Cooper v. Woolfitt*, 2 H. & N. 122, 115 R. R. 457, Pollock, C.B., accounts for the distinction as follows: "Emblements pass by a devise of the land, partly because, being a grant, the devise must be taken most strongly against the grantor. If the point was new, it might perhaps be argued that the devisee as '*haeres factus*' would not take more than the heir would; but it has long since been determined that a devise is not the mere substitution of one person for another, as heir, but operates as a conveyance." Unless the word "grant" is here used as a generic term applicable to all transfers of real property, the explanation does not appear satisfactory, because most wills lack the essential elements of a grant: In *Bradner v. Faulkner*, 34 N. Y. 347, Peckham, J., citing *Moore v. West*, said: "They passed to the devisee upon the presumed intention of the testator that he who took the land should take the crops which belong to it."

The presumption that crops pass to the devisee may be rebutted by the words of the will that shew an intent that the crops should pass to the personal representative. Thus, where the testator gave his land to A., and to his executors all his stock on the farm, with the implements of husbandry, and all his other personal estate, to pay debts and legacies, it was held

that the gift of the stock upon the farm carried the standing crops. *West v. Moore, supra*.

West v. Moore was followed in *In re Roose, Evans v. Williamson*, 17 Ch. D. 696. There a testatrix devised all her real estate to A., and gave all the "farming stock, goods, chattels and effects in and about" one of the farms to B. Jessel, M.R., held these words sufficient to pass the growing crops to B. and disapproved of *Vaisey v. Reynolds*, 5 Russ. 13, where it was held that the words "farming stock in and about" a farm are not a proper description of growing crops.

But it must appear with certainty that the testator intended some one other than the devisee to take the crops. Where there is a devise of lands to one and a gift of "all personal estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever not specifically bequeathed" to another, this is not sufficient. *Cooper v. Woolfitt, supra*.

Arrears of military bounty payable by the United States to a volunteer who died in the service, were held to be payable to his personal representatives as part of his estate, and not to his relatives. *Seidel's Estate*, 2 Woodw. (Pa.) 259. So also arrears of payment due a soldier at the time of his death. *Maitland v. Grissinger*, 1 Woodw. 294.

The persons to whom pensions are payable are generally regulated by the pension laws, and arrears due at the pensioner's death are payable to his family, and are not assets of the estate. If, however, pension moneys have been received by the pensioner in his lifetime and deposited by him in a bank or loaned to a third person, they are assets of his estate. *Beecher v. Barber*, 6 Dem. (N.Y.) 129.

Moneys received by a public officer in his official capacity are not assets in the hands of his executor, but are trust funds for his successor in office, if they have been kept separate as an official fund, or can be traced and identified as such. *People v. Houghtaling*, 7 Cal. 348.

And the proceeds of a note given to an officer in his own name for the purpose of satisfying an execution in the hands of the officer, belong to the execution creditor, and do not go to the executor or administrator of the officer as assets of the estate. *Childs v. Jordan*, 106 Mass. 321. So money of a client received by a solicitor, and not mixed with the money of the solicitor, but kept separate, is not an asset of the solicitor's estate. *Schoolfield v. Rudd*, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 294.

Money intrusted to another by the deceased to be distributed after his death as directed by a private letter which he would leave, is not an asset of the estate of which the executor is entitled to take possession. *Morris v. Waucher*, 115 N. Y. App. Div. 278; 188 N. Y. 568.

These cases proceed upon the principle that the moneys received were trust funds, and were the properties of the *cestuis que trust*, and not of the person in whose possession the monies were found. But if the money received has no earmark, and is not distinguishable from the deceased's own moneys, the person claiming to be the owner must come in as a general creditor of the estate, and the property will be assets in the hands of the personal representative.

The Court will not assist a volunteer by making effectual an incomplete gift. Where a testator intended to give his nephew certain bank shares, and in a letter to him he said that he "made a free gift of them" to him, and executed a power of attorney for transferring the shares, but they were not transferred and were in the testator's name at the time of his death, it was held these shares formed a part of the personal estate. *Weale v. Olive*, 17 Beav. 252, 99 R. R. 132. And in *Re Hyslop* (1894), 3 Ch. 522, a testator, in a letter of instructions to his executor, stated that a debt owing from the executor to the testator was cancelled. This letter was never communicated to the debtor during the testator's lifetime, nor was

it properly executed as a will, and it was held it did not cancel the debt. The rule is the same in those cases where the deceased makes statements or declarations as to forgiving debts. *In Byrn v. Godfrey*, 4 Ves. 5, 4 R. R. 155, the testator held a note of the plaintiff. He had never collected interest on the note, and a few days before his death he told the plaintiff he never intended to demand payment and considered it satisfied. Notwithstanding these declarations it was held the note was a part of the assets of the estate. And see *Eden v. Smyth*, 5 Ves. 341, 5 R. R. 60.

The principle of not assisting a volunteer to perfect an incomplete gift does not apply to a *donatio mortis causa*. *In re Dillon, Duffin v. Duffin*, 46 Ch. D. 76, 83. The case of *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bli. (N.S.) 497, 30 R. R. 69, shews that there may be a good *donatio mortis causa* of an instrument which does not pass by delivery; that the executors of the donor are trustees for the purpose of giving effect to the gift; and they must lend their names to enable the donee to recover the money, the donee having an equitable title to it. And see *In re Beaumont* (1902), 1 Ch. 889.

In *Re Ainslie, Swinburn v. Ainslie*, 30 Ch. D. 485, the testator devised land on which was growing timber. Before his death a number of trees had blown down and so remained at his death. It was held that, having regard to the maxim *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit*, the principle applicable was that if a tree was attached to the soil it was real estate and passed to the devisee, and if severed, personalty; that the life and manner of growth of any particular tree was no test of its attachment to the soil, and that the degree of attachment or severance was a question of fact in the case of each particular tree.

The benefit of a license to keep a cart was held to be personal estate and to pass to the personal representative. *Hunt v. Hunt*, 2 Vern. 83.

The doctrine of the common law as to the liability of an executor or administrator for the loss of assets

of the estate in his hands was that when he had once become fully responsible by the actual receipt of the property, he could not discharge himself by shewing that it had been lost by inevitable accident such as fire, robbery and the like. *Crosse v. Smith*, 7 East. 258. The doctrine of equity, which has been adopted by courts of probate, is that if an executor or administrator has acted for the benefit of the estate, used proper diligence, and acted with ordinary care and circumspection in the discharge of his trust, he will not be held answerable for losses which he could not have foreseen and which ordinary precaution could not have guarded against. The general principle which seems to run through all the authorities as to his liability recognizes the doctrine that if he acts honestly and prudently, though there be loss or diminution of the estate, he will not be held liable, but if he has acted negligently or dishonestly and loss to the estate ensues, he is responsible for it. *Massey v. Banner*, 1 J. & W. 248; *Vreeland v. Schoonmaker*, 16 N. J. Eq. 512.

If assets come to the hands of an executor and are subsequently lost through no default of the executor he is not chargeable with such assets. In case of loss there must be something in the nature of wilful default or neglect. *Job v. Job*, 2 Ch. D. 562.

If goods of the deceased are stolen from the possession of the executor, or from the possession of a third person, to whose custody they have been delivered by the executor, the latter will not be charged with these as assets. *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 240. So if cattle die, or buildings are wrecked by tempest.

In *Black v. Hurlbut*, 73 Wis. 126, it was held that it was inexcusable negligence for an executor to retain money in his custody where it could be stolen, after the time required by law for paying it over to creditors or distributees.

In *Foster v. Davis*, 46 Mo. 268, money belonging to the estate was taken from the executor's house by

robbers. The occurrence took place during the civil war, in a community where violence and lawlessness were prevalent. For some time before the robbery the executor had kept the money buried in the ground, but it was not shewn why it was taken from its safe hiding place and put in the executor's house. It was held he was liable for the loss.

If goods are taken out of the possession of an executor he is answerable only for the amount he may recover in an action of damages for the trespass. But if he omits to sell the goods when a good price is offered, and afterwards they are taken from him, he may be charged with the price he could have obtained unless excused under the provisions of The Trustee Act. *Jenkins v. Plombe*, 6 Mod. 181; *Wightwick v. Lord*, 6 H. L. C. 235.

An executor or administrator is not liable for property confiscated and taken out of his possession by the government, even though the government be a *de facto* and not a *de jure* government. *Miller v. Cook*, 77 Va. 818.

The proceeds of a policy of insurance upon the life of the deceased payable to himself, his executors, administrators or assigns, provided no declaration has been made by the assured to satisfy the Insurance Act, is an asset of the estate for the payment of debts and distribution. *Wright v. Wright*, 100 Tenn. 313. So a policy of life insurance payable merely to the "legal heirs" of the deceased, is assets of the estate: *Re Duncombe* (1902), 3 O. L. R. 510; but a policy payable to "my legal heirs as designated by my will," and the testatrix gave specific properties and legacies to her husband and three daughters by name, is not assets of the estate. *Griffith v. Howes* (1903), 5 O. L. R. 439. Compare *Re Edwards* (1910), 22 O. L. R. 367.

Profits made by an executor in speculating in claims against the estate must be charged against him as assets. *In re Rainforth's Estate*, 83 N. Y. S. 57.

Money on deposit in the name of a married woman is *prima facie* her money, for which her husband as executor or administrator of her estate must account. *Re Holmes*, 79 N. Y. App. Div. 264; *Crossitti's Estate*, 211 Pa. St. 490.

On the day before her death a woman made her will, and gave to the person therein named as executor certain money, which he deposited in his bank account. He made no claim to the money as a gift, and it was held it was assets of the estate. *In re Brintnall*, 81 N. Y. S. 250.

A debt due from an heir or legatee of the deceased is an asset of the estate, and the executor or administrator should charge himself with the full amount thereof, where the distributive share of such heir or legatee is equal to or greater than the debt. *Re Ellis* (Prob. Ct.), 5 Ohio, N. P. 207; *Hoffman v. Hoffman*, 88 Md. 60.

The Court refused to charge an administrator with the amount of a note left by the deceased in the custody of a relative, where the amount was uncertain and it had never been in the possession of the administrator, and the maker refused to account for it, claiming that the deceased delivered it to him as paid or as a gift, and there was no evidence that the debt had been lost by the delay. *Re Baker*, 42 App. Div. N. Y. 370.

Wearing apparel of the testator will not be charged against his executor where it is not proved to have been converted to his own use by him, and a sale of it was not necessary for the payment of debts and legacies. *McCall v. Peachy*, 3 Munf. (Va.) 288; *Carrol v. Cornet*, 2 Marsh. (Ky.) 204. The wearing apparel of a married woman is not generally considered as assets. See *Re Hall*, 70 Vt. 458, *post*, under "What are not Assets."

Chattels specifically bequeathed are assets for the payments of debts, and in case of a deficiency of assets for payment of debts, the executor is chargeable in

his accounts, though in other cases it seems they need not appear in the account. Where it does not appear in the account what has been done with articles specifically bequeathed it will be presumed they have been disposed of in accordance with the terms of the will. *Re Pollack*, 3 Redf. (N.Y.) 100. Where a specific bequest of stock is made by will, it belongs to the legatee at once upon the death of the testator, unless needed for the payment of debts, and no security can be exacted from him on delivery of the stock. *In re Stoiber* (1918), 170 N. Y. Supp. 897.

The modern doctrine as to the effect of appointing a debtor of the testator executor of his will is that payment of the debt is presumed to have been made, and the executor is chargeable in his accounts with the amount of the debt as cash in hand. This seems to be the invariable rule if he was solvent at any time during the term of his office, and in some jurisdictions it is the rule without regard to any question of his solvency or insolvency. 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. 1203.

The rule is thus stated in 18 C. Y. C.: "At common law the appointment of one's debtor as executor was held to extinguish the debt, and the rule was applied even where the executor died before probate or was one of several joint debtors. In equity, however, the effect of the appointment of a debtor to the office of executor was that the debt due from the debtor executor was considered to have been paid by him to himself and upon this supposition the rule was established in equity that the executor was accountable for the amount of his debt as assets. In the United States the rule is well settled that debts owing from executors stand upon the same footing with debts due the decedent's estate from other sources and are to be regarded as assets. An administrator who is indebted to his intestate must account for the debt, and even at common law his appointment, not being through the act and favour of his creditor, does not appear to have extinguished his debt. It is sometimes said that when

a debtor becomes executor or administrator of the estate of his creditor the debt is extinguished at law, but becomes at once assets in his hands, and the representative is chargeable with the amount thereof as cash, as under such circumstances equity will raise a trust or presume that the debt is paid," pp. 177, 178.

This rule is, however, subject to some limitations. While the debt must be treated as money in the executor's hands for the purposes of administration it will not for all purposes stand on the same footing as if he had actually received so much money. If wholly unable to pay the money in pursuance of the order of the Surrogate Court on account of his insolvency, he cannot be attached and punished for contempt as he could be if the money had actually been received from some other debtor. *Baucus v. Stover*, 89 N. Y. 1; *In re Rugg*, 3 N. Y. St. 224. It is also clear that an executor unable to pay his own debt, and thus unable to comply with the order of the Surrogate Court charging him with it as so much money in his hands, would not be guilty of embezzling the money and could not be convicted of crime as if the money actually came to his hands. *Baucus v. Stover*, *supra*.

The rule applies where the debt is due the estate from the executor named in the will, and from a firm of which he is a member. The amount of the debt must be treated as assets, although he and his firm were insolvent at the time when he accepted the trust. *Leland v. Fulton*, 1 Allen (Mass.) 531.

Debts due from an executor or administrator to their testator or intestate must be inventoried as assets of the estate. *Kelsey v. Smith*, 1 How. (Miss.) 68; *Burkhalter v. Norton*, 3 Dem. 610. An executor or administrator who is a legatee or heir, and also a debtor of the estate, is bound to apply his legacy or share in liquidation of such indebtedness. *Linthicum v. Polk*, 93 Md. 84; *Re Arkenburgh*, 69 N. Y. App. Div. 618.

Where a debtor becomes the executor of his creditor, it is his duty at once to charge himself as executor with the debt, and the Statute of Limitations will not run in his favour. *Schmelz v. McMenamin*, 119 Va. 223.

The indebtedness of an insolvent executor will be applied in the discharge of any compensation allowed him. *Freeman v. Freeman*, 4 Redf. Surr. (N.Y.) 211.

Where a note is made by the testator and executor jointly the burden is on the executor to shew that the note does not represent his debt. *Bard's Estate*, 13 Pa. Dist. 552.

As to property over which the deceased had a power of appointment, see the next chapter.

If interest upon money is actually received by an executor or administrator it must be accounted for. It is the earnings of a fund which belongs to the estate and enures for the use of the beneficiaries. *Loring v. Wise* (1917), 226 Mass. 231.

Where stock stood in the name of the deceased at the time a dividend was declared thereon the presumption is that it was the property of the deceased, and the personal representative is *prima facie* chargeable therewith. *In re McKinnon* (1918), 169 N. Y. Supp. 417.

CHAPTER IX.

WHAT ARE NOT ASSETS.

Sections 3, 6 and 7 of The Execution Act (R. S. O. 1916, ch. 80), are as follows:

3. The following chattels shall be exempt from seizure under any writ issued out of any Court, namely:

- (a) The beds, bedding and bedsteads (including cradles) in ordinary use by the debtor and his family.
- (b) The necessary and ordinary wearing apparel of the debtor and his family;
- (c) One cooking stove with pipes and furnishings, one other heating stove with pipes, one crane and its appendages, one pair of andirons, one set of cooking utensils, one pair of tongs and a shovel, one coal scuttle, one lamp, one table, six chairs, one washstand with furnishings, six towels, one looking glass, one hair brush, one comb, one bureau, one clothes press, one clock, one carpet, one cupboard, one broom, twelve knives, twelve forks, twelve plates, twelve tea cups, twelve saucers, one sugar basin, one milk jug, one tea pot, twelve spoons, two pails, one wash tub, one scrubbing brush, one blacking brush, one wash board, three smoothing irons, all spinning wheels and weaving looms in domestic use, one sewing machine and attachments in domestic use, thirty volumes of books, one axe, one saw, one gun, six traps, and such fishing nets and seines as are in common use, the articles in this subdivision enumerated not exceeding in value \$150;

- (d) All necessary fuel, meat, fish, flour and vegetables, actually provided for family use, not more than sufficient for the ordinary consumption of the debtor and his family for thirty days, and not exceeding in value \$40;
- (e) One cow, six sheep, four hogs, and twelve hens, in all not exceeding the value of \$100, and food therefor for thirty days, and one dog;
- (f) Tools and implements of, or chattels ordinarily used in the debtor's occupation, to the value of \$100; but if a specific article claimed as exempt be of a value greater than \$100 and there are not other goods sufficient to satisfy the writ such article may be sold by the Sheriff who shall pay \$100 to the debtor out of the net proceeds, but no sale of such article shall take place unless the amount bid therefor shall exceed \$100 and the cost of sale in addition thereto;
- (g) Fifteen hives of bees. 9 Edw. VII., c. 47, s. 3.

6. Chattels exempt from seizure shall, after the death of the debtor, be exempt from the claims of his creditors, and his widow shall be entitled to retain them for the benefit of herself and his family, or, if there is no widow, the family of the debtor shall be entitled to them. 9 Edw. VII. c. 47, s. 6.

7. The debtor, his widow or family, or, in the case of infants, their guardian, may select out of any larger number the chattels exempt from seizure. 9 Edw. VII. c. 47, s. 7.

In *Re Tatham* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 343, it was held that these exemptions are not, except as to funeral and testamentary expenses, assets in the hands of an executor or administrator for the payment of debts; that the effect of section 6 is to give the widow (or children where there is no widow) a parliamentary title to the exempted goods.

Of course the executor or administrator has no right to sell the exemptions for payment of funeral or testamentary expenses where there are any other assets applicable to payment. The widow, or children, would be entitled to have the assets marshalled for payment of these debts so as to relieve the exemptions.

In *Riggan v. Riggan*, 93 Va. 78, it was held that the administration of a husband's estate was liable to the widow for the value of property sold by such administrator which was absolutely exempted to the widow.

The right to select exempted chattels is, by section 7, given to the debtor, "his widow or family"; and the right to claim \$100 in lieu of the tools and implements of trade is a right given to the debtor personally; and the distinction may well have been intentional. The general exemptions which may be selected are articles used not alone by the debtor, but also by his family. The tools of the debtor's trade are given to him personally, but are not generally of value to the widow. *Pickering v. Thompson* (1911), 24 O. L. R. 386.

Within the rule that applicability to the payment of debts is the test of the character of property as assets of the estate of the deceased owner, the property exempt by statute from liability for debts does not constitute assets, unless the exemption relates only to process against the person of the owner. If the exemption continues after the death of the owner for the benefit of his family, then, unless it is only for a limited time, the property does not become assets of his estate. *Johnson v. Cross*, 66 N. Car. 167; *Griffith v. Com.*, 1 Dana 271.

Those gifts of money by the husband to the wife for clothes, or to purchase ornaments, or for her separate expenditure, which are usually called pin-money, are not assets of the estate. For an elaborate statement of the law as to pin-money see *Howard v. Digby*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 634, 37 R. R. 276.

Somewhat analogous to pin-money are the profits made by the wife from the sale of butter, eggs, poultry, fruit, etc., where the husband allows the wife to dispose of such produce. Where a wife had, from such savings, made a loan to her husband, it was held she was entitled to prove a claim against his estate for the amount, there being no deficiency of assets to pay debts. *Slanning v. Style*, 3 P. Wms. 339.

So the savings of a wife out of her allowance for housekeeping belong to the wife and not to the husband's estate. *Mangey v. Hungerford*, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 156. And goods purchased from such savings are the property of the wife and not assets of the estate. *Conway v. St. Louis* (1917), 12 O. W. N. 264. See, however, the judgment of Riddell, J., in *Southby v. Southby* (1917), 40 O. L. R. 434, citing the judgment of Page Wood, V.C., in *Barrack v. McCullough*, 3 K. & J.: "Any money given to her by her husband for household expenses or for dress, or the like . . . would belong to the husband."

The wearing apparel of a married woman is presumed to belong to her husband, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and need not be accounted for by her executor. *In re Hall*, 70 Vt. 458. In *Coffinberry v. Madden*, 30 Ind. App. 360, it was held that a watch, chain and charm, a ring and a diamond stud, worth \$500, were not within the meaning of a statute providing that wearing apparel of the deceased should not be considered as assets.

Money voted to executors as officers of a corporation in which the estate was largely interested, and the testator an officer at the time of his death, as extra compensation for their services as such officers, in accordance with a usage of long standing, was held not to be assets of the estate. *Re Schaefer*, 65 N. Y. App. Div. 378, reversing 34 Misc. 34.

An executor is not chargeable with assets which never come to his hands and of which he has no knowledge. *O'Brain v. Wilson*, 33 So. (Miss.). 946.

Property disposed of by the deceased by a valid gift *mortis causa* is not assets of the estate to which the executor is entitled. *Deneff v. Helms*, 42 Or. 161; unless such property is required for payment of debts of the deceased.

Section 57 of The Trustee Act provides that "property over which a deceased person had a power of appointment, which he might have exercised for his own benefit without the assent of any other person, shall be assets for the payment of his debts where the same is appointed by his will; and, under an execution against the personal representatives of such deceased person, such assets may be seized and sold after the deceased person's own property has been exhausted."

This is but a re-statement of the law as laid down in *Fleming v. Buchanan* (1853), 3 D. M. & G. 976, 98 R. R. 401, where it was held that freehold estates over which a testator has a general power of appointment, and which he appoints by his will, are assets for the payment of his debts, but are only applicable for that purpose after all the testator's own property has been previously so applied.

Property appointed by will under a general power is assets for the payment of debts of the appointor, and is not regarded as the property of the donor of the power distributable by the donee thereof. In such a case the property is treated as assets of the testator exercising the power, and the assets so appointed are regarded as property bequeathed by him. Where therefore, the donee of a general testamentary power of appointment over a fund borrowed money, and as security covenanted with the lender that he would make a will appointing that the loan should be a first charge on the fund, and made a will accordingly, it was held that the lender was not entitled to priority as regards the fund over the appointor's general creditors. *Beyfus v. Lawley* (1903), A. C. 411, affirming *In re Lawley* (1902), 2 Ch. 797.

The power must, of course, be exercised; but, provided the power is exercised, the estate becomes assets.

An advancement made by the testator in his lifetime is not a part of the estate to be inventoried, though the will declares that the advancement shall be deemed a part of the residue of the estate for the purpose of distribution among the legatees, and that the amount of the advancement shall be deducted from the share of the child advanced; the whole design and operation of such a clause being to designate the mode in which distribution shall be made in order to insure perfect equality among the legatees. *Black v. Whitall*, 9 N. J. Eq. 572.

The price for which a legatee sells his interest in the estate is not a part of the estate in the sense that he may be charged with the receipt of assets, since the transaction in no way disturbs the estate or affects any claimant, but merely substitutes one person for another to receive the legacy. *Ristone v. Kurtz*, 99 Iowa, 338.

CHAPTER X.

ADVERTISING FOR CREDITORS.

Having collected the assets of the deceased, one of the first and principal duties of the executor or administrator is the payment of the debts and liabilities of the deceased. What is the proper performance of the duties of an executor or administrator in this respect? It is ascertaining the debts and liabilities due or owing by the deceased's estate, the payment of such debts and liabilities, and the legal and proper distribution of the estate among the persons entitled. Per Jessel, M.R., *Sharp v. Lush*, 10 Ch. D. 468.

Much of the learning in the English text books on the order of administration of assets is of no importance here, owing to the fact that priority among different classes of debts has long been abolished in Ontario. See section 53 of The Trustee Act. . But because the deceased must be decently and properly buried, and because the executor or administrator is personally liable for the costs of and incidental to the proper administration of the estate, these expenses are a first charge upon the moneys come to the hands of the personal representative.

Before the debts or legacies are paid, or, in cases of intestacy, before any distribution is made, the executor or administrator should see that the proper advertisement for creditors' claims is published. Section 56 of the Trustee Act provides:

“(1) Where a . . . personal representative has given such or the like notices as, in the opinion of the Court in which such . . . personal representative is sought to be charged, would have been directed to be given by the Supreme Court in an . . . administration suit, for creditors and others to send in to such . . . personal representative, their claims

against the estate of the testator or intestate, at the expiration of the time named in the notices, or the last of the notices, for sending in such claims, he may distribute the . . . assets of the testator or intestate, or any part thereof, amongst the persons entitled thereto, having regard to the claims of which he has then notice, and shall not be liable for the assets, or any part thereof, so distributed to any person of whose claim he had not notice at the time of the distribution."

This section is the same as sec. 29 of The Law of Property Amendment Act, 1859 (England), which was considered in *In re Cary and Lott's Contract* (1901), 2 Ch. 463. The executors duly advertised for creditors' claims and paid all claims sent in. They then conveyed the real estate to the devisees "subject to a charge for the payment of any money which the personal representatives of the testator are liable to pay." Subsequently the grantees in this conveyance agreed to sell a portion of the property and the purchasers demanded an indemnity against any outstanding debts and liabilities of the testator. The Court held the grantees could make a conveyance free from any contingent liability for unknown debts, and the purchaser was not entitled to an indemnity.

Prior to the passing of this provision an executor remained liable to creditors notwithstanding all precautions on the executor's part and want of notice of claims, and, indeed, absolute safety could be obtained only under an administration judgment.

"In my opinion a prudent and reasonable executor ought to advertise for creditors as soon as possible after the testator's death, and when he has notice of any claim, *prima facie*, he ought not to proceed to pay the legatees without making due provision for all the claims of which he has had notice." Romer, J. *In re McKay, Mosley v. McKay* (1897), 2 Ch. 518.

The advertisement should, as far as possible, follow the words of the Act. Besides calling for claims

against the estate, it should state that the effect of non-compliance with it will be the exclusion of persons failing to comply therewith from participation in the estate to be divided. A notice stating that "Parties having claims against the estate are also required to file the same by said date," is not sufficient. *Stewart v. Snyder*, 30 Ont. R. 110, 27 A. R. 423. A form of advertisement will be found at the end of this chapter.

An advertisement under section 56 of The Trustee Act, calling upon "creditors and others" to send in their claims against the estate, is broad enough to cover next of kin; and the statute is applicable to claims for distributive shares of the assets, as well as to claims for debts and demands in the nature of debts. *Re Ashman* (1908), 15 O. L. R. 42; *Newton v. Sherry*, 1 C. P. D. 246; *Re Moore*, 9 O. W. N. 282.

In England it is the practice to insert the advertisement in the *London Gazette* in addition to a newspaper having a local circulation, and in *Wood v. Weightman*, L. R. 13 Eq. 434, it was held that the executors were not entitled to the protection of the statute where this was not done. This is not, however, the practice in Ontario, and in *Re Cameron, Mason v. Cameron*, 15 P. R. 272, Boyd, C., held it was not necessary to advertise in the *Ontario Gazette*, "as few persons see or read the *Gazette*." See also *Re Ashman* (1908), 15 O. L. R. 44.

In a subsequent case Street, J., said the notice should be "published in the localities where claimants against the estate resided, or else in the *Ontario Gazette* if their residence were unknown." *Stewart v. Snyder*, 30 Ont. R. 110. As far as this relates to the necessity of publication in the *Gazette* it would seem to be a mere dictum, as the case went off on the insufficiency of the advertisement. Where there is a probability of the deceased having creditors to whom notice in a local paper would be of no value, for instance in the case of a merchant, it might be prudent to adver-

tise in the *Gazette* in addition to a local paper. In a subsequent case an application was made to Street, J., for an order for payment of money out of Court, and he directed an advertisement for creditors in a local paper and the *Gazette*. *Re Daubney* (1902), 1 O. W. R. 773. It is submitted that the practice indicated by the Chancellor in *Re Cameron* is correct.

Not less than three insertions, generally four, are ordered, and a month's notice should be given from the first publication and the time fixed for distribution. *In re Bracken, Doughty v. Townson*, 43 Ch. D. 1. Three weeks notice was considered too short a time. *Wood v. Weightman, supra*.

An advertisement for creditors' claims does not exonerate an executor or administrator if he had actual notice of a claim before distribution, even though the creditor has not filed a claim in response to a notice asking him to do so. *The Carling Brewing Co. v. Black*, 6 Ont. R. 441; *Scottish Equitable v. Beatty*, 29 L. R. Ir. 290; *In re Land Credit Co. of Ireland v. Ireland*, 21 W. R. 135.

Under the similar English Statute it was held that an executor who had distributed the assets of his testator after issuing advertisements and taking the steps pointed out by the Act, had the same protection as if he had administered the estate under a decree of the Court; and if he should have retained any legacies as trustee after appropriating them for the benefit of the *cestui que trust*, he will no longer be under any liability *qua* executor. *Clegg v. Rowland*, L. R. 3 Eq. 368; *Hunter v. Young*, 4 Exch. Div. 256.

Notice of a claim or demand to one of two or more executors is sufficient. *Smith v. Smith*, 1 Cr. & M. 231, 39 R. R. 762. "If there be two trustees, each of whom has received a notice of a distinct charge, it would be the duty of both to act upon the notices received by each, and to deal with the fund according to the priority of the charges. To this extent and in this event, therefore, it may be said that notice to one trustee is

notice to both. *In re Wyatt* (1892), 1 Ch. 188, affd. *sub nom. Ward v. Duncombe*, 1893, A. C. 369.

Where an executor has properly advertised for creditors, and has sufficient to pay all claims of which he has notice, and pays them in full, but another creditor subsequently appears whose claim added to the others would have created a deficiency, the executor is protected. The unpaid creditor's only remedy is to compel the other creditors to refund rateably the amount which they received in excess of the amount which would have been payable to them had all the claims been known to the executor. *Leitch v. Molsons Bank*, 27 Ont. R. 261; *Doner v. Ross*, 19 Gr. 229; *Chamberlain v. Clark*, 9 A. R. 273.

If a creditor does not come in until some individual legatees have received their legacies in full and there remains in the hands of the executors certain goods to pay the other legatees, it would appear that the creditor is entitled to receive out of the funds of the unpaid legatees, not the whole of his debt, but only part of it, bearing the same proportion to the whole as the legacies given to those legatees bore to the whole amount given by the will; and that he must seek payment of the balance of his debt, in proper proportions, from those legatees who have been actually paid. *Gillespie v. Alexander*, 3 Russ. Ch. Ca. 136. See, however, *Davies v. Nicholson*, 2 DeG. & J. 693, where it was held that the rule does not apply where the estate has not been administered by the Court, but this seems doubtful in view of the more recent decisions in *Clegg v. Rowland* and *Hunter v. Young*, *ante*.

So where, on a deficiency of assets, creditors who have filed their claims have been paid interim dividends thereon. It has long been the practice of the Court to allow creditors who, either by inadvertence, or relying upon their securities, fail to come in and prove their claims within the time limited by the notice to creditors, to come in at any time while the funds of the estate are in Court, and establish their

claims as creditors of the estate: *Lashley v. Hogg*, 11 Ves. 602. And over a century and a half ago the Court of Chancery, in *Ex p. Styles and Pickart*, 1 Atk. 208, prescribed the conditions upon which that relief might be obtained, which, with one exception, have been recognized ever since. In that case Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said, "Upon the common equity of this Court, if creditors will make an affidavit that they have not read the *Gazette*, they will be admitted, so as not to disturb the former dividend, and by that means must, in the first place, be brought up equal to the creditors under the former dividend, before the commissioners can proceed to make a second."

The only case in which this rule seems to have been modified (if accurately reported) was *Ex p. Long*, 2 Bro. C. C. 50, where Lord Chancellor Thurlow held that when creditors who had not received a former dividend were allowed to come in and prove their debts, they should only be allowed future dividends *pari passu* with the other creditors. But Lord Redesdale, L.C., in *Re Wheler*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 242, said: "I have observed a practice here (in Ireland) different from that in England; that when a creditor comes forward to prove after a dividend has been made, he is not allowed any benefit of that dividend, but is only admitted to receive his share of the future dividends. I do not think this is warranted by the statute. It may be that a creditor has kept back from some fraudulent intent, or with a view to delay the proceedings; in such a case the practice may be proper. But where everything on the part of the creditor has been fair, and the delay has been occasioned by accident, or unavoidable circumstances (as, for instance, in the case of a foreign creditor who cannot have received notice in time) the commissioners ought to apply the fund in the first place to put such creditor on a footing with the others. If the effects are not sufficient for that the other creditors can have no further dividend; if

there be enough all must take alike in the future dividend."

And in a note, the reporter adds: "It is now the constant practice to permit creditors, without an order, to proceed after a dividend, and in the first place to direct them to be paid equal to those that had proved before, and then to direct a general distribution of the residue. Lord Redesdale, in conformity with this, reformed a practice which had prevailed in Ireland to the contrary." See also *In re McMurdo* (1902), 2 Ch. 684.

The advertisement for creditors must be in the English language. The Legislature of New Jersey passed an Act requiring that all judicial sales be advertised in a German newspaper. The Chancellor held that notwithstanding this Act, the advertisement must be printed in English, quoting from 4 and 5 Geo. II., which provides that all judicial proceedings after 1733 shall be published in the English language. 27 C. L. J. 492.

In *Re Ringwell*, 5 Ohio N. P. 496, it was held that the advertisement must be printed in the English language although the deceased was a German and nearly all his business transactions had been made with Germans. And see the remarks of McLennan, J.A., in *Uffner v. Lewis*, 27 A. R. p. 249.

There is no duty cast upon an executor or administrator to ascertain the creditors, if any, of the parties entitled to share in the estate either as heirs or legatees, or to notify them by advertisement or otherwise of his intention to distribute the estate, and he assumes no risk, so far as such creditors are concerned, in paying the heirs or legatees the shares to which they are entitled. *American Agl. Co. v. Scrimger* (1917), 130 Md. 389.

An advertisement to send in claims does not amount to a promise to pay statute barred debts: *Scott v. Jones*, 4 Cl. & F. 382; nor does it stop the

running of the Statute of Limitations: *Re Stephens*, 43 Ch. D. 39.

The following is the usual form of Notice to Creditors, and, it is believed, contains everything necessary to comply with the statute:—

NOTICE TO CREDITORS.

In the Matter of the Estate of A.B., late of the
of in the County of
(occupation), Deceased.

NOTICE is hereby given pursuant to section 56 of The Trustee Act (R. S. O. 1914, Chapter 121) that all creditors and others having claims or demands against the estate of the said A.B., who died on or about the day of 19 , are required on or before the day of , 19 , to send by post prepaid, or deliver, to C.D. (name and address) the executor of the last will and testament of the said deceased (or the administrator of the estate of the said deceased) their Christian names and surnames, addresses and descriptions, the full particulars of their claims, a statement of their accounts, and the nature of the securities (if any) held by them.

AND take notice that after such last mentioned date the said executor (or administrator) will proceed to distribute the assets of the said deceased among the parties entitled thereto, having regard only to the claims of which he shall then have notice, and that the said executor will not be liable for the said assets or any part thereof to any person or persons of whose claims notice shall not have been received by him at the time of such distribution.

X. Y.

Solicitor for the said executor.

Dated the day of 19

CHAPTER XI.

PAYMENT OF DEBTS.

A creditor of an estate cannot be prejudicially affected by the terms of a will. His rights are fixed and determined by the law and not in any manner controlled by the will of his debtor. A creditor's rights to be paid out of the assets of his debtor's estate does not depend upon testamentary provisions, but is secured by the law, and is the same and none other, both in testate and intestate estates. Both the executor and administrator take the property of the deceased person precisely as it was left at the time of decease, whether such condition is the result of the operation of law or the act of the party himself. *Richardson v. Richardson*, 87 Ill. App. 354.

The duty of an executor or administrator is, after paying the funeral expenses and collecting the assets, to pay the just debts and satisfy the just claims against the testator's estate. But it is clearly his duty not to waste an estate not his own, which he is administering for the benefit of others, in satisfying demands which are equally untenable in law and in equity. Per Bowen, L.J., in *In re Rownson, Field v. White*, 29 Ch. D. 363.

The general rule that partnership assets are to be first applied in payment of partnership debts, and the individual assets of the partners in payment of their individual debts, applies equally in the distribution of the estate of a deceased partner, thereby giving partnership debts priority over individual debts in the distribution of partnership assets, and individual debts a corresponding right in the distribution of individual assets. *Ridgeway v. Clare*, 19 Beav. 111, 105 R. R. 80; *Baker v. Dawbarn*, 19 Gr. 113.

Section 52 (1) of The Trustee Act provides that "A personal representative may pay or allow any

debt or claim on any evidence that he thinks sufficient." Sub-sec. (2) deals with the power of such representative to compromise claims, and will be dealt with hereafter. Notwithstanding the broad language of the above section a personal representative has not an absolute power to pay every claim presented, and must use ordinary common sense, and exercise a reasonable discretion in the consideration of claims made against the estate. In *Re Williams*, 27 Ont. R. 405, the executors had paid a note of the testator for \$2,000, although they knew the note was made without consideration and was a gift by the testator to the payee, and therefore not legally enforceable. The Judge of the Surrogate Court held the note was a "claim," and the executors were protected under the statute; but a Divisional Court reversed the judgment and held the statute did not authorize the payment, "for they had evidence before them rebutting the *prima facie* presumption arising from the signature of the testator, and they had no further evidence to sustain the claim."

The case of *Re Samuel Williams' Audit*, 32 C. L. J. 130, would appear to have been wrongly decided, in view of the decision in *Re Williams*, unless it was decided on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence before the executors to rebut the presumption of consideration for the notes paid.

An executor or administrator may pay a *bona fide* claim against the estate although the Statute of Limitations would be a valid defence, but he would commit a devastavit if he paid a debt to a creditor who is prevented from enforcing it by the Statute of Frauds. And for the same reason an executor or administrator cannot retain as such a debt due to himself. There is this difference between a case under the Statute of Limitations and a case under the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Limitations does not destroy the debt but only the remedy, and it has been held that an executor may waive that defence in the case of a debt

which existed and appears to be well founded. *Norton v. Frecker*, 1 Atk. 526. But a parol contract within the Statute of Frauds, though not void to all intents and purposes as a valid agreement, is incapable of being enforced in an action either directly or indirectly. And if you have a contract which is not capable of being enforced either at law or in equity it does not create a debt or liability against the estate of the deceased. *In re Rownson, Field v. White*, 29 Ch. D. 358.

The privilege given to a personal representative of paying statute barred debts is an anomaly and ought not to be extended, and in *Midgley v. Midgley* (1893), 3 Ch. 282, the Court held that an executor could not pay such a debt after it had been judicially declared by a court of competent jurisdiction that it was barred by the statute.

And where a creditor brings an action to recover a debt, to which the Statute of Limitations might be a bar, the beneficiaries of the estate have a right to insist upon the statute as a defence thereto. *Re Rutherford*, 9 Q. W. N. 32, 34 O. L. R. 395. In the American courts the general rule is that a creditor whose claim is not barred by the Statute of Limitations is entitled to interpose the statute against claims which are barred, where the assets are not sufficient to pay all in full. *Re Kendrick*, 107 N. Y. 104. In *Budgett v. Budgett* (1895), 1 Ch. 202, Kekewich, J., held that a trustee could not be compelled to set up the statute as a defence, drawing a distinction between a trustee and an executor.

Where the parties interested do not raise the defence of the Statute of Limitations there is no duty on the Court to do so. *Alston v. Trollope*, 35 Beav. 466, 147 R. R. 261.

An executor will not be allowed for the payment of a debt of the testator which appears on its face to be illegal, e.g., to have been given for money lost at gaming. *Carter v. Cutting*, 5 Munf. (Va.) 223. But

notes given by the deceased for gaming debts and paid by the executor without knowledge on his part at the time of payment of the illegal consideration, will be allowed. *Coffee v. Ruffin*, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 487.

In *Re Hull*, 89 N. Y. S. 939, 97 App. Div. 258, it was held that claims which constituted debts of honor were not properly paid by the executor, and he was not entitled to credit therefor. And in *Re Van Buren*, 19 Misc. 373, 44 N. Y. S. 357, an administrator was refused allowance of the amount paid on a demand against the estate which had no legal foundation and which could not have been recovered.

See the remarks of Meredith, C.J.C.P., in *McEwan v. Toronto General Trusts Corporation* (1916), 36 O. L. R. p. 253, as to the danger of paying stale claims upon equivocal and uncertain evidence, where the alleged debtor cannot be heard in his own defence.

But if an executor, on competent advice, pays a claim *bona fide* made against the estate, the money paid is not on his death, even though paid under a mistake of law, an unadministered asset so as to vest in an administrator *de bonis non* a right of action to recover it back. *Mayhew v. Stone*, 26 S. C. R. 58. And if there is anything in the nature of a family arrangement as the origin of the alleged liability, for which a bond has been given, such bond is a sufficient consideration to support the demand. *Re Summers* (1902), 1 O. W. R. 523.

Maintenance gratuitously supplied by a parent to an infant cannot be claimed as a debt in the administration of his estate. *Re Cotterell's Estate*, L. R. 12 Eq. 566.

Although section 12 of The Evidence Act requires some corroborative evidence to support an action against the estate of a deceased person, if an executor or administrator is satisfied that the claim is just and proper it may be allowed without such corroboration.

Rawlinson v. Scholes, 79 L. T. 350; *In re Griffen*, 79 L. T. 442.

As to evidence to support claims for personal services to the deceased see *Re Wever's Estate*, at end of this chapter.

On an audit of an executor's accounts the Judge is not bound to disallow payments made by the executor because there was no corroboration in support of the creditor's claim. The responsibility for payment falls upon the executor; he must use care and judgment in considering the claims presented to him, and if he does so fairly and honestly, and in the interest of the estate, he will, on passing his accounts, be allowed such as he thought fit to pay. *Re Blank Estate*, 5 Terr. L. R. 230.

With respect to contingent debts and liabilities, a question of great importance formerly arose; namely, whether an executor can safely make payments of legacies or deliver over a residue where there is an outstanding covenant of the testator which has never yet been broken, and which may not be broken hereafter. The question was discussed in several early cases, and the result seems to be that an executor, with notice of even a possible liability, cannot safely make payment of legacies or distribute the residue. If he does he will have to answer to the claim of the creditor whose contingent claim has ripened into a certain claim. Thus in *Taylor v. Taylor*, L. R. 10 Eq. 477, it was held that where executors of a shareholder in a joint stock company, which was a going concern at the time of the testator's death, paid a legacy without providing for any contingent liability in respect of the shares, they were liable to pay the amount of the legacy in satisfaction of calls thereafter made.

In *In re Hyatt*, 38 Ch. D. 609, the testator had mortgaged his real estate and his executors, without making provision for the mortgaged debt, applied the whole of the personalty in payment of the claims of ordinary creditors. The mortgaged property proved

insufficient to pay the debt and it was held that the executors could not escape liability.

Under The Bank Act (3-4 Geo. V., ch. 9, sec. 53), no person holding stock in a bank as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee is personally subject to any liability as a shareholder; but the estate and funds in his hands are liable. Where administrators parted with assets in their hands without providing for the liability on bank shares owned by the intestate they were held guilty of a devastavit, and so rendered themselves personally liable. It was further held that the Statute of Limitations afforded a defence to the claim of devastavit. The cause of action in so far as it was based upon a claim for double liability upon the shares was not barred, for it was based upon contract, and the time did not begin to run until there was a call, and so the liability of the administrators was not barred for that was the liability of the deceased and his estate. In the result there was no personal liability by the administrators, but the beneficiaries to whom the stock had been transferred were held to be liable for the shares respectively transferred to them. *Clarkson v. McLean* (1918), 13 O. W. N. 371; 42 O. L. R. 1.

In *Whittaker v. Kershaw*, 45 Ch. D. 320, the defendant was a residuary legatee. The executors handed over to her, as the residuary estate, the certificates of some shares not fully paid up, and also a sum in cash. No transfer of the shares was made. Subsequently a call was made on the shares and the defendant refused to pay. An action was then brought against the executors in whose name the shares stood, and they were compelled to pay the call. They then applied to the defendant but she refused to recoup them, and they sold the shares, under an order of the Court, but did not realize sufficient to pay the calls, and for the balance this action was brought. The defendant contended she was not liable to refund, because the executors had paid over the residue with

notice of the debt. The Court of Appeal held that, though where an executor makes a payment to a legatee with notice of a debt due he cannot call upon the legatee to refund on being subsequently compelled to pay the debt, the same rule does not apply where the executor has merely notice of a liability; and, that notice of a liability for calls is not a debt, because no debt arises in respect of calls until the call has been duly made; and, therefore, notice of the liability in the present case was no bar to their right to recover.

Where such contingent liabilities exist the executor is entitled to retain sufficient assets to meet them, or to be indemnified against them. *Simmons v. Bollard*, 3 Mer. 547. In *Williams v. Headland*, 4 Giff. 505, 141 R. R. 302, in an administration suit, the executors claimed to retain a part of the residue as an indemnity against possible liability in respect of unregistered mining shares. The Court refused the claim, but required the residuary legatee to undertake to answer such liability.

The liabilities of an executor or administrator in respect of covenants in leases, and in conveyances, is provided for in sections 54 and 55 of The Trustee Act.

These sections have been held to be retrospective. *Smith v. Smith*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 384; *Re Green*, 2 DeG. F. & J. 121. The protection extends to property held on a fee-farm rent. *Millar v. Sinclair* (1903), 1 Ir. R. 150.

On making an order for the distribution of the estate of a testator the Court will not set aside any part of his assets to indemnify his executors against possible liabilities which may arise in respect of leases formerly held by him, unless there is privity of estate between the executors and the lessors. *In re Nixon*, *Gray v. Bell* (1904), 1 Ch. 638.

It is unnecessary to reserve funds to meet contingent liabilities when the estate is distributed under an order or judgment of the Court, provided the executor or administrator fairly represents everything to

the Court. *Smith v. Smith* (1861), 1 Dr. & Sm. 384; *In re Nixon*, *supra*.

Creditors of the deceased domiciled abroad are entitled to be paid *pari passu* with the local creditors. *Milne v. Moore*, 24 Ont. R. 456; *In re Kloebe*, 27 Ch. D. 175.

It is the duty of an executor to pay interest bearing debts as early as possible, and he may be liable if he does not do so unless he can shew that the assets were insufficient to pay the debts immediately. *Seaman v. Everard*, 2 Lev. 40. So if an executor may save the penalty of a bond by payment of a less sum than that specified in the condition, or by other performance of the condition, and he neglect to do so, it will be a devastavit in him if he have assets. 1 Saund. 333.

Generally speaking interest is not allowable where from the nature of the claim filed against the estate no interest is due; and the claims of creditors with whom settlement is made in the ordinary course of administration are usually dealt with on the footing they occupied in this respect at the death of the deceased. Claims bearing interest by their terms should be paid with interest accruing before and after the deceased's death, according to their tenor; but interest is not usually allowed on unliquidated claims. *Re Kirkpatrick*, 10 P. R. 4; *Reber's Estate*, 143 Pa. St. 308. Where the estate is insolvent interest is not computed beyond the death of the deceased. *Koepler's Estate*, 4 Pa. Dist. 346.

Where an executor is in funds, a debt due to himself must be considered as paid and can no longer draw interest. *Sebring v. Keith*, 2 Hill (S.C.) 340. But he cannot be prevented from charging interest up to the time of final settlement where he has no right to retain any part of the assets in payment of his claim until it has been allowed by the Court on a final accounting. *Re Saunders*, 4 Misc. (N.Y.) 28. He cannot, however, prolong the running of interest on his

claim by delaying the settlement of the estate, and he will be allowed interest only for the period within which, by the exercise of due diligence, he might have settled the estate. *In re Richmond*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 567.

Where the testator's son was directed to pay the debts and to pay the widow \$150 per year during her life, and the real estate was devised to the same son, it was held that the effect of this was to charge the payment of both the debts and annuity upon the land so devised to the son. *Re Thomas* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 660. He received the fund out of which the payment was to be made. *Robson v. Jardine*, 22 Gr. 420, 425.

Where an executor or administrator pays debts in full the presumption arises that he had sufficient assets to pay all the debts of the estate. *Godkin v. Watson*, 9 O. W. N. 251.

Although priority among creditors has been abolished in Ontario (see sec. 53 of The Trustee Act), the funeral expenses have the first claim on the assets in the hands of the executor or administrator. "It appears to me," said Jessel, M.R., "that the executor is liable to pay the funeral expenses, even without an order on his part, if he has any assets available for the purpose; and it is also decided that the funeral expenses are a first charge on the assets." *Sharp v. Lush*, 10 Ch. D. 472.

Testamentary expenses and the costs of administration are the next charges on the assets of the estate. As to what are included in "testamentary expenses," see Chapter XIII. Costs of administration includes whatever sum is allowed an executor or administrator for his care, pains and trouble and time in and about the estate.

Suppose a debtor dies domiciled in Ontario, and leaves assets in a foreign country by the law of which there are rules of priority in the payment of debts (as in England), and administration is duly taken out in Ontario, and also in the place of *situs* of the assets,

which rule is to govern in the administration of the assets? The law of the domicile? or the law of the *situs*? In Story's Conflict of Laws, that eminent writer states his opinion to be that in regard to creditors the administration of the assets of deceased persons is to be governed altogether by the law of the country where the executor and administrator acts, and from which he derived his authority to collect them. And this seems to be a correct statement of the law.

In *In re Kloebe*, 27 Ch. D. 175, the Court held that in the administration of an English estate of a deceased domiciled abroad, foreign creditors are entitled to dividends *pari passu* with English creditors. Pearson, J., cites a passage from Westlake's Private International Law as laying down the law correctly: "Every administrator, principal or ancillary, must apply the assets reduced into possession under his grant in paying all the debts of the deceased, whether contracted in the jurisdiction from which the grant issued or out of it, and whether owing to creditors domiciled or resident in that jurisdiction or out of it, and in that order of priority which according to the nature of the debts or of the assets is prescribed by the laws of the jurisdiction from which the grant issued." He then adds: "All that is there said, and no doubt correctly, is that although *mobilia sequuntur personam* the collection, the *lex fori* must be observed; so also it is to be observed in the administration of those assets when collected. Therefore if a man dies domiciled in England, possessing assets in France, the French assets must be collected in France, and distributed according to the law of France. If the French creditors are entitled according to that law to be paid in priority, that rule must be observed, because it is the *lex fori*, and for no other reason. But if it should happen that a man died domiciled in France, leaving assets in England, those assets can only be collected under an English grant of administration, and being

so collected must be distributed according to the law of England. No doubt in a case in which French assets were distributed so as to give French creditors, as such, priority, in distributing the English assets the Court would be astute to equalize the payments, and take care that no French creditors could come in and receive anything till the English creditors had been paid a proportionate amount. But subject to that, which is for the purpose of doing what is equal and just to all the creditors, I know of no law under which English creditors are to be preferred to foreigners. On the other hand the rule is that they are all to be treated equally, subject to what priorities the law may give them from whatever part of the world they come, and in the case cited of *De La Vega v. Vianna*, 1 B. & Ad. 284, Lord Tenterden says: 'A person suing in this country must take the law as he finds it; he cannot, by virtue of any regulation in his own country, enjoy greater advantages than other suitors here, and he ought not, therefore, to be deprived of any superior advantage which the law of this country may confer. He is to have the same rights which all the subjects of this Kingdom are entitled to. And this has been the rule in this country, as far as I know, from the earliest time.' "

He then refers to *Cook v. Gregson*, 2 Drew. 268, before V.C. Kindersley. "The facts are these: A man died domiciled in Ireland, he had property both in Ireland and England. The same persons proved in both countries. At that time the law in Ireland gave judgment creditors priority over simple contract creditors. Before the Irish creditors had been paid Irish assets were transmitted to this country, and it was said that inasmuch as the transmission had occurred, they had become English assets, and the Irish judgment creditors must remain in the same position as the other creditors. But the Vice-Chancellor said that was not so. The Irish judgment creditors had priority in Ireland, and were entitled to be paid

according to the Irish rules of priority—a matter no one can dispute, nor could that case have been cited before me but for the words of a sentence in the Vice-Chancellor's judgment in which he says: 'It so happens that in this case the same persons are executors in both countries, but the case must be decided on the same ground as if they were different. Now, if they were different persons, it is clear that the duty of each would be this: he must take care first to pay the debts owing in the country in which he is executor, and then, and not till then, if there is a surplus he may send it to the other country.' This is to say, a man who takes out a grant as executor or administrator is bound to deal with the property under that grant, according to the laws of the country which gives him the grant, and accordingly if you take out administration in Ireland you must administer all the assets in the Irish jurisdiction according to the law there, and you have no right to get rid of the assets there in order to give priorities to persons which they would not have in Ireland."

The only case directly opposed to the law as laid down by Story is *Wilson v. Dunsany*, 18 Beav. 293, where Romily, M.R., held that the personal assets of a deceased must be administered on the principle of the law of domicil. In the *Kloebe case* Pearson, J., said: "I may add that there appears to be some mistake in *Wilson v. Lady Dunsany*; it is unfortunate that the case was ever reported."

Professor Dicey thus states the results of the authorities: *First*. The assets in the hands of the English administrator, wherever collected, are liable for all the debts of the deceased, whether incurred in England or a foreign country. *Secondly*. In the payment of creditors all questions of priority are, it would seem, governed wholly by the English law (*lex fori*).

The principle of English law appears to be, that every question as to the order in which debts are to be

paid is a matter of procedure, and therefore to be determined in accordance with the *lex fori*, and hence that an English administrator, in reference to the assets which he is administering under an English grant, must follow the order of priority prescribed by English law; and this whether the creditor claiming payment be an English or a foreign creditor.

A suggestion, however, has been made that where the deceased has died domiciled abroad, and therefore the administration is an ancillary administration, the English administrator ought to look partly to the law of the deceased's domicile, in reference, at any rate, to the debts there contracted; but there does not appear to be any sufficient authority in support of this view, which is opposed to the marked tendency of English Courts to determine all matters of procedure, in the most extensive sense of that term, in accordance with the *lex fori*.

Thirdly. The principle that an English administrator must, in the administration of the deceased's estate, follow English law exclusively, applies, it would seem, only to assets which he holds as English administrator.

If, for example, he has in England assets collected in a foreign country, *e.g.*, Ireland, under an Irish grant, then these foreign assets should be dealt with in accordance with the law of Ireland. The same person in effect fills a two-fold character, *viz.*, that of an English administrator and of an Irish administrator, and such Irish assets he holds and must administer as an Irish administrator.

It must be borne in mind that the word "administration" is here not used in its most extensive sense: it here means simply the clearing of the deceased's estates from liabilities; it does not include the distribution of the residue or surplus which remains after the estate is cleared among the persons entitled to succeed beneficially thereto. This point is manifestly determinable in accordance with the rules governing beneficial succession.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

1. The deceased has died owing to A, an Englishman, a debt of £20, contracted in England, and to B, a Frenchman, a debt of £30, contracted in France. The assets in the hands of the deceased's English administrator are liable for both debts. *In re Kloebe, ante.*

2. The deceased owes £20 to A on an English judgment (which by the law of England is entitled to priority over a simple contract debt), and owes £20 to B on a judgment recovered in Ontario, which for this purpose is a simple contract debt. The £20 due on the English judgment must be paid by the English administrator to A in priority to the £20 due to B on the Ontario judgment. *Cook v. Gregson, ante; Harris v. Saunders*, 4 B. & C. 411.

3. The deceased, an Englishman residing in Venezuela, has executed an instrument to secure payment to A of £1,000. A registers this instrument in the form prescribed by the law of Venezuela, and by that law becomes entitled to have his debt paid out of the general assets in priority to other creditors. This does not entitle A to priority of payment out of the assets administered in England. *Pardo v. Bingham*, L. R. 6 Eq. 485.

Where a creditor is also a legatee under the will the executor may have to consider whether the debt has been paid by the legacy. The rule as to the satisfaction of debts by legacies is laid down in the leading case of *Talbot v. Shrewsbury*, Pr. Ch. 394, as follows: "If one being indebted to another in a sum of money dies, and by his will gives him a sum of money as great as or greater than the debt without taking any notice at all of the debt, that this shall nevertheless be in satisfaction of the debt so that he shall not have both the debt and the legacy."

Judges have frequently expressed their disapproval of this rule, and the Courts have laid hold of

slight circumstances to get rid of it. It does not apply where the debt is a current account and so uncertain, or on a negotiable bill of exchange or other document: *Carr v. Eastabrooke*, 3 Ves. 561; or if the legacy is contingent, or uncertain as to amount, as if it is the whole of or a part of the residue, or a life interest, or is deferred. Wms. Exors. 10th ed., 1042; *Crichton v. Crichton* (1895), 2 Ch. 853. And a legacy as to which no time was fixed for payment was held not to be a satisfaction of a debt payable within three months of the testator's death. *Re Horlock, Calham v. Smith* (1895), 1 Ch. 516.

If the debt was contracted subsequently to the will, no presumption can arise, for the testator could not have intended that a legacy should go in satisfaction of a non-existing debt; and section 27 of The Wills Act cannot have the effect of altering the testator's intention at the time when he is making his will. *Graham v. Graham*, 1 Ves. 262; *Thomas v. Bennett*, 2 P. Wms. 343; *Jeff's v. Wood*, 2 P. Wms. 132.

In *Edmunds v. Low*, 3 K. & J. 318, it was held that a direction in a will to pay debts was not, of itself, sufficient to rebut the presumption; but in *In re Huish*, 43 Ch. D. 260, Kay, J., said: "Now what difference is there between a direction to pay debts and legacies, and a direction to pay debts only? There is none, because the gift of a legacy is in itself a direction that the legacy shall be paid. If, after giving a legacy to his creditor, the testator says: 'I direct my debt to be paid,' that means 'although I have given a legacy to my creditor, I direct my debt to him to be paid also.' It seems to me it makes no difference where the testator directs that his legacies shall be paid. Accordingly I think that the case of *Edmunds v. Low*, which appears to have drawn a distinction between a direction to pay debts and legacies, and a direction to pay debts only, was not sufficiently considered, and I find that the balance of authority is against it."

This was followed in our own Courts. *Re Dale* (1911), 3 O. W. N. 329, where the direction to pay was to pay debts only.

A further exception may be found in cases where the legacy and debt are of a different nature. A devise of land cannot be taken in satisfaction of a debt, because money and land are different things. *Coates v. Coates* (1898), 1 Ir. 258; *Goodfellow v. Burchett*, 2 Vern. 297; nor can a bequest of a specified chattel be in satisfaction of a debt. *Byde v. Byde* (1761), 1 Cox 44.

The fact that the creditor is the testator's wife or child makes no difference in the application of the rule. *Tolson v. Collins*, 4 Ves. 483; *Shadbolt v. Vanderplank*, 29 Beav. 405.

Parol evidence is admissible to shew whether or not the testator intended the legacy to be in addition to the gift. *In re Horlock, Calham v. Smith, supra*.

A testatrix by her will gave to Mrs. H. "my investment of 400 pounds and 300 pounds, together 700 pounds, Queensland stock, and 450 pounds Victoria Inscribed Government stock, in all 1,150 pounds, for her sole use and benefit absolutely." Mrs. H. had been an intimate friend of the testatrix for many years, and, in 1903, had borrowed 500 pounds from the testatrix for which she gave her promissory note. She paid interest in 1904, but gave no further acknowledgment. The testatrix died in 1917. There was some evidence that in 1911 the testatrix told Mrs. H. she "need not worry about the promissory note, as on her return home she would destroy the note." The note was not destroyed and was found among the deceased's papers. The executor claimed a right of retainer and Mrs. H. contended he had no right to retain the amount of a debt out of a legacy of stocks. Sargent, J., said that notwithstanding what was said by Kekewich, J., in *In re Akerman* (1891), 3 Ch. 212, 219, the right alleged was properly called one of retainer. Lord Cottingham, L.C., in *Cherry v. Boulthbee*

(1839), 4 My. & Cr. 442, 447, said that the right could only arise where there was a right to receive the debt, and the legacy or fund was payable by the person entitled to receive the debt. In *In re Taylor* (1894), 1 Ch. 671, Chitty, J., had deliberately used the word 'retainer' throughout his judgment, and said that the law was settled that as against a specific devisee, or in the case of a specific bequest of leaseholds or of chattels, there was no right of retainer. In order that the right might exist there must be money against money, and that the fact that the gift to the debtor was something like money, or which might be easily turned into money, did not give the executor the right alleged. The executor in the present case was not entitled to retain any part of the stocks against Mrs. H.'s debt.' *In re Savage, Cull v. Howard* (1918), 2 Ch. 146.

A son recovered judgment against the administrator of his mother's estate for \$2,496 for the board, lodging and care of his mother for the six years before action. In 1904 the plaintiff had given his mother a mortgage for a sum, which with interest, was more than sufficient to pay the judgment. Nothing had been paid on the mortgage and the remedy for the recovery was barred. It was held, however, that the debt remained and formed a part of the mother's estate and could be retained by the administrator and applied to extinguish the amount of the judgment. *Noecker v. Noecker* (1917), 41 O. L. R. 296. See also *Tillie v. Springer*, 21 O. R. 585.

In the English case just referred to there was no discussion as to the right of the executor to set-off the amount of the debt represented by the note (the remedy on which was evidently barred by the Statute of Limitations), but in the *Noecker* case this point was expressly before the Court, and Clute, J., after an exhaustive review of the authorities, held that although the statute had run against the demand on the

mortgage debt it could be set-off against the plaintiff's judgment.

In considering claims filed against the estate the executor or administrator is often perplexed to know just how to deal with demands made by near relations of the deceased for payment for personal services alleged to have been rendered to the deceased. It seldom happens there is anything in the shape of writing to evidence a contract of hiring, and what corroborative evidence there may be is frequently that of the husband, wife or children of the claimant consisting of "some loose expressions, heard in casual conversation, that he meant to make compensation."

Where services have been rendered by one person to another, and such services are of a kind that are generally paid for, the law implies a promise to pay the value of such services. To this proposition there are, however, several exceptions. Where the conduct, situation and relation of the parties are such that it appears that services were rendered without intention or expectation of payment, compensation therefor cannot be recovered. For instance, one neighbour cannot recover for services rendered another where the circumstances, instead of being such as to imply a promise to pay for the services, wholly negatives that presumption: *Davis v. Wilson*, 14 Ky. 30; and where a neighbour renders services to another greater than are ordinarily rendered but makes no demand for compensation until three years after they terminated the presumption is that they were gratuitous. *In re Draulich*, 14 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 341.

Another presumption is that services rendered by members of a family, one to the other, where such members are living together as a matter of mutual convenience, are rendered gratuitously. Within this exception the word "family" includes not only husband and wife, parents and children, but near and certain distant relatives, connected either by consanguinity or affinity, and, in some cases, adopted children, where

these members of the family are residing under the same roof.

The reason for this exception is founded on a legal presumption that where relatives are living together for mutual convenience the law will not imply a promise to pay for the services rendered. It all goes back to the contractual intention. If one renders a service to another without intention to charge for it—to ask for compensation—to lay the foundation for a legal liability, resting merely in the satisfaction which the performance of a kindly gratuitous act entails, then, no matter what construction is put upon the other's expressions of gratitude, whether they are mistakenly regarded in the light of "a lively sense of favours to come" or not, whether in the hope of some proportionate or disproportionate return, the doer of the act is not legally entitled to any compensation if his expectations are not realized. *Castle v. Edwards*, 63 Mo. App. 564; *Swires v. Parsons*, 5 Watts & S. 357.

"One who renders services to another voluntarily is not, in the absence of an express promise to pay therefor, entitled to compensation for such services. . . . The request which is necessary to entitle one to recover compensation for services rendered may be implied from circumstances, and the rule as generally stated is that, in the absence of family relationship, where one renders beneficial services for another, the law ordinarily presumes a request or a promise to pay what such services are reasonably worth, unless it is understood that they were to be rendered gratuitously, or unless they were rendered under circumstances which repel this presumption.

"Where services are rendered with the understanding that they are to be gratuitous, the law does not raise an implied promise to pay therefor, no matter how valuable the services may be; and no recovery can be had for services rendered by reason of friendship or from kindly, charitable or humane

motives. Where two persons understand that they are mutually rendering and receiving services, with no present design to make any pecuniary charge therefor, neither can recover for the services so rendered." 40 Cyc. 2812.

An intention not to charge for services rendered on request will not prevent a recovery if nothing has been said or done to justify a belief on the part of the one for whom they were rendered that they were gratuitous: *Hay v. Walker*, 65 Mo. 17; *Christianson v. McDermott*, 123 Mo. App. 448. But where services are performed by one person for another with the intention not to charge therefor, and are accepted on that understanding, the person rendering such services cannot subsequently, upon changing his mind, recover therefor. *Kansas v. Kansas*, 84 Kan. 778.

Such being the law between strangers, *a fortiori* the claims of members of a family for compensation for services rendered, the one to the other, must be established on a still wider and firmer basis. And where the claim is made against the estate after the death of the alleged debtor the presumption that the services were intended to be gratuitous may be so strong as to be rebutted only by proof of an express contract, or of circumstances so weighty as to raise the presumption of such contract. *Hardman's Admr. v. Crick*, 133 Am. St. Rep. 251. It is not enough to shew that valuable services were rendered. It must be shewn also that the plaintiff expected to receive compensation, and that the deceased so understood, by reason of a mutual understanding or otherwise, or that under the circumstances he ought so to have understood. Both propositions are essential and must be proved. *Leighton v. Nash* (1914), 111 Me. 525.

"In the case of near relatives or members of the same family, living together as one household, the law regards personal services rendered, and board and lodging or other necessities or comforts furn-

ished, as gratuitous, and in the absence of an express agreement to pay for the same or facts and circumstances from which such an agreement can be inferred, there can be no recovery therefor. Where, however, it appears that the parties at the time the services were rendered or the board and the like provided, contemplated and intended compensation, a recovery may be had; and while near relatives are the persons most frequently forming a household these rules are not confined to them but are applicable where one is taken into a family and thereafter treated as a member thereof, whether a relative or not. On the other hand it has been decided that although relationship, either by consanguinity or affinity, is a fact which tends to rebut the presumption of a promise to pay for services rendered, it does not, standing alone, overcome the presumption, but there must be evidence beyond that relationship that the creation of no debt was intended, in all cases except that of parent and child." 40 Cyc. 2815-6.

The cases cited in support of the last paragraph hardly bear out the statement of the text. They are cases of much more distant relationship than parent and child, viz.: brothers-in-law, grand-nephew, sister-in-law.

Parent and Child. The father, says Blackstone, has the benefit of his children's labour while they live with him and are maintained by him, and this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices and servants: 1 Bl. Com. 453. This right, like that of custody, rests on the parental duty of maintenance, and furnishes some compensation to the father for his own services rendered the child.

Whether the right remains absolute in the father until the child has attained full age is apparently a matter of doubt. It is certainly perfect while the period of the child's nurture continues, that is, up to the age of fourteen years. But if this is all, it can be of little consequence, because the child's labour and

services are for that period of little or no value; nor could compensation be thus afforded for the many years when the child was entirely helpless. All will admit that the father's right continues until the child reaches fourteen. And since the guardianship by nature extends through the full term of the child's minority; since, too, he may by will place a testamentary guardian of his own choice over the infant; since it is reasonable that the law should set off years of latter usefulness against years of earlier helplessness, in short, since the age of majority is fixed as the age when an infant becomes legally emancipated from his father's control, we may fairly assume that, all other things being equal, the father is actually entitled to the value of the child's labour until the latter becomes of age. This is the principle assumed by Blackstone and Reeve, though to such opinion Kent appears to yield a somewhat doubtful assent. Schouler Dom. Rel. 252.

The father has a right to the control of the person, education and conduct of his children until they attain the age of twenty-one years. "It seems to me to follow that if the father can dispose of the custody and tuition of his children by will until they attain the age of twenty-one, it must be because the law recognizes, to some extent, that he has himself an authority over the children till that age is reached." Bowen, L. J., *In re Agar-Ellis* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 317.

It follows that services rendered by infant children, members of the same family, are not rendered in expectation of reward. Such services are performed from motives of affection or mutual convenience, without any implied conditions of reward, and were so accepted, and therefore could not possibly create a contract. See the expression of Robinson, C.J., in *Sprague v. Nickerson*, *post*.

If infant children continue to reside with their parents after they attain their majority, they cannot recover for their services if there has been no agree-

ment or understanding, and no circumstances to warrant the inference that a money return was to be made. In *Peckham v. Depotty* (1890), 17 A. R. 273, the facts were these: The plaintiff, when four years old, had been placed by her father with the defendant, who was not a relative, to remain with him until she attained the age of eighteen, he agreeing to support her, send her to school, supply her with clothing, and give her certain articles when she was eighteen. She remained with the defendant until she was twenty years old, being treated as a member of the family. She sued for services performed after attaining the age of eighteen years. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that there was no implied right to remuneration for such services, and that in the absence of an express agreement for payment of wages she could not recover. Burton, J.A., said: "The fact that there has been no actual relationship between the parties does not appear to me to be an element in the case. The defendant was in fact *in loco parentis*." See also *Morris v. Hoyle* (1878), 28 C. P. 598.

Upon this principle Lord Mansfield always nonsuited slaves who had been brought to England and there commenced actions for wages. *R. v. Thames Ditton*, 4 Doug. 300. And where a person who had been a slave in the West Indies on an estate belonging to a lady, came with her to England and there continued in her services, Lord Kenyon held that he could not maintain an action for wages without some evidence of a promise to pay them, as there was no original contract for services for wages. *Alfred v. Fitzjames*, 3 Esp. 3.

"Services performed by a child for a parent are presumed to be gratuitous, and to entitle the child to compensation therefor they must have been rendered under a contract for payment, either express or implied; and the contract to pay will not be implied from the mere rendition of the services; but in addition

there must be facts and circumstances from which it may be inferred that pecuniary compensation was intended. Of course there may be recovery for such services when an express agreement or promise to pay is shewn, or it is made to appear that compensation therefor was expected and intended. While the statements and declarations of a parent with reference to the value and importance of services rendered him by his child, or shewing an intention to make compensation therefor, are to be considered in determining the right to payment for such services, yet loose general statements or declarations of gratitude or affection on the part of the parent, or mere general statements of intention to make compensation, or that he desired the child to be paid, or that the child ought to be paid, or should be paid for such services, do not entitle the child to a recovery. These rules apply to adult children who continue to reside with their parents as members of the family after attaining their majority, and are not confined to cases where the actual relationship of parent and child exist, but apply as well to children who are adopted as members of the family." 40 Cyc. 2816-8.

As between a parent and an adult child, any claim for compensation for services must be determined from the particular circumstances of the case. Where a daughter resided with her mother prior and subsequent to her marriage, it was held she was not entitled to recover for her services in the absence of clear proof of an express contract to pay therefor. *Terry v. Warder*, 25 Ky. 1486.

The earliest Canadian case on the subject is *Sprague v. Nickerson* (1844), 1 U. C. R. 284, where Robinson, C.J., said: "It is, in my opinion, of very dangerous tendency that, after the father of a family has died, his children, and more especially his daughters, who have lived with him as members of his family, should be encouraged to bring actions against the estate upon a claim for services rendered to their

parent. Where there is an express contract between a father and his daughter, that the latter living with him, and being above twenty-one years of age, shall serve him on wages, as any other hired person would do, of course there can be no reason why effect should not be given to the contract. But here is an unmarried female, living for years in the house with her father, because he is old and infirm; she brings, after his death, an action for several years' wages, not shewing any specific contract of hiring had taken place, but founding her claim on some loose expressions, heard in casual conversation, that he meant to make her compensation. The evidence was not clear—the amount allowed exorbitant, I think. This young woman could not be living anywhere else more properly than with her aged and infirm parent; and if she did acts of service, instead of living idly, it is no more than she ought to have done in return for her clothes and board, to say nothing of the claims of natural affection which usually lead children to render such service. If upon the kind of evidence that was given here such verdicts could be given and upheld, creditors would stand a good chance, in many cases, of having the assets materially diminished, if not consumed, by claims of this nature set up by some one or more members of the family and supported by the testimony of others, as to what the father declared he would do in his will." See also *Walker v. Boughner*, 18 O. R. p. 455, and *Leach v. Young*, 14 O. W. R. p. 58.

The rule has been stated to be that "as between parents and an adult child, whenever compensation is claimed in any case by either against the other for services rendered, it must be determined from the particular circumstances of that case whether the claim should be allowed or not. There can be no fixed rule governing all cases alike. In the absence of any direct proof of an express contract, the question always is: Can it be reasonably inferred that pecuni-

ary compensation was in view of the parties at the time when the services were rendered? And that depends upon the circumstances of the case, the relation of the parties being one of the circumstances." *Harshberger's Admr. v. Alger*, 31 Gratt. 52; *Stansbury v. Stansbury's Admr.* 20 W. Va. 23.

On the other hand where the contractual relation is established—that services rendered should be paid for—the parties stand on the footing of strangers, and the contract will be given effect. The circumstances vary with each case. A son, not residing with his parents, was held entitled to payments for looking after his father's property: *Parker v. Parker's Admr.*, 33 Ala. 459; and also where the son worked for his father and "found" himself and his horse: *Kinnibrew v. Kinnibrew's Admr.* 35 Ala. 628. A daughter over age who was working away from home and returned to work at her father's request, was held entitled to recover the value of her services. *Robnett v. Robnett*, 43 Ill. App. 191; *Re Strickland*, 10 Misc. N. Y. 486. So a daughter over age who remained working at home in consideration of a sum to be paid her on her marriage was held entitled to it on the happening of that event. *Stock v. Stoltz*, 137 Ill. 349. Where a daughter left her own children to nurse a sick mother at the mother's request, it was held that the circumstances warranted the inference that she was to be paid. *Markey v. Brewster*, 10 Hun. 16; *Wilsey v. Franklin*, 57 Hun. 382. And where a natural son and his father dealt as strangers, and the son performed services for the father, he was entitled to receive compensation for them. *Broderick v. Broderick*, 28 W. Va. 378.

Where a son lives apart from his father there is no presumption that services performed by the son for his father, at the father's request, are gratuitous, and evidence of an express contract is not necessary. The nature of the services performed, the situation of the parties, and the ability of the father to pay,

must all be considered. *Butler v. Kent*, 152 Ala. 594; *In re Young*, 32 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 403.

Where a daughter had a home of her own in which her mother resided, and there was evidence that remuneration was expected and promised, the daughter was held entitled to recover for services rendered to her mother. *Eisminger v. Stanton*, 129 Mo. App. 403. A daughter cannot recover wages for services rendered in the nursing and care of her father except on clear proof of an express contract to that effect. The same rule obtains when the daughter is an adult and married. Although after marriage her services belong to her husband, yet if the wife under the circumstances owing to the absence of an express contract, might not recover, the husband can have no higher right. *Houch v. Houch*, 3 Ont. R. 552; *Patton v. Conn*, 114 Pa. 186.

Adopted children come within the rules applicable to parent and child: *Laing v. Dietz*, 191 Ill. 161; *Lunay v. Vantyne*, 40 Vt. 501. And the rule has been extended so as to include illegitimate children living with the legal family as well as children brought up with them without being formally adopted: *Walker v. Taylor*, 28 Colo. 233; *Martin v. Martin*, 101 Ill. App. 640. In *Graham v. Stanton*, 177 Mass. 321, Holmes, C.J., said: "It would be a strange thing to say that an actual contract to pay for services could be inferred from the conduct of one who takes a child into his household under the name of daughter. The fact of his calling her so implies he is not purporting to enter into relations with her on a business footing."

The rule that where a son remains at home after his majority and renders ordinary services to his father, no contract to pay therefor will be implied, but an express contract must be proved, is subject to the exception that, where services are rendered in reliance on a promise to convey or devise real estate, a contract to pay the reasonable value of the services may be implied, provided the contract is satisfactorily proved,

but cannot be specifically enforced in an action. *Voss v. Voss*, 134 Wis. 52.

In our own Courts the rule is stated to be that where a party renders services to another in the expectation of a legacy, devise or other provision by will, and in sole reliance on the testator's generosity, without any contract express or implied that compensation will be provided for him by will, and the party for whom such services are rendered dies without making such provision, no action lies; but where from the circumstances of the case it is manifest that it is understood by both parties that compensation should be made by will, and none is made, an action lies to recover the value of such services. This rule was applied where the plaintiff's grandfather promised to make the same provision for the plaintiff as he should make for his own daughters; and, relying on such promise the plaintiff went to reside with her grandfather and worked for him for nine years. *Walker v. Boughner* (1889), 18 O. R. 448. See also *McGugan v. Smith*, 21 S. C. R. 263; *Murdock v. West*, 24 S. C. R. 305; *Bradley v. Bradley* (1909), 19 O. L. R. 525; *Johnson v. Brown* (1909), 13 O. W. R. 1212; *Richardson v. Garnett* (1895), 12 Times L. R. 127, and *Fitzgerald v. Wallace*, 3 O. W. R. 900.

Brother and Sister. The rules applicable to parent and child apply to claims by brothers and sisters for mutual services rendered. And the rules are subject to the same modifications either when the circumstances negative the gratuitousness of the service or there is evidence of a contract. *In re Shubart's Estate*, 154 Pa. 230.

The plaintiff sued her brother for wages during several years that she had lived with him, keeping house for him while he was unmarried, and doing ordinary farm work. It was held that, from this alone the law would not imply a promise to pay wages. Hagarty, J., said: "The only importance the fact of relationship was, that it made the fact of their liv-

ing together, especially during the years that the defendant was unmarried, a most natural arrangement and flowing most probably therefrom. Now in such a state of facts there was most certainly no evidence of any actual hiring or promise to pay. Does the law necessarily imply a hiring and a promise to pay therefrom? We are not prepared to hold that it does. . . . It would we fear be a mischievous doctrine to lay down, that in every case in which a niece, a cousin or sister-in-law is proved to be living in a farmer's house, treated in every way as one of the family, and assisting in the work of doing all or most of the housework, she could, in the absence of any evidence whatever as to hiring or wages, be entitled to the direction of a judge that the law in such case implied a promise to pay." *Redmond v. Redmond* (1868), 27 U. C. R. 220.

This was followed in a later case where Rose, J., said: "As I understand the effect of the decision in *Redmond v. Redmond* it is that when brothers or sisters, or near relatives, live together as a family, no promise arises by implication to pay for services rendered, or benefits conferred, which as between strangers would afford evidence of such promise, and so in an action between relatives so living together, for board or wages, or the like, an express promise or agreement must be proved by the party urging the claim." *Iler v. Iler* (1885), 9 O. R. 551.

One of two brothers owned a mill, and the other worked in the mill for many years prior to the death of the owner, without any agreement as to wages. On the death of the owner of the mill the other brother filed a claim for work done. The Master disallowed the claim, and, on appeal, Proudfoot, V.C., said: "The appellant contended that all he required to do, was to shew that he worked for John, and that a promise to pay would be implied. That is probably the rule among strangers, but between near relatives, as parent and child, uncle and nephew, and as here, between

brothers, the law makes no implication, but an express hiring must be proved in order to support a claim for wages." *Re Ritchie, Sewery v. Ritchie* (1876), 23 Gr. 66. And see *Priest v. Priest* (1906), 8 O. W. R. 659.

The presumption against an implied right to remuneration for services rendered by near relations arises only when the person rendering the services and the person to whom they are rendered, are in effect living together as members of the same household, but even where this is not the case the implied right to remuneration may, in case of near relatives, be negatived on very slight grounds. In *Mooney v. Grout* (1903), 6 O. L. R. 521, the facts were these: the plaintiff was a married woman living with her husband five miles away from her sister, a widow. The widowed sister was taken ill and sent for the plaintiff to nurse her. The plaintiff went and remained with the sister for six months, but being unable to remain from her own home any longer, the sick sister was removed to the plaintiff's house where she remained until her death some ten weeks later. The deceased owned a house and lot worth \$1,800 and cash and securities of \$1,250. The deceased made her will whereby she gave the plaintiff a life interest in the real estate and the income of the personal estate for life. The plaintiff knew of this will, but swore she understood the personal estate was to go to her absolutely, and did not know differently until after her sister's death, when she decided to claim for services rendered. The trial Judge did not accept the plaintiff's evidence and dismissed the action, and a Divisional Court affirmed the judgment. Street, J., delivering the judgment of the Divisional Court, said: "It is true that the plaintiff and her sister, the deceased, each had her separate household at the time the plaintiff was requested by the deceased to take care of her in her illness. Under these circumstances the presumption, which arises in the case of services rendered by members of a family living together to one

another, that such services are not to be paid for, does not, I think, arise. But the presumption that services rendered by one sister to another when they are not living together as members of the same family are to be paid for, is much more easily rebutted than it would be if the services had been rendered to a stranger. In the present case the plaintiff says that, until after the death of her sister, and until she heard the contents of the will, she had no intention of making a charge for her services. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the deceased ever thought that the plaintiff expected to be paid. If either of them had supposed that the plaintiff was working for hire, it is but reasonable to think that the matter would have been mentioned during the nine months' attendance on the deceased. In the absence of any offer of, or request for payment during that time, I think we may properly assume under the circumstances an understanding on the part of both that the provision in the will of the deceased in favour of the plaintiff was to be her remuneration for her trouble, and that no charge would be made. This being the case, there was no contract while the services were being rendered, and the plaintiff had no right to claim pay for them upon finding that the income of the money only, and not the principal, had been bequeathed to her." See also *Bradley v. Bradley* (1909) 19 O. L. R. 525.

There is no presumption of an implied contract to pay for board furnished by a sister to her invalid brother, who came from a distance to her home, where he died. *O'Brien's Estate*, 17 Phila. 456.

Grandparents and Grandchildren. The authorities seem to shew that the rules applicable to parent and child apply to grandparents and grandchildren, and when grandchildren reside with their grandparents the presumption that services rendered were never intended to form the subject of claim is equally strong, and will require to be rebutted by proof of an agreement to pay wages, or such circumstances as will

shew an intention to pay: *Bixler v. Sellman*, 77 Md. 494; *Davis v. Goodenow*, 27 Vt. 715. And the presumption that the services are rendered gratuitously is not overcome by occasional declarations that the grandchild is a good girl and should be paid for her services: *Dodson v. McAdams*, 96 N. Y. 149.

Where a granddaughter leaves her husband to keep house for her grandfather, she does not form one of the family, and may be entitled to be paid for her services: *Matter of Wells*, 4 N. Y. St. 878.

Services rendered by a grandfather, living in the household of his grandchild, are presumed to be gratuitous. *Teeter v. Poe*, 48 Ill. App. 188. And see *Murdock v. West* (1898), 24 S. C. R. 305, *ante*.

Uncle and Nephew. The relation of uncle or aunt and nephew or niece will not alone rebut the presumption that the services rendered are to be paid for unless they are living together as members of the same family.

Where a nephew lived with his aunt, regularly paying board, the Court held there was no presumption of an implied contract for additional compensation for nursing, etc. *Clark's Estate*, 12 Phila. 147.

Where a nephew while on a visit to an aunt, rendered her valuable services, it was held that the fact of the relationship did not rebut the presumption that he acted under a promise of compensation: *Brown's Estate*, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. 428. And where a nephew, while on a visit to his uncle was taken sick and remained with him for a long time, the uncle was held entitled to compensation: *Matter of Eckert*, 2 Pearson (Pa.) 476.

The relation of uncle and niece by marriage will not of itself rebut the presumption of an implied contract to pay for services: *In re Walker*, 14 Lanc. (Pa.) 64.

In February, 1891, R., a man of means, became a widower. In August he invited the plaintiff, who was his niece, to visit him, and while she was with him he

See *Brighouse*
Morton
129 S.C.R. 517

proposed that she should live with him in place of his daughter who had recently married. The plaintiff was at that time a governess, earning £80 a year, and hesitated about accepting the offer. Thereupon, according to the evidence of the plaintiff, R. agreed that if she would come and live with him "he would provide for her in the future." This was the contract sued upon. In September the plaintiff decided to accept her uncle's offer and so wrote him. In January, 1891, he replied he would allow £10 a month and travelling expenses. In February she went to reside with him, remaining until the following January, when, in consequence of some disagreement, she ceased to live with him. R. died in 1894. The jury gave the plaintiff £250, but the trial Judge ruled there was no evidence of any contract. On appeal Lord Esher, M.R., in giving judgment, said: "In this case an old man, living alone, suggested to a young lady, his niece, that she should come and keep house for him. She said she could not do so because she was earning money and in that way assisting her parents. Then he said: 'If you will come, I will provide for you,' and thereupon she went. The agreement come to in January, 1892, was quite consistent with the prior verbal contract made in August, 1891. A jury might, indeed, have held that the latter agreement was to be in substitution for the earlier one; that, however, was a question for the jury, not for the Judge. The question was rightly left to the jury, but the Judge was wrong in not entering judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the finding of the jury." *Richardson v. Garnett* (1895), 12 Times L. R. 127.

In a very recent case it was held that the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption, arising from the relationship of aunt and niece, that the services were gratuitous. *Mercantile Trust Co. v. Campbell* (1918), 43 O. L. R. 57.

Cousins. In the case of cousins the courts are inclined to relax the rigour of the rule: *Gallagher v.*

Vought, 8 Hun 87. In *Neal's Exors. v. Gilmore*, 79 Pa. 421, the Court said: "It is true that their relation as first cousins was not such as of itself to rebut the legal presumption of an implied contract arising from services rendered and accepted. . . . If the boys lived with them as their children and members of the family, the jury ought to have been instructed that the plaintiffs could not recover. Nothing is better settled than while the performance of labour by one for another raises an implied assumpsit to compensate it, yet this implication may be rebutted by proof of circumstances shewing such a relation between the parties as repels the idea of contract."

Where a relative more distant than a child goes to live with a person at his request, the presumption that such relative lives with the person as a member of the family, and not as a servant, is less strong than in the case of a child; and slight circumstances will be sufficient to overcome it. *Thornton v. Grange*, 66 Barb. 507.

Parent and Son-in-Law. Where the relation is that of parent-in-law and son-in-law or daughter-in-law, and where the family relation exists, these cases have been held to fall within the rule that in the absence of a contract, the services will be deemed to have been rendered without expectation of payment: *Reid v. Farrar*, 6 N. Y. St. 199; *Williams v. Stonestreet*, 3 Rand. (Va.) 559.

Where the degree of relationship diminishes, the presumption is more easily rebutted, and very slight evidence has been considered sufficient to replace the presumption of gratuitous service. *Mariner v. Collins*, 5 Harr. (Del.) 290. Where a father-in-law boarded in the family of his son-in-law, and the father-in-law was a man of means and contributed nothing in the way of labour or money to the maintenance of the household, and the son-in-law was dependent on his labour for his support, it was held there was no

presumption that such board was furnished gratuitously: *Rogers v. Millard*, 44 Iowa 466.

In some of the courts an effort has been made to break away from the rule that places this relationship on the same basis as that of parent and child. In a Texas case it was said: "We cannot adopt the doctrine claimed. It is true that a rule has been maintained in many courts of high authority, that amongst near relatives, as between father and son, uncle and nephew, suits shall not be maintained for services which are rendered on the ground of natural love and affection, or in expectancy of a future legacy, inheritance or devise; and the reason of the rule is that the party rendering the services is generally more liberally rewarded for his services than he would be under an express contract or an implied assumpsit. But we do not think that the relationship of father-in-law and son-in-law comes within this rule, and, when the reason of the rule fails, the rule itself should cease." *Wright's Admx. v. Donnell*, 34 Tex. 291.

The deceased was the plaintiff's mother-in-law. Some 14 years before her death she came to live with her daughter. The deceased devised all her property to her son, and the plaintiff brought an action against the executor for board and lodging. A jury found for the plaintiff and the executor appealed. The Court set aside the verdict, saying that in cases of this nature it must appear that the parties understood or, under the circumstances should have understood, that compensation of some sort was to be made for the services rendered and sustenance furnished. The right of recovery in actions of this kind depends upon either an express or implied promise and the evidence must shew a valid and satisfactory basis for such a promise. Here the only evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim was that of her step-daughter, of some conversations heard 14 years before, when board or price was not discussed. The evidence shewed that the deceased did a large part of the household

work up to a short time before her death. The court said: "This testimony disposes not only of the express but also of the implied promise." *Coombs v. Hogan* (1917), 116 Me. 437.

Brothers-in-Law, or Sisters-in-Law. In Illinois it was held that where brothers-in-law or sisters-in-law reside in the same house the inference is that the services one to the other are intended to be gratuitous: *Broughton v. Smart*, 59 Ill. 440. But in Pennsylvania there are two old cases deciding that this degree of relationship does not raise the presumption of gratuitous services: *In re Russell's Estate*, 7 Phila. 64; *In re McCarty's Estate*, 9 Phila. 318.

Parent and Step-child. In a number of American cases it has been held that as between step-parent and step-children, where the family relation exists, that is, where all are residing as one family under the one roof, services rendered are presumably gratuitous in the absence of a contract, or facts and circumstances from which a contract can be inferred: *Murdock v. Murdock*, 7 Cal. 511; *Feiartag v. Feiartag*, 73 Mich. 297; *Baxter v. Gale*, 74 Minn. 36.

The relationship of step-son-in-law and step-mother-in-law is too remote to create the presumption that the services rendered were gratuitous, and the rule requiring stricter proof of a contract between them than in ordinary cases was held not to apply: *Hardiman's Admr. v. Crick*, 131 Ky. 358.

Where services are rendered to one standing *in loco parentis* there is no implied promise to pay for them, though such presumption may be overcome by the facts and circumstances of the case. It was so held where a step-daughter lived in the family of her step-father from the time she was nine years old, and was cared for as one of the family until of full age, after which she continued to reside there and perform the same services until her marriage, some

five years later, during which period she had her board and clothing and was given money from time to time, no accounts being kept by either party. *Harvis v. Smith* (1889), 79 Mich. 54.

Where the step-daughter was married and, at the request of her step-father went frequently to his house and did the washing, sewing, putting up fruit, etc., and there was independent evidence shewing that the deceased intended to make reasonable compensation for such services, an appeal court refused to set aside a verdict in favour of the step-daughter. *Dobbs v. Cates* (1895), 60 Mo. App. Div. 320.

Where a father-in-law took it upon himself to see that his daughter had the best medical treatment and skill, and that he intended to pay and did pay for the same, and that it was not his intention to make a charge for these disbursements against his son-in-law, the Court held he could not recover against the estate of the son-in-law. *In re Babcock* (1918), 169 N. Y. Supp. 800.

Husband and Wife. It is scarcely necessary to say that a wife is not entitled to be paid for services rendered her husband. And where a woman lives with a man as his mistress or concubine she cannot recover for services rendered unless there is an express contract: *Vincent v. Moriarity*, 31 N. Y. App. Div. 484; *Swires v. Parsons*, 5 Watts & S. 357.

Where a woman lived with a man as his wife, both believing such relationship to exist, and upon his death it appeared that the marriage between them was void, it was held there was no implied contract entitling her to recover for her services: *Cropsey v. Sweeney*, 27 Barb. 310. But where a married man represented himself to be a widower, and induced a woman to marry him, although his wife was alive, it was held that the woman could recover for services rendered during the time she lived with him in ignorance of the fact. *Higgins v. Breen*, 9 Mo. 497.

The plaintiff sued for specific performance of a verbal contract entered into with the defendant whereby he agreed to give the plaintiff all his property, or, in the alternative, for payment upon a *quantum meruit* for the maintenance of the deceased for eight years. The plaintiff recovered on the latter claim, but the Court held that such a promise or contract was not a special promise to pay at death, and did not give the plaintiff a right to recover more than six years arrears: *Cross v. Cleary* (1898), 29 O. R. 542.

Riddell, J., gave this case a grudging assent in *Johnson v. Brown*, 13 O. W. R. 1212, where he said: "Were it not for *Cross v. Cleary*, 29 O. R. 542, I should hold that the whole period could be recovered for. No action could possibly be brought before the death, and it would seem against principle that the Statute of Limitations should be held to begin to run at a time anterior to that at which an action could be brought. But I am bound by *Cross v. Cleary*, unless and until it should be overruled; and I must hold that payment for services going back to 6 years before the teste of the writ can only be recovered in this action. The writ is issued 8th April, 1909; the services recoverable for them began 8th April, 1903; Mrs. Walters died 26th September, 1908: there are 5 years 24 3-7 weeks. This at \$2 per week equals \$568.85."

The rule laid down in *Cross v. Cleary* has been followed in *Re Rutherford* (1915 34 O. L. R. 395, and *Mather v. Fidlin* (1916), 10 O. W. N. 229, both cases in Single Court.

In an action against decedent's estate for services rendered decedent, the policy of the law requires clear and convincing testimony that it was the understanding of both parties that decedent was obligated to and should pay for the services, and that the services were rendered pursuant to such understanding. *Cannon v. Sares* (1917), 198 N. Y. S. 294.

A claim against an estate for personal services, based on a verbal agreement, was disallowed where it was withheld for a considerable period during deceased's lifetime, although the claimant was apparently in need of funds and the deceased was wealthy, and it appeared that the claimant had been paid \$7 per week during the time the services continued. The natural inference was that such payments were to cover all the claimant's services in the case. Where the only corroborative evidence was that of the claimant's husband it was held that his interests were so involved in that of the claimant as to be practically a party to the proceedings. *In re Wever's Estate*, 165 N. Y. S. 1038.

There appears to be no place for the presumption of gratuitous service, where the service is in the usual course of business, such for example, as that of professional men, and are rendered by one near relative to another. *Valentine v. Valentine*, 4 Redf. 265; *Moffett's Estate*, 11 Phila. 79. The reports do not shew that the parties were members of one household.

There remains to be considered the order in which the assets of the estate can be resorted to for the payment of debts. Before the passing of the Devolution of Estates Act the order was as follows:

1. The general personal estate not bequeathed at all, or by way of residue only.
2. Real estate devised in trust to pay debts.
3. Real estate descended to the heir and not charged with the payment of debts.
4. Real or personal estate charged with the payment of debts, and (as to realty) devised specifically or by way of residue, or suffered, by reason of lapsed devise, to descend; or (as to personalty) specifically bequeathed, subject to that charge.
5. General pecuniary legacies, including annuities and demonstrative legacies which have become general. (See Jarman, 6th ed., p. 2026, note h.)

6. Specific legacies (including demonstrative legacies that so remain), specific devises and residuary devises not charged with debts, to contribute *pro rata*.

7. Real and personal estate over which the testator had a general power of appointment which has been expressly exercised by deed (in favour of volunteers) or by will.

8. Paraphernalia of the testator's widow.

The provisions of the Devolution of Estates Act, as they affect the administration of assets, are as follows:—

3.—(1) All real and personal property which is vested in any person without a right in any other person to take by survivorship shall, on his death, whether testate or intestate, and notwithstanding any testamentary disposition, devolve to and become vested in his personal representative from time to time as trustee for the persons by law beneficially entitled thereto and, subject to the payment of his debts, and so far as such property is not disposed of by deed, will, contract or other effectual disposition, the same shall be administered, dealt with and distributed as if it were personal property not so disposed of.

(2) This section shall apply to property over which a person executes by will a general power of appointment as if it were property vested in him.

(3) This section shall not apply to estates tail or to the personal property, except chattels real, of any person who, at the time of his death, is domiciled out of Ontario.

5. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, in the administration of the assets of a deceased person, his real property shall be administered in the same manner, subject to the same liability for debts, costs and expenses and with the same incidents as if it were personal property, but nothing in this section shall alter or affect as respects real or personal property

of which the deceased has made a testamentary disposition the order in which real and personal assets are now applicable to the payment of funeral and testamentary expenses, the costs and expenses of administration, debts or legacies, or the liability of real property to be charged with the payment of legacies.

6. Subject to provisions of section 38 of The Wills Act the real and personal property of a deceased person comprised in any residuary devise or bequest shall, except so far as a contrary intention appears from his will or any codicil thereto, be applicable rateably, according to their respective values, to the payment of his debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and the costs and expenses of administration.

On the passing of this Act it was assumed that its effect was to create one fund for the payment of debts, constituted of massed realty and personalty. See the judgments of Boyd, C., in *Re Reddan*, 12 O. R. 781, and *Tillie v. Springer*, 21 O. R. 585, and of Street, J., in *Scott v. Supple*, 23 O. R. 393. Subsequently the matter came squarely before the Court in *Re Hopkins Estate* (1900), 32 O. R. 315. By his will the testator directed his debts to be paid, and then specifically bequeathed his personal property to M. and specifically devised his real estate to C. There were debts of \$7,000, and the Court was asked to determine "whether the debts of the deceased should be paid out of the personal estate only, or out of the real estate only, or out of both, and if so in what proportions." Street, J., said: "The Devolution of Estates Act vests the real as well as the personal estate of a deceased person in his personal representatives for the purpose of paying his debts, but except in the case of a residuary devise of real and personal estate which is specially provided for by the 7th section (now sec. 6), the order in which the different classes of property were applicable to the payment of debts does not appear to have been disturbed by its provi-

W sions. The personal property of the deceased, in the absence of same express clause in the will to exonerate it, remains therefore the primary fund for the payment of debts."

A testator devised land to his son and in his will directed his son to pay debts and legacies. It was held that the effect of this was to charge the payment of both debts and legacies upon the land devised. *Re Thomas* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 660.

A will was, in part, as follows: "My will is first that all my just and lawful debts and funeral expenses be paid by my executors . . . and the residue of my estate, real and personal, which may not be required for the payment of my said just debts and funeral expenses, I give, devise and bequeath absolutely to my beloved wife," for her life and then to his children. Osler, J.A., held this came within sec. 7 (now 6), and that the debts, etc., should be paid rateably out of the real and personal estate according to their respective values. *Re Way* (1903), 6 O. L. R. 614.

A testator bequeathed all his personal estate to his son, to whom he also specifically devised a farm, and he gave the residue of his real estate to his executors upon certain trusts, and directed that the debts, etc., should be paid "out of my estate." Teetzel, J., following *Re Thomas*, held that the whole personal estate was primarily chargeable with such payment, and if not sufficient the balance should be borne by all the real estate *pro rata*. He also held that sec. 6 only applies where both real and personal estate is comprised in the residuary gift. *In re Moody* (1906), 12 O. L. R. 10.

A testator gave all his personal property by general (not by specific or residuary bequest) to his widow, and died intestate as to his real estate. The will contained no direction as to payment of debts. It was contended that the debts should be paid out of the personalty, and it was held, that notwithstanding

the Act, the personal estate was the primary fund for the payment of debts. Boyd, C., delivering the judgment of a Divisional Court, said: "Contrary to my first impression, I think we should not disturb the earlier decisions in this country as to personalty being still the primary fund for creditors. . . . If the law does not create a mixed fund of lands and personal property for the rateable payment of debts, and so make the debts to be borne partly by each, I do not think a clear, unmistakable expression of intention can be drawn from the will, or even from the will coupled with the partial intestacy, which, upon the authorities, would relieve the personal estate and burden the land with the debts." *Re McGarry* (1909), 18 O. L. R. 524.

The will contained a general direction to pay debts. Then followed a specific devise to W. of a farm, and certain pecuniary bequests. The personal estate was insufficient to pay the debts and the executors sold the farm and from the proceeds paid the debts. There remained a balance in the hands of the executors. The legatees contended they were entitled to have their legacies paid out of this balance. Masten, J., after quoting section 5, said: "So that the order in which assets are liable for the payment of debts remains as heretofore," and held: (1) The legacies were not payable out of the balance; (2) No case had arisen for the marshalling of the assets of the deceased so as to entitle the legatees to payment; (3) W. was entitled to the fund. *Re Steacy* (1917), 39 O. L. R. 548.

There is another class of personal property which may be (though seldom is) reached for the payment of debts, namely, *donationes mortis causa*. It has been suggested that these gifts are liable rateably with specific legacies. See 10 C. L. T. 101. In the absence of any authority on this point this seems very doubtful. A gift *causa mortis* is revocable and subject to the debts of the donor, not because it is testamentary in character, but for the reason that revocability is

one of the conditions annexed to the gift; and that unless defeasible in favour of the donor's creditors it would be fraudulent as to them. According to the great weight of authority title to the property passes from the donor to the donee immediately upon delivery, defeasible only during the donor's lifetime. If not revoked during the donor's life, the title of the donee becomes absolute at his death, and, by relation, from the time of delivery. 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. 1065; *Jones v. Selby*, Prec. Chy. 300. It would appear, therefore, that all the other estate must be exhausted (with the possible exception of 9) before a gift of property, the title to which has become indefeasible, except for the payment of debts, can be recalled to pay debts.

CHAPTER XII.

FUNERAL EXPENSES.

Funeral expenses, says Lord Coke, according to the degree and quality of the deceased, are to be allowed of the goods of the deceased, before any debt or duty whatever. But an executor or administrator is not justified in incurring such as are extravagant, even as it respects the legatees or next of kin entitled in distribution. 3 Inst. 202. Nor, as against creditors, is he warranted in spending more than that which is absolutely necessary. In strictness, says Lord Holt, no funeral expenses are allowed in the case of an insolvent estate, except for the coffin, ringing the bell, and the fees of the parson, clerk and bearers; but not for the pall or ornaments. *Stackpole v. Stackpole*, 4 Dow. 227.

Perhaps, observes Dr. Burn, the expenses of the shroud and the digging of the grave ought to have been added. 4 Burn E. L. 348, 8th ed.

This statement of Lord Holt, though inappropriate to our times, suggests that the line be drawn so as to include what is necessary in the sense of giving a Christian burial, excluding the ornamental accompaniments and provisions for mourners and strangers which they might make for themselves. Thus, at the present day, the undertaker's and grave digger's necessary services shall be allowed in addition to those pertaining to religious exercises; also the cost of a plain coffin or casket, the conveyance of the remains to the grave, and the grave itself; all these being essential to giving the remains a decent funeral. On the other hand, mutes, weepers, pall-bearers in needless array; carriages for mourners, and especially carriages for casual strangers; floral decorations, refreshments, hired musical performers, and

the processional accompaniments of a funeral,—all these, though appropriate, often, to the burial of those who have left good estates, are inappropriate to the poor and lowly, and to those whose creditors must virtually pay or contribute to the cost. Public demonstrations which increase the outlay, the attendance of societies to which the deceased belonged, military and civic escorts, and the like, are always properly borne by such bodies or the public thus gratified, rather than imposed as a charge upon a private estate which cannot readily bear the burden. Schouler, 1472.

In *Stag v. Punter*, 3 Atk. 119, Lord Hardwicke, upon exceptions to a Master's report for not allowing £60 for a testator's funeral, said: "At law, where a person dies insolvent, the rule is, that no more shall be allowed for a funeral than is necessary: at first only 40 shillings, then 5 pounds, and at last 10 pounds. I have often thought it a hard rule, even at law, as an executor is obliged to bury his testator before he can possibly know whether his assets are sufficient to pay his debts. But this Court is not bound by such strict rules, especially where a testator leaves great sums in legacies, which is a reasonable ground for an executor to believe the estate is solvent. As this is the case here, I am of opinion that sixty pounds is not too much for the funeral expenses, especially as the testator had directed his corpse should be buried at a church thirty miles from the place of his death."

The rule appears to be, that the executor is entitled to be allowed reasonable expenses according to the testator's condition in life; and if he exceeds those he is to take the chances of the estate turning out insolvent. No precise sum can be fixed to govern executors in all cases. It must obviously vary in every instance, not only with the station in life of each particular testator, but also with the price of the requisite articles at the particular place. Wms. Exors. 838; *Hancock v. Podmore*, 1 B. & Ad. 260.

“The standard of reasonable burial expenses is established by local and contemporary usage; for religious and humane sentiment carries the cost far beyond what mere sanitary rules might prescribe, and that sentiment should not be outraged.” Schouler, 1472.

Reg v. Price, 12 Q. B. D. 247, establishes the legality of cremation, and an executor who cremates the dead body of his testator, either in accordance with the directions contained in his will or in the exercise of his own discretion, is entitled to be paid the reasonable expenses of so doing, in the same manner he would be entitled to be paid the expenses of burial.

In a subsequent case *Dr. Tristram*, the Judge of the Consistory Court of London, referring to the judgment in *Regina v. Price*, said: “The cremation of a dead body, though not contemplated, is not prohibited either by ecclesiastical or by statute law, nor yet by common law, unless it is done so as to amount to a public nuisance, or with a view to prevent a coroner’s inquest being held upon it. . . . As by common law, as well as by ecclesiastical law, any person (subject to certain exceptions) dying in England is entitled to Christian burial in the accustomed form in a consecrated burial ground belonging to his own parish, or to the parish in which he may have died, it is not competent to an executor or administrator, or to any other person on whom the law imposes the duty of burying the dead, to deprive him of that right, unless he has left written directions or expressed in his life a wish to be cremated.” *In re Kerr* (1894), P. 284.

The principal inquiry in determining the amount to be allowed for funeral expenses should be—Is the expenditure for this purpose disproportioned to the means of the estate, or injurious to the interests of the creditors and family of the deceased? Whenever it is ascertained that the estate could well afford the expense without materially affecting its funds or injuriously affecting the interests of creditors or of

those who are to take or enjoy it after the death of the testator or intestate, there is no impropriety in allowing the personal representative a credit for such expenditure. *Blendall v. Blendall*, 24 Ala. 295.

Compliance with the last wishes of the deceased as to the style and character of the funeral, if not extravagant or unreasonable, and if no injustice is done to creditors, violates no principle of law. *Donald v. McWhorter*, 44 Miss. 124. This principle was applied in *Blendall v. Blendall*, *supra*, where \$210 was allowed for a marble tomb where the estate amounted to about \$8,000, with but few debts, and the deceased left neither widow nor children to be provided for.

But the fact that the deceased expressed a wish to be buried in an expensive coffin does not authorize a person to furnish a coffin not suited to the pecuniary condition of the estate. *Barbee v. Green*, 92 N. Car. 471; Jarman, 6th ed., 2014.

Where a will limited the amount to be expended for funeral expenses, the executor was allowed a larger amount paid by him without knowledge of such limitation, the amount paid being otherwise reasonable and proper. *Matter of Galland*, 92 Cal. 293.

In *Bridge v. Brown*, 2 Y. & C. 181, out of an estate of £12,000 a charge of £145 for funeral expenses was cut down to £100. In *Bissett v. Antrobus*, 4 Sim. 512, the Court refused to allow £2,210 funeral expenses of a deceased nobleman whose personal estate was believed to be solvent at his death, but ultimately from unforeseen circumstances, proved to be insolvent.

In *Matter of Hildebrand*, 1 Misc. 245, it was held that \$60 was a reasonable amount to expend for funeral expenses, though the deceased's estate was not sufficient to pay the widow's statutory exemptions.

In *Matter of Kiernan* (Surrogate Court), 38 Misc. (N.Y.) 394, an outlay of \$490 for a casket and box out of an estate of six or seven thousand dollars, was

held unreasonable, and the administrator was only allowed \$175 therefor.

In *Matter of Ogden*, 41 Misc. (N.Y.) 158, a charge of \$495 was allowed out of a personal estate of about \$40,000.

In *Howard's Estate*, 27 Pa. Co. Ct. 608, out of an estate of \$2,800, \$800 was allowed, there being no known heirs or unpaid creditors, the funeral being large and the necessary expenses considerable.

Where the estate was \$2,842, and the next of kin not near relatives, the Court refused to disturb an allowance of \$200 for undertaker's fees, in addition to \$58 for a burial lot and church services, and \$30 for carriages. In *re Campbell's Estate*, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 480.

Where the deceased had no relatives in the city where he had lived, and for a number of years had been janitor in railroad offices, and his associates were generally labouring men, and his estate less than \$5,000, an allowance of \$455 to the undertaker for funeral expenses charged at \$526, was held to be excessive and was cut down to \$150. *Foley v. Broeksmit*, 93 N. W. 344; 119 Iowa 457.

An executor who gives no order for the funeral of his testator, is liable only to the extent of the expenses of a funeral suitable to the rank and circumstances of the testator. *Brice v. Wilson*, 3 N. & M. 512; 40 R. R. 461. But if he sanctions an expensive funeral he is liable for the expense. *Lucy v. Walrond*, 3 Bing. N.C. 841, 43 R. R. 815. The sum paid by the executor may still be questioned on an audit of the accounts. In New York it has been held that a personal representative who has sufficient assets in his hands is personally liable to pay for the funeral expenses and interment of the deceased to such an extent as is suitable to his station in life. *Benedict v. Ferguson*, 15 N. Y. App. Div. 96, 44 N. Y. S. 307.

Only such sums will be allowed for funeral expenses, costs of cemetery lot, erection of a monument,

etc., as will bear a just, fair and reasonable proportion to the amount of the estate of the deceased and his station in life. Undertakers assume the risk of the estate proving insolvent, in which case, as against creditors, they will be held strictly to the requirements of the rule. *Cullen's Estate*, 8 Pa. Sup. Ct. 494.

Although the courts insist on the strictest economy in payment of funeral expenses where the estate is insolvent and the cost falls upon the creditors, an executor or administrator is not justified in incurring expenses of an extravagant nature, even as it respects legatees or next of kin entitled in distribution. *Stackpole v. Stackpole*, 4 Dow. 227; *Bradley's Estate*, 11 Phila. 87.

The necessary and reasonable expenses of giving a decent burial to the deceased are a charge upon the estate, and have a preference over all debts against it as a part of the expenses of the trust; and the law implies a promise on the part of the executor to pay one who, in the absence or neglect of the executor, from the necessity of the case, incurs and pays such expenses. *Patterson v. Patterson*, 59 N. Y. 574. Even in the case of an insolvent estate, the executor is allowed the reasonable expenses of his testator on a plea of *plene administravit*. *Edwards v. Edwards*, 2 Cr. & M. 612; *Ray v. Honeycutt*, 119 N. C. 510.

Primarily the estate of a deceased, and not his widow, is responsible for his funeral expenses. The mere fact that the widow requests the burial, can not change the rule. There is in most cases no other person to make the request, as the administrator is ordinarily not appointed until after the funeral. If the undertaker desires to hold the widow responsible he must protect himself by her valid promise to pay. No promise to pay can be implied on her part from a bare request. *Hayden v. Maher*, 67 Mo. App. Div. 434.

An administrator paying doctor's bills and funeral expenses of an adult child of the intestate cannot be allowed therefor out of the estate, though the child

was an invalid and lived with the intestate's family. He may have a charge on the child's distributive share of the estate, but it is not funeral expenses of the estate. *In re Murphy's Estate*, 30 Wash. 9, 70 P. 109.

The law casts upon a husband the duty of burying his wife, but he is entitled to retain the sums expended in her funeral out of her separate estate as against creditors. *In re McMyn*, 33 Ch. D. 575. This case was not followed in Manitoba, where it was held that a husband cannot recover from his wife's estate moneys disbursed for the expense of her funeral unless she has charged them by will upon her estate, or unless there is some statute making them a charge upon her separate estate. *Re Montgomery, Lumbers v. Montgomery*, 20 Man. R. 44, 17 W. L. R. 77.

But in *Re Gibbons*, 31 O. R. 252, Rose, J., followed *Re McMyn*. He said: "I see no reason why, when a married woman dies seized of separate estate, that estate should not be charged with the burthen of her funeral expenses, as well as where a man dies leaving an estate." This is the law in New York. *Pache v. Oppenheim*, 93 App. Div. 221; *Re Very's Estate*, 53 N. Y. Supp, 289; and in New Jersey: *Doll v. Cash*, 61 N. J. Eq. 108.

Where the wife has no separate estate the estate of her husband is liable for her funeral expenses, though at the time of her death she is living apart from him and has separate maintenance. *Bertie v. Chesterfield*, 9 Mod. 31; *Ambrose v. Kerrison*, 10 C. B. 776; 84 R. R. 775.

In Indiana it was held by an Appellate Court that the funeral expenses of a deceased minor are not a charge against the infant's estate where he leaves a father able to pay them. *Rowe v. Raper*, 36 C. L. J. 1. The Court said: "The deceased left him surviving a father. The claimant was his step-mother. It is insisted by the appellant that the funeral expenses which are the foundation of the claim are not a charge against the estate. This position is sup-

ported by authorities. The Court, after referring to these authorities, cites Schouler on Dom. Rel. sec. 242, where it is stated that "A father is, in general, liable for the funeral expenses of his deceased minor child;" citing *Blair v. Robinson*, 108 Pa. St. 249; *Sullivan v. Horner*, 41 N. J. Eq. 299, 7 Atl. Rep. 441. The foregoing is the general rule. "When the parent has not property of his own to support his minor child, resort may be had to the property of the child for such purpose, but such condition must first be made to appear before such a resort can be had. With equal reason, a claim may be enforced against the estate of the minor for funeral expenses when the father is unable to pay them." *Re Butler*, 1 Connoly, 58.

Funeral expenses are not maintenance. Where a widow was given a certain yearly sum for maintenance, it was held her funeral expenses must be paid out of her own estate and not out of that of her husband. *Re Swayzie*, 3 O. W. N. 621.

Expenses for a cemetery lot and a monument were held not to be funeral expenses within the meaning of a statute limiting funeral expenses to \$300. *Sinnott v. Kennedy*, 27 Wash. L. Rep. 82, 14 App. D. C. 1. This decision appears to have been based on the statute mentioned. Apart from the statute, the decisions in other States of the Union are to the contrary.

In *Birkholm v. Wardell*, 42 N. J. Eq. 337, it was held that the cost of a burial lot is allowable as an item of funeral expense, if reasonable in amount, regard being had to all the circumstances.

In *Clemes v. Fox*, 6 Colo. App. 377, it was said: "The right to purchase a lot in which to bury a deceased person rests on very similar principles to those which control the administrator's right to pay funeral charges and the expenses which are immediately attendant after the death and burial."

Where the testator had in his lifetime purchased a burial lot, credit for the expense of a lot in another

place was not allowed. *Matter of Woodbury* (Surrogate Court), 40 Misc. N. Y. 143.

In *Tuttle v. Robinson*, 33 N. H. 104, and *Barclay's Estate*, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 123, the cost of improving a burial lot was not allowed. But in *Allen v. Allen*, 3 Dem. (N.Y.), it was held that where the burial place had become undesirable, an administrator should be allowed credit for the reasonable expense of disintering the body of the deceased and reburying it in another place. But not where the place of burial was suitable and had been selected by the deceased. *Watkins v. Romine*, 106 Ind. 378. And in *Matter of Furniss*, 86 N. Y. App. Div. 96, a credit of \$50 expended by executors for the perpetual care of the cemetery lot in which the deceased was buried was allowed.

On the other hand, it was held in *Pettigrew v. Pettigrew*, 207 Pa. St. 313, that the duties of an executor terminate with the first interment, and if any question arise as to the necessity or advisability of a reinterment involving a removal to another locality, that is a matter for the next of kin.

A reasonable amount for services and expenses incurred in transporting the body of the deceased from a foreign country, where he died, is properly payable out of the estate. *Re Parry's Estate*, 41 Atl. R. 384. An allowance of \$650 for funeral expenses incurred in the transportation of the bodies of the deceased and his wife from Texas to New York, and their burial, was held not an unreasonable allowance. *Sullivan v. Harner*, 41 N. J. Eq. 299. And in *Jennison v. Hapgood*, 10 Pick (Mass.) 77, the travelling expenses of the family going to the place where the deceased was stricken with his last illness, were allowed.

An executor or administrator will not be allowed for his personal expenses, or for his time, in attending the funeral. *Lund v. Lund*, 41 N. H. 355; nor for the sums paid to an organization, of which the deceased was a member, for parading at the funeral,

where it did not appear that such organization required any payment for parading on such occasions. *Matter of Reynolds*, 124 N. Y. 388; nor for the costs of a portrait of the deceased painted after his death. *McGlinsey's Appeal*, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 64. But religious ceremonies, when in accordance with the faith of the deceased and the custom of the family, are proper, and the expenses of them, if reasonable, will be allowed. 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. 1265.

On the same principle a reasonable sum expended for flowers is a proper charge against the estate. *O'Reilly v. Kelly*, 22 R. I. 151; 84 Am. St. Rep. 833. A suit of clothes for burial was allowed in *Steger v. Frizzel*, 2 Tenn. 369. Carriage hire for the funeral, if reasonable, is proper. *McDonald v. McWhorter*, 44 Miss. 124.

The cost of a dinner may be allowed where necessary for friends and relatives coming from a distance; but not otherwise where the credit is objected to, though customary at country funerals. *Bard's Estate*, 13 Pa. Dist. 552; *Harding's Estate*, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 679; 21 Pa. Co. Ct. 641. But in *Santee's Estate*, 9 Kulp. (Pa.) 142, the charges by an executor for dinners for people and horses at the funeral of the testator, the trouble of selecting the casket, cleaning up after the funeral, etc., were all disallowed.

One of the frequent items of disbursements in the accounts of executors and administrators is that of merchants' accounts for mourning goods for the widow and children of the deceased. In *Johnson v. Baker*, 2 C. & P. 207, 31 R. R. 663, it was held that the costs of mourning goods is not funeral expenses and cannot be claimed against the estate by the executor if he gives the order for it. In *Paice v. Canterbury*, 14 Ves. 364, a payment for mourning rings was allowed, but this appears to have been because of the discretion given by the will to the executors. And see the dicta of Rowlatt, J., in *Goldstein v. Salvation Army Assurance Society*, *post*; under "Tombstone."

On the other hand, in *Pitt v. Pitt*, 2 Cas. temp. Lee, 508, Sir George Lee allowed a widow for her mourning in her account, as administratrix, in the Ecclesiastical Court.

The American cases favour reasonable payments for mourning. "Mourning apparel for the family is generally allowed as an item of the funeral expenses, because custom requires mourning to be worn at funerals as a mark of proper respect for the dead, and providing such apparel may be considered as a necessary part of the preparation for the funeral, but there are cases to the contrary." 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1264.

"The wearing of suitable mourning apparel is commonly regarded not only as proper, but almost indispensable mark of affection and evidence of grief; the distribution of a decedent's estate among his next of kin without providing therefrom for the usual and conventional ceremonies in memory of the dead would seem not only parsimonious, but utterly repugnant to one's conception of justice and propriety." *Matter of Wachter*, 16 Misc. Rep. (N. Y. Surrogate) 137.

Charges for mere kindly offices, or for use of one's house for funeral services, if by a relative, are looked upon with disfavour. *Hewitt v. Bronson*, 5 Daly (N.Y.) 1; *McHugh's Estate*, 152 Pa. St. 422.

CHAPTER XIII.

TESTAMENTARY EXPENSES.

Testamentary expenses, Administration expenses and Executorship expenses are synonymous terms. "I cannot distinguish between 'executorship expenses' and 'testamentary expenses.' As I understand the words 'executorship expenses,' they are the expenses incident to the proper performance of the duty of the executor in the same way as testamentary expenses are, neither more or less." Per Jessel, M.R., *Sharp v. Lush*, 10 Ch. D. 470.

The term "executorship expenses" in a will means expenses incident to the proper performance of the duty of an executor, and includes costs incurred by executors in obtaining the advice of solicitors and counsel as to the distribution of their testator's estate; also the costs of the executors and other parties in an action, whether instituted by the executors themselves, or by the beneficiary, for the administration of the estate; also the testator's funeral expenses; also expenses incurred by the executors for the protection of specific legacies, e.g., for warehousing furniture specifically bequeathed pending the distribution of the assets, and payments by the executors in discharge of debts falling due from the testator's estate after his death, e.g., rent due after the testator's death for a house of which he was tenant from year to year, *Wms. Exors.* 851. See *In re Scott*, *post*.

The word "testamentary" has ceased to have its purely etymological meaning. The existence of a testament is not now essential to the proper use of the word, and may be equally employed to the case where there is no testament, but where the estate is being administered according to the law of the land. This is well illustrated by *In re Clemow*, *Yeo v. Clemow*

(1900), 2 Ch. 182, where a testator directed his trustees to pay his widow's "testamentary" expenses. The widow signed a document which purported to be a will, but in an action in the Probate Division brought by one of the next of kin of the widow, it was declared the widow died intestate and letters of administration were subsequently granted to the plaintiff. Because the widow died intestate it was contended that there were no "testamentary expenses" of her estate, but the Court held that the term extended to the costs of the plaintiff in obtaining letters of administration, and his costs of the action in the Probate Division.

Testamentary expenses are a first charge upon the estate, whether the estate is administered in or out of the Court. *Loomes v. Stoherd*, 1 S. & S. 458.

A testator died domiciled in England leaving assets in Victoria, where duty is payable on all assets of deceased persons situated therein. By his will the testator gave many pecuniary legacies, and left a large residuary estate. Malins, V.C., said: "It is perfectly clear that, whatever are the expenses of these assets in Victoria, whether they are the expenses of calling them in, or selling property, or paying duty to the Government, they are all deductions to be made as expenses of the estate to be paid out of the estate generally; and that which remains after paying all the debts of the testator, remains as assets of the testator and goes to pay the legacies in full, and there is no obligation on the legatees to pay part of those expenses."

Testamentary expenses do not include succession duties. Such duties are neither debts of the deceased, nor testamentary expenses. *Re Bolster* (1905), 10 O. L. R. 591; *Re Holland* (1902), 3 O. L. R. 406; *Manning v. Robinson*, 29 Ont. R. 483; *Re Watkins*, 12 B. C. R. 97.

The plaintiff's costs of unsuccessfully impeaching the validity of a will are not "testamentary expenses." In *Re Prince, Godwin v. Prince* (1898), 2 Ch. 225. But the costs of executors in defending such an action, and

the costs of proving a will in solemn form, come within the term. *Ib.*

The costs of a special case to obtain the opinion of the Court on the true construction of the will were held not to be testamentary expenses within a provision of the will directing such expenses to be paid out of a specific fund. *Gilbertson v. Gilbertson*, 34 Beav. 354, 145 R. R. 545. But testamentary expenses include costs incurred in administration proceedings. *Penny v. Penny* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 440. And where a testator directs that a particular fund is to be charged with the payment of his testamentary expenses that fund must bear the costs of an administration action. *Miles v. Harrison*, L. R. 9 Ch. 316, 323.

The costs of raising a fund, including counsel fees, auctioneer's charges, commissions, etc., fall upon the fund and are not chargeable as costs of administration. *Teaf's Estate*, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 463.

A direction in a will for payment of "testamentary expenses" out of the estate is not sufficient to entitle a specific devisee to be relieved at the expense of the estate of payment of any succession duty to which the devise to him is subject. *Re Cust*, 18 D. L. R. 647, 29 W. L. R. 716.

In *Perry v. Meddowcroft*, 4 Beav. 197, 55 R. R. 49, the executors had incurred expenses in getting in some costs due to the testator, these costs having been specifically bequeathed. Lord Langdale, M.R., said: "I consider it part of the duty of executors to get in all the testator's estate, whether specifically bequeathed or otherwise, and I know of no instance in which the expenses have not been paid out of the general estate as part of the expenses of administration."

In *In re DeSommerly* (1912), 2 Ch. 622, Parker, J., said: "This might be all right if the subject matter of the specific gift were the amount the executors should recover, but the specific gift was, according to the true construction, a gift of the right to sue for the costs. I doubt the correctness of the decision. I can-

not think that where there is a specific gift of a right of action the costs of legal proceedings to enforce the right are payable out of the estate."

And in *In re Scott* (1915), 1 Ch. p. 607, Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., said: "I think we must hesitate to regard *Perry v. Meddowcroft* as an authority to which great (if any) weight ought to be attached." He says further: "When there is a specific legacy the first duty of the executor is to consider whether he assents to it or not. If he assents to it the property passes out of him and is in the specific legatee, and from that moment the executor cannot possibly interfere with the possession of the chattels, cannot claim them from anybody else, and the legatee who has the legal title is the person to recover them, and do what is necessary. Of course, in saying this, I do not mean to assert, or even to imply, that there may not be such conduct on the part of the executor in wilfully and improperly delaying the assent to a legacy as may entitle the specific legatee to claim compensation or damages for what would be a breach of trust." And Phillimore, L.J., said: "I know of no authority that the executors are bound to bring a chattel to the testator's domicile, or bring it from foreign parts in order to deliver it to the legatee;" that being a case where a testator domiciled in England, made specific bequests of articles in France.

Where a testator made specific bequests of shares and mortgages and the executors assented to these specific bequests, it was contended by the specific legatees that the costs of transferring the legal title to them should be borne by the general estate. Astbury, J., said: "In the present case the costs of transfer and stamps are not costs incurred by the executors in getting in the estate for distribution, but they are incurred **and payable** after the specific legacies have been assented to. On the principle of *In re De Sommery* and *In re Scott* these are costs and expenses which the specific legatees must pay in order to complete their

title to the specific property, which after assent the plaintiffs are holding as trustees for them, and not as executors. *In re Grosvenor* (1916), 2 Ch. 375.

The result of these latter decisions probably is that, after assent by the executors, they are not liable for any costs of getting in or caring for chattels specifically bequeathed, but, as put by Phillimore, L.J., in *In re Scott*, they would be justified in ordinary cases of going to a reasonable expense in delivering such chattels, such as packing a picture or some valuable chattel and sending it to the home of the legatee.

The expense incurred in the upkeep and preservation of specifically bequeathed property between the death of the testator and the assent of his executors to the bequest is payable by the specific legatee, and not out of the general estate of the testator. *In re Pearce* (1909), 1 Ch. 819. Where a specific bequest of stock is made by will, it belongs to the legatee at once upon the death of the testator, unless needed to pay debts, and no security can be required from him on delivery of the stock. *In re Stoiber* (1918), 170 N. Y. Supp. 897.

A claim of an administrator whose appointment had been revoked, for reimbursement of moneys expended and services rendered in good faith pursuant to his appointment, were allowed as a part of the expenses of administration in *Brown v. McGee*, 117 Wis. 389.

Credit will not be allowed to an executor for expenditures made in connection with a contest over a will which is still pending, as the liability for such costs cannot be fixed until the contest is determined. *Titlow's Estate*, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 625.

The expenses of an heir, incurred after an administrator is appointed, in hunting up other heirs or next of kin, are not testamentary expenses. *In re Glynn*, 57 Minn. 21.

Where the testator has not provided for the payment of testamentary expenses they are a necessary

charge upon the whole estate, real and personal—particularly so since the Devolution of Estates Act. The estate as a whole should defray these charges and expenses, and if there is a different disposition of the real and personal parts, then there should be rateable apportionment and distribution of the expenses according to the respective values of the real and personal estate. *Re Thomas* (1901), 2 O. L. R. p. 664; *Re Way* (1903), 6 O. L. R. 614. And see end of chapter XI.

CHAPTER XIV.

SUCCESSION DUTY.

If the estate of the deceased is liable to succession duty the personal representatives must ascertain and pay this duty before the payment of legacies or distribution.

There is a wide distinction between probate duty and succession duty. Probate duty is occasioned by application being made to the Surrogate Court where the deceased was domiciled, or where he had assets to be administered, to authenticate a will or clothe the personal representative with authority to collect and administer an estate. Succession duty applies to a legacy under a will or succession of property in case of intestacy. Probate duty is payable in all cases, and forms a part of the costs of administration; succession duty is payable only on estates coming within the Succession Duty Act, and is payable out of the legacy or distributive share.

Succession duty is payable on "all property in Ontario and any income therefrom passing on the death of any person, whether the deceased was at the time of his death domiciled in Ontario or elsewhere." Sec. 7.

In *Woodruff v. Attorney-General for Ontario* (1908), A. C. 508, the Privy Council held that it is *ultra vires* of the Legislature of any province to tax property not within the province. "The powers of the Provincial Legislature being strictly limited to 'direct taxation within the province,' any attempt to levy a tax on property locally situated outside the province is beyond their competence." In this case the property in dispute consisted of a quantity of debentures of municipal corporations in the United States, which a testator (a resident of Ontario) had always

left in the possession of his agents in the United States.

Where the assets are debts the situs of such assets is not always an easy question to determine. In *Treasurer of Ontario v. Pattin* (1910), 22 O. L. R. 184, the deceased resided in Windsor, Ontario, and at the time of his decease had a number of mortgages upon real estate in Michigan, executed by mortgagors who were residents of Michigan. At the time of his death the mortgage deeds were in the possession of the deceased in Windsor. It was held that, by the artificial rule of law, these mortgages were *bona notabilia* in Ontario, and as such were comprised in the properties held by the personal representatives upon his application for letters in Ontario. Had the mortgage deeds been located in Michigan at the time of the testator's death it is quite probable the rule laid down in the *Woodruff Case* would have prevailed.

In *Hope's Case* (1891), A. C. 476, it was held that the locality of a specialty debt is attributable to the place where the deed is found at the time of the creditor's death; and it was said that the locality of a simple contract debt is attributable to the place of residence of the debtor. A mortgage debt being a specialty debt comes within the rule laid down in *Hope's Case*. See also *Re Fisher*, 7 O. W. N. 754, where a testator died in Ontario, having mortgages on property in British Columbia. At his death the mortgage deeds were in Toronto. His estate was called upon to pay succession duty in British Columbia, but it was held this did not relieve the estate from paying duty in Ontario.

The recent case of *The King v. Toronto General Trusts Co.*, 11 Alta. L. R. 138, 56 S. C. R. 26, seems to turn on the provisions of the Land Titles Act of Alberta, which provides that the registrar upon registration of instruments affecting land *shall retain the same in his office*. G. lived in Ottawa and died there. At the time of his death he held a mortgage upon land situate in Alberta. This mortgage was made in duplicate,

duly registered, and one of the duplicates was in the mortgagee's possession in Ottawa at the time of his death. The gist of the judgment of the Supreme Court is thus stated by Davies, J.: The mortgage is a specialty debt, therefore, in my judgment, would be conspicuous in the province where the mortgage security is required to be registered and kept, and the duplicate copy which the mortgagee may, for convenience or other reason, take with him abroad to his residence, cannot have the effect contended for of making the debt 'conspicuous' at such residence in another province." Compare sec. 67 of the Ontario Registry Act.

Debenture stock is not a specialty debt, and where such stock is of a city in another province from that in which the testator has his domicile, and can only be transferred at the office of the treasurer of that city, it is not subject to succession duty in the province where the testator lived. *Receiver-General N. B. v. Rosborough*, 24 D. L. R. 354, 48 N. B. R. 258.

Agreements for sale of land in Saskatchewan, in possession of a party in Manitoba at the time of his death, are specialty debts, and as such constitute property and are liable to succession duty in Manitoba. *Standard Trusts Co. v. Treasurer of Manitoba*, 24 Man. L. R. 310, 51 S. C. R. 428.

Property which can be administered only within Ontario is property situated within the province. *Attorney-General v. Newman*, 31 O. R. 340.

Section 7 (b) of the Ontario Succession Duty Act now provides that "Debts and sums of money due and owing from persons in Ontario to any deceased person at the time of his death on obligation or other specialty shall be property of the deceased situate in Ontario, without regard to the place where the obligation or specialty shall be at the time of the death of the deceased."

Life insurance, payable by the policy to the deceased's wife, forms a part of the "aggregate value" of the estate for determining the amount of the suc-

cession duty, although the amount of the insurance money is itself exempt from duty. *In re Shambrook Estate* (1908), 44 C. L. J. 461; 28 C. L. T. 575.

In establishing the "aggregate value" of the property for succession duty purposes, the debts due by the deceased should be deducted. *Receiver-General of New Brunswick v. Hayward*, 35 N. B. R. 453. The case of *Attorney-General for Ontario v. Lee* (1905), 9 O. L. R. 9, is no longer applicable. Section 4 of the Act provides that an allowance shall be made "for reasonable funeral expenses, debts and encumbrances and Surrogate Court fees (not including solicitor's charges)" in determining the dutiable value of the property.

Money on deposit in a branch of a bank in the province where the deceased resided is liable to succession duty, although the head office of the bank is out of the province. *The King v. Lovitt*, 1 E. L. R. 513.

In England there is a definite meaning attached to the expression "legacy duty;" but in Ontario there is only the one inheritance tax. The statute calls this "succession duty." It is a duty imposed upon all property devolving upon death; and it is a tax which has to be borne by the legatee, unless the will contains some provision casting the burden upon the residuary estate. Where a testatrix, domiciled in Ontario, and speaking with reference to a bequest within Ontario, directs that it shall be free from "legacy duty," this means succession duty, which is the only legacy duty known to Ontario law. *In re Gwynne*, 3 O. W. N. 1428.

Succession duty does not come within the description either of a debt or a part of the testamentary expenses. It cannot be a debt of the testator, for it does not arise as a liability until after his death. It is not testamentary expenses, because it is not payable upon the grant of probate or administration. A special direction in a will to pay the testator's debts does not operate to make the duty a charge on the residue. *Re*

Bolster (1905), 10 O. L. R. 591; *Re Holland* (1902), 3 O. L. R. 406; *Re Cust*, 29 W. L. R. 716.

Succession duty on the amount of the legacies and the value of the real estate devised, is properly deducted from the legacies or payable by the devisees, and should not be paid out of the residue, and the personal representatives have no discretion to pay such duty out of the residue. *Kennedy v. Protestant Orphans Home*, 25 Ont. R. 235; *Manning v. Robinson*, 29 Ont. R. 483; *Ross v. The Queen*, 32 Ont. R. 143; *Re Watkins*, 12 B. C. R. 97; *Re Sharp* (1906), 1 Ch. 793.

In this regard succession duty must not be confused with what, in England, is known as estate duty. The Finance Act, 1894, requires that estate duty must be paid by the executors before there can be an effectual grant of probate, and as payment of this duty is essential to obtaining a grant of probate that duty must be considered as much a testamentary expense as any other payment necessarily or properly incurred by the executors for that purpose. *In re Treasure* (1900), 2 Ch. 548.

A testator possesses the general power to relieve the legatees and devisees from the payment of succession duty by throwing it on the residue of the estate, where it is sufficient to make payment, but an intention that a devise or bequest shall be "free" of the tax as between the estate and the legatee or devisee must clearly appear. A mere declaration that it is to be clear of all charges or incumbrances or other legal demands is not sufficient. *Dos Pasos on the Law of Collateral Inheritance*, 210.

Where certain legacies were given, and "after full payment and satisfaction" of these legacies, the residue was given to others, it was held that each of the legacies ought to bear its own duty, and the words "full payment and satisfaction" did not carry the legacy duty. *In re Townend* (1914), W. N. 145.

In New Brunswick it was held that legacies given to executors in lieu of commission were not liable to

succession duty. *In re Chubb*, 32 C. L. J. 294. But it would appear such legacies would be liable to pay duty in Ontario. See sec. 4 (d).

In a recent case it was held, following *In re Turnbull* (1905), 1 Ch. 726, that where a legacy is given "free of all duty," that the legacy duty was payable out of the general estate, but that the operation of the gift must be determined with reference to the duties imposed in respect of the legacy *at the date of the death of the testator*, and ought not to be extended to duties created or imposed by the legislature subsequent to that date. *In re Snape, Elam v. Phillips* (1915), 2 Ch. 179.

That case, however, has not been treated with much respect. In *In re Palmer, Palmer v. Palmer* (1916), 2 Ch. 391 (affirmed (1917) W. N. 233), the will read: "I declare that all the legacies . . . hereinbefore given or made . . . shall be handed over or paid free of all duties and deductions in respect of duties (other than income tax) to the several legatees entitled thereto." Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., said: "In my view there is no general principle which can be relied upon. A testator may use language which is sufficient to cover a duty not in force at his death, and in one at least of the clauses of his will the testator in this case has done so." And Pickford, L.J., said: "In this case I think the time at which the duties are to be ascertained is when the bequests are handed over or paid. They are to be handed over or paid free of all duties and deductions, &c., and that must, in my opinion, mean duties existing at that time."

In re Hatch (1916), W. N. 240, the testator directed that all legacy, annuity, succession and other duties should be paid out of the residuary estate. Sargant, J., said that the decision in *In re Snape*, if and so far as it laid down any general principle, was wrong, and having regard to *In re Palmer* he was left at large to decide on the construction of the will before

him, and held, that the direction in the will extended to all duties when payable.

In *In re Stoddart* (1916), 2 Ch. 444, the will read: "I direct all the legacies bequeathed to be paid and enjoyed free of all death duties." The testator died in 1913, and the Finance Act, 1914, created a further claim for estate duties on the legacies given by the will. Sargant, J., held that "this particular estate duty, although it was imposed after the death of the testator, and (though I do not see the relevance of that date) after the year within which the testator's estate normally would be administered, is within the very wide language of his will." For cases where the enjoyment of a legacy is postponed until after a life estate, see *In re D'Oyley* (1917), 1 Ch. 556; *In re Eve* (1917), 1 Ch. 562.

A bequest in a will of the interest or income of a fund is not a "legacy given by way of annuity," within the meaning of section 15 of the Succession Duty Act, but simply a gift of interest or income. Where an annuity is given the principal is gone forever, and it is satisfied by periodical payments. *Bethune v. The King* (1912), 26 O. L. R. 117. In this case the duty had been paid to the Government, but the Court held that as it was paid under a mistake of law it could not be recovered back. If it had not been paid as on an annuity there would have been some other succession duty to have been paid—possibly a larger amount, and Falconbridge, C.J., said:—"In this view, and considering that it was done to facilitate a winding-up of the estate, I think that the payment by the estate was not improvident; and probably in the passing of their accounts this circumstance will be taken into consideration."

In *In re Hicklin* (1917), 2 Ch. 278, it was held that estate duty charged on a trust fund passing, in default of appointment, to the pecuniary and residuary legatees of another will must be borne rateably and pro-

portionately by the beneficiaries of that property; and, that the costs and expenses of and incidental to (a) the payment of that rateable duty, (b) the payment of legacy duty on the pecuniary legacies, and (c) the final distribution of such a trust fund, are ordinary costs of distribution and must be borne by the residuary legatees of that fund.

The latest case is *In re Loveless* (1918), 1 Ch. 223, affirmed (1918) 2 Ch. 1, where a testator gave his residuary estate to trustees upon trust, as to a share thereof, to pay to his wife out of the income "a clear annuity of £2,000 during her widowhood." Eve, J., said: The question raised by this summons raises a very neat issue. Does the gift of a "clear" annual sum of so much amount to a gift of that sum and the income tax payable for the time being in respect thereof? I cannot say what conclusion I might have arrived at had there been no previous decisions on similar gifts to guide me to a right conclusion, but, on the cases as they stand, I am satisfied that I should be departing from a well-established rule were I to hold that the addition of the word "clear" is, in itself, sufficient to carry with it the additional gift of the income tax. The question has been considered in a number of cases where other words have been added to the word "clear," such for example, as "of all taxes" and "of all deductions," and Mr. Sanger has argued that these other words have had the effect of interpreting and in some cases limiting the meaning of the word "clear." To some extent this may be true, but in two cases at least the Court has considered the effect of the word "clear" apart from the superadded words. In the case of *Peareth v. Marriott*, 22 Ch. D. 182, which came first before Wood, V.C., then before Bacon, V.C., and finally before the Court of Appeal, Bacon, V.C., held that a gift of "the clear annual income" was, on the construction of the whole will, a gift of the income free of income tax, but when his decision came up for review before the Court of Appeal, and it was found that by the order made by Wood, V.C., in 1861, the gift

had in fact been interpreted as a gift of the annual income clear of all deductions except income tax, the Court held that the point was *res judicata*, and accordingly the order of Bacon, V.C., was discharged; but, in referring to the earlier order of Wood, V.C., the Master of the Rolls, in the course of his judgment, not only says that it was an adjudication of the rights, but adds that the order was, in his opinion, perfectly right. From this it appears that a gift of "the clear annual income" is not a gift of the income tax in addition. And, indeed, if the judgment of Bacon, V.C., is referred to, it will be seen that he did not rely on the word "clear," but upon a separate direction in the will that no deduction was to be made from any of the legacies. He says: "If it stood only on the gift of a clear annuity of £1,500, I should have no doubt that the annuitant is bound to bear the burden." So that both the Vice-Chancellors and the Court of Appeal were all agreed upon the point that the word "clear" would not suffice to relieve the annuitant. Then again Kay, J., in *Gleadow v. Leetham*, 22 Ch. D. 269, deals with the word "clear." The gift was "the clear yearly sum free from all deductions and abatements whatsoever." Income tax not being a "deduction," but a payment which the legatee had to make herself, the learned Judge had to consider whether the word "clear" would cover the income tax, and he says: "If, however, income tax be not a deduction, but a payment which she has to make herself, not out of the annuity, but because she receives the annuity, I do not consider that the word 'clear' carries the matter any further."

In the face of these decisions, emphasized by the recent decision of Neville, J., on the wide words of *In re Saillard* (1917), 2 Ch. 140, a decision which has since been affirmed by the Court of Appeal (1917), 2 Ch. 401, I should be shutting my eyes to authority were I to hold that the use of this word by itself is sufficient to entitle the annuitant to receive this annuity free of income tax.

CHAPTER XV.

TAXES AND INSURANCE.

Section 94 of the Assessment Act provides:—

“The taxes due upon any land with costs may be recovered with interest as a debt due to the municipality from the owner or tenant originally assessed therefor and from any subsequent owner of the whole or any part thereof, saving his recourse against any other person, and shall be a special lien on the land in priority to every claim, privilege, lien or incumbrance of every person except the Crown, and the lien and its priority shall not be lost or impaired by any neglect, omission or error of the municipality, or of any agent or officer, or by want of registration.”

And by sec. 95 the taxes payable by any person may be recovered with interest and costs, as a debt due to the municipality.

The Act commonly called Locke King's Act is contained in sec. 38 of the Wills Act, and is as follows:—

“(1) Where any person has died since the 31st day of December, 1865, or hereafter dies, seized of or entitled to any estate or interest in any real estate, which, at the time of his death, was or is charged with the payment of any sum of money by way of mortgage, and such person has not, by his will or deed or other document, signified any contrary or other intention, the heir or devisee to whom such real estate descends or is devised shall not be entitled to have the mortgage debt discharged or satisfied out of the personal estate, or any other real estate of such person, but the real estate so charged shall, as between the different persons claiming through or under the deceased person, be primarily liable to the payment of all mortgage debts with which the same is charged, every part thereof according to its value bearing a proportionate part of the mortgage debts charged on the whole thereof.

“(2) In the construction of a will to which this section relates, a general direction that the debts, or that all the debts, of the testator shall be paid out of his personal estate, or a charge or direction for the payment of debts upon or out of residuary real estate and personal estate or residuary real estate shall not be deemed to be a declaration of an intention contrary to or other than the rule in sub-section 1 contained, unless such contrary or other intention is further declared by words expressly or by necessary implication referring to all or some of the testator's debts charged by way of mortgage on any part of his real estate.

“(3) Nothing herein shall effect or diminish any right of the mortgagee to obtain full payment or satisfaction of his mortgage debt, either out of the personal estate of the person so dying or otherwise; and nothing herein shall effect the rights of any person claiming under any will, deed or document made before the first day of January, 1874.”

The English Act was further amended by the Real Estate Charges Act, 1877, whereby it was extended to include “any other equitable charge, including any lien for unpaid purchase money.” The amendment has not been incorporated in our Act. It has been held that the charge created by the delivery of land in execution under a writ of *elegit* is within this amendment: *Re Anthony* (1892), 1 Ch. 450; and that every charge created by statute is an equitable charge. *Re Hale* (1906), 1 Ch. p. 682.

A testatrix by her will devised lands to devisees. Between the date of her will and her death, in 1900, municipal and provincial taxes had accumulated on the devised lands. The will contained a direction for payment of debts, etc., out of a certain fund. The devisees claimed the right to have the taxes paid out of the fund on the ground that the residue was, by the will, expressly made liable as a fund for payment of debts. Irving, J., held that both the municipal and provincial taxes were debts of the testatrix and were

payable out of the residuary estate. The Full Court of British Columbia affirmed this decision. Hunter, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "I fail to see the applicability of Locke King's Act. In the first place that Act applies in terms only to land 'charged by way of mortgage.' I do not understand how to allow taxes to fall into arrear is to charge land by way of mortgage, but even if it were possible to do so, the decisions on that Act shew that 'a contrary intention' is evinced by the creation of a fund out of which to pay debts: see *Eno v. Tatam* (1863) 32 L. J. Ch. 311; *Moore v. Moore*, *ib.*, 605." *In re Watkins*, 12 B. C. R. 97.

In an Ontario case the same question came before Falconbridge, C.J.K.B., in an action by a beneficiary under a will for a direction that he was entitled to a conveyance of lands devised to him, free and clear of taxes and other rates which had accrued prior to the death of the testator. The learned Chief Justice held that the devisee of the lands was bound to pay these taxes. *Mackay v. Mackay* (1912), 4 O. W. N. 300.

In a latter case the property devised was subject to two mortgages, and taxes were unpaid thereon for the years 1916 and 1917. Kelly, J., said that sec. 38 of the Wills Act applied, and the devisee took the lands devised subject to the mortgages, a contrary intention not being expressed in the will. "Any municipal taxes upon the property accumulated during the lifetime of the testatrix and forming a charge on these lands are not in the same position, not being an incumbrance within the meaning of the Act, but a debt of the testatrix payable in the course of administration." *Re Semple* (1917), 13 O. W. N. 102.

It will be seen that the Ontario cases are in direct conflict. In neither of these cases is the British Columbia case referred to, and in *Re Semple* neither of the previous cases was brought to the attention of the Court. In the result the reasoned decision of the Full

Court in *Re Watkins*, and the judgment in *Re Simple*, would appear to be the safer guide.

It is not the duty of an executor to pay taxes on real estate accruing after the testator's death. *Bowers v. Williams*, 34 Miss. 324; *Larrou v. Larrou*, 2 Redf. 69; *Stone v. Wood*, 16 Ill. 177.

By the Assessment Act land held by an executor or administrator shall be assessed against him in the same manner as if he was not the personal representative, but he is only personally liable for the taxes to the extent of the trust property in his hands available for payment of such taxes: Section 37 (12). The apparent intention of the Assessment Act is to ignore the existence of trusts, and to treat for the purposes of the Act the person actually holding or controlling the real estate as the actual owner of the property. The ultimate destination of the property is immaterial. *In re McMaster Estate Assessment* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 474.

If the real estate so assessed to an executor or administrator is revenue producing, the taxes would be a first charge on the rents.

The person entitled to possession is the person to pay the taxes yearly chargeable on the property, and the fund out of which the taxes are ordinarily payable is the rents of the land. *Fontaine v. Pellett*, 1 Ves. Jr. 337.

The charge of taxes is one of the things which should be paid by the tenant for life, so as to protect the property for the remainderman. As between him and the remainderman the Court will not allow him to receive rents from part of the property, while he allows taxes to accumulate on another part. *Re Denison*, 24 Ont. R. 197. See also *In re Cameron* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 756. And see *post*, under Life-Tenant and Remainderman.

The legal presumption is that personal property belonging to the estate is, during the settlement of the estate, at the place where the deceased died. As

between the administrator or executor and those beneficially entitled to the estate, it is taxable in the hands of the former so long as the estate is in process of settlement and before distribution; but when there is no further need of an administrator or executor, and the distributee or beneficiary can legally demand his share, the property is no longer taxable to the personal representative. 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. 653.

If an executor neglects to pay taxes which it is his duty to pay, he is responsible for any loss that may result from his neglect. *Re Harteman*, 73 Cal. 545; *Stubbs v. Stubbs*, 4 Redf. (N.Y.) 170; but the duty to pay taxes and the corresponding liability for neglect to do so, depends on whether the executor has, or ought to have, money with which to do it. *Thompson v. Thompson*, 11 Ga. 692.

A testator appointed his wife executor and devised to her the use of his dwelling house for life, directing that it should be kept in repair out of his estate. It was held she was not entitled to charge the estate for taxes assessed on the house when in her possession under the will. *Wiggen v. Swett*, 6 Mete. (Ky.) 194.

In *Re Armstrong* (1904), 3 O. W. R. 627, on the construction of a will, the Court held that the widow was entitled to a life estate, and added: "Hence taxes and repairs fall upon the life estate if the property is kept in the shape of realty. The duty of protecting the corpus rests upon the trustees, while seeing that the widow has full use and benefit of it during her life."

INSURANCE.

Section 23 of the Trustee Act gives a trustee power to insure any buildings of the trust estate and to pay the premiums for such insurance out of the income without the consent of the person entitled to the income. The section does not apply to any property which a trustee is bound forthwith to convey absolutely to any beneficiary upon being requested to

do so. This section is similar to section 18 of the English Trustee Act, 1893.

Prior to this enactment a trustee could not insure the trust property without the consent of the tenant for life. Lewin on Trusts, 8th ed. 580.

It has been held that a trustee is not bound to insure the trust property, and not chargeable with neglect in case of a loss by fire. *Bailey v. Gould*, 4 Y. & C. Ex. 221; *Fry v. Fry*, 27 Beav. 146; 122 R. R. 354.

The American authorities seem to hold that the failure to keep trust property insured is not consistent with ordinary care in the management of the trust estate, and that the trustee is bound to take this precaution against loss. Having regard to the almost universal practice among business men, in our day, this would seem to be the prudent rule. The trend of modern English text writers is more in accordance with the American decisions than with the older English cases. In Beven on Negligence, it is said:—"The question seems really to turn on what, in the existing state of opinion, and with reference to contemporary modes of life, is the reasonable thing to do; and whatever may have been the case in the year 1840, it would be a hard saying at the present day, and with the immensely diminished rate of insurance, to affirm that a prudent business man would not insure his property," p. 1490.

In *Henderson Trust Co. v. Stuart*, 108 Ky. 167, it is said that a failure to insure is not necessarily such negligence as, in case of loss, will render the personal representative liable for its value, but the liability for such failure is a question to be determined from the facts of each particular case; the cost of insurance, value of the property, its liability to destruction by fire, and whether or not the representative has money in his hands that could be used for the purpose, are the cardinal elements to be considered. Where the property is already insured the failure of the executor

to take out a vacancy permit on its becoming unoccupied is such negligence in the case of the property as will make him liable for the injury resulting therefrom.

In *Reubottom v. Morrow* (1865), 24 Ind. 203, part of the estate that came to the hands of the administrator was a mill, which was subsequently destroyed by fire. The Court held that *Bailey v. Gould* was good law, and added: "But we think, with the Judge who tried the case below, that the administrator ought to be held to adopt such precautions against the loss of property by fire as prudent men, under similar circumstances, are accustomed to exercise to indemnify themselves against the like casualty. This would be but reasonable care, and, ordinarily, an administrator is held to that. The decided weight of the evidence was that mill owners, in that region, were not generally in the habit of insuring in consequence of the high rates of premium demanded."

The question was discussed in a recent case and the rule in England would seem to remain as laid down in *Bailey v. Gould*. In *Re McEachern* (1911), W. N. 23, the facts were shortly as follows: The testator devised his mansion house to his widow and son upon trust to receive the rents and profits therefrom, and after payment thereof of all necessary expenses to pay the balance of the rents and profits to the widow for her life, then to the son for his life, with remainders over. At the testator's death the mansion house was insured against fire in an amount falling far short of its value.

A summons raised (*inter alia*) the question whether the devisees in trust ought to increase the subsisting insurances to an adequate amount, and to pay the annual premiums in respect of such insurance out of the rents and profits of the estate.

The widow objected to any increase being made in the insurance at her expense. The remaindermen contended that the insurance should be substantially

increased and that the annual premium should be borne by the rents and profits, on the ground that the premium constituted a necessary expense, and that even if that were not so, the trustees ought as prudent managers to exercise the statutory powers under section 18 of the Trustee Act, 1893, and increase the insurance to an adequate amount to pay the premium out of the rents and profits.

Eve, J., said that *Bailey v. Gould* and *Fry v. Fry* went to shew that the Court would not hold an executor or trustee liable on the footing of wilful default for losses occasioned by fire on premises left uninsured by him, and he could not in the face of those authorities hold that insurance against fire was an expense necessary to be incurred by trustees, for, if it were, liability on the part of the trustee for loss due to his neglect to insure would seem to follow as an inevitable consequence. After referring to Lewin on Trusts, 11th ed. 702, he said he could not hold that section 18 of the Trustee Act, 1893, imposed on a trustee a statutory obligation to insure or on a tenant for life a statutory liability to pay the costs of such insurance. The section seemed to confer powers, not to impose obligations, and inasmuch as the trustees were not unanimous in the present case as to the exercise of the powers conferred on them, he would answer in the negative the question just as it was put in the summons, without saying anything as to whether the trustees ought to insure the premises at the expense of the estate generally, because the only point that had been argued was that such insurance ought to be maintained by the tenant for life.

The American view is stated by a contributor to the Albany Law Journal, who says that insurance premiums are of the same general nature as repairs, and adds: "Now repairs are one of the burdens that are borne by the life-tenant, as are taxes and interest on mortgages. *Matter of Albertson*, 113 N. Y. 527; *Matter of Mason*, 98 N. Y. 57. In these cases sums

were paid annually to save loss or depreciation of the capital, and it is in this category that insurance finds its logical place. If it be objected that the payment of premiums does not benefit the life-tenant, I answer 'Neither do taxes nor mortgage interest.' Yet the courts have firmly settled the obligation of the life-tenant to pay these from income. In fact, as was well said in a recent case, a testator's main idea in establishing a trust estate is that the capital of the trust shall be kept intact, and go in its entirety to the remainderman, leaving repairs and expenses of administration to be borne by the life-tenant. On principle therefore it seems that insurance premiums should be paid from the income of the life-tenant; and this principle is, it seems to me, decisively settled by authority. In *Matter of Albertson, supra*, the testator gave his residuary estate to trustees to pay over the income or profits thereof to his wife, during her life, and upon her death to pay over the capital to persons specified. During the widow's lifetime the trustees paid the interest on a mortgage on the farm, and the insurance premiums, and the taxes from the income of the estate. The Court of Appeals, Judge Gray writing the opinion, held unanimously that such payments were properly made from income. He said: 'The principle has been firmly established that interest on mortgages, taxes, repairs, and all these current expenses which are fairly incidental to the maintenance of the realty used by a life-tenant are payable by him, that it should be adhered to on all occasions unless in so doing we violate a plain direction to the contrary.' This decision was referred to and approved of in *Woodward v. James*, 115 N. Y. 346, where the rule was reiterated." Vol. 42, p. 25.

See also *In re Redding* (1897), 1 Ch. 876, where the "income derived" from an estate was given to a life-tenant and the executors paid taxes and insurance on the property, the Court held the "income derived"

from the estate meant the net income after paying taxes, insurance, etc.

Trustees who failed to keep alive policies of life insurance have been held liable to the beneficiaries. *Garner v. Moore*, 24 L. J. Ch. 687; but only if they have funds in hand, or can procure funds to pay the premiums. *Hobday v. Peters*, 28 Beav. 603, 126 R. R. 262.

A trustee insuring trust property and receiving rebates from the insurance company with whom he effects the risk, has no right to appropriate these rebates to his own use; and this notwithstanding that the estate is not charged with more than it would have had to pay if the rebates had not been allowed to the trustee. *In re Wilson and Toronto General Trusts Corporation* (1908), 15 O. L. R. 614.

Premiums paid for insurance on personal property will be allowed as a disbursement for the protection and preservation of the estate. *Cornwell v. Deck*, 2 Redf. (N.Y.) 87.

Where trustees are directed to insure the trust property against loss or damage by fire, the premiums must be borne by income: *Re Redding* (1897), 1 Ch. 876; unless the property is unproductive and incapable of beneficial enjoyment by the tenant for life. *Lonsdale v. Berchtoldt*, 3 K. & J. 185, 112 R. R. 97.

“I do not think the tenant for life is bound to keep the furniture insured; in point of fact she has no interest in the furniture except to use it. If she does not insure the furniture and it be burnt, she can no longer enjoy it; but I think she, as executrix and trustee, ought to insure it at the expense and for the benefit of the estate; that is because the furniture belongs, subject to the tenancy for life, to the estate.” Per North, J., *In re Betty* (1899), 1 Ch. 821, 829.

In *In re Quicke's Trusts* (1908), 1 Ch. 887, trustees, during the minority of a life-tenant, insured the mansion house and certain settled chattels and furniture, and paid the premiums out of the income. The

house and chattels were destroyed by fire and the trustees recovered £7,000 on the house policy and £1,244 on the chattel property. The Fires Prevention Act, 1774, provides that insurance companies may, upon the request of any person interested in any building burnt down, expend the insurance money in rebuilding. Swinfen Edy, J., held that under this Act the remainderman was entitled to have the £7,000 expended in rebuilding: but, because the Act did not apply to insurance on chattels, the life-tenant was entitled to the £1,244.

The learned author of Macgillivray on Insurance Law, commenting on this decision, says: "This case, however, may require to be reconsidered, for it certainly is somewhat startling to find that the power given to trustees to insure out of income is a power which can only be exercised for the benefit of the tenant for life and which cannot be exercised for the benefit of the estate except incidentally by reason of the remainderman's statutory rights under 14 Geo. 3, c. 78."

CHAPTER XVI.

HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES.

Executors must be allowed a reasonable time for breaking up the testator's domestic establishment and discharging his servants. In *Field v. Peckett*, 29 Beav. 576; 131, R. R. 71, the matter was discussed by the Master of the Rolls. In that case the testator left a large estate and had twenty-one servants. The household establishment was continued for two months and an expense of 402 pounds incurred. Sir John Romilly said: "With reference to the housekeeping it is a very trifling matter, and I will mention to what extent I think it is to be allowed. There can be no question that some little time must be allowed to executors to look about them and to consider what is to be done. An executor is not, the moment he hears that his testator is dead, to discharge all the servants, by giving them a month's wages, but he must be allowed some reasonable time for that purpose, and the only question really is, whether it was necessary to keep them there for two months, because, before that time, and probably in the course of a fortnight or three weeks, he would have known how many servants were required, and their board would not have been the same, though their wages might have been. The expense of housekeeping for the two months was a considerable amount, and if all the servants were not really required, he might have discharged those who were not required upon giving them a month's wages, and have thus saved the expense of their board." In the event the whole sum was allowed the executors.

In this connection it may be proper to refer to the widow's right to quarantine, which is thus stated in an old authority:—"Quarantine is where a man dyeth seized of a manor-place and other lands, whereof the

wife ought to be endowed; then the woman may abide in the manor-place and there live of the store and profits thereof the space of forty days, within which time her dower shall be assigned." *Termes de la Ley*. See also sec. 2 of the Dower Act.

It is a right to reside in the dwelling house concurrently with the heir, and to receive her reasonable maintenance during forty days after her husband's death; but she is not entitled to possess any portion of the premises beyond the dwelling house. *Callaghan v. Callaghan*, 1 C. P. 348.

Paragraph 7 of Magna Charta (1215), is as follows: "A widow after the death of her husband shall straightway, and without difficulty, have her marriage portion and her inheritance which belonged to her, and which she and her husband held on the day of the death of that husband. And she may remain in the house of her husband after his death for forty days; within which her dowry shall be paid over to her."

Although the Great Charter contained few absolutely new provisions, but recapitulated the most important rights that had been enjoyed by English free-men, the writer has not been able to find earlier trace of the right of quarantine.

Quarantine is not merely a personal right. The widow is entitled to have a reasonable and proper attendance and companionship. But if the widow marry within the forty days she loses her quarantine. *Lucas v. Knox*, 3 O. R. 453. But she cannot assign her right. *Norton v. Norton*, 94 Ala. 481; and her privilege dies with her. *Clancy v. Stephens*, 92 Ala. 577.

On the administration of an estate the widow claimed to be relieved from accounting for certain quantities of wheat, potatoes, pork, apples, pickles, preserves and firewood—all of the value of \$31.58—used by her for her maintenance on the farm of the testator during the forty days, and it was held she was not chargeable therewith. *Re Bennett*, 11 C. L. T. 305.

Where a farm was devised to the widow for life, and at the time of the testator's death a quantity of grain was sown in the ground, it was held that the widow and not the executors was entitled to the crops. *Cudney v. Cudney*, 21 Gr. 153.

In dealing with the question of assets, *ante*, it was pointed out that the widow has a statutory title to her husband's exemptions; and under Funeral Expenses the decisions relating to the expenses incurred for mourning are considered.

Where a widow is entitled to dower out of the lands of her deceased husband the personal representative has power to compromise the same for a cash sum under section 52 of the Trustee Act. *Re McIntyre* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 548.

In general, the right extends only to the house and land of which the widow is dowable. *Callahan v. Nelson*, 128 Ala. 671; and in which the deceased died at the time of his death. *King v. King*, 155 Mo. 406; but it is not necessary that the widow should have resided in the mansion-house at the time of her husband's death. *King v. King, supra*. Where a portion of a building was rented as a store and the remainder occupied as a dwelling, it was held the widow was not entitled to remain in possession of the rented portion. *Davis v. Lowden*, 56 N. J. Eq. 126. Nor does the privilege extend to mortgaged premises as against the claim of the mortgagee. *Young v. Estes*, 59 Me. 441.

It has been held that if the executor or administrator rents the premises which is subject to the widow's quarantine, she is entitled to the rents and profits for the period she is entitled to the occupation thereof. *Reeves v. Brooks*, 80 Ala. 26; *Orrick v. Pratt*, 34 Mo. 226; *Conger v. Attwood*, 28 Ohio St. 134.

CHAPTER XVII.

TOMBSTONE.

“Upon the general question whether an executor procuring a gravestone or slab to the memory of his testator, suitable to his degree and estate, can charge the same against his estate, I do not think there can be much doubt. The charges attending a funeral are allowed to an executor (except as against creditors) even where the expenses are considerable, provided they are suitable to the degree and estate of the deceased, and they are allowed, not as being necessary, but because they are so suitable. They are sanctioned as customary marks of respect, as proper to be allowed, because they are so; and it does appear to me that the principle upon which such expenses are allowed applies with still more force and with better reason to an expense incurred, if not immoderate, for a permanent memorial of the deceased. Not only is it usual and considered a proper mark of respect, and its omission in some degree a reproach to survivors, but it is useful as marking the place of burial and as furnishing evidence of pedigree. But if it be proper and usual, that I conceive is sufficient to authorize an executor in incurring the expense, and therefore in being allowed for it out of the estate. In Roger’s Ecclesiastical Law, citing 3 Inst. 102, it is said ‘concerning the building or erection of tombs, sepulchres or monuments for the deceased in church, chancel, common chapel, or churchyard, it is lawful, for it is the last act of charity that can be done for the deceased;’ and in 2nd Coimyn’s Digest, under the head ‘tomb, monument, etc.,’ it is said, ‘So an heir or executor may erect or set up a tombstone or other monument in a convenient place within the church or churchyard, for the honour of his ancestor there buried:’” Per Sprague, C., *Menzies v. Ridley*, 2 Gr. 544.

“The remaining item is the charge for a gravestone. No creditors intervene. Such an expense was allowed in *Menzies v. Ridley*, as a charge attending a funeral, not as necessary, but as suitable, as a customary mark of respect, and proper to be allowed, because it is so. The whole reasoning in that case proceeds on the ground of their being properly funeral expenses, and not merely charges against the estate, which will be allowed to an executor in passing his accounts. See *Wood v. Vanderburg*, 6 Paige R. 277, 288.” Per Proudfoot, V.C., *Smith v. Rose*, 24 Gr. 440.

A testator provided for “a suitable tablet” over his grave “not to exceed \$1,500,” and also for tablets or stones over the graves of his deceased wives, with no limit as to the costs of these. He died worth \$200,000, and the executors removed the remains of the deceased’s three wives to the same burial place as that of the testator and built one monument in respect of the whole four at a cost of \$3,000. Held, not an improper expenditure. *Archer v. Severn*, 13 O. R. 316.

In *Sinnott v. Kenaday*, 14 App. Cas. 1 (D.C.), \$575 for a tombstone out of an estate of \$36,000 going to collateral heirs was upheld as reasonable.

In *Conway’s Estate*, 10 Pa. Dist. 509, \$700 out of an estate of \$25,000 going to collateral heirs, was held not to be an extravagant allowance.

But \$1,050 for a monument and the expenses incidental thereto, where the value of the estate was only \$2,500, was held to be unreasonable. *Matter of Smith*, 75 N. Y. App. Div. 339; 78 N. Y. S. 130.

A testator directed his executors to erect a monument to the memory of himself and his wife, at a cost not exceeding \$250. After payment of certain preferred legacies there was a deficiency of \$500 in the amount required to pay the general legacies. The Court suggested that the executors should “limit their discretion as to the cost of the monument, and expend

upon it no more than \$50—an ample sum in the circumstances.” *Re Lambertus* (1914), 6 O. W. N. 300.

In *Matter of Mount*, 3 Redf. 9, the amount of the estate was \$938 and a charge of \$78 for a gravestone was cut down to \$50. In *Matter of Morton*, 89 Hun 574, it was held that \$1,400 for a monument was too expensive for an estate of \$35,400. In *Matter of Beech*, 22 N. Y. S. 1079, the Court held that an estate of \$8,000 justified an expenditure of \$400 for a monument. In *Owens v. Bloomer*, 14 Hun 296, the Court considered an expenditure of \$500 for a monument extravagant, the estate not exceeding \$8,000. In *Burnett v. Noble*, 5 Redf. 69, the personal estate being less than \$2,000, an allowance of \$700 was refused and reduced to \$250.

A testator gave certain bequests, and directed his executor “out of the balance of my money . . . that said balance shall be used to defray funeral expenses and the erection of a monument over my grave.” The Court held that this did not require that all the balance remaining after payment of funeral expenses be used in erecting a monument, but that only so much thereof as might be reasonable, having in view the testator’s station in life and the amount of his estate. *In re Young’s Estate*, 157 N. Y. S. 494.

In *Evans v. Brickman*, 12 Hun 425, the testator left his entire estate to his executors for his funeral expenses and the erection of a monument. The estate amounted to \$1,200, and the Court held that it was the intention of the deceased to devote an amount which was reasonable in view of his position in life and the extent of his property, and affirmed the decree fixing the sum of \$150 as the limit to be expended for the monument.

By the will the executor was directed to erect certain tombstones over the graves of the deceased and certain members of his family. He also made several bequests of specific legacies. To have carried out the direction as to the tombstones would have exhausted

the estate and left an insufficient amount to pay the legacies. Held, that as the direction to erect the tombstones if carried out would probably exhaust the estate and prevent the executor paying any legacies, and as none of the next of kin insisted on such direction being carried out, the executor might disregard such direction. *In re Thomas L. Carley*, deceased, 4 S. L. R. 280.

In two American Courts it has been held that where the widow of the deceased ordered and paid for a tombstone; if the claim is reasonable and one which the administrator could have contracted, she was entitled to be subrogated to the right against the estate of the person who furnished the monument. *Pease v. Christman*, 158 Ind. 642; *Hoctor v. Lavery*, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 74. But for a tombstone ordered by another person the administrator cannot be held liable, although he has knowledge of its erection and makes no objection. *Foley v. Bushway*, 71 Ill. 386; *Lerch v. Emmett*, 44 Ind. 331; *Sweeny v. Muldoon*, 139 Mass. 304.

By the Assurance Companies Act, 1909, among the purposes for which certain societies may issue policies of assurance there is included money to be paid for funeral expenses of a parent. The trial Judge allowed the costs of a tombstone as part of the funeral expenses. On appeal, Rowlatt, J., delivering the principal judgment of the Court, said: "One must look at the object of this statute, which was to enable people to secure by insurance money wherewith to fulfil what is really a sentimental obligation. I think the enactment ought to be construed with some latitude. Undoubtedly it would not be considered as a matter of law that the erecting of a memorial in the shape of a church or chapel, or the founding of a bed in a hospital, or even wearing mourning, was a part of the funeral expenses; but the memorial upon the grave may be the completion and the identification of the grave itself, and, while I do not say that in every case a tombstone must be part of the funeral expenses, I do

not say that as a matter of law it is not. We have no jurisdiction to review the finding in this case upon the facts, and I think in every case the learned Judge must consider whether a tombstone is reasonable under the circumstances or not. Speaking for myself, I should say that *prima facie* £50 is a very large sum to spend on a funeral; but the learned Judge has said that among Jews a very large measure is to be allowed. He has allowed the expense of the tombstone, and seems to think that £53.16 is not too much to spend on this funeral. Whether or not I should have come to the same conclusion is immaterial." In another part of the judgment in appeal the same Judge said: "Past maintenance cannot be recovered under a policy for funeral expenses. Money spent in keeping a relative alive is no part of the expenses of burying him." *Goldstein v. Salvation Army Assurance Society* (1917), 2 K. B. p. 295.

Under the provisions in a will the executors were "to retain \$500 to be deposited in a chartered bank or invested in sound securities, the yearly interest to be devoted to the care of the grave." Middleton, J., held that apart from statutory provisions, this created a perpetual trust; and as the purpose was not charitable, the trust was void. "But by the Cemetery Act, R. S. O. 1914, ch. 261, sec. 14, the 'owner' of a cemetery may receive such a bequest; and, by sub-sec. 4, personal representatives or trustees may pay over moneys in their hands which they are directed to apply for or toward the purposes mentioned in the section, *i.e.*, 'preserving and maintaining . . . in perpetuity any particular lot or enclosure in such cemetery.' This is implemented by sub-sec. 5. Thus legislative sanction is given to this particular form of perpetual trust. The executors may pay over the \$500 to the 'owner,' *i.e.*, the person owning, controlling or managing a cemetery and should make an agreement with him (or them) as contemplated by the sta-

tute." *Re Jones* (1918), 13 O. W. N. 405; 42 O. L. R. 62.

In *Re Cronin* (1910), 1 O. W. N. 677, Britton, J., seems to have held that a direction to set aside and expend a sum "to provide for the perpetual care of my grave," was valid apart from the provisions of the Cemetery Act. The judgment is not referred to in *Re Jones*. For some curious decisions on "Gravestones, Grave-yards and Grave Subjects," see 26 C. L. Journal, 100.

CHAPTER XVIII.

REPAIRS AND IMPROVEMENTS.

It is difficult to say just how far an executor or administrator is justified in expending money in repairs to the trust property. Unless there is express provision in the will it is clear he is not justified in making extensive repairs without the direction of the Court. He is bound to see that trust premises do not fall into decay for want of repair. But when the property has fallen into bad repair, the question will of course arise whether it is worth while to do the repairs. Where it is a question between a tenant for life and remainderman, the latter is not entitled to throw the burthen of the repairs on the tenant for life by paying for them out of the rents. *In re Hotchkys*, 32 Ch. D. 408.

Where trustees were authorized to make repairs to the dwelling house it was held they were to keep it in habitable state, but not to make ornamental repairs. *Maclaren v. Stainton*, cited Lewin on Trusts, 8th ed., 576. And a power to repair does not give authority to rebuild. *Bleazard v. Whalley*, 2 Eq. Rep. 1093.

Where the mansion-house burned down and the trustee applied a large sum, in addition to the insurance monies, in restoring it, the Court held it had no power to order a sale or mortgage to recoup the trustee; but it appearing that the estate had benefited to the full amount of certain funds in Court, which had arisen from a sale of a part of the settled estates, Kay, J., sanctioned the application of those funds towards recouping the trustee, on the ground that the trustee having *bona fide* expended money for building on the estate, under a reasonable expectation that the Court would sanction the expenditure, and having improved the estate to the full amount of the funds in

Court, might be recouped the amount so expended. *Jesse v. Lloyd*, 48 L. T. N. S. 656.

If the trust be to make repairs out of *rents*, and the trustees borrow money to make the repairs, and then repay themselves out of the rents, they will not be allowed the interest on the money borrowed, for the trust was to apply the rents after they had accrued. *Fazakerley v. Culshaw*, 19 W. R. 793.

That it is not always safe to anticipate the protection of the Court in making expenditures is shewn by *Vyse v. Foster*, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 309. There the testator devised his estate upon trust for sale. His executors were advised that a few acres might be sold more advantageously if their value was developed by building a villa thereon. They accordingly built one at a cost of £1,600. On passing the accounts, Bacon, V.C., disallowed the expenditure, but on appeal it was held that, as the executors had, in the *bona fide* exercise of their judgment, expended this sum in improving the estate, they could, at most, only be disallowed the amount of loss (if any) occasioned to the estate by the expenditure.

In an earlier case a trustee was allowed for substantial improvements if the property sold for the original price, plus the costs of improvements. In *Exp. Hughes*, 6 Ves. 617; 6 R. R. 1.

In *Bevis v. Boulton*, 7 Gr. 39, it was held that where a trustee expends his money, and thereby increases the value of the estate, it would be inequitable to wrest it from him without re-paying the expenditure by which the estate has been substantially improved.

The widow of an intestate obtained letters of administration and remained in possession of the farm. From the rents and profits she spent a considerable sum in improvements on the farm. Spragge, V.C.: "The only point debated at the hearing was the plaintiff's claim for improvements. For the claim *Bevis v. Boulton* was cited: but that case, and the cases upon the authority of which it was decided, were cases in

which the question was, upon what terms the Court would deprive parties defendants of the land upon which they had made improvements, in favour of an equity established by the plaintiff, and are not authorities for a direct claim for improvements in the shape in which it is made by the bill." And the widow was not allowed for the improvements. *Barry v. Brazill*, 11 Gr. 253.

An executrix, who had an annuity charged on the income of the testator's real and personal estate, expended money in good faith in improving the real estate, and in other unauthorized ways, and was in consequence found indebted to the estate. It was held that the expenditure in improvements should be allowed in reduction of her indebtedness, so far as the expenditure had enhanced the value of the estate and benefited those interested in it. *Morley v. Matthews*, 14 Gr. 551. See also *Smith v. Bonnisteel*, 13 Gr. at p. 35, where the same limited relief was given.

A testator gave to his widow "the balance of the rents arising from my homestead farm." Latchford, J., said: "The repairs necessary to keep the buildings and fences on the homestead farm in the state in which they were at the death of the testator should be paid by the executor out of the rent and charged against the widow." The executor was obliged to borrow \$250, by way of mortgage on the farm, to pay the debts of the testator. As to this the Judge said: "The personalty being exhausted, the debt of \$250 is a charge upon the realty in the proportions in which the widow and the devisees in remainder benefit under the will. If the parties cannot agree, there will be a reference to an official referee to determine the amount to be contributed by each." *Re Brown Estate* (1909), 13 O. W. R. 597.

A tenant for life is not liable to repair, whether he be without impeachment of waste, or impeachable for waste. *Lansdowne v. Lansdowne*, 1 J. & W. 522; *Re Cartwright*, 41 Ch. D. 532. On the other hand, the

life-tenant is not entitled to have repairs done at the expense of the estate. *Brunskill v. Caird*, L. R. 16 Eq. 493; nor is he entitled to a charge on the estate for repairs done by himself. *Hamer v. Tilsey*, Joh. 486. And it makes no difference from what cause the repairs are made necessary, or whether they are rendered necessary during the life tenancy or by dilapidations existing at the time the life-tenant comes to his estate. *Hibbert v. Cooke*, 1 Sim. & St. 552; *Re De Teissier* (1893), 1 Ch. 153.

When the estate is managed by trustees, ordinary current repairs are paid out of income; but if substantial repairs are necessary for the preservation of the property, the Court will, on the application of the trustees, allow the cost to be raised out of capital. *Re Hotchkys*, 32 Ch. D. 408, 415.

In *In re Freman* (1898), 1 Ch. 28, trustees applied to the Court to determine how the costs of repairs ought to be borne, the property being an estate occupied by a life tenant. North, J., said, "Then there is the question, what is to be done about the repairs? What was pointed out in *In re Hotchkys* as the right thing to be done is the right thing to be done here. The property ought to be kept in repair. As was pointed out there, it must be done by an equitable arrangement between the tenant for life and remainderman. I think the right thing to do in this case is this: That the money required for the repairs should be borne by capital; but of course the tenant for life will have to keep down the interest upon that capital. If the money is taken out of other personal estate, the tenant for life will get so much less income, because this investment will not produce income. If, on the other hand, the money is borrowed on mortgage for the purpose from some outside lender, the interest on the mortgage will have to be kept down by the income, and the tenant for life will have his or her income reduced by the provision which will have to be made to keep down the interest on the mortgage."

By his will the testator directed that the income of his estate, after paying all expenses for upkeep, taxes, repairs, and other necessary expenses, be used and expended by his wife in maintaining a home for herself and their children and in the support, maintenance and education of the children, and that, when the period of distribution arrived, the corpus of the estate should be divided between the wife and children in certain proportions. The estate consisted of a hotel property which, apparently, was rented to a tenant at the time of the testator's death. There was an appeal from the order of the Surrogate Judge as to expenditures made by the executors for repairs and permanent improvements and in the purchase of trade-fixtures from an outgoing tenant. No question was raised as to the propriety of making these expenditures, but it was contended that they should be charged against income, and not, as the Judge decided, against capital. The Court said: "The executors were not justified in purchasing the trade-fixtures or making the permanent improvements without obtaining the sanction of the Court; but, if they had applied under the Settled Estates Act for authority, it would no doubt have been given on proper terms, as was done in *In re Freeman* (1898), 1 Ch. 28, 33, and *In re Hotchkys* (1886), 32 Ch. D. 408.

"Part of the repairs were rendered necessary by dilapidations existing at the time of the death of the testator. Inasmuch as by the will of the testator in the case at bar, repairs were to be made out of income, any want of repair arising after the death must be made good out of income; but this obligation does not extend to dilapidations existing at the time of his death: *Brereton v. Day* (1895), 1 I. R. 518; *In re Smith* (1901), 17 Times L. R. 588, 84 L. T. R. 835."

There being no material before the Court to enable it to apportion the burden of the expenditures in question it was referred back to the Surrogate

Judge to be dealt with in accordance with the rule laid down in *In re Freman. Re Elliot* (1917), 13 O. W. N. 266.

In *McDonnell's Estate*, 9 Kulp. (Pa.) 123, it was held that an administrator was not entitled to any credit for repairs to the real estate made after the death of the intestate; but the judgment, apparently, is on the ground that the letters of administration gave the administrator no control over the real estate.

In *Re Bender*, 8 P. R. 399, the Court sanctioned the expenditure of a considerable sum for improvements in the shape of an addition to a building.

Where an executor or administrator requires the direction of the Court on this, or any other matter connected with the trust, such direction may be obtained by an Originating Notice under the provisions of Consolidated Rules 600 and 601. The practice and procedure is fully set out in Holmsted's *Judicature Act*, p. 1232 *et sub.* See *Re Heward's Estate* (1907), 10 O. W. R. 961, where an application was made to the Court and an order made allowing \$3,000 to be expended in making repairs.

No remedy exists for the recovery of money expended in repairs or improvements by one tenant in common, so long as the property is enjoyed in common; but in a suit for partition it is usual to have an inquiry as to those expenses of which nothing could be recovered so long as the parties enjoyed their property in common, so as to make an equitable distribution: *Leigh v. Dickinson*, 15 Q. B. D. 66; *Rice v. George*, 20 Gr. p. 226. But the right of a tenant in common, in partition proceedings, to be paid for improvements is restricted to such as are made by him after his tenancy in common has commenced in fact. A widow was life-tenant of a farm and the children remaindermen. During the life of the widow one of her sons, under an agreement with her, worked the farm, supplying her and her unmarried daughter with

a home. He built a new house on the farm, paying for it himself, with the exception of a small sum received from his mother. On her death he claimed, in partition proceedings, for the improvements as made by a tenant-in-common, but it was held that as the improvements were not made by the son in the character of a tenant-in-common, but as the agent of his mother, he could not be allowed for them. *Lasby v. Crewson*, 21 O. R. 255.

CHAPTER XIX.

MISCELLANEOUS ALLOWANCES.

No rule can be laid down which will catalogue or classify the various kinds of expenditures which will be allowed an executor or administrator. Much will depend upon the nature of the estate and upon the character of the services for which the charge is made. *Re Willard*, 139 Cal. 501. Those actual and necessary expenses for which an executor must be reimbursed are those which are contracted in good faith and with reasonable judgment, whether with or without the advice of counsel. *Re Stanton*, 41 Misc. (N.Y.) 278.

Credit will be allowed for payments made by an executor for services rendered before probate is granted which were necessary to the proper care and preservation of the estate. *Re Ogden*, 41 Misc. 158.

On the other hand credit will not be allowed for any disbursements unless they are necessary or proper to protect the estate or carry out the provisions of the will. *Johnson v. Henagan*, 11 S. Car. 93. On this principle credit will not be allowed for the costs of removing and renovating the tombstone of the deceased's parents: *Brantz v. Brantz*, 52 Md. 686; or for disbursements on account of an appeal which was not for the protection or benefit of the estate, but which was prosecuted by the administrator for his own benefit and to relieve himself from accounting for funds in his hands. *McClelland v. Bristow*, 9 Ind. App. 543.

If expenses have been unnecessarily incurred, credit will not be refused for that reason alone. The right to credit in such cases, depends on the good faith and prudence of the executor, and the burden is on him to shew that he had good reason to believe at the

time that the expenditures for which he claims credit were necessary for the benefit of the estate. *Robbins v. Wolcott*, 27 Conn. 234.

In *Chisholm v. Bernard*, 10 Gr. 479, a retaining fee paid to a solicitor was allowed, as it was not, in the circumstances of the case, an unreasonable disbursement for the executors to make in view of the trouble in administering the estate.

In *Re Quinn*, Connoly (N.Y.) 381, it was held that where executors refused a reasonable price for land which they were directed by the will to sell, instead of selling it to the highest bidder as they should have done, they were not entitled to credit for the expenses of offering it for sale a second time, or for insurance and taxes accruing after the time when it was first offered for sale.

Expenses incurred by one of the next of kin in hunting up the others, though at the suggestion of the administrator, are not for the benefit of the estate, and therefore are not allowable as an expense of administration: *In re Glynn*, 57 Minn. 21; so too, fees paid by an executor to a surveyor for designating the lines between parcels of land devised by metes and bounds will not be allowed. That is something that interests the devisees alone. *McGougan v. Hall*, 21 S. Car. 600.

In California it was held that an administrator was not entitled to an allowance for expenditures in having an examination made of a mine, in which the estate held stock, for the purpose of ascertaining its value. *In re Bell's Estate*, 79 P. 358, 145 Cal. 646; nor was he entitled to an allowance for money paid to a detective to watch the executors, who had been removed at his suit, because they had not turned over all the papers and he believed them dishonest. *Ib.*

The fact that the administrator is interested in the estate does not affect his right to credit for money necessarily expended in looking after the interest of the estate. *Williams v. Petticrew*, 62 Mo. 460. But the costs of insuring individual property of the execu-

tor which is security for a debt due from him to the estate, cannot be allowed as an item of administration expense. *Good's Estate*, 150 Pa. St. 307.

An administrator was allowed the cost of keeping a horse which could not be sold. *Branham v. Com.*, 7 Marsh (Ky.), 190. But the expense of maintaining the deceased's favorite horse as long as he lived, such expense not being provided for by the will, was disallowed, though it was the request of the testator. *Matter of Teyn*, 2 Redf. (N.Y.) 306.

Credit will be allowed for payments made to an auctioneer for his services in selling the property of the estate. *Pinckard v. Pinckard*, 24 Ala. 250: and to a broker in cases of sale requiring unusual exertion. *Ballentine's Estate*, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 86. But not for money expended by the executor or administrator for ardent spirits used at an auction sale of the goods of the deceased, though it was shewn to be customary to furnish spirits on such occasions. *Griswold v. Chandler*, 5 N. H. 492.

The proper expenses for necessary advertisements will be allowed the executor or administrator. *Re Smith*, 1 Misc. (N.Y. Surr. Ct.) 269.

Where an executor unnecessarily resisted payment of a legacy he was not allowed credit for interest accumulated during the litigation and paid by him. *In re Peters* (Mo. App.) 107 S. W. 406.

In New York it was held that where an executor removes from the State after undertaking the duties of his office, and afterwards comes into the State on the business of the estate, he is not entitled to credit for the travelling expenses so incurred. *Marsh v. Gilbert*, 2 Redf. 465; *Re Dunn*, 8 N. Y. St. Rep. 766; *Re Ingersoll*, 6 Dem. 184. But in *Everts v. Everts*, 62 Barb. (N.Y.) it was held that travelling expenses, including board, should be allowed to a non-resident executor who necessarily came into the State to prove the will

An executor is entitled to credit for travelling expenses necessarily incurred in taking a journey to be examined as a witness in a suit brought by him to foreclose a mortgage held by the estate. *Elliot v. Lewis*, 3 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 40.

Unnecessary travelling expenses, as where nothing could be accomplished by the journey which could not have been done by correspondence, will not be allowed. *In re Barber*, 12 N. Y. Supp. 538.

Travelling expenses necessarily incurred in caring for the assets should be allowed as an expense of administration. *In re McDowell* (1916), 197 N. Y. St. 165.

Livery bills, when necessarily incurred and reasonable in amount, will be allowed as travelling expenses. *Re Ingersoll*, *supra*. But the use of the executor's horse and wagon will not be allowed for, because sound policy forbids that he should make any profit out of his dealings with the estate, and he would be subject to the temptation of making more frequent journeys than are necessary if he were paid for the use of his horse. *Pullman v. Willets*, 4 Dem. (N.Y.) 536.

An executor was refused an allowance for serving citation proceedings. *In re Wick*, 53 Misc. (N.Y.) 211; and for personal services in repairing and painting buildings belonging to the estate. *In re Woods*, 55 Misc. 181.

Office rent and incidental expenses were disallowed where the business transacted concerned mortgages and notes and could as well be attended to at the executor's residence. *Re Semple's Estate*, 28 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 431.

Office rent was allowed where it appeared that the office was hired by the executor exclusively for the business of the estate, and it appeared "that the having of said office was reasonable and practically necessary in view of the large mass of books and papers belonging to the estate." *Newell v. West*, 149 Mass. 520; *Bronson v. Bronson*, 48 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 481.

In *Maffet's Estate*, 7 Kulp. (Pa.) 153, it was held proper for executors to employ a superintendent and furnish him with an office where the estate was large and was composed of lands, coal mines and stocks.

The hire of a safe deposit box in which to store the papers of the estate is an expense incident to the performance of the duty of an executor to care for the property of the deceased. *Hartson v. Eldon*, 58 N. J. Eq. 478.

In *Meeker v. Crawford*, 5 Redf. (N.Y.) 450, the estate amounted to more than a million dollars, invested in various securities, and it was held that the employment of a clerk at \$600 a year was calculated to be beneficial to the estate, and that the amount paid should be allowed as a reasonable charge. But the fact that the executors are busy men and have not as much time to give to the management of the estate as other individuals, cannot be permitted to affect the rule that executors must perform, within reasonable limits, the actual manual labour requisite to the due execution of the trust; nor can such rule be affected by the fact that the executors in employing a bookkeeper and fixing his compensation acted precisely as they would have done in the management of their own affairs. *Re Harbeck*, 81 Hun (N.Y.) 26.

The question whether an executor should be allowed for payments made by him for the services of a bookkeeper for the estate depends upon the circumstances. If the services were such as, under the circumstances, the executor ought to have performed, and for which his commission is intended to compensate him, such charges should be disallowed. *Estate of More*, 121 Cal. 609.

An executor was allowed \$30 paid a bookkeeper where the only objection thereto was that he was a relative of the executor and worked in his bank. *Re Pratt's Estate*, 119 Cal. 156.

Executors' accounts extended over six years and they were allowed a commission of 5 per cent. on col-

lections, amounting to \$1,800. It was held they were not entitled to credit for clerk hire and office rent, although the will empowered them to retain reasonable help in getting in and closing the estate. *Wright v. Berton*, 32 N. B. 708.

A trust company accepted administration of an estate for a fixed remuneration of \$750. Part of the estate consisted of stocks of goods of two general stores. The administrators paid a considerable sum for taking stock and sold the goods by auction at a rate on the dollar. They also paid their solicitor a commission for collecting notes, accounts, mortgages and rents. The Surrogate Judge allowed the administrators these sums and his judgment was affirmed on appeal. (The facts do not appear fully in the report, but are known to the writer, who was solicitor for the administrator.) *Re Hart* (1904), 3 O. W. R. 785.

Executors and administrators are bound within reasonable limits to discharge the actual manual labour required for the due execution of their duties, and cannot make charges for clerical work because they are men of affairs. The test would seem to be the necessity for the services and the reasonableness of the disbursements. *In re McDowell* (1916), 197 N. Y. St. 165, following *In Matter of Harbeck*, 81 Hun 28.

An executor, in finishing the growing crops of the deceased, is not personally bound to discharge the duties of an overseer, but he may employ and pay out of the assets in his hands the necessary costs of an overseer as may be necessary for the completion and preservation of the crops. *Lee v. Lee*, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 316; *Sullivan v. Tuck*, 1 Md. Ch. 65.

Vindication of the deceased's character is not a matter in regard to which the administrator may employ counsel at the expense of the estate. *Woodard v. Woodard*, 36 S. Car. 118. Nor will allowance be made for fees paid to counsel to prosecute a person

charged with the murder of the deceased. *Lusk v. Anderson*, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 429.

Executors were allowed the amount paid by them on a mortgage on which the testator was not personally liable, notwithstanding that the property was finally lost to the estate and it received no benefits from the payments, where at the time of the payments it was held under an executory contract of sale, and the executors were justified in believing that the purchaser would fulfil his covenant, in which case the payments would have benefited the estate. *Re Horsford*, 27 App. Div. 427, 50 N. Y. Supp. 550.

An executor retained in his hands funds that he might have distributed among the legatees. On the accounting it was contended he was not entitled to credit for income taxes paid on such funds. The Court, however, allowed the payments since it was presumed the funds would have been assessed to the legatees in their hands. *In re Sudds*, 66 N. Y. S. 231.

If a testamentary scheme of distribution involved the keeping of numerous complicated accounts, and extending over a considerable period, the administrator will be allowed the expense of a bookkeeper. *Merritt v. Merritt*, 161 N. Y. 634.

Money expended by a successful party in an action as to who should administer the estate cannot be allowed as a charge against the estate, as such action is personal between the two litigants. *Cate v. Cate* (Ch. App.), 43 S. W. 365.

In *Bennett v. Wyndham*, 4 D. F. & J. 259, 135 R. R. 132, a trustee, in the due execution of his trust, directed a bailiff employed on the trust property, to cut down certain trees. The bailiff ordered the woodcutters usually employed on the property to fell the trees, in doing which they negligently allowed a limb to fall on a passer-by, who, being injured, recovered £1,200 damages against the trustee in an action. These damages were allowed the trustee out of the trust property.

CHAPTER XX.

RIGHT OF RETAINER.

In England an executor may pay one of several creditors of equal degree in preference to the others. So it is his privilege to retain for his own debt due to him from the deceased, in preference to all other creditors of equal degree. This is usually referred to as an executor's **right of retainer**. By section 53 of our Trustee Act, in case of deficiency of assets, all debts are to rank *pari passu*, including debts to the personal representative of the deceased. In *Clark v. Chamberlain*, 1 O. R. 135; 9 A. R. 273, it was held that the effect of this section is to disable an executor from giving a preference to one creditor over another, so that if he pays one in full, the presumption is that he has sufficient funds to pay all the creditors in full.

In *Willis v. Willis*, 20 Gr. 396, the executor had paid out more than had come to his hands, and claimed to be reimbursed, but it was held that he could not by paying off creditors create a demand in his own favour that would give him a right of retainer in priority to other creditors, and that he was only entitled to be paid *pro rata*. See also *Re Ross*, 29 Gr. 385.

As an executor or administrator is not bound to set up the Statute of Limitations as a defence, it should seem that he may retain a debt due to himself though it may be more than six years old. *Stahlschmidt v. Lett*, 1 Sm. & G. 415. But as against an executor claiming as a creditor, another creditor has the right to set up the Statute of Limitations. *Re Ross*, 29 Gr. p. 391.

An executor or administrator cannot, however, retain a debt due to himself if it is such as he is prevented from enforcing by reason of the Statute of Frauds. *Re Rownson*, 29 Ch. D. 358.

An executor may retain a debt due by a legatee or distributee to the deceased, although such debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations. *Re Wheeler* (1904), 2 Ch. 66; *Boden v. Mier*, 98 N. W. R. 701; *In re Akerman* (1891), 3 Ch. D. 212.

The phrase "right of retainer" is sometimes used to denote the right which an executor or administrator has of retaining out of the share of a beneficiary a debt due by such beneficiary to the estate. This right is not one of "set-off" or "retainer" in the proper sense of these terms, but it is, viewed from the side of the beneficiary, his right to receive payment of the legacy, having regard to the amount of the debt due the testator's estate; and viewed on the side of the executor, his right to be paid out of the fund in hand. *Tillie v. Springer*, 21 O. R. 585, 588.

This right does not depend on the right of preference, and therefore has not been abolished by the provisions of the Trustee Act. The Devolution of Estates Act has rather enlarged it so that the executor can retain out of the proceeds of land. *Tillie v. Springer, supra*. Whether it would apply to the case of a specific devise is doubtful. In England it has been held not to apply. See *Re Taylor*, 1894, 1 Ch. 671. In Ontario the doubt arises on the effect of the Devolution of Estates Act, which vests all the estate in the executor or administrator, and in this respect is different from the English law.

In the converse case, the benefit taken by a defaulting executor under a will can be retained to make good his default, whether that benefit came to him by original or derivative title. A testator appointed D. one of his executors, and gave a legacy of £2,000 to D.'s wife. The wife died without having been paid her legacy, and D. was her sole executor and legatee. On D.'s death it was found he had appropriated £215 of the testator's estate. It was held the surviving executor was entitled to retain the £215 from the wife's

legacy. *In re Dacre, Whitaker v. Dacre* (1915), 2 Ch. 480.

The principles upon which the right of retainer by an executor is based, and its limitations, are exemplified by the decision of Kay, J., in *Re Jones, Calver v. Laxton*, 31 Ch. D. 440, and it is there shewn that possession, or its equivalent, are necessary to support the right. So where an executor has a right of retainer for a debt due to himself by the testator, and he allows the real estate to shift into the beneficiary, he loses the right of retainer. *Re Starr*, 2 O. L. R. 762.

The principle that a legatee who is indebted to the testator's estate can receive nothing from the testator's bounty until he has brought into account the amount due in respect of the debt, does not apply where the debt is owed by a partnership of which the legatee is a member. *Turner v. Turner* (1911), 1 Ch. 716. And an executor cannot, as a general rule, retain a legacy in satisfaction of a debt which was due by the legatee, not to the testator, but to a firm in which the testator was a member. *Jackson v. Yeats* (1912), 1 I. R. 267.

Where the estate of a deceased person is insolvent, the provisions of the Trustee Act displace any right on the part of the executor to retain his debt in full. *Re Ross*, 29 Gr. 385.

See Chapter XI., "Payment of Debts," where other cases on right of retainer are collected.

CHAPTER XXI.

LEGACIES AND ANNUITIES.

For the convenience of the executor, in order that he may ascertain the debts and assets of the testator, he has one year from the death of the testator in which to pay legacies. An executor cannot be compelled to pay a legacy before the expiration of the year, notwithstanding a direction in the will that payment should be made sooner. There is, however, no rule which prevents an executor, if he thinks proper, paying legacies or handing over the residue within the period of one year. *Pearson v. Pearson*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 12; *Gartshore v. Chalie*, 10 Ves. 13; *Re Holland* (1902), 3 O. L. R. 406.

The necessity of retaining funds for a particular purpose furnishes no excuse for delaying the settlement of the balance of the estate and the payment of the legacies which are due; there being sufficient funds for the payment of all legacies whether due or not. *Brown v. Farren* (N.H.), 58 Atl. Rep. 870.

A bequest of an annuity, unless otherwise directed, commences from the death of the testator, and the first payment is paid at the end of the year from the testator's death. *Gibson v. Bott*, 7 Ves. 89, 96.

Where the annuity is payable monthly, the first payment is made at the end of a month after the testator's death. *Houghton v. Franklin*, 1 S. & S. 390.

But where an annuity was directed to be paid quarterly, the first payment to be made within eighteen months after the testator's death, it was held the annuity did not commence till fifteen months from the death of the testator. *Irvin v. Ironmonger*, 2 R. & My. 531.

Where the will directs an annuity to be purchased, the annuitant has a right to take its value in cash,

instead of the annual sum, and should he die before the annuity is purchased his legal representatives are entitled to the sum which at his death would have purchased the annuity. *In re Ross* (1900), 1 Ch. 162; *Re Robbins* (1906), 2 Ch. 648. This is on the ground that the annuity is in the nature of a legacy and becomes vested at the death of the testator, and the subsequent death of the annuitant is immaterial. *Bayley v. Bishop*, 9 Ves. 6; *Yates v. Compton*, 2 P. Wms. 408; *Barnes v. Rowley*, 3 Ves. 305; *In re Brunning, Gamon v. Dale* (1909), 1 Ch. 276.

Where the testator directed his executors to invest in good securities such sum as would pay a certain annuity, and the income of the fund was insufficient to pay the annuity, it was held that the annuitant was entitled to be paid the deficiency out of the corpus or capital. *Anderson v. Dougall*, 15 Gr. 405.

Under the Apportionment Act (R. S. O. 1914, ch. 156), moneys payable as annuities are considered as accruing from day to day and are apportioned in respect of time accordingly. Sec. 4. And see *Cuthbert v. North American Life Assurance Co.*, 24 O. R. 511.

A statutory guardian is entitled to the possession of all the property in which the infant is interested, and for which by law, or express contract, or other provision, no other custody has been provided. Such a guardian is entitled to receive legacies given to infant legatees, and presently payable, and the receipt of the guardian is a good discharge to the executor. *Huggins v. Law*, 14 A. R. 383.

But where the legacies are not to be paid to the infants until they attain their majority the rule does not apply, because that is a clear indication that the executor was the party intended by the testator to act as trustee for the infants until they attained that age. *Ib.* 385; *Galbraith v. Duncombe*, 28 Gr. 27.

In some early cases it was assumed that our Courts ought to exercise a judicial discretion in determining the extent to which recognition should be given to the

acts of foreign Courts with respect to the property of their citizens, and that we ought not to permit the handing over to foreign guardians of funds out of the control of our Courts, unless satisfied that to do so was in the interest of the foreign subject according to our standards.

In England the situation was fully reviewed in the case of *Thiery v. Chalmers* (1900), 1 Ch. 80. There Kekewich, J., formulated very clearly the principle that, where the foreign guardian is entitled by the law of the domicile, the fund ought to be paid to him, even when it is a trust fund under the control of the Court. This was followed by the Court of Appeal in *Didisheim v. London and Westminster Bank* (1900), 2 Ch. 15.

In *Re Lloyd* (1914), 31 O. L. R. 476, the Appellate Division affirmed a judgment of Latchford, J., who refused to order moneys in the hands of Ontario administrators to be paid over to a Texas guardian on the ground that such transfer was not for the benefit of the infant. In the more recent case of *Kelly v. O'Brian* (1916), 37 O. L. R. 326, Mr. Justice Middleton reviews the authorities and says that in *Re Lloyd* "our Court did not have before it the authoritative decision from which I have quoted," and he ordered the executors to pay the moneys in their hands belonging to an infant domiciled in Quebec to the infant's tutor appointed by a Court in that province, following the decision in *Hanrahan v. Hanrahan*, 19 O. R. 396. See also *Fletchers v. Rodgers* (1878), 27 W. R. 97.

In *Re Sinclair, Allan v. Sinclair* (1897), 1 Ch. 921, the question to be determined was, what are the rights of an annuitant in the case of a deficiency of assets to meet the annuity. In Seton on Judgments, 5th ed., 1384, it is laid down: "Where assets are deficient an annuity should be valued, and abate proportionately, and the appointment belongs to the annuitant absolutely; *Wroughton v. Colquhoun*, 1 D. G. & Sm. 357,

unless given subject to condition: *Carr v. Ingleby*, 1 D. G. & Sm. 362." In the present case the annuity in question was given to the annuitant for life "or until the annuitant should do or suffer some act or thing whereby, or by means whereof, the said annuity, or any part thereof, if belonging to him absolutely, would become vested in or payable to some other person or persons, whichever should be the shorter period." The fund out of which the annuity was payable was deficient, and the annuity had been valued, and the amount of the valuation was represented by a sum in Court. The annuitant applied for payment out of the fund to him. Kekewich, J., with some hesitation made the order, refusing to follow *Carr v. Ingleby*, *supra*. It is to be noted that although the annuity was given until the happening of the event above mentioned, yet there was no gift over, and the covenantor's estate could have no claim on the fund. These circumstances appear to have weighed with the Court.

Where an annuity is charged upon both income and capital, and the income for any one year is insufficient to pay the annuity for that year, the capital cannot afterwards be recouped for the deficiency out of the surplus income of any subsequent year. *In re Croxon*, *Ferrers v. Croxton* (1915), 2 Ch. 290.

It is not necessary in all cases that pecuniary legacies or distributive shares should be paid in cash. Any mode of payment may be adopted with the consent of the legatee or heir. This is the general rule in regard to what constitutes payment. Thus the investment of money in the name of a legatee has been held a payment of the legacy, *pro tanto*, so as to vest the title in him and pass to him the right to the accruing interest. *Sullivan v. Winthrop*, 1 Sumn. (U.S.) 1. So, too, a credit on a distributive share of the price of property purchased by the distributee at the administrator's sale is a valid payment. *Wilson v. Randall*, 37 Ala. 74; *In re Beverley* (1901), 1 Ch. 681; *Re Hall*,

87 L. T. N. S. 560, W. N. (1902) 208, reversed on other grounds (1903), 2 Ch. 226.

On the other hand it has been held that a distributive share was not paid merely by purchasing a bank draft for the amount and sending it to the party entitled, who proceeded with due diligence to collect it, but the bank failed in the meantime and the draft was not paid. *State v. Wagers*, 47 Mo. App. 431; or by the deposit of the amount of the share in a bank without notice to or the assent of the party entitled. *Scott v. Fox*, 14 Md. 388.

In *Durling v. Neigh*, 15 S. & R. (Pa.) 114, it was held that the personal responsibility of the executor was not substituted for that of the estate by the giving of the executor's notes for the legacy and the execution of a receipt for the notes as in full of all demands against the estate "when paid."

And the individual note of an administrator to the guardian of an infant for the amount of the infant's distributive share, payable to the guardian individually, cannot be claimed as a payment of such share. *Edwards v. Williams*, 39 S. Car. 86.

An executor may validly appropriate specific assets to a trust share of residue, or transfer them to a legatee of a share, in advance of a final division; and a transfer to one of several executors entitled to a share of the residue of certain securities at the then market price, and which had since risen in value, was upheld as valid and binding on the other beneficiaries. *In re Richardson, Morgan v. Richardson* (1896), 1 Ch. 512. And see *In re Nickels* (1898), 1 Ch. 630, as to the power of trustees to distribute the estate in specie in payment of or on account of legacies or shares.

It is the duty of executors, as far as possible, to preserve articles specifically bequeathed, according to the testator's wish; and, unless compelled, they ought not to apply them to the payment of debts. *Clarke v. Lord Ormonde*, Jacob 108. But specific legacies as well as others are subject to the rule subordinating

them to the payment of debts. *Spode v. Smith*, 3 Russ. 511; *Davies v. Nicholson*, 2 DeG. & J. 693. The forgiveness of a debt by will amounts to a specific legacy of the debt. *Re Wedmore* (1907), 2 Ch. 277.

Where the bequest is of a given number of articles out of a larger number, as for instance a bequest of six horses in the testator's stable, and there are twenty horses in the stable, the legatee and not the executor, has the right of selection. *Tapley v. Eagleton*, 12 Ch. D. 683. And where the legatee has an unlimited right of selection of a class of articles he may take the whole. *Arthur v. Mackinnon*, 11 Ch. D. 685.

Where a testator takes shares in a company and specifically bequeaths such shares before they are fully paid up, any payments remaining due at or becoming due after his death, which are necessary to constitute him a complete shareholder, must be borne by his general estate; but if he was a complete shareholder at the time of his death, payment of calls made afterwards must be borne by the specific legatee. *Day v. Day*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 261, 127 R. R. 92.

Where an executor receives notice that a legatee has charged his legacy in favour of a stranger, or has assigned it for value, the executor is bound to withhold all further payments to the legatee, unless made with the consent of the mortgagee or assignee of the legacy. All rights of set-off and adjustment of equities between the executor already existing at the date of the notice have priority over the charge or assignment, and may properly be deducted from the amount of the legacy; but the executor can create no new charge or right of set-off after that time. *Stephens v. Venables*, 30 Beav. 625, 132 R. R. 442.

Where an executor pays a legacy after notice of assignment he is not entitled to credit therefor, when passing his accounts, if the assignment is sustained. *Stewart v. Fallon* (N.J.), 58 Atl. Rep. 96.

The question sometimes arises, whether trustees can safely pay the share of one beneficiary who has

attained a vested interest in possession, before paying the other beneficiaries who may not have attained vested interests, or whose shares by reason of incapacity or otherwise, are not presently payable. If they do so, it may happen that by reason of subsequent depreciation or loss of securities, the balance retained by the trustees may be insufficient to pay the other beneficiaries in full, in which case the first beneficiary will have been paid more than the others. It appears, however, to be well settled that if, when the first payment was made, the trustees have and retain in their hands, assets which, fairly valued, are sufficient to meet shares not presently payable, but have to be held in trust, they are justified in paying other shares payable *pari passu* but payable at once, and are not liable if the assets so retained should, in the event, prove insufficient to pay the unpaid beneficiaries in full. *Fenwick v. Clarke*, 4 DeG. F. & J. 240, 135 R. R. 119; *Re Winslow*, 45 Ch. D. 249; *Re Hurst*, 67 L. T. p. 99.

Where an executor is not expressly charged with the payment of legacies charged on land devised to another, he is under no obligation to pay them or see to their payment. *Robinson v. Iver*, 63 N. C. 645.

An executor is not bound to search out a legatee, but it is sufficient if he is always ready, when called upon, to pay the legacy. *Thompson v. Youngblood*, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 248.

ABATEMENT OF LEGACIES.

If the estate is insufficient to pay the debts and all the legacies in full, the general legacies must abate in equal proportions. If there are specific and general legacies, generally speaking, nothing shall in such cases be abated from the specific legacies.

A residuary legatee has no right to call upon particular general legatees to abate; the whole estate not specifically given must be exhausted before general

legatees can be obliged to contribute anything out of their bequests. *Purse v. Snaplin*, 1 Atk. 418.

Where a legacy is given to an executor expressly as a compensation for his trouble, and there is a deficiency of assets, such a legacy does not abate with legacies which are mere bounties, even though the legacy somewhat exceeds what the executor would otherwise be entitled to demand. *Anderson v. Dougall*, 15 Gr. 405; *Hellem v. Severs*, 24 Gr. 320.

So a legacy given to a widow for the relinquishment of her dower. *Heath v. Dendy*, 1 Russ. 543; *Norcott v. Gordon*, 14 Sim. 258; *Becker v. Hammond*, 12 Gr. 485. The widow is treated as a purchaser of the legacy in giving up her dower, but that is hardly satisfactory as a reason. There is really no other. *In re Wedmore* (1907), 2 Ch. 277; *Davies v. Bush*, 3 Younge 341. See, however, the judgment of Middleton, J., in *Re Rispin*, *post*, where he says it is based upon the doctrine of election.

But the right or interest must be subsisting at the time of the testator's death, and if there is no dower to be satisfied, the legacy will abate. *Davenhill v. Fletcher*, 1 Amb. 244; *Davies v. Bush. supra*; *In re Greenwood* (1892), 2 Ch. 295.

Where an estate is solvent but insufficient to pay legacies in full, the profit costs of a solicitor-trustee, given to him by the will, do not take priority over other legacies. *O'Higgins v. Walsh* (1918), 1 I. R. 126; *In re Brown* (1918), W. N. 118.

A legacy which is, in its nature, general, and given to a volunteer, will not be entitled to any exemption from abatement on the ground of its being applied to any particular object or purpose; thus sums of money given for mourning rings, or to servants, or for charities, are not to be preferred to other general legacies. *Apreece v. Apreece*, 1 Ves. & B. 364; *Attorney-General v. Robbins*, 2 P. Wms. 25; *Attorney-General v. Hudson*, 1 P. Wms. 675. In *Masters v. Masters*, 1 P. Wms. 423, Lord Parker exempted a legacy of a certain sum

for building a monument to the memory of a relation from abating with the general legacies; but this decision has been doubted on strong grounds. See *Blackshaw v. Rogers*, cited 4 Bro. C. C. 349.

A legacy of a capital sum sufficient at the time of appropriation to produce a certain yearly sum abates in common with other legacies. In England it is held that for the purpose of abatement, the capital sum required to satisfy the legacy must be ascertained on the basis of an investment in Consols. "The Court selects, as the basis for ascertaining the amount of capital money bequeathed by the will, that Government security which is the most permanent and the least likely to be redeemed, and that is Consols." *In re Hollins* (1918), 1 Ch. 503.

In both *Williams* and *Theobald* it is stated that legacies given in payment of debts do not abate with legacies given to mere volunteers. In the recent case of *In re Wedmore*, *supra*, Kekewich, J., seems to doubt that the cases relied on by these learned authors extend the rule to debts, and expressly decides that it did not extend to an ascertained debt. "I have already referred to the case of *Davies v. Bush* as the only one that purports to extend it, but when you look into that decision it does not go so far. Lord Lyndhurst does not decide on the point, and he expresses the opinion in language which entirely relieves me from treating it as a binding authority here. There the legacy was given in release of a right of account. There had been an account between the testator and a legatee, and the Court was satisfied that it was not worth while taking the account because nothing was due to the legatee, whose case fell through for that reason; and the Lord Chief Baron says: 'If no debt was due, and the release was required merely for the sake of peace, then, unquestionably, the legatee cannot be treated as a purchaser.' That is exactly on the same lines as the decision of Chitty, J., in *In re Greenwood*. And he goes

on: 'If any doubt were really due, then I am inclined to think that the present comes within the principle of those cases which have been decided.' He does not decide that it was; he only expresses an indication of his opinion. How can I bring a case of this kind within the rule? This is a legacy in satisfaction of an ascertained debt. There is no doubt that in one sense the legatee may be considered a purchaser. If he elects to take under the will, he gives up the debt and takes the legacy, but still it is not at all like the case of a legatee taking a legacy in lieu of a right to dower out of land. We know precisely what the debt was—it was £1,000. We also know precisely what the legacy was—it was £3,000, payable to the same person; but it seems to my mind impossible to apply to that state of circumstances the considerations which apply to a case of dower. The legatee elects to take the larger sum and gives up the debt, and taking the larger sum the legatee takes it by way of bounty. She says, in effect, "Rather than insist upon my covenant I will accept the testator's bounty." I cannot see myself how legacies accepted in that way differ in any way from other general legacies which are mere bounties. In saying that I have practically decided a by-point which must not be overlooked, as it was argued, namely, that the legatee must be considered to have taken the £1,000 as debt and £2,000 only as bounty; but that distinction cannot be upheld. The debt was gone in exchange for the legacy, and the legatee takes the whole £3,000 as a legacy. The result is, no doubt, that she loses something out of the debt of £1,000. She might have avoided that by electing to claim against the will, but she claims under the will, and she takes the whole legacy subject to the usual rules of administration which affect all legacies."

The same point came before our own Courts recently in *Re Rispin* (1914), 6 O. W. N. 669, 35 O. L. R. 385. The testator gave a number of pecuniary legacies, one being a legacy for \$1,500 to Dr. T., who had been

attending him during his last illness. This legacy was to be taken in satisfaction of the doctor's bill against the testator, which amounted to \$300. The estate proved insufficient to pay all the legacies in full. The Surrogate Judge declined to follow *In re Wedmore*, deeming it to be in conflict with the principles enunciated in a number of earlier cases. On appeal, Middleton, J., reversed the judgment of the Surrogate Judge. "With all respect to those who entertain the contrary view, the decision in question commends itself to me. The law by which a legacy to a widow in lieu of dower is entitled to priority is now too well settled to admit of question. It is in truth based upon the doctrine of election. The testator desiring to dispose of property which is not his, namely, his wife's dower interest, in effect offers her a price which he is willing to pay for it. Before those claiming under his will can take a benefit under his will which deals with this property sought to be purchased from the widow, they must pay the price.

"This has no application whatever to the case of a creditor. The testator is not purchasing anything from him; and, although his failure to rank as a creditor may benefit the legatees, it cannot be said that any assets pass from him to the testator or his estate. He takes the legacy by the bounty of the testator. The testator has chosen to limit his bounty by directing that it is conditional upon the creditor waiving his claim as creditor. The bounty is so much the less, because part of the money received in truth represents a debt. The creditor should have the right, and no doubt has the right, to decline to receive the legacy upon these terms. He could then assert his claim, but I can conceive no foundation for the statement that because a debt, which may be trivial in amount, has to be forgiven as a condition of the receipt of the legacy, the legatee, therefore, acquires priority."

Re Rispin was affirmed 35 O. L. R. 385. Riddell, J., delivering the judgment of the full Court, said it was

suggested that probably the right decision would be to allow the appellant the amount of his bill in full and let him share *pro rata* for the balance; but that course is negatived in *In re Wedmore*.

General legacies to creditors whose debts have been previously liquidated by composition at less than their real amounts are merely voluntary, and therefore not exempt from abatement together with all other general legacies upon a deficiency of assets. *Coppin v. Coppin*, 2 P. Wms. 296.

Near relationship, or that a man is morally bound to provide for his widow and children, does not of itself give to such a legatee priority over mere strangers, if the estate is insufficient to pay all the legacies in full. *Re Schweder's Estate* (1891), 3 Ch. 44.

Where a legacy is given free from duty, the legacy duty must be treated as an additional legacy and be added to the legacy for the purpose of abatement. *Re Turnbull* (1905), 1 Ch. 726.

A pecuniary legacy and a provision for maintenance abate rateably. *Cook v. Noble*, 12 O. R. 81. So a pecuniary legacy and an annuity not payable out of corpus. *Wilson v. Dalton*, 22 Gr. 160.

A preferential legatee, even though the legatee be considered a purchaser, is not entitled to payment until after all the debts are satisfied. *Re Lawley* (1902), 2 Ch. 799, 808.

Prima facie, all general bequests are upon an equal footing, and those who claim priority of payment in full, in case of deficiency of assets, must positively and clearly establish that it was the intention of the testator that the bequests should not abate rateably. This is in substance the test supplied by Knight-Bruce, V.C., in *Thwaites v. Foreman*, 1 Coll. C. C. 414. *In re Battershall*, 10 O. W. R. 933, the testator gave a number of specific legacies, and added: "The above legacies to be paid in full one year after my decease." He then gave other specific legacies without any direction as to payment. Boyd, C., held that this indicated a

clear intention that the preceding legacies should not abate. "The words 'in full' cannot be explained away, and express a manifest intention to provide for the payment in full of these legacies." See *Marsh v. Evans*, 1 P. Wms. 668; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 14 Sim. 313.

But it is well settled that the use of words directing a legacy to be paid "immediately," or "in the first place," or "out of the first moneys," etc., or within a brief specified time after the testator's death, is no evidence of an intention to give priority. Words that are merely introductory cannot, generally, by themselves be held to direct any order of payment. These principles are well illustrated by the case of *Lindsay v. Waldbrook* (1897), 24 A. R. 604. There a testator by his will directed that a farm should be sold and that his executors should "first out of the proceeds set apart the sum of \$2,000, and invest the same in some safe security for the benefit of and for the maintenance and education of" his grandson R. J. W.; and he then directed that "out of the proceeds of the sale of the land there shall be paid the following legacies," to his son and three daughters. Armour, C.J., held that the legacy of \$2,000 should not abate, but this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal. MacLennan, J.A., said: "It was argued that the proceeds out of which the legacies to his son and daughters were to be paid were the proceeds after setting apart the legacy to the grandson; but that is not the language used, and, on the contrary, all are equally to be paid 'out of the proceeds of the sale of the land.' "

INTEREST ON LEGACIES.

Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, where no special time is fixed for the payment of a legacy, it carries interest only from the expiration of a year from the testator's death, and this whether the legacy is vested or not. The executor is allowed one year from the testator's death to get in the assets and

settle the affairs of the estate; at the end of that time the Court, for the sake of general convenience, presumes the estate to have been reduced into possession, and interest then becomes payable, and is given for delay in payment. *Re Scadding* (1902), 4 O. L. R. 638; *Pearson v. Pearson*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 10, 9 R. R. 1; *Wood v. Penoyre*, 13 Ves. 325, 9 R. R. 185.

Within the twelve months the executor cannot be compelled to pay a legacy even in a case where the will directs it to be paid sooner. *Benson v. Maude*, 6 Madd. 15; *Brooke v. Lewis*, 6 Madd. 358.

“Nothing can be more settled than that a man saying: ‘I direct all my stock to be applied to the payment of legacies,’ will not make these legacies bear interest one moment sooner than they otherwise would; whether the fund bears interest or not is wholly immaterial in the case of pecuniary legacies. I remember a case of *Greening v. Barker*, where the fund did not come to be disposable for the payment of legacies till nearly forty years after the death of the testator, and yet the legacies were held to bear interest from the year after the testator’s death, and the Court there was of opinion that it was a general settled and fixed rule that pecuniary legacies bear interest from the expiration of twelve months, if there should at any time be a fund for payment of them, and that in case the fund was productive within the twelve months all the immediate profits belonged to the residuary legatee. The executor may pay the legacy within the twelve months, but he is not compelled to do so; he is not to pay interest for any time within the twelve months, although during that time he may have received interest.” *Pearson v. Pearson*, *supra*.

A legacy was given “to be paid out of the money due on the Irish mortgage when the same shall be recovered.” This mortgage was not got in for several years after the testator’s death, but the Court held that the legacy bore interest from the end of the year

after the death. In this case the mortgage bore interest at a larger than the legal rate, but the legatee was held entitled to interest at the legal rate only.

A legacy to be "paid as soon as possible," does not take it out of the general rule, and bears interest only from the end of a year from the testator's death. *Webster v. Hale*, 8 Ves. 410, 7 R. R. 103.

On the other hand where no time is fixed for payment, the legacy is payable at, and bears interest from, the end of the year after the testator's death, even though it be expressly made payable out of a particular fund which is not got in until after a long interval. *Lord v. Lord* (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 782. This was applied and followed in *In re Walford, Kenyon v. Walford*, 1911, W. N. 212, where a testator bequeathed to his sister £10,000, "to be paid out of the estate inherited from my mother." The testator's father had a life interest in this estate, and he survived the testator seven years. Joyce, J., held the legacy carried interest only from the date of the father's death, but the Court of Appeal held this was clearly a demonstrative legacy and there was no expression in the will shewing that it was only to be paid when the reversion fell in, and it therefore bore interest from the end of a year after the testator's death.

There are three cases where interest on a legacy runs from the death of the testator: (1) Where the legatee is an infant and the testator in *loco parentis*. *Wilson v. Maddison*, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 372, 60 R. R. 192. (2) Where the legatee is an infant child of the testator, interest is allowed by way of maintenance where the testator makes no other provision for the child's maintenance. *Donovan v. Needham*, 9 Beav. 164, 73 R. R. 309. (3) Where the legacy is in satisfaction of a debt of the testator. *Clark v. Sewell*, 3 Atk. 96.

A legacy to a testator's wife in lieu of dower carries interest only from the expiration of a year from the testator's death. In *Elton v. Montague*, 1 L. J. Ch. 212, it was held that "a testator means his widow

to be provided for from the moment of his death, and therefore a legacy to her carries interest from that time." But in *In re Bignold*, 45 Ch. D. 496, it was held that a legacy to a widow in lieu of dower was not an exception to the general rule. In *Re Rispin*, 35 O. L. R. 385, Mr. Justice Middleton said: "The law by which a legacy to a widow in lieu of dower is entitled to priority is now too well settled to admit of question. It is in truth based upon the doctrine of election. The testator, desiring to dispose of property which is not his, namely, his wife's dower interest, in effect offers her a price which he is willing to pay for it. Before those claiming under the testator can take a benefit under his will which deals with this property *sought to be purchased from the widow, they must pay the price.*" In *Heath v. Dendy*, 1 Russ. Ch. Ca. 543, Lord Gifford, M.R., speaks of the widow, in such a case, being a "purchaser" of the sum represented by the legacy. If this is the true principle—if the widow is really a purchaser—then it is difficult to understand why a legacy to the widow, in lieu of her claim for dower, should not bear interest from the date of the testator's death just as much as a legacy to any other creditor in lieu of a debt of the testator.

There is another class of legacies that bear interest from the testator's death, namely, legacies charged upon land where no time is fixed for payment. *Shirt v. Westby*, 16 Ves. 393, 10 R. R. 210; *Pearson v. Pearson*, *supra*. In 14 Halsbury, 274, it is stated that a legacy payable out of the proceeds of the sale of real estate does not bear interest until the end of a year, citing *Turner v. Buck* (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 301. But the decision in that case was considerably shattered in *In re Waters*, *Waters v. Boxer* (1889), 42 Ch. 517, where Mr. Justice Kay held the contrary, referring to *Turner v. Buck* as a "unique decision," and suggesting that legacies that are a primary charge on the proceeds of a sale are a charge on the real estate.

But where a period of time, within the discretion of the executor, is fixed for payment, interest does not run until the period has elapsed. In *Thomas v. Attorney-General*, 2 Y. & C. 525, 47 R. R. 453, the testator gave legacies, and directed his executor to pay them "as soon after my death as convenient, or within three years, if it suits his convenience," and it was held that the legatees were not entitled to interest before the expiration of the three years.

That case was followed, and perhaps extended, in *Re Robinson, McDonnell v. Robinson* (1892), 22 O. R. 438, where Boyd, C., said: "The legacy of \$1,000 is directed to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of lands, and these lands are directed to be sold at any time within two years after the death of the testatrix, so as to raise a fund for payment. The testatrix died 12th March, 1890; the two years limit for sale expired in March, 1912; and from that date let interest be allowed on the legacy; or, if the lands were sooner sold, the interest may run from the date of sale." See also *McMylor v. Lynch* (1894), 24 O. R. 632.

In the case of a bequest of a life estate in a residuary fund, or some aliquot part thereof, if no time is prescribed in the will for the commencement of the interest or the enjoyment of the use or income of such residue, the legatee for life is entitled to the interest or income of the clear residue, as afterwards ascertained, to be computed from the death of the testator. *Brown v. Gellatly*, L. R. 2 Ch. 751; *La Terriere v. Bulmer*, 2 Sim. 18; *Douglass v. Congreve*, 1 Keen. 410.

Where the whole estate is to be converted into money, the proceeds invested and such investments continued until the whole property is realized, and from out of the fund so realized and invested certain legacies are to be paid, the legatees are not entitled to the interest until the whole is realized. But the period is not to be extended beyond the time when the realization might, with due diligence, be effected. *Smith v. Seaton*, 17 Gr. 397.

Where executors were directed to invest moneys for the benefit of two daughters of the testator, the moneys to come from his general estate, it was held there was no right to demand payment within the "executor's year;" and interest, therefore, ran from a year from the testator's death. *Re Fletcher* (1914), 31 O. L. R. 633.

An immediate specific legacy also carries interest from the death of the testator. Thus, where a legatee was given £5,000, a "portion of the stocks and securities comprised in" a certain schedule; it was held that this was a specific gift, and that the income of the £5,000 passed with the legacy. *In re Martin* (1900). 1 Ch. 370. This is on the ground that specific legacies are considered as separated from the general estate at the time of the testator's death; and consequently, from that period, whatever produce accrues upon them, and nothing more or less, belongs to the legatee. *Sleech v. Thorington*, 2 Ves. Sr. 563. Accordingly, the increase from cows, mares, etc., fallen after the death of the testator, go to the specific legatee. Wms. 1286.

The doctrine of maintenance which is applied to parents is also applied to testators placing themselves *in loco parentis*, though perhaps upon the cases the distinction is something very nice as to what constitutes the assumption of such relation. But the doctrine is not applied in favor of a legatee standing in the relation of a natural child. *Perry v. Whitehead*, 6 Ves. 544; or a niece: *Cricket v. Dolby*, 3 Ves. 10; or a grandchild: *Houghton v. Harrison*, 2 Atk. 329, as such, any more than in favor of a stranger, unless there can be further engrafted upon it a parental relation assumed by the testator.

An exception to the rule that interest is not payable on a legacy until the legacy is due and payable, is in the case of a legacy given to an infant child of the testator and no other means of maintenance is provided.

A testator bequeathed to his two infant sons \$4,000 each, contingent upon their attaining 25 years of age; the only other provision for them was a gift to each of a share of the residuary estate. *Held*, that these legacies carried interest from the death of the testator. *Re McIntyre* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 548, (1905) 9 O. L. R. 408. "The well settled rule is that where a legacy is given to a minor by a parent or by a person *in loco parentis* payable at a future period, if no other provision is made for maintenance, interest will be allowed for that purpose even though by the terms of the will the legacy is contingent on the legatee living to the period which is mentioned for the payment of the legacy." *Ib.* 412, per Moss, C.J.O.

In *Haughton v. Harrison*, 2 Atk. 329, Lord Hardwicke stated the rule, "If a legacy is left upon no condition but to be paid at the age of 21, and not given over, it is a legacy vested and transmissible; but still no interest can be demanded unless in the case of a child who had no other maintenance or provision, for a parent is bound by nature to support a child."

Again he stated it in *Heath v. Perry*, 3 Atk. 101, and in *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 3 Atk. 716. In the latter case he observes, "But in all these cases the ground the Court goes on is giving interest by way of maintenance." And in that case he held that inasmuch as the testatrix had allotted maintenance for her daughter from the general funds of her personal estate there could be no allowance of interest on a contingent legacy to the daughter.

So in *Wynch v. Wynch*, 1 Cox 433, Lord Kenyon, M.R., said, "It is very clear that when a father gives a legacy to a child, whether it be a vested legacy, or not, it will carry interest from the death of the testator, as a maintenance for the child; but this will be only where no other fund is provided for such maintenance; for it is equally clear, that when other funds are provided for the maintenance, then if the legacy be payable at a future day, it shall not carry interest,

until the day of payment comes, as in the case of a legacy to a perfect stranger."

Nearly 90 years later the rule and exceptions were compendiously stated by James, L.J., *In re George*, 5 Ch. D. 837. He said: "But the rule of law is well established that a contingent legacy does not carry interest while it is in suspense, except in the case of a legacy by a parent or one standing *in loco parentis* to the legatee; and that exception is subject to another exception, that the rule giving interest to the child does not take effect when the testator has provided another fund for his maintenance, so that the income of the legacy is supposed not to be required for the purpose."

In *Binkley v. Binkley*, 15 Gr. 649, Spragge, V.C., said: "It is clear law that a legacy given by a parent to an infant child, payable upon coming of age, or upon that event or marriage, the will being silent as to interest upon the legacy, stands upon a different footing from a legacy to a stranger, the latter not carrying interest; while in the case of a legacy to a child, the child is entitled to maintenance to the extent, if necessary, of interest upon the legacy—this is a general rule—it is otherwise when other provision is made by the will for the maintenance of the infant." To the same effect, Mowat, V.C., in *Sparks v. Perrin*, 17 Gr. 519, and Proudfoot, V.C., in *Rees v. Fraser*, 26 Gr. 233.

In the recent case of *In re Bowlby*, *Bowlby v. Bowlby* (1904), 2 Ch. 685, the question to what extent is a child, to whom a legacy payable *in futuro* or contingent is given, entitled to the interest which the legacy bears or carries—whether to the whole interest as such or only to so much as may be necessary for maintenance—was fully discussed in argument and considered by the Court of Appeal. Although Vaughan Williams, L.J., argued strongly that the effect of giving interest at all was to entitle the infant to the whole, the conclusion of the Court was that, by

the practice of the Court, the infant is only allowed so much as is necessary for maintenance, thus affirming the view expressed by Spragge, V.C., in *Binkley v. Binkley*, *supra*, that a child is entitled to maintenance to the extent, if necessary, of the interest upon the legacy.

But where there is in the will an express provision for maintenance from some other source, and the amount is specified, the legacy will not bear interest for the purposes of maintenance even though the provision made should be deemed insufficient for the purpose. This is upon the principle that as interest is allowed in other cases because it will not be assumed that the father intended no maintenance, there is no ground for the assumption where a provision is made. *Re McIntyre*, 9 O. L. R. p. 413.

So where the amount of the maintenance is specified that is, in general, the limit. Simpson on Infants, 2nd ed. 304.

Where there is a general provision for maintenance and no amount specified there seems to be no absolute bar to recourse, if necessary, to interest upon the contingent legacy. Much less should there be where there is no express provision of any kind. The amount of the allowance in such cases must be governed by a consideration of the other circumstances, and a due regard to such other sources or funds as may be properly resorted to for maintenance. *Re McIntyre*, p. 414.

If an infant has other property of his own sufficient for his maintenance, he can have no right to interest upon a contingent legacy. *Rees v. Fraser*, 26 Gr. 233. In this case the legatee was a grandson of the testator. He was born in the testator's house and resided there until the testator's death, and afterwards with his grandmother. The Court held that the testator intended to put himself *in loco parentis*, in reference to the father's duty of making provision for the child.

The exception to the rule does not extend to a provision for an adult child. *Wall v. Wall*, 15 Sim. 513; or a wife. *Re Crane* (1908), 1 Ch. 379. Nor does it apply where in the case of a bequest by a person who does not stand to the legatee in the relation of a parent. *Martin v. Martin*, L. R. 1 Eq. 369. A parent is bound to provide for the maintenance of his children, and the Court infers that for that purpose he meant to give interest, though he has not expressly said so.

A general direction in a will to use the income or part of the estate for the maintenance and education of children, gives the executors a discretion to use such part of the income as they may consider necessary from time to time for the maintenance and education of any of the children, without regard to whether some of the children are or are not more self-supporting than others. *Re Blahout*, 11 O. W. N. 312. Education is included in the term "maintenance." *Re Breed's Will*, 1 Ch. D. 226.

A legacy to a person in his capacity of executor is not due unless he accepts the office and duties of an executor. If the legatee should be an infant, as he cannot accept the office until he is of age, it follows that a legacy to an infant as executor does not carry interest until he is twenty-one. *Re Gardner* (1892), 67 L. T. 552.

Legacies were given to grandchildren when they attained twenty-one, but subject to a widow's life interest. Both the grandchildren attained the age of twenty-one before the death of the widow and it was held that the legatees were entitled to interest only from the death of the widow, because until her death the legacy was not payable. *Re Scadding* (1902), 4 O. L. R. 632.

A testator gave legacies to his daughters "to be paid in seven years from the date hereof." He lived more than seven years after the date of the will. It was held the legatees were only entitled to interest as

in an ordinary case. *Miller v. Miller*, 25 Gr 224. And see *Re Scadding*, ante.

So where a testator gave a legacy by way of annuity to his son on his attaining the age of 23 years. The son attained the age of 23 in his father's lifetime. It was held that the legacy became an ordinary immediate legacy, and carried interest, not from the death of the testator, but at the expiration of one year from the death. *In re Prefreeman* (1914), 1 Ch. 877.

A legacy to A. as soon as he attains twenty-one, with interest, is contingent, and interest is payable until he attains twenty-one, to be computed from one year after the testator's death. *Knight v. Knight*, 2 S. & S 490, 25 R. R. 253. But in the recent case of *In re Boulter* (1918), 2 Ch. 40, it was held that where a legacy is held in trust for an infant child contingently on attaining twenty-one, the trustees may apply intermediate income for maintenance, notwithstanding that, not so applied, it will never belong to the infant. On the other hand, a contingent legacy in favour of an infant of whom the father is not the parent, or towards whom he does not stand in *loco parentis*, and which is not directed to be set apart for the benefit of the infant, bears no interest either for maintenance or otherwise until it vests. *In re Dickson*, 29 Ch. D. 331, 334.

An order was made for payment out of a fund in Court to which an infant was contingently entitled, of allowance for maintenance, upon security being given by way of life insurance for the benefit of those who would be entitled upon the death of the infant under full age. *Re Campbell* (1899), 18 P. R. 400.

RATE OF INTEREST.

As a general rule, the rate of interest allowed is simple interest, at the legal or statutory rate, and this, irrespective of the rate of interest that can be earned by a safely invested fund, and irrespective of the rate

which was actually received by the executors' investments. *Welch v. Adams*, 152 Mass. 74. This rate is fixed because it will be presumed that the estate will, after the year has expired, have actually made this sum, but also because, as it would be difficult, if not unreasonable, to investigate how much interest had been made in such cases, it is a reasonable rule to adopt the rate of interest which the law has fixed where none other is stipulated for.

It would seem that this rule will not be varied, in the Courts here, because a higher rate of interest is allowed in the country where the testator resided, or where the fund was invested at the time of making the will. Where a testator resided in Antigua and brought an action in England to recover a legacy he was allowed interest at the rate in England, and not at the higher rate in Antigua. *Malcolm v. Martin*, 3 Bro. C. C. 50.

So where a legacy was given in the currency of Jamaica, where the testator resided, and there were assets in both England and Jamaica, the legatee, in an action in an English Court against the English executor, was allowed interest at the English rate only. *Bourke v. Ricketts*, 10 Ves. 330.

Where the trust funds have been employed by the trustee in trade the interest will be computed at a higher than the legal rate. *Heathcote v. Hulme*, 1 J. & W. 134. So if the trustee, being in business or trade, mixes the assets of the estate with his own, even though he denies that he used the funds in his business. *Williams v. Powell*, 15 Beav. 461, 91 R. R. 509.

Instead of the higher rate of interest the legatee may elect to take the profits made by the executor using the trust funds. *Jones v. Foxall*, 15 Beav. 388, 92 R. R. 473.

The general rule, apart from the context of the will, is that a legacy shall be paid to the legatee in the current money of the country where the testator was domiciled. It is immaterial that the legatee resides

elsewhere, or that the assets of the testator are partly in the place of his domicile or elsewhere. *Saunders v. Drake*, 2 Atk. 465; *Pearson v. Garnett*, 2 Bro. C. C. 38.

Phipps v. Earl of Anglesea, 5 Vin. Abr. 209, was a case of a marriage settlement, all the parties residing in England, where the settlement was made and executed. A sum was charged upon lands in Ireland, and the question was whether the *cestui que trust* was entitled to have the sum paid to her in England without any deduction for exchange from Ireland to England. It was held she was entitled to be paid in England without any deduction.

This was followed by Lord Eldon in *Lansdowne v. Lansdowne*, 2 Bli. 89, 21 R. R. 43, where he says the intention of the testator is to furnish the rule of decision, and that the residence of the testator must decide the question as to legacies given generally.

If the legatee requires payment to be made to him at a place elsewhere than where the assets are being administered, he must pay the costs of remittance, that is the cost of purchasing for and sending to the legatee a draft on the place of remittance in favor of the legatee for the equivalent. *Cockerell v. Barber*, 16 Ves. 461.

In *Graham v. Graham*, 1 R. & M. 453, a testator, domiciled in Jamaica, gave legacies in Jamaica currency, which ultimately came to be paid out of assets in England. It was held there could be no expense of remittance—the value was to be computed according to the standard par of exchange between Jamaica and British currency, and not according to the actual rate at the time of payment.

Where executors pay general legacies before the expiration of a year from the testator's death the residuary legatees cannot claim interest on the sums so paid from the date of payment to the expiration of the year. *In re Juilliard's Estate* (1918), 169 N. Y. Supp. 1079.

CHAPTER XXII.

AGENTS.

Section 22 of the Trustee Act is as follows:

22.—(1) A trustee may appoint a solicitor to be his agent to receive and give a discharge for any money or valuable consideration or property receivable by the trustee under the trust.

(2) A trustee may appoint a banker or solicitor to be his agent to receive and give a discharge for any money payable to the trustee under or by virtue of a policy of assurance or otherwise.

(3) A trustee shall not be charged with a breach of trust by reason only of his having made or concurred in making any such appointment.

(4) Nothing in this section shall exempt a trustee from any liability which he would have incurred if this Act had not been passed, in case he permits any such money, valuable consideration, or property to remain in the hands or under the control of the banker or solicitor for a period longer than is reasonably necessary to enable the banker or solicitor to pay or transfer the same to the trustee.

(5) This section shall apply only where the money or valuable consideration or property was or is received on or after the 4th day of May, 1891.

This is similar to section 17 of the Trustee Act, 1893. In England the appointment of the solicitor is sufficiently made by entrusting him with a deed containing a receipt. In Ontario it may be evidenced in any manner shewing an appointment.

In *Re Brier*, 36 Ch. D. 243, L. C. Selborne said this section does not substantially alter the law as it was administered by Courts of Equity, but gives it the authority and force of statute law, and throws the

onus probandi on those who seek to charge an executor or trustee with loss arising from the default of an agent when the propriety of employing an agent has been established.

In order to bring into operation sub-section (4) the circumstances must be such that the trustee either knew or ought to have known of the receipt of the money by the banker or solicitor. Two executors were told by their solicitor that a mortgage, forming part of the trust property, would shortly be paid off and the money placed to the joint credit of the executors at a bank; and they accordingly sent the solicitor an executed reconveyance of the mortgaged property, which contained the usual receipt of the mortgage money. The solicitor then proceeded, on the mortgagor's behalf, to sell the mortgaged property off in lots, and he from time to time received the purchase money of the lots, which he ultimately misappropriated. In the meantime one of the executors had died, and it was sought to make the survivor liable. About four months elapsed between the time of the delivery of the deed and the discovery of the misappropriation. Parker, J., said the authority given to the solicitor was a continuing one intended to be acted on when the transaction was ripe for completion—that the defendant was justified in expecting that it might be completed any day and not withdrawing the authority by withdrawing the deed from the solicitor's custody, and that being unaware of the solicitor's misconduct, he acted neither unreasonably or dishonestly in believing what he was told by the solicitor, and ought not to be held liable for a breach of trust because he was deceived by a man whom he had no reason to distrust. *In re Sheppard* (1911), 1 Ch. 50.

It will be noticed that sub-section (1) does not authorize a trustee to appoint anyone to receive and give a discharge for any money or valuable consideration or property receivable by the trustee under the trust, except a solicitor. In *Flower v. Metropolitan*

Board of Works, 27 Ch. D. 592, it was held that one of several trustees cannot in general be authorized by his co-trustees to receive trust moneys and give a good receipt. This decision appears to still hold good, though it may be that when one of the trustees is a solicitor he may be appointed agent under sub-section (2).

Where trustees are expressly authorized to retain or invest in securities payable to bearer, with coupons attached, they may deal with them in the way usual with prudent men of business, and may deposit such securities in their joint names with the estate bankers. But such securities should not be allowed to remain in the hands of the solicitors for the trustees. It is no part of a solicitor's duty to cut off the coupons and collect them, while that is the duty of a banker. *In re De Pothonier* (1900), 2 Ch. 529.

An executor who employs a solicitor as agent is bound to supervise his management of the matters entrusted to him and to take all due precautions, and cannot escape liability for the misappropriation of trust funds committed by such agent, although he was of excellent standing prior to the misappropriation. *Low v. Gemley*, 18 S. C. R. 685.

If trust property be put within the control of persons who ought not to be entrusted with it, and a loss is thereby sustained, the executor will be liable to make it good, however unexpected the result, and however free such conduct may have been from any improper motive. Necessity, which includes the regular course of business in administering the property, will exonerate him. But if without such necessity, he is instrumental in giving to the person who makes default, he will be liable, although such person be a co-executor. *Clough v. Dixon*, 8 Sim. 594; *Langford v. Gascoyne*, 11 Ves. 333.

Where a trustee, a solicitor, allowed a confidential clerk and cashier of the firm of solicitors, of which he

was a member, to receive occasionally in the trustee's absence, moneys payable to the estate, and give receipts for the same, and the clerk embezzled the same, McDougall, Sur. Judge, held the trustee was not liable to make good the loss to the estate. *Re McM—Trust*, 28 C. L. J. 502.

The general doctrine, as laid down in the cases, is that a trustee is only bound to conduct the business of the estate in the ordinary and usual way in which similar business is conducted by mankind in their own transactions. "It never could be reasonable to make a trustee adopt further and better precautions than an ordinary prudent man of business would adopt, or to conduct the business in any other way." *Re Speight v. Gaunt*, 22 Ch. D. 740; 9 A. C. 1.

In *Ex parte Belchier*, 1 Amb. 218, Lord Hardwicke said that where trustees act by other hands, either from necessity or conformably to the common usage of mankind, they are not answerable for losses, and Jessel, M.R., commenting on this passage in *Re Speight v. Gaunt*, *supra*, says: "Now, what is meant by either from necessity or conformably to the common usage of mankind? It means that in the ordinary course of business transactions an agent is employed." He instances the case of the appointment of a rent collector to collect rent, though the trustee might collect them in person; but he does not do so because it is the common usage of mankind to employ an agent to do so; he also instances the employment of stock-brokers to buy or sell stock. Then, as to the moral necessity from the usage of mankind, he quotes approvingly Lord Hardwicke's definition of this expression as being the case of a trustee acting as prudently for the trust as for himself and according to the usage of business. Lord Hardwicke gives as instances the case of a trustee appointing the payment of rents to a banker in good credit who subsequently fails and the money is lost—there would be no liability on the part of the trustee; so also the appointment of stewards

and agents. And he points out that none of these instances may properly fall under the head of cases of necessity, but there is no liability because the trustees acted in the usual method of business.

Jessel, M.R., further cites the case of *Bacon v. Bacon*, 5 Ves. 331, where it was held an executor was not liable for the loss of money transmitted to an attorney, who was a co-executor, to pay debts, and who had misappropriated the money; and Lord Loughborough there lays down the rule that if the business was transacted in the ordinary manner, unless there was some circumstance of suspicion, the allowance of the payment was fair. Suppose he had paid the money to his own clerk, and the clerk had run away, he puts as being within the same principle of protection. And the Master of the Rolls sums up the effect of *Bacon v. Bacon* as being that when you must necessarily employ an agent, or where you might reasonably in the ordinary course of business employ an agent, and you use due diligence in the selection of your agent, you are not liable for the consequences.

In *Re Weall*, *Weall v. Andrews*, 42 Ch. D. 678, Kekewich, J., says: "A trustee is bound to exercise discretion in the choice of agents, but so long as he selects persons properly qualified he cannot be made responsible for their intelligence or their honesty; he does not in any sense guarantee the performance of their duties." It would not, of course, be a proper exercise of discretion to employ an agent whose honesty is open to question.

Reasonableness, in this connection, is discussed by Mr. Justice Kekewich in the last mentioned case. "Consider for a moment the position of that special agent called a trustee as regards the position of sub-agents. He certainly has the right to appoint them, if and so far as the work of the trust reasonably requires. For instance, he may appoint a broker to make or realize investments, or a solicitor to do legal business; and the power of employment involves that of

remuneration at the cost of the trust estate. The limit of the power of employment is, as pointed out in the well known case of *Speight v. Gaunt*, 9 A. C. 1, reasonableness; and reasonableness must also, I think, be the limit of remuneration. A trustee is bound to exercise discretion in the choice of his agents, but, so long as he selects persons properly qualified, he cannot be made responsible for their intelligence or their honesty. He does not in any sense guarantee the performance of their duties. It does not, however, follow that he can entrust his agents with any duties which they are willing to undertake, or pay them or agree to pay them any remuneration which they see fit to demand. The trustee must consider these matters for himself, and the Court would be disposed to support any conclusion at which he arrives, however erroneous, provided it is really *his* conclusion—that is the outcome of such consideration as might reasonably be expected to be given to a like matter, by a man of ordinary prudence, guided by such rules and arguments as generally guide such a man in his own affairs.”

Although trustees must always exercise their own judgment, and not surrender it to agents, and, *a fortiori*, not to beneficiaries, yet they are not debarred from what are the wishes and opinions of any of the parties interested. Thus in *Fraser v. Murdoch*, 6 A. C. 855, trustees who were empowered by a testatrix to continue to hold all or any of the shares and stocks owned by her at her death, “should they consider it advisable or expedient to do so,” wrote to the life-tenant asking her views as to whether she would like to have some stock of a certain bank retained, adding that they did not consider it a very eligible trust investment. She answered that she would, and accordingly they retained some of the stock, which, by reason of the failure of the bank, was lost. In giving judgment, Lord Blackburn said: “I agree that trustees are to exercise their own discretion; but I think they may inquire as

to what are the wishes and opinions of others, especially of those who are interested, before they fully determine what, in the exercise of their own discretion, they think expedient; and I think that, in this case, there is no evidence that the trustees did more than they properly might." And Lord Selborne said: "It would be extremely dangerous to hold that trustees, having such a discretion to exercise, might not fully discuss with the beneficiaries the reasons for and against a particular decision, without running the risk of being held to act against their own judgment, if they should disregard, in the end, objections to which they had thought it right in the first instance to direct attention."

Because a man is imprudent in the management of his own affairs it does not follow that he will escape liability, as a trustee, by being imprudent in the trust matters committed to his care. In *Rae v. Meek*, 14 A. C. 569, Lord Herschell, speaking of *Learoyd v. Whiteley*, 12 A. C. 727, and *Knox v. MacKinnon*, 13 A. C. 753, said: "I think these cases establish that the law requires of a trustee the same degree of diligence that a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in the management of his own affairs;" and this test may now be regarded as established.

Generally speaking, executors are not allowed to employ an agent to perform those duties which, by accepting the office of executors, they have taken upon themselves; but there may be very special circumstances in which it may be thought fit to allow them such expenses as they may have incurred in the employment of agents. *Weiss v. Dill*, 3 My. & K. 26; 41 R. R. 2; *Hopkinson v. Roe*, 1 Beav. 180, 49 R. R. 335.

Trustees are entitled to choose the solicitor and banker they employ. *In re Cleveland* (1902), 2 Ch. 350; and it is said they are not bound to regard the direction of their testator in this respect. *Foster v. Elsley*, 19 Ch. D. 518. And see *Fry v. Tapson*, 28 Ch. D. 268.

B. was solicitor for the testator, and continued to act for the executors. By the will the executors were directed to invest \$5,000 for the widow. The testator had told the executors that B. had invested this \$5,000, and after the testator's death B. told the executors he had invested this sum on mortgages. B. died, and it was then discovered that the mortgages never existed—that he had probably done away with the \$5,000 before the testator's death. The executors, relying on the statement made to them by B., distributed the balance of the estate. In an action by the widow against the executors it failed on the defence of the Limitations Act (now ch. 75, sec. 47, R. S. O. 1914), but Moss, J.A., said that B. was not the agent of the executors so as to render them responsible for his fraudulent acts, which were done neither by their authority, nor with their privity, nor for their benefit. *Clark v. Bellamy*, 27 A. R. 435, 442.

Executors may employ an accountant where their accounts are of a complicated nature, and the occasion is one in which, according to the usage of business, a prudent man, acting for himself, would employ such a person. *New v. Jones*, 1 M. & G. 668; *Henderson v. M'Iver*, 3 Mad. 275. But of course executors are not entitled to have their books of account kept by an accountant merely in order to save themselves trouble. *Re Harbeck*, 81 Hun (N.Y.) 26.

In *Taylor v. McGrath*, 10 O. R. 669, executors were allowed a sum paid to a professional accountant for making up an account delivered to the *cestui que trust* on his demand, but not a sum paid to the same accountant for making up the account brought into the Master's office. As to sums paid to a bookkeeper, see under "Miscellaneous Allowances."

In *Edmunds v. Peake*, 7 Beav. 239, it was held that executors may, where that is the ordinary business usage, allow an auctioneer who is selling the trust property, to receive the deposit money; but they must

not allow it to remain in the auctioneer's hands for an unreasonable time.

Executors should deposit trust moneys in a bank pending investment, and will not be liable for the failure of the bank, unless the money is left there for an unreasonable time. *Johnson v. Newton*, 11 Hare, 160. Where executors deposited monies with the same person the testator entrusted his money with, though not bankers, they were held not liable for loss. *Dorchester v. Effingham*, Tam. 279, 31 R. R. 97.

But if executors unnecessarily leave trust moneys in a bank when they ought to have invested them, and the bank fails, they will be liable. *Challen v. Shipman*, 4 Hare, 555; *Rehden v. Wesley*, 29 Beav. 213. In one case it was held that moneys should not be left on deposit for more than six months without investment. *Cann v. Cann*, 51 L. T. 770. This must, however, depend on the circumstances of each particular case; the amount of cash on hand, amount required for distribution, the period of distribution, etc.

An executor collected a large amount of money belonging to the estate and deposited it in a savings bank, and paid the debts of the estate with his own money, charging the estate the amount thus paid. The bank failed and a considerable amount of the deposit was lost. Held, that he had no right to make the estate his debtor by advancing money for it when there was ample money of the estate for this purpose, and that the loss was therefore his own and not that of the estate. *Guthrie v. Wheeler*, 51 Conn. 207.

To absolve a trustee from liability for loss by bankers, agents and other persons it is necessary that he should not deviate from the line of his duty. If he allows money which ought to be invested to remain on deposit with a banker an unreasonable time, he is responsible for any loss caused by the banker's insolvency. *Fletcher v. Walker*, 3 Madd. 73, 18 R. R. 195; *Newton v. Reid*, 9 L. J. Ch. 273; and will be liable for the loss in interest. *Spratt v. Wilson*, 19 O. R. 28.

In *Knight's Estate*, 44 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 412, where a trustee, charged to see that the trust funds "be securely invested," allowed them to remain for two years in the bank where they were when he was appointed trustee, he was held accountable for a loss on the failure of the bank.

In many cases, however, the circumstances have been such as to justify the course of the trustee, and he has been exonerated. In one case where the receipts of the estate were about £15,000, and the executrix allowed £190 to remain at her banker's for a year after the testator's death, when the bank failed, the Court held this was not an improper sum to be allowed to remain in the bank for that time. *Swinfin v. Swinfin*, 29 Beav. 211, 131 R. R. 530. In another case the executors paid all the absolute legacies and left a balance of £500 at a bank until money due on some mortgages, which were about to be paid off, came in, intending then to make investments as directed by the will. Fourteen months after the death of the testator, and before the mortgage moneys came in, the bank, which up to that time had been in high repute, stopped payment and half the deposit was lost. The executors were held not liable. *Fenwick v. Clarke*, 4 D. F. & J. 240, 135 R. R. 119.

It has been pointed out that in making investments in securities ordinarily bought and sold on the stock exchange, a trustee is justified in employing a broker for the purpose of purchasing such securities and doing things usually done by a broker; but if a trustee deposits money with such broker until an investment is found, that is in effect, lending it on the broker's own personal security and is a breach of trust. Per Lord Blackburn, *Speight v. Gaunt*, 9 A. C. p. 19; *Robinson v. Harkin* (1896), 2 Ch. 415.

When loans are made in transactions not governed by the rules of the stock exchange, and it is found convenient to send the money through a broker, solicitor or other agent, this may be done by cheque payable to

the borrower or his order. *Rowland v. Witherden*, 3 M. & G. 568; *Floyer v. Bostock*, 35 Beav. 603.

Entrusting a solicitor of good repute with money to pay a debt which the solicitor said had been compromised at the sum, is a proper act, and the trustee is not liable for the misappropriation of the money. *Re Bird* (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 203.

Executors may employ a solicitor or debt collector in collecting debts owing to the estate, where such is the usual course of business, or where the collection can be done better by adopting this course; and if money is lost by reason of the collector's insolvency, the executors are *prima facie* not responsible. *Re Brier*, 26 Ch. D. 238.

If an executor deposits trust funds in a bank to his own account, and mixes it with his own funds, and the bank fails, the executor is liable to make good the loss. *Fletcher v. Walker*, 3 Mad. 73, 18 R. R. 195.

Where executors sent money to their solicitor to obtain probate they were held not responsible therefor, but were held liable for money sent to him prematurely to pay legacy duty. *Castle v. Warland*, 32 Beav. 660.

In the case of *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 240, goods had been stolen from a solicitor to whom they had been intrusted by the trustee. In his judgment, Hardwicke, L.C., thus states the law:—"I do not know that a bailee, executor, administrator or trustee, are bound to keep goods always in their own hands. They are to keep them as their own, and take the same care; if therefore a man lodged trust money with a banker, if lost, in many cases the Court has discharged the trustee, especially if lost out of the broker's hands by robbery. In the present case what has been done is what she would have done with her own; leaving them with her solicitor in order to be delivered to the plaintiff when proper so to do; and why might she not do that?" See also *Job v. Job*, 6 Ch. D. 562.

A trustee, although remunerated for his services, is not liable for loss occasioned to the trust estate by the felonious acts of his servant, provided such servant is properly entrusted with the custody of the trust property, and is selected and employed without negligence. *Jobson v. Palmer* (1893), 1 Ch. 71.

Trustees who have been allowed a commission to manage the estate will not be allowed as a disbursement commissions paid to agents on collection of interest on mortgages in which some of the estate moneys were invested. *Stephens v. Miller* (B.C.), 40 D. L. R. 418, following *Cox v. Bennett* (1891), 39 W. R. 308.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LIABILITIES OF AN EXECUTOR.

Purchasing Estate Property.

There is no principle of equity more firmly established than that which forbids a trustee, no matter how the trust is created, from making a profit out of the trust estate. And to this end a trustee who is selling is absolutely and entirely disabled from purchasing the trust property, whether the purchase be made in his own name or in the name of another, whether the sale be made by himself as a single trustee or with the sanction of his colleagues. *Ex p. James*, 8 Ves. 353, 7 R. R. 56; *Whichcote v. Lawrence*, 3 Ves. 740.

The rule does not apply to a person named as a trustee who has disclaimed without having acted in the trust. *Stacey v. Elph*, 1 M. & K. 195, 36 R. R. 304; nor to a person named as trustee who has never accepted the trust. *Clarke v. Clark*, 9 A. C. 733. Nor does it apply where there is an express power, in the document creating the trust, to purchase; or where the purchase is made with the leave of a competent Court. *Farmer v. Dean*, 32 Beav. 327, 138 R. R. 755.

It follows from the foregoing that wherever an executor or administrator has so dealt with the trust property, he will, if the transaction is allowed to stand, be chargeable with the actual value of the property he has purchased.

At one time it was said that to invalidate such a purchase it was necessary to shew that the trustee had gained some advantage in the transaction, but in *Ex p. James*, *supra*, Lord Eldon repudiated such a doctrine, and however fair the transaction it may be set aside.

The difficulty of examining upon satisfactory evidence, in the greater number of cases, whether the trustee has gained any advantage, is pointed out by Lord Eldon in *Ex p. Lacey*, 6 Ves. 625, 6 R. R. 9. "Suppose a trustee buys an estate, and by the knowledge acquired in that character discovers a valuable coal mine under it, and locking that up in his breast, enters into a contract with his *cestui que trust*, if he choose to deny it, how can the Court treat against his denial? The probability is that a trustee who has once conceived such a purpose will never disclose it, and the *cestui que trust* will be effectually defrauded."

And in *Ex p. Bennett*, 10 Ves. 393, it was held that to set aside a purchase by a trustee of the trust property it was not necessary to shew that he had gained an advantage. Such a purchase is not a purchase from the *cestui que trust*, but a purchase by the trustee from himself. "The rule I take to be this—not that a trustee cannot buy from his *cestui que trust*, but that he shall not buy from himself." *Ex p. James*, *supra*. The trustee is bound by his duty to his *cestui que trust* to acquire all the available knowledge to enable him to sell the trust property to the best advantage. That being so, the question what knowledge he has obtained, and whether he has fairly given the benefit of that knowledge to the *cestui que trust* which he always acquires at the expense of the *cestui que trust*, no Court can discuss with competent sufficiency or safety to the parties." *Ib.*

The fact that a trustee has sold trust property in the hope of being able to repurchase it for himself at a future time is not, of itself, a sufficient ground for setting aside the sale, where the price was not inadequate or the sale improper in other respects. In a case of suspicion of improper dealings with the trust property, where the parties suspected and who might have been able to give a satisfactory explanation, are all dead, if a reasonable explanation of the evidence, consistent with the honesty of the suspected transac-

tion, can be found, the Court will adopt it rather than draw inferences from the evidence which are unfavorable to the good faith of those who are no longer able to explain their acts and written words. That a transaction was legal and honest is a presumption of law which is strengthened by lapse of time. *In re Postlethwaite*, 60 L. T. 514.

By an arrangement between the executors one of them took goods of the estate at the price of \$515, after the same had been valued by appraisers at \$733. The Court ordered the executors to be charged with \$733 and interest thereon. *Cudney v. Cudney*, 21 Gr. 153. An executor cannot buy the debts for his own benefit. *Ex p. Lacey*, 6 Ves. 625, 6 R. R. 9.

A purchase by the administrator of personal property of the estate at its appraised value will not be upheld where there is any suspicion of fraud or unfairness. *Queeney's Estate*, 12 Luz. Leg. Rev. 25.

In the case of *In re Norrington, Brindley v. Partridge*, 13 Ch. D. 654, the executors had an absolute discretion to sell and convert the estate. Shortly after the death of the testator the executor Partridge purchased the business at a valuation. The Court set aside the sale and Partridge was ordered to account for the profits after deducting just allowances "because it would be unreasonable that you should look into his books and find that he had made a sum of profits, without deducting from it the rent, the wages, and the expenditure he incurred for stock, and so on. To just allowances he is entitled; to salary, in my opinion, he can have no kind of claim. You cannot give salary to a trustee who is made liable for his irregularity."

An executor sold property of the estate for \$800 to his wife. On passing the accounts the Judge of Probate (New Brunswick) found as a fact that the property was worth \$1,800, and ordered the executor to account for the difference, and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. *Re Daly*,

Daly v. Brown, 39 S. C. R. 122. See *Re Donaldson, Gibson v. Donaldson* (1904), 3 O. W. R. 290, where a Divisional Court reversed the findings of a Master holding an administratrix liable for selling land at less than its actual value.

As a lease of an estate is a sale of a partial interest in it, the trustees cannot demise it to one of themselves. If a trustee accepts a lease he is bound to pay the rent; or he may, at the option of the *cestui que trust*, be made to account for the profits. *Ex p. Hughes*, 6 Ves. 617, 6 R. R. 1.

It makes no difference that the sale is by public auction and the highest bid obtained, if the property is bought in by the trustee or by an agent for the trustee. *Shaw v. Tackaberry* (1915), 29 O. L. R. 490.

It is a settled rule that a trustee or agent, authorized to make a purchase for his *cestui que trust* or principal, cannot make the purchase from himself without disclosing the fact. Such transactions are so dangerous that they are wholly forbidden, and are not merely declared void where damage has arisen from them, or fraud is mixed up with them. Thus where an agent was authorized to invest in bank stocks, and appropriated some of his own shares to his principal and rendered an account as if he had purchased these shares for her, she was held entitled, many years afterwards on the fact coming to her knowledge, to repudiate the transaction. *Harrison v. Harrison*, 14 Gr. 586.

Where an executor, having assets in his hands sufficient to pay unpaid taxes on lands of the estate, permitted the lands to be sold for taxes and bid them in and took the deed thereof in his own name, he was held guilty of fraud. *Kelly v. Pratt*, 83 N. Y. S. 636.

In case of a purchase by a partner of the executor, with partnership funds, the executor is liable for the full amount of the profits resulting from the purchase, and not merely for his share of the profits. *Wilbanks v. Crosno*, 112 Ill. App. 503.

F., a solicitor, was one of three mortgagees, and acted as solicitor for the mortgagees in selling the mortgaged premises to a company formed for purchasing the property. F. was also a shareholder in the purchasing company. It was held that the sale could not be set aside on the simple ground that F. was such shareholder, for the sale by a person to a corporation of which he is a member is not either in form or substance a sale by him to himself along with others. But it was held that there was such a conflict of interests and duty in F., of which the company had notice, as to throw upon them the burden of upholding the sale. *Farrar v. Farrars Limited*, 40 Ch. D. 395.

An administrator has no right to purchase in his own right at a sheriff's sale under executions issued upon a judgment in his own favor and one held by him as administrator. At such sale he represents the interest of the estate as much as he does his own, and the duty rests upon him to see that the property brings as much as possible. *Montgomery v. Black*, 86 S. W. Rep. 1006.

As to the duty of a trustee who has obtained from the Court liberty to bid at a sale of the trust property, see *Ricker v. Ricker*, 7 A. R. 282.

Profit out of the Estate.

Analogous to the rule which prevents a trustee from purchasing trust property, is that which compels an executor or administrator to account for all profits made by or out of the estate.

Whenever a trustee violates his duty, and deals with the trust estate for his own behalf, the rule is, that he shall account to the *cestui que trust* for all the gain which he has made. All the losses are charged to the wrongdoer, while no profit can ever accrue to him. Per Lord Brougham, *Docker v. Somes*, 2 My. & K. 655, 39 R. R. 317.

In *Sugden v. Crossland*, 3 Sm. & G. 192, 107 R. R. 73, it was held that an executor who retired from his trust in consideration of a money payment to enable another to be appointed in his place, was bound to account to the estate for the sum so paid.

Where a trustee invested trust funds on mortgage, and the mortgagor devised the equity of redemption to "the mortgagee," it was held that, though the mortgagor did not know the mortgagee was trustee, yet the devise belonged to the trust, and not to the trustee beneficially. *Re Payne*, 54 L. T. 840.

Where a trustee has sold stock to himself he must account for profits made thereon. His liability is not limited to what the stock was worth when he sold it to himself. *In re Bussman's Estate* (1918), 170 N. Y. Supp. 420.

The imperative rule that no person can, by acting as trustee, derive any pecuniary benefit to himself, is well illustrated by *Crosskill v. Bower*, 32 Beav. 86, 138 R. R. 646, where three trustees, two of whom were bankers, were empowered to carry on a business and to borrow money "from any bankers or other persons" for that purpose. The bankers made advances at compound interest, but it was held that, having regard to their fiduciary character, they were entitled to simple interest only.

But where a trustee was continued as a partner in a firm in succession to the testator and paid a salary of £600 a year, and the evidence shewed that the salary resulted, not from the trust, but from work done independently of the trust, it was held he was not bound to account to the estate for the salary. *In re Lewis, Lewis v. Lewis*, 1910, W. N. 217.

An executor and trustee, who acted as auctioneer in the sale of the trust property, was held not entitled to charge a commission on the sale. *Kirkman v. Booth*, 11 Beav. 273; 83 R. R. 158. But a company acting as executor can recover a sum paid to one of its

directors as an auctioneer. *Bath v. Standard Land Co.* (1911), 1 Ch. 618.

A mortgagee with a power of sale was a member of a firm of auctioneers. He took possession of the mortgaged land as mortgagee and the firm sold it as auctioneers. It was held they were not entitled to charge a commission on the sale. *Matthewson v. Clarke*, 1 Drew. 3, 106 R. R. 270. An auctioneer in such a case would appear to be entitled to his charges if appointed by the Court. *Arnold v. Garner*, 16 L. J. Ch. 329.

In an administration action, the solicitors for the executors were paid their costs, and by reason of some agreement between the solicitors and one of the executors, they paid this executor half the profit costs. North, J., held he had no power on the motion then before him to compel the executor to repay the money, but said: "If an action is brought by the other executor, or by some one beneficially interested in the estate, for an account of the profit received by the executor, I do not see what answer he would have to it." *In re Thorpe* (1891), 2 Ch. 361.

To the same effect is *In re Evans*, 83 Am. St. Rep. 794, where a contract by an administrator with his attorneys by which he was to receive a portion of their fees for services rendered by the attorneys to the estate, was held to be against public policy and void.

Where executors received commissions or rebates in respect of insurance on properties belonging to the estate, these were held to be assets of the estate. *In re Wilson and The Toronto General Trusts Corporation* (1906), 13 O. L. R. p. 86. See also *Re Prittie Trusts*, 12 O. W. R. p. 268.

An executor, who is one of a banking firm, cannot charge the ordinary banker's commission against the testator's estate. *Heighington v. Grant*, 5 M. & Cr. 258, 48 R. R. 297. Nor is an agent, who is appointed executor of his principal, entitled to charge commis-

sions on business done subsequently to the testator's death. *Sheriff v. Axe*, 4 Russ. Ch. Cas. 33.

But where a hotel-keeper directed his business to be carried on by his executors, who were brewers and spirit merchants, who had been in the habit of supplying the deceased in his lifetime, and continued to supply after his death, the Court refused to hold the executors were entitled to the cost prices only, but directed an enquiry as to the necessity of the supplies and the market prices. The M. R. said that he could not suppose that the testator, who had himself directed his business to be carried on by these defendants, expected they would be deprived of the usual fair profit. *Smith v. Langford*, 2 Beav, 362, 50 R. R. 207.

Where a will provides for payment of commission, charges or other profits, the executor will be allowed the usual charges. Where there was such a provision in the will, a land surveyor, who was a trustee, was allowed his charges. *Willis v. Kibble*, 1 Beav. 559, 40 R. R. 453. So where a trust is before the Court, and the trustee has, before accepting the trust, expressly stipulated for such remuneration. *Moore v. Froud*, 3 M. & Cr. 48. But in such cases the trustees will be strictly limited to the charges indicated by the settlor. *Re Corsellis*, 34 Ch. D. 675. See *post*, as to the costs of a solicitor-trustee.

Where executors improperly dealt with a portion of the trust funds by allowing one of their number to retain it in his hands at a low rate of interest, the Court refused them their costs of an action prior to decree. *Ashbough v. Ashbough*, 10 Gr. 430. And executors may be deprived of their costs, in such a case, though not guilty of any wilful misconduct. *Kennedy v. Pingle*, 27 Gr. 305.

The equitable principle that a trustee cannot deal with himself with respect to trust property, applies to a surviving partner who is also executor of the estate of the deceased partner. *Egan v. Wirth*, 26 R. I. 363.

The rule which prevents a trustee profiting out of the estate of his *cestui que trust* does not apply where he remotely, and only incidentally, profits by his connection with the trust; as for instance, where a trustee, who is a solicitor, lends trust moneys on mortgage to one of his own clients, and thereby obtains a fee from the client for preparing the security, etc. *Whitney v. Smith*, 4 Ch. App. 513.

An incidental benefit derived by an executor as a stockholder of a corporation, from the sale of assets of the estate to a syndicate which such corporation helped to form, does not make him liable to account to the estate for the profits ultimately derived from the purchase of such assets. *Owen v. Potter*, 115 Mich. 556.

A testator died possessed of shares in a company. Afterwards, upon fresh allotments of stock being made, his executrix took up the additional shares, paying the premium out of her own money as to some of the shares and selling her right as to others. It was held she was not entitled as against the estate to such new shares, but only to a lien thereon for the amount advanced by her to take them up. *In re Sinclair, Clark v. Sinclair* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 349.

A. made pre-emption entry for lands and devised same to B. on attaining 21. C. took out probate and four years later the Crown cancelled the pre-emption for non-payment, and C. immediately made homestead entry and obtained the patent in his own name. When C. learned the facts he brought action against B.'s administrators, and it was held that the defendants held the pre-empted lands in trust for the devisee. *Roberts v. National Trust Co.* (1915), 32 W. L. R. 55, 23 D. L. R. 890.

Executors were directed by the will to sell the real estate and they allowed one of their number to hold one of the stores at less than a fair occupation rent; it was held they were chargeable with what would have

been a fair occupation rent. *DeCordova v. DeCordova*, 4 A. C. 692.

The executor of a deceased partner may sell the share of the deceased partner to the surviving partners if that be done properly and fairly. The Court may interfere if the surviving partners have availed themselves of their relation, and the inequality of their knowledge to gain an advantage against the estate. *Chambers v. Howell*, 11 Beav. 6, 83 R. R. 104.

The widow and executrix of a saloon-keeper was charged with the value of the good-will and remainder of the term of a license, where she obtained a renewal of the license in her individual capacity, and continued to keep the saloon open. *Mueller's Estate*, 190 Pa. 601. So where an administrator obtained in his own name a renewal of a charter for a ferry owned by the deceased, it was held he was bound to account for the value thereof as assets of the estate. *Huson v. Wallace*, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 1.

Profits made by an executor in speculating in claims against the estate must be charged against him as assets. *In re Rainforth's Estate*, 83 N. Y. S. 57.

Where trustees hold shares belonging to the trust, and they are appointed directors of the company in respect of such holding, and there is no provision in the will enabling them to retain their remuneration as such directors for their own benefit, they must account for such remuneration to the trust, and the remuneration is treated as capital and will go to the remainderman as an accretion to the shares. *In re Francis*, 74 L. J. Ch. 198; 92 L. T. 77.

Where part of the assets of an estate consisted of stock in a corporation which had a plant that was an unpromising investment, and the executor induced another corporation to buy the plant, it was held he was guilty of no wrong in personally taking stock in the purchasing corporation to the amount necessary to buy the plant, and selling it at figures realizing him

a considerable interest on the investment, the transaction being in good faith and promotive of the interest of the estate. *Houghteling v. Stockbridge*, 99 N. W. 759, 11 Detroit Leg. N. 100.

Whenever a trustee charged with the duty of investing money belonging to and for the benefit of another, invests it in such a way as to make it possible for him to profit by the investment individually, he makes himself personally liable for any loss which may occur by reason of such investment. *Carr's Estate*, 24 Pa. Sup. Ct. 369.

In New York it was held that there may be circumstances under which it would be wise and prudent for executors to employ one of their number to perform non-executorial duties to the estate, and payment for such services may be allowed. *Russell v. Hilton*, 80 N. Y. App. Div. 178. So the employment by an executor of a member of his family to perform services for the estate, where such services, if rendered by a disinterested person, would pass without question, may be sanctioned; but such a course is always open to suspicion and merits investigation. *Re Wagner*, 40 Misc. (N.Y.) 490.

Another illustration of the honesty required by a trustee in this regard is shewn in *Molyneux v. Fletcher* (1898), 1 Q. B. 648. The will authorized the trustees "to apply in or towards the advancement in life of each child a sum not exceeding £500 on his or her presumptive share," and the trustees were to be the sole judges of the advisability of such payment and the signification of the term "advancement in life." The share of one of the married daughters became vested, and her husband was indebted to one of the trustees. At the request of this daughter the trustees advanced £250, which was handed to the husband and used by him to pay his debt to one of the trustees, all of which was done with the knowledge of the trustees. The Court held that the pretended exercise of the power was not made in good faith for the advancement in

life of the daughter of the testator, but really to enable her to provide her husband with money to pay the debt to the trustee, and the payment made thereunder was a breach of trust.

In *Rose v. Rose* (1914), 32 O. L. R. 481, will be found a review of the authorities in regard to conflict between the interest and duty of a trustee.

Mixing Trust Funds.

Trust moneys should be paid into a bank to the credit of the estate, in the names of all the trustees jointly, and payable to their joint order or cheque. It should be kept distinct from the trustees' own private money; if they mix them, the burden rests upon them to distinguish one from the other. If they fail to do so, the whole will be held to belong to the trust. V. C. Sir John Stuart in *Cook v. Addison*, L. R. 7 Eq. 410, said:—"It is a well-established doctrine in this Court, that if a trustee or agent mixes and confuses the property which he holds in a fiduciary character with his own property, so that they cannot be separated with perfect accuracy, he is liable for the whole." See also *Lupton v. White*, 15 Ves. 432, 10 R. R. 94.

Confusion of property is conversion and such misfeasance will render a trustee responsible for loss occasioned by failure of a bank where funds are deposited, although the instrument creating the trust directed its deposit in that particular bank. *Corya v. Corya*, 119 Md. 593.

Where the funds of an estate in the hands of an executor or administrator are mingled with his individual funds, by depositing them to his individual credit in a bank, it is generally held that he is chargeable with interest, because it will be considered under such circumstances that he has used the money. *Williams v. Powell*, 15 Beav. 461; *Hetfield v. Debaud*, 54 N. J. Eq. 371; *Dunscomb v. Dunscomb*, 1 Jones Ch. 508.

Mere readiness to pay over the fund when called for will not exempt the executor or administrator from liability for interest when he has mingled it with his own money; and in such case no demand is necessary to make him liable. *Kerr v. Laird*, 27 Miss. 544.

If an executor or administrator deposits the funds of the estate with a firm of which he is a member, or otherwise mingles them with the funds of such firm, the presumption is that such funds were used in the business of the firm, and he will be charged with interest, though there is no evidence of actual fraud. *Matter of Stott*, 52 Cal. 403; *Matter of Mairs*, 4 Redf. 160; so if he deposits the funds of the estate in a bank of which he is owner. *Matter of Babcock*, 2 Connely, 82.

If an executor deposits estate money to his own bank account, and mixes it with his own money, and afterwards draws out sums by cheques in the ordinary manner, the rule in *Clayton's Case*, 1 Mer. 572, attributing the first drawings out of the first deposits in, does not apply; and the executor must be taken to have drawn out his own money in preference to the trust money. The rule in *Clayton's Case* may apply if the contest is between two *cestuis que trust* whose money the executor has mixed with his own. *In re Hallett's Estate*, 13 Ch. D. 696. The judgment of Jessel, M.R., in this case, contains an elaborate review of the cases, shewing the extent to which trust funds can be followed where there has been a mixing of funds. So also *Godkin v. Watson*, 5 O. W. N. 811.

It is equally clear that in a case where funds have been mixed, when any of the money drawn out has been invested, and the investment remains in the name or under the control of the trustee, the rest of the balance being afterwards dissipated by him, he cannot maintain that the investment represents his own money alone, and that what remains has been spent and can no longer be traced and recovered, was the money belonging to the estate. In other words, when

the private money of the trustee and the money of the estate have been mixed in the same banking account, from which various payments have from time to time been made, then, in order to determine to whom any remaining balance or any investment that may have been paid for out of the account ought to be deemed to belong, the executor must be debited with all the sums that have been withdrawn and applied to his own use so as to be no longer recoverable, and the trust money in like manner be debited with any sums taken out and duly invested in the name of the executor. *In re Oatway* (1903), 2 Ch. 356.

If a trustee, partly with his own money and partly with the trust funds, purchases property and it cannot be predicated of any particular part of the property that it was purchased with the trust money, yet the *cestui que trust* has a lien upon the whole for the amount that has been misemployed. *Lane v. Dighton*, Amb. 409; *Lewis v. Maddocks*, 17 Ves. 48, 7 R. R. 10.

If an executor deposits trust funds in a bank to his own account, and mixes it with his own funds, and the bank fails, the executor is liable to make good the loss. *Fletcher v. Walker*, 3 Mad. 73; 18 R. R. 195.

Miscellaneous.

In taking accounts against a trustee when he is fixed with a personal liability, his good faith is to be considered, and every fair allowance is to be made in his favour, especially if the demand against him is one which arose many years ago, and the beneficiary was at the time cognizant of all the matters connected with it. *McDonnell v. White*, 11 H. L. Cas. 271, 145 R. R. 305.

An executor or administrator may commit a devastation in many other ways; not only by an abuse of his powers, but also by negligence in exercising his powers, and wrongful administration.

In *Doe d. Woodhead v. Fallows*, 2 C. & J. 481, it was held that an administratrix who applied the assets of the estate in satisfaction of her own debt, was liable.

An executor or administrator will also incur liability by misapplying the assets in undue funeral expenses. *Stag v. Punter*, 3 Atk. 119; *Hancock v. Podmore*, 1 B. & A. 260, 35 R. R. 287.

Where an executor, believing the assets were amply sufficient for the payment of the testator's debts, permitted specific legatees to retain or possess themselves of the articles bequeathed to them, they were held liable for the value thereof on a deficiency of assets. *Spode v. Smith*, 3 Russ. Chy. Cas. 511; *Davies v. Nicholson*, 2 DeG. & J. 693, 119 R. R. 300. In such a case the executor or administrator would be protected if he had given the proper notice under section 56 of the Trustee Act. And see *In re Kay*, *Mosley v. Kay* (1897), 2 Ch. 518, under "Honestly and Reasonably."

An executor is guilty of a devastavit who surrenders, or otherwise fails to preserve the residue of a term, where the land is of greater yearly value than the rent. *Thompson v. Thompson*, 9 Price, 476.

Or applies the assets in payment of a claim which he is not bound to satisfy, e.g., if he makes disbursements in the schooling or clothing of the children of the deceased without authority under the will or from the Court. *Giles v. Dyson*, 1 Stark N. P. C. 32, 18 R. R. 743.

Or by paying a sum in fulfilment of a merely moral obligation where there is no legal liability. *Shallcross v. Wright*, 19 L. J. Chy. 443; *Godson v. Good*, 2 Marsh 300. But this does not apply where the claim could be defeated only by setting up the Statute of Limitations as a defence. *Re Rownson*, 29 Ch. D. 358.

But he is liable if he pays a statute-barred debt after a judicial decision that the debt is not recoverable. *Midgley v. Midgley* (1893), 3 Ch. 282. Or if he

pays a creditor who is prevented from enforcing his claim by the Statute of Frauds. *In re Rownson, supra*.

Where an executor or administrator, having ample assets on hand to discharge all liabilities of the estate, delays paying interest-bearing debts, he is liable. *Seaman v. Everad*, 2 Lev. 40. So if he may save the penalty of a bond by payment of the less sum specified in the condition, or by the performance of the condition, and neglect to do so. 1 Saund. 333a.

Or by delay in bringing an action, where the delay has enabled the debtor to successfully defend the action by pleading the Statute of Limitations. *Hayward v. Kinsey*, 12 Mod. 573.

Where there has been delay in collecting debts, and the debtors have become bankrupt, the executor is liable for the amount lost to the estate. *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 839; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Madd. 290; 16 R. R. 224.

And executors were held chargeable with neglect in allowing assets to remain outstanding in an improper state of investment, notwithstanding that the will contained the usual indemnity clause. *Stiles v. Guy*, 1 M. & G. 422, 80 R. R. 58.

An executor or administrator will be personally responsible if he lends money of the estate upon promissory notes or other personal security. See further under "Investments."

A testator devised his farm to his minor children and directed that his executors should rent the same; that no timber should be cut except for use on the premises; and that the executors should have full power to carry the will into effect. The widow was one of the executors, and she cut and sold a large quantity of timber. The Court held that the provisions of the will imposed a duty on the executors as trustees to see that no timber was taken except for the use of the premises, and that they were jointly liable. *Stewart v. Fletcher*, 18 Gr. 21.

If trustees for sale fail in reasonable diligence in inviting competition, or if they contract to sell under circumstances of great improvidence or waste, they will be personally responsible. *Orde v. Noel*, 5 Madd. 440, 21 R. R. 328; *Pechel v. Fowler*, 2 Aust. 550, 3 R. R. 627. It is, therefore, the duty of trustees for sale to inform themselves of the real value of the property, and for that purpose to employ, if necessary, some experienced person to value it. *Oliver v. Court*, 8 Price, 165, 3 R. R. 627; *Campbell v. Walker*, 5 Ves. 680, 5 R. R. 135.

Executors will not be relieved from the effect of payments made by them under mistake of law. *Munroe's Estate*, 9 Kulp. 334.

In *Vyse v. Foster*, L. R. 8 Ch. 309, James, L.J., said that where a trustee uses the trust funds in business he must account for the profit made by him for employing the funds in such business; or at the option of the *cestui que trust*, if it does not appear what profits are attributable to such employment, he must account for trade interest, that is to say, interest at 5 per cent. In *Lewin on Trusts*, 10th ed., p. 383, it is suggested that in view of the diminished rate of interest obtainable on investment of trust moneys, this rate should be reduced to 4 per cent. But in a more recent case Farwell, J., said he "did not feel at liberty so to decide, or to alter the 5 per cent. mentioned by James, L.J." In *re Davis, Davis v. Davis* (1902), 2 Ch. 314.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CARRYING ON BUSINESS.

One of the perplexing questions that often confronts an executor is that of his right or obligation to carry on the trade or business of the testator. His duty, as well as his liability, will vary with the circumstances. If the will gives no authority to carry on the business, then, as is hereafter pointed out, his power is very limited. If the will gives such authority, then much depends on the limit of the power so given. If the business of the testator was a partnership business then the authority may depend not only on the power given by the will, but upon the provisions of the partnership articles.

An administrator is not justified in leaving assets in trade, for this is a hazardous use to permit of trust moneys; besides which, trading lies outside the proper scope of administration functions. Under circumstances not clearly imprudent, however, an executor may fairly pursue an authority which is plainly conferred upon him by the will in this respect; though less as an executor, perhaps, than as one specially honored or burdened by the testator's personal confidence.

But as to withdrawing assets from a partnership, or closing out a business in which the deceased was engaged, a wider discretion must occasionally be conceded to the personal representative; for this duty must be performed with a prudent regard to time, opportunity and other circumstances. An administrator is not necessarily wanting in due care, if he suffer the surviving partner to remain in possession of, or sell out, the joint stock in the usual course of trade; and to thus sell the stock may be for the highest interests of the estate, provided due care be exercised in the choice of agents.

These principles apply to speculative investments of all kinds with the assets. The personal representative incurs all the risks and is entitled to none of the profits resulting from such transactions committed in breach of trust. But if assets come to him thus invested by the deceased, it is a question of prudence when and how he shall withdraw the fund; and though he is not justified in continuing the speculation involving the estate more deeply, a reasonable breadth of honest discretion should be allowed him. Schouler, 1333.

The general principle is that a trade is not transmissible, but is put an end to by the death of the trader, and an administrator (or executor, where the will gives no authority to carry on the business of the deceased) has no legal authority to carry on the business without the direction of the Court. *Barker v. Barker*, 1 T. R. 295. If he does so he must account for all profits made in continuing the business, and if it proves a losing concern he will be personally responsible for the debts contracted in the business since the death of the deceased. *Ex p. Garland*, 10 Ves. 119, 7 R. R. 352; *Re Johnson*, 15 Ch. D. 548.

But this means that an executor or administrator is not to buy or sell. There are many cases where executors not only may, but are bound to continue the business to a certain extent: Thus if a party contracts for himself and his executors to build a house, and dies, the executors must go on, and they will be liable in damages for not completing the work. So, if a party engages for himself alone to build a house, and having procured all the necessary material, it should seem that his executors ought to complete the work, and not dispose of the material as a loss to the estate. So if the deceased has partially completed a work, his representatives are not bound to sacrifice the property by selling it in an imperfect state. Wms. Exrs. 1689.

If the contract is personal to the testator or intestate the executor or administrator is not bound to

complete the contract. For instance, if the deceased undertook to write a book, and died before completing it, his representatives are discharged from the contract.

If the business of the deceased is of such a nature as to justify his executor or administrator in continuing the same for a reasonable time, if this should be requisite for the purpose of selling the business as a going concern, or otherwise, the trustee will not be charged with any loss in employing the assets in so continuing the business, if he acts *bona fide*, and according to the best of his judgment. *Garrett v. Noble*, 6 Sim. 504, 38 R. R. 166.

So in the case of a farmer. If he die before the crop is harvested, the executor or administrator must reap and harvest the crop. But if he die before any crop is sown the executor or administrator would not be justified, except under exceptional circumstances, in carrying on the usual farming operations. And he is justified in feeding and caring for the live stock of the deceased until it can be advantageously sold, and this will not be considered a carrying on of the business. *In re Fernandez*, 119 Cal. 579.

In some jurisdictions it is held the executor has a sound discretion as to completing contracts of the deceased and will not be charged with loss if he acts reasonably. *Allam's Estate*, 199 Pa. St. 573.

Acts done by testamentary executors with the sole object of realizing upon the property and more advantageously liquidating an estate, in the usual manner, cannot be considered as carrying on business. *Henry v. Seaton* (1915), 17. Que. P. R. 192.

In *Gilman v. Wilber*, 1 Dem. 547, the deceased, who carried on a school, died in the middle of a school year for which contracts had been made with teachers and pupils. The executor was held not to be chargeable with the loss resulting from continuing the school until the close of the year.

An executor was allowed for payments made by him for accounts for advertisements contracted by the testator in carrying on his business, and for continuing such advertisements a short time, reducing the advertisements and finally discontinuing them. *Re Semple's Estate*, 28 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 431.

"I think it is a rule without exception, that, to authorize executors to carry on a trade, or to permit it to be carried on with the property of a testator held by them in trust, there ought to be the most distinct and positive authority and direction given by the will itself for that purpose." Per Langdale, M.R., *Kirkman v. Booth*, 11 Beav. 273, 83 R. R. 158.

A direction in the will that the testator's trade shall be carried on does not of itself authorize the employment in the trade of more of the testator's property than was employed in it at his decease; nor does such a direction, coupled with a direction that the testator's debts shall be paid, authorize a mortgage of his real estate not employed at his death in the trade, for the purpose of carrying it on. If the executors find they have not the means of carrying on the trade according to the directions contained in the will, they should apply to the Court for directions to know what they are to do in the administration of the estate. *McNellie v. Acton*, 4 D. M. & G. 756, 102 R. R. 360.

In *Ex p. Garland*, 10 Ves. 119, Lord Eldon held that when the will directed a limited sum, besides the property actually employed in the business at the testator's death, to be paid by the executors for the purpose of carrying on his business, the general assets beyond that fund were not liable.

In *Burwell v. Cawood*, 2 How. (U.S.) 560, Judge Story, adopting the reasoning of Lord Eldon, remarks that "nothing but the most clear and unambiguous language, demonstrating in the most positive manner that the testator intends to make his general assets liable for all debts contracted in the continued trade

after his death, and not merely to limit it to the funds embarked in that trade, would justify the Court in arriving at such a conclusion from the manifest inconvenience thereof, and the utter impossibility of paying off the legacies bequeathed by the testator's will, or distributing the residue of the estate, without in effect saying at the same time that the payments may all be recalled if the trade should become unsuccessful or ruinous." These remarks were approved of by Mr. Justice Field in *Smith v. Ayer*, 101 U. S. 320. And see *In re East*, C. A. 111 L. T. 101 (1914), where executors were held liable even when the will empowered them to continue carrying on the business.

A direction in a will empowering trustees to postpone the sale and conversion of any part of the testator's property for such period as to them should seem expedient, justifies the trustees in postponing the sale of the testator's business with a view to benefit the life-tenant who is entitled to the profits till sale. The business was carried on for twenty-two years, but the Court refused to limit the discretion of the trustees as to time. *In re Crowther, Midgley v. Crowther* (1895), 2 Ch. 56. And see *Re Chancellor*, 26 Ch. D. 42.

But where the only power given the executors was to sell the business of the testator with all convenient speed, the Court refused to extend the time for carrying on the business longer than two years. *In re Smith, Arnold v. Smith* (1896), 1 Ch. 171.

By the will the widow was directed to sell and convert into money his business, and she was given the interest on the fund to be realized from the sale. To properly realize the estate it was necessary to carry on the business for some time after the death of the deceased. It was held that the executrix was entitled to a reasonable amount for her services for carrying on the business which resulted in large profits, and interest for the period during which the business was carried on to be computed at a reasonable rate on the amount of capital which the business represented at

the testator's death, but not to the entire profits as interest; the surplus profits to be treated as belonging to the corpus of the estate. *Re Bean Estate*, 23 D. L. R. 335.

But where in addition to a direction to carry on the trade, the testator has specifically appropriated other assets for that purpose; the trustee, though personally liable for the debts which he contracts in the course of the business, has a right to be paid out of these specific assets, and the trade creditors are not to be disappointed in payment so far as the assets so appropriated are concerned. But the creditors' right cannot extend beyond that, either in administration or bankruptcy. *Strickland v. Symons* (1884), 26 Ch. D. 245.

Where an administrator continued to carry on the business of the intestate, maintaining the family out of the receipts, and in administration proceedings it was found the assets were not sufficient to pay all the debts, it was held that the creditors in respect of the goods supplied for the business were not entitled to prove against the estate in priority to creditors of the deceased or otherwise. *M'Aloon v. M'Aloon* (1900), 1 Ir. R. 367.

So a person supplying goods to an executor for the purpose of carrying on the testator's business for the benefit of the estate, under authority given by the will, has no right of recovery against the estate, but he may sue the executor, and he has also the right to be subrogated to any right of indemnity which the executor has against the estate. *Braun v. Braun* (1902), 14 Man. R. 346. See also *Lovell v. Gibson*, 19 Gr. 280, where it was held that the assets of a deceased person were not liable for debts incurred by an executor or administrator in carrying on the trade or business of the deceased.

In re Brooke, Brooke v. Brooke (1894), 2 Ch. 600, Kekewich, J., held that where trustees improperly carry on the trade or business of the deceased, and the creditors of the deceased stand by and allow this to be

done, they must be treated as assenting to the wrongful conduct of the trustee, and if there is a conflict between the original creditors of the deceased and the creditors of the business, the former must suffer. This judgment was overruled, on this point, in *In re Oxley* (1914), 1 Ch. 604, and it was held that merely standing by with knowledge that the business was being so carried on and abstaining from interference with it were not of themselves sufficient to bind the original creditors of the testator by the acts of the executors.

If a testator's business is carried on by his executors, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the executors are entitled to a general indemnity out of the estate as against all persons claiming under the will. But they have not the same right as against creditors of the testator, except where they properly carry on the business for a reasonable time to enable them to sell it as a going concern. *Dowse v. Gorton*, 1891, A. C. 190; *Re Chancellor*, 26 Ch. D. 42.

A testator authorized his three executors to carry on his business for such period as they might think fit, and gave them power to employ one of them at a salary to manage the business. One of the executors was appointed such manager at a salary, and in an administration action the executors claimed to be allowed the sums paid as salary. The estate being insolvent, it was held that the allowance claimed could not be made to the executors as against creditors of the estate. *In re Salmon*, 107 L. T. 108, 56 S. J. 632.

The profits made from continuing the testator's business are as much assets of the estate as those which were in the testator's possession at the time of his death, and the creditors of the testator have a right to resort to such after acquired assets, even at the expense of the executors. *Abbott v. Parfitt*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 346; *Dowse v. Gorton*, *supra*.

An executor properly continuing the business in pursuance of the provisions of the will, is entitled to be paid his costs and expenses in priority to the debts

incurred by him in carrying on the business. *In re Owen, Frisby v. Owen*, 66 L. T. 718.

And a trustee appointed by the Court to carry on the business of a testator is entitled to be indemnified by the general assets against liabilities incurred by him in carrying on the business, and the trade creditors are consequently entitled to resort to such assets for payment of their debts. *O'Neill v. McGrorty* (1915), 1 I. R. 1.

The executors or administrators of a deceased partner cannot be compelled to become a partner personally, even where by the articles of partnership the partners covenant that they and their executors and administrators will continue as partners for a certain time, though the covenant is binding on the estate of the deceased partner in the hands of such executors or administrators. *Downs v. Collins*, 6 Hare, 418; 77 R. R. 171.

A testator's directions to carry on business with his surviving partners, does not authorize the executors to embark any new capital in the business. "All that a will, which directs the testator's business to be carried on, authorizes the executors to do, is, to continue in it so much of the testator's estate as may be embarked in it at the time of his death." *Smith v. Smith*, 13 Gr. 81.

A direction to continue the testator's business until the executors should agree on a time to sell does not justify spending money of the estate upon a building which is not a part of the business. *Re J. H.*, 25 O. L. R. 132.

The testator was a partner in a firm of distillers. By his will he authorized his executors to continue the business for one year after his death. A few months after his death the surviving partner and the executors formed a joint stock company and the interest of the estate in the business was valued and put in as so much stock, and remained therein for seven years,

Held, this was a breach of trust under the terms of the will. *Worts v. Worts*, 18 O. R. 332.

A surviving partner, who is also the executor of the deceased, is not entitled to an allowance for carrying on the business after his partner's death, for the benefit of the estate. *Stocken v. Dawson*, 6 Beav. 371, 63 R. R. 116. In one case he was allowed expenses actually incurred under an erroneous conception that he was sole proprietor by purchase from his co-executor, but which purchase was set aside as a breach of trust, though *bona fide*. *Burden v. Burden*, 1 Ves. & B. 170; 12 R. R. 210.

In Ontario, the work of an executor in such a position might be taken into consideration in fixing his compensation for his care, pains and trouble. In England, no such compensation is paid an executor unless provided for by the will.

A testator directed that his business should be carried on by one E. P. The executors, from the confidence thus reposed in E. P. by the testator, permitted him to get in the outstanding debts due to the estate. E. P. did not pay over the amounts collected and it was held the executors were liable. A direction to carry on business could not be extended to the collection of debts. *Pistor v. Dunbar*, 1 Anstr. 107, 3 R. R. 561.

An authority to the executors or executor acting under the will to carry on the testator's business, if they should see fit, does not authorize an administrator with the will annexed to carry on the business. *Lambert v. Rendle*, 3 N. R. 247, 143 R. R. 891.

The rule that an executor is liable for all profits made in carrying on the testator's business is subject to some limitation where the executor is also the residuary legatee, or the business has been specifically bequeathed to him. In such a case the executor is liable only for the actual value of the assets and not for the profits. *In re Mullon*, 14 N. Y. 98; *Re Van Houten*, 18 N. Y. App. Div. 301.

If a trustee in the course of the ordinary management of his testator's estate, either by himself or his agents, does some act whereby some third person is injured, and that third person recovers damages against the trustee in an action for tort, the trustee, if he has acted with due diligence and reasonably, is entitled to be indemnified out of the testator's estate. Where a trustee was carrying on his testator's colliery business for the benefit of the estate, and, in so doing, let down the surface of the land and thereby injured the buildings on the adjoining land of a third party, for which the latter recovered a judgment for damages against the trustee, the Court held he was entitled to be indemnified out of the estate which was in course of administration. *In re Raybould* (1900), 1 Ch. 199.

CHAPTER XXV.

COMPOUNDING CLAIMS.

Section 52 of the Trustee Act is as follows:—

52.—(1) A personal representative may pay or allow any debt or claim on any evidence that he thinks sufficient.

(2) A personal representative, or two or more trustees acting together, or a sole acting trustee, where by the instrument, if any, creating the trust, a sole trustee is authorized to execute the trusts and powers thereof may, if and as he or they may think fit, accept any composition or any security real or personal, for any debt or for any property, real or personal, claimed, and may allow any time for payment for any debt, and **may compromise, compound, abandon, submit to arbitration or otherwise settle any debt, account, claim or thing whatever relating to the testator's or intestate's estate or to the trust, and for any of these purposes may enter into, give, execute, and do such agreements, instruments of composition or arrangement, releases, or other things as to him or them seem expedient without being responsible for any loss occasioned by any act or thing done by him or them in good faith.**

Sub-section (1) has been dealt with under the heading of "Payment of Debts."

Section 52 is founded on the English Act known as Lord Cranworth's Act, which is now embodied in section 21 of the Trust Act, 1893. The English Act provides that the section applies only if and as far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the instrument creating the trust.

The exact effect of this enactment has not been clearly decided. In *In re Owens*, 47 L. T. 61, Jessel, M.R., said "it might have a revolutionary effect on this branch of the law. It looks as if the only question

left would be whether the trustees have acted in good faith or not." On the other hand it has been suggested that the section is merely a statutory expression of the law of the Court, with this important difference, that it "shifts the onus of proof, where any particular transaction is impeached, from the trustee to the *cestui que trust*. Formerly a trustee had to justify his action in compromising, compounding, etc.; henceforth the dissatisfied *cestui que trust* must prove impropriety of motive." Underhill on Trusts, 438.

Even before the passing of this Act a trustee was allowed to compound or release debts where it appeared to have been for the benefit of the trust estate. For instance, where a tenant was in arrears for rent, and became insolvent, and to regain possession the executor released the arrears, and paid a sum to obtain possession. *Blue v. Marshall*, 3 P. Wms. 381. An administrator obtained judgment against a debtor, who being in gaol, petitioned to be discharged under the Insolvent Act. The debtor offered less than the costs incurred in the action, and the Court held the administrator was not chargeable with the debt. *Pennington v. Healey*, 1 Compt. & M. 402. And in *In re Houghton* (1904), 1 Ch. p. 625, it is said that the statutory authority really adds nothing to the common law powers of executors.

In *Irwin v. Toronto General Trusts Company*, 24 A. R. 484, it was held that an administrator had no power to compromise a claim for dower by conveying to the widow another property, a portion of the intestate's real estate. The judgment appears to proceed on the ground that at that time an administrator was not within the Act. In 1899 the Act was amended so as to include administrators. In *Re McIntyre* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 548, a widow claimed dower out of lands of her deceased husband which he, in his lifetime, had contracted to sell for \$2,000. The executors, desiring to complete the sale, compromised the claim by paying the widow \$390, and Street, J., said the section seemed

sufficient to cover what they did and to justify their action. There was an appeal on another point, but as to the power of the executors to compromise the claim for dower, the judgment of Street, J., was not questioned.

A testator gave his land to his son, and legacies payable out of his personal property to his daughters. He gave his wife certain money in lieu of dower, but she elected against the will and the executors paid her a lump sum for dower. The son was an infant, and during his minority the income from the land was to be treated as being part of the personal estate. The sum paid to the widow for dower, as well as the executors' compensation for their care of the land, was allowed by the Surrogate Judge out of the personalty, so that the son got the land free from the dower and from the money allowed as compensation. On appeal Middleton, J., said: "This was obviously wrong; but the whole sum paid for dower should not be charged on the land, as the rental should bear part of it. There should be disallowed the executors as against the personalty the sum of \$450, which sum should be charged on the lands." *Re McGrath* (1918), 13 O. W. N. 398.

There may be a compromise of a claim against an estate although, in the result, the party making the claim gets all he demands. In *In re Houghton* (1904), 1 Ch. 622, the defendant and the widow of the testator were joint executors. Before probate was granted the widow took from the testator's safe securities valued at £1,180, claiming that these securities, or the moneys represented by them, were her property. Subsequently the widow produced receipts shewing beyond question that £820 belonged to her, and the defendant did not press the balance of the claim. The question was whether the defendant could compromise this claim by allowing it in full. Kekewich, J., said: "I use the word compromise advisedly. No doubt there was no give and take. Esther Houghton had all she claimed, and in that sense there was no compromise.

On the other hand she had possession of the securities; they could only be got from her by discussion, and perhaps litigation. It was entirely for those representing the estate to say whether there should be litigation, with delay and costs, or whether the claim should be acceded to. That is a compromise. Very little was given up, but there was a reason for the transaction, when the possibility of litigation and its consequences are considered. I think therefore that, if honest, it was a compromise."

This case is also an authority for the proposition that it is competent for an executor, in a proper case, to compromise a claim by his co-executor against the estate; but it was there said: "The position, however, is a delicate one, and an executor in that position would do well to apply to the Court for directions as to whether he is at liberty to make the compromise." And see *De Cordova v. DeCordova*, 4 A. C. 692, where such a compromise was set aside. See also *Astbury v. Astbury* (1898), 2 Ch. 111, as to the effect of an acknowledgment of more than six years' interest being due on a mortgage, to work an acknowledgment under sec. 18 of the Statute of Limitations, R. S. O. ch. 75.

In view of the law as it stood before the passing of this section of the Trustee Act, it is somewhat difficult to understand what is the effect of the provision giving power to "a personal representative, or two or more trustees acting together," to compromise claims. Mr. Underhill suggests that it must be construed to mean that the power is to be exercised by *not less* than two trustees, unless a sole trustee is expressly authorized, and cannot be construed to enable *any two* of a greater number of trustees to compromise or compound without the joinder of their fellows: pp. 439, 440.

But before the passing of this Act it was held that one of several executors might compromise a claim without the assent of the others, in the absence of fraud. In *Smith v. Everett*, 27 Beav. 454, 122 R. R. 484, Sir John Romilly, M.R., said: "That settlement

of accounts was made by the two executors alone, but I am of opinion that it concludes the plaintiff, and for this reason: two out of the three executors joined in that transaction, and it is a settled principle with respect to the power of executors, that any one of several executors may settle an account with a person accountable to the estate, and that such settlement is binding on the other executors. In *Herbert v. Pigott*, 2 Cr. & M. 384, executors brought an action against a debtor to the testator's estate; two of the executors released the debt; and it was held to be binding. Although a question, which I apprehend is now settled, has been raised, whether the same principle extends to one of several administrators, still there can be no question that one of several executors has power to act so as to bind the estate, subject, of course, to any question of his liability to the parties interested in the estate for any impropriety of conduct, and subject to this also, that if there be any fraud or gross error in the settlement of the account it may be a ground for reopening it."

As the statute is a relieving one, it is difficult to understand how it can have the effect of abridging the powers of executors, so as to prevent one of several executors settling or compromising claims.

If the effect of a compromise is to relieve an executor from a liability to the estate, which he is under jointly with another, the compromise is a fraud on the estate and not binding. *Stott v. Lord*, 31 L. J. Ch. 391.

An executor may compromise the claim of a legatee. *Re Warren*, 32 W. R. 916.

A claim was made against an estate for \$1,000. There was no evidence to corroborate the claimant's account and the executors refused to pay it. After negotiations and attempts at settlement, the executors paid \$250 in full, and it was held the executors had a right to make such a compromise. *Re Robbins*, 23 Gr. 162.

But where trustees accepted \$250 in discharge of a debt of \$300, and gave no evidence to explain the reason of this, it was held, that, in the absence of such evidence, the Master was right in charging the trustees with the loss. There must be some reason shewn for the compromise. *Baldwin v. Thomas*, 15 Gr. 119.

Executors, in the exercise of a prudent discretion, may accept real estate in payment of a debt owing to the estate. *McCarger v. McKinnon*, 17 Gr. 525.

An executor or administrator may, as such, refer to arbitration causes of action which arose in the lifetime of the testator, so as to bind the estate, and without making himself personally responsible. *Reid v. Reid*, 16 C. P. 247. The power of an administrator to submit to arbitration is said to be based upon the fact that he has power to prosecute or defend suits. *Cogswell v. Concord Ry. Co.*, 68 N. H. 192. In *District of Columbia v. Bailey*, 171 N. S. 161, it is said the power arose by reason of the full dominion which the law gives to an executor or administrator over the assets, and the full discretion which is vested in him for the settlement and liquidation of all claims due to and from the estate.

A compromise of a disputed claim, honestly made, constitutes a valuable consideration, even if the claim turns out ultimately to be unfounded; it is not even necessary that the question in dispute should be really doubtful, it being sufficient that the parties in good faith believe it to be so. *Francis v. Allan*, 11 O. W. N. 259.

CHAPTER XXVI.

INVESTMENTS BY TRUSTEES.

In recent years the authority of trustees to make investments from trust funds has been materially enlarged, and now executors are allowed, apart from the directions of the will or deed of trust, a considerable choice of investments which formerly the Courts would not approve of. The provisions relating to investments by trustees are now contained in sections 28-34 of the Trustee Act (R. S. O. 1914, Chap. 121), and these should be carefully considered by executors who may be called upon to invest trust funds.

Section 28.—(1) A trustee having money in his hands, which it is his duty, or which it is in his discretion, to invest at interest, may invest the same in the stock, debentures or securities of the Dominion of Canada, or of Ontario or of any of the other Provinces of Canada or in debentures or securities the payment of which is guaranteed by the Dominion of Canada or by Ontario or by any of the other Provinces of Canada or in the debentures of any municipal corporation in Ontario, including debentures issued for public school purposes, or in securities which are a first charge on land held in fee simple in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan or Alberta, provided that such investments are in other respects reasonable and proper.

(2) Subject to the proviso in sub-section 1 any money already invested in any such stock, debentures or securities shall be deemed to have been lawfully and properly invested.

By 4 Geo. V. ch. 21, sec. 28, the above section was extended so as to include securities which are a first charge on land in British Columbia; and by Geo. V. ch. 20, sec. 15, the following words were added to sub-section 1: "or he may entrust the same to a trust company incorporated under the laws of Ontario to invest

as his agent in any of the above-mentioned securities in the manner contemplated by sub-section 2 of section 17 of the Loan and Trust Corporations Act."

In this Act the word "trustee" includes an executor, administrator and a trustee however appointed and several joint trustees. Sec. 2 (r).

Section 28 corresponded with section 1 of the English Act, the Trustee Act, 1893, except that the latter provides that "a trustee may, *unless expressly forbidden* by the instrument (if any) creating the trust, invest any funds," etc. It will be noticed the Ontario Act gives the trustee power to invest funds "which it is his duty, or which it is in his discretion," to invest. *In re Burke* (1908), 2 Ch. 248, it was held that a discretion to keep trust funds and invest them in one particular way does not "expressly forbid" investment in any of the investments authorized by the Act. In that case the will provided: "My trustees shall keep my trust estate and invest the same on deposit with" a named bank at interest. There seems to be no reason for thinking the Ontario Act would receive a narrower construction.

In *Re Richardson*, 3 O. W. N. 1473, 5 D. L. R. 449, the will directed "my executor to deposit the proceeds of such sale in some chartered bank and keep such proceeds so deposited until M. R. shall have attained the age of twenty-one years." The executors filed a petition asking, *inter alia*, permission to disregard the provision of the will and invest the money instead of paying it into a bank. Riddell, J., held that where no discretion is given to the executor the Act does not apply—that here the executor had no discretion—and that if he disregarded the express direction of the will he made himself responsible for any loss.

In a case before the Act was passed it was held that where a testator authorized his trustees to invest in "public securities" this did not authorize an investment in municipal debentures. *Ewart v. Gordon*, 13 Gr. 40.

Although the range of trust investments has been greatly extended, the Court still scrutinizes, with considerable jealousy, any direction to invest in securities not authorized by the legislature. Thus where a settlor empowers his trustees to invest the trust funds "at their discretion," it seems to be the better opinion that the discretion of the trustees is limited to a discretion as to which of the several forms of security *authorized by law* they shall invest in, and does not give them power to invest in securities not so authorized; such, for instance, as ordinary railway stock. *Bethell v. Abraham*, 17 Eq. 24; *Re Brown, Brown v. Brown*, 29 Ch. D. 889. And indeed the word "invest" seems to point to a loan, and not to an employment in a trading speculation, as also does a direction to place out at interest, or on security. *Worts v. Worts*, 18 O. R. 332; *Harris v. Harris*, 29 Beav. 107; *Underhill on Trusts*, 4th ed. 326; *Spratt v. Wilson, infra*.

Where a settlement authorized the trustees to "invest" in real estate, this was held to authorize an actual purchase of real estate. "So far as the word 'invest' is concerned, in connection with money, I am satisfied it may well apply to the cause of a purchase of land as distinguished from a mortgage of land. It has been of long and familiar use in this sense." *Re Barwick*, 5 O. R. 710.

In *Re J. H.* (1911), 25 O. L. R. 132, executors were empowered to invest "in such reasonably safe income-producing securities as—they may approve without rendering themselves liable for any loss." The testator had stock in banks and insurance companies. Riddell, J., held that by "securities" the testator meant stocks similar to the stocks the testator held at the date of his death. He points out, however, that power was intended to be given to invest in securities beyond those given by the Act; otherwise there would have been no need for giving the executors indemnity.

In the absence of clear and express direction, even where trustees have a discretion, they cannot, without a breach of trust, lend trust funds on personal security, or personal property, or invest it on trade security, *e.g.*, in the shares of a public company. *Child v. Child*, 20 Beav. 50; *Harris v. Harris*, 29 Beav. 107. "The rule is well settled, where moneys are left by testamentary instrument to be invested at the discretion of an executor or trustee, that he is to invest in such securities as are sanctioned by the Court. The general discretion so given does not warrant investment in personal securities, and it would be disregarding fixed standards of decision to lay it down that such a discretion can be exercised otherwise than by law." Per Boyd, C., *Spratt v. Wilson*, 19 O. R. 28. In the last named case the executors were directed to invest in such securities as they should think fit, and apply the interest for the maintenance of the infants until their majority. Instead of investing the funds the executors deposited them in a savings bank at 3½ per cent., and the Court held they did not conform to their duty, and were liable for the difference between the rate earned and legal interest.

A power to invest on such good security as the trustee may think fit will not justify an investment on personal security; or in securities in which it is not usual for a prudent man to invest. *Knox v. MacKinnon*, 13 A. C. 753; and where there is a power to invest on personal security it must be exercised with great caution. *Pickard v. Anderson* (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 608. A power to invest in such securities as the trustee "shall think fit" means "shall honestly think fit." *Re Smith, Smith v. Thompson* (1896), 1 Ch. 71.

As long ago as 1783 Lord Hotham said:—"The Court will always discourage lending trust money on private security, though large interest may be gained. It becomes a species of gambling." *Adye v. Fouilleteau*, 1 Cox 24. A few years later Lord Kenyon was no less emphatic: "It was never heard of that a trus-

tee could lend an infant's money on private security. This is a rule that should be rung in the ears of every person who acts in the character of a trustee, for such an act may very probably be done with the best and honestest intention. Yet no rule of equity is so well established as this." *Holmes v. Dring*, 2 Cox 1.

In *Wilkes v. Steward*, Cooper 6, it was held that a loan on personal security was not authorized by a direction in the will to lay out a legacy in the funds "or such other good security as they could secure and think fit." The statement of Bayley, J., in *Webster v. Spencer*, 3 B. & Ald. 360, 22 R. R. 427; that an executor should be allowed to exercise a fair and reasonable discretion in lending on private security without being guilty of a devastavit, is not to be relied upon. Lord Hardwicke said: "A promissory note is evidence of a debt, but no *security* for it." *Ryder v. Bickerton*, cited in *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Sw. 81n.

In an able article in 9 C. L. T. 77 on Trust Investments, by R. S. Cassels, K.C., it is said: "The chief rule to be deduced from the cases is that, without the clearest and most express authority in the instrument creating the trust, the trustees cannot safely make investments upon securities of a personal or possibly speculative character. Even power to invest upon "any securities" is not sufficient to justify the trustee in accepting personal securities. *Lewis v. Nobbs*, 8 Ch. D. 591; and wide discretionary powers as to investment do not authorize an investment upon speculative securities. *Burritt v. Burritt*, 27 Gr. 144; *Smith v. Smith*, 23 Gr. 114; *New London & Brazilian Bank v. Brocklebank*, 21 Ch. D. 302; *Stretton v. Ashmall*, 3 Drew, 9; *Re Brown*, 29 Ch. D. 889. In the last case there was power to invest in such modes as trustees should in their uncontrolled discretion think fit; yet a *bona fide* investment in the bonds of a foreign government was directed to be realized as soon as possible. Where there is a power to invest upon personal securities it is most strictly construed. Thus in *Langston v.*

Ollivant, G. Coop. 33, executors had power to place out funds upon such real and personal security as should be thought good and sufficient. The executors lent to a man in trade, the husband of the *cestui que trust*, £500 of the trust funds upon his bond, at the same time lending him £600 of their own money. At this time the man was in good credit, but he afterwards failed and a loss occurred. The trustees were held liable for the loss on the ground that the transaction was not really an investment but merely an accommodation loan. Instances of a similar nature might be multiplied, but the cases can be readily referred to in the text books."

Strict compliance with the provisions of an investment clause is in all cases necessary. Thus in *Webb v. Jonas*, 38 Ch. D. 660, trustees were held liable where the trust deed authorized them to invest "in their or his names or name" on "real securities," and they invested in a contributory mortgage of freeholds, the Court being of opinion that it was of the very essence of the investment clause that the security should be in the name of the trustees alone. An analogous decision is that of *Consterdine v. Consterdine*, 31 Beav. 330; 135 R. R. 451. In that case three trustees were appointed with an absolute discretion to sell and invest. It was held they were not justified in investing in the shares of a company in which only one trustee could be registered as owner, and where, therefore, there might be danger of loss through want of joint control.

In *Ovey v. Ovey* (1900), 2 Ch. 524, the Court was asked to authorize the investment of certain trust funds in other securities than consols. The will prescribed that the trust funds should be invested in 3 per cent. consolidated bank annuities "and no other securities." The decision of Malins, V.C., in *In re Wedderburn's Trusts*, 9 Ch. D. 112, where an investment was authorized in certain securities notwithstanding prohibitive words in the settlement, was cited, but Cozens-Hardy, J., declined to follow that

case, considering that it would be a wrong thing to set aside the express direction of the testator.

As a general rule, an executor or administrator has no right to invest the funds of the estate in securities out of the jurisdiction in which he was appointed, and if he do so he is personally responsible for the safety of the fund. *Cook v. Cook*, 34 Fed. Rep. 249; and this liability attaches even where the will relieves the executor of responsibility for losses. *Pabst v. Goodrich*, 113 N. W. 398. But such investments may be made when directed by the will. *Burrill v. Sheil*, 2 Barb. 457; or where all of the beneficiaries consent. *Freeman v. Freeman*, 2 Redf. 211.

What may be a perfectly justifiable investment at one time may at another under different circumstances be an entirely unjustifiable one. In *Re Maberlay*, 33 Ch. D. 455, trustees were given certain funds upon trust to invest them in freehold land in Ireland. It was held that owing to the then unsettled condition of that country it would be a breach of trust, notwithstanding this direction, to invest funds there. So in *Boss v. Godsall*, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 617, 57 R. R. 473, trustees under a marriage settlement were empowered and *required* at the request of the wife to advance part of the funds to the husband on the security of his bond. The husband became insolvent, and the wife then required the trustees to make a loan to him. It was held there was such a change in circumstances that the clause was inapplicable and that the trustees were justified in refusing to make the loan. Upon the converse question, whether a trustee is justified in making investments upon securities that are proper, *e.g.*, in consequence of statutory authorization, at the time the investment is made, but were not proper at the time the trust was created, there has, in England, been some conflict of authority. Our statute, however, probably removes any difficulty of this kind.

Where an improper investment is made the trustee is liable for all subsequent consequences, however

unexpected, or however remotely connected with the original breach of trust. In *Kellaway v. Johnson*, 5 Beav. 319, there was an unauthorized sale and investment, and the trustees were held liable for a subsequent loss, the root and cause of the loss being the original unauthorized sale. In *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav. 550, trustees obtaining an unauthorized but ample security, were held liable for a future loss traceable to that first error. In *Cocker v. Quayle*, 1 Russ. & My. 535, 32 R. R. 275, trustees had power to lend on bond with the consent in writing of a certain person. They lent with oral consent and without taking a bond. The borrower subsequently became bankrupt and a loss occurred. It was held that as the original loan was made in an unauthorized way they were liable for all future loss, though in the result the position would have been exactly the same. Had they complied, in making the loan, with the terms of the trust deed, a bond debt and a simple contract debt would have been in the same position in the bankruptcy proceedings. And it is laid down in *Clough v. Bond*, 3 My. & Cr. 490, 45 R. R. 314, that where a line of duty is not strictly pursued and loss is eventually sustained, the trustees are liable, however unexpected the result, however unlikely to arise, and however free from improper motive their conduct may have been. So in *Grayburn v. Clarkson*, L. R. 3 Ch. 605, it is said that where there is a breach of trust the trustee is liable for all consequences, though they do not develop themselves until long afterwards. And in *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 488, it was held that trustees are responsible for all loss if they are once guilty of a breach of trust, no matter what the cause of the immediate loss may be. They would not be relieved even if the actual and immediate cause of the loss were accidental. Even if the loss is caused by the negligence of his legal adviser the trustee is not excused. *Hopgood v. Parkin*, L. R. 11 Eq. 74.

It is no answer to the claim upon trustees to make good a loss incurred in respect of one fund to say that

owing to their care and foresight a great improvement has taken place in another fund, nor can they be allowed to set off such improvement against the loss. *Wiles v. Gresham*, 2 Drew. 258. Nor is the fact that the quantum of interest of an attacking *cestui que trust* is very small, any ground for allowing the trustee to escape liability. *Walcott v. Lyons*, 54 L. T. N. S. 786.

Sometimes a trustee who has made an improper investment seeks to escape liability by shewing acquiescence on the part of the *cestui que trust*. This defence, however, is a difficult one to support successfully. The *cestui que trust* is entitled to place reliance on the trustee, and is not bound to make enquiries unless something is done to excite his suspicion. *Re Vernon*, 33 Ch. D. 402. Where acquiescence is set up as a bar it must be shewn that the *cestui que trust* was *sui juris* and acquainted with the facts: *Sawyer v. Sawyer*, 28 Ch. D. 595; *Spratt v. Wilson*, 19 O. R. 28; and the intention to waive rights by the *cestui que trust* must be clear. *Re Cross*, 20 Ch. D. 109. The *cestui que trust* is not estopped from objecting to the account of the trust fund on the ground of acquiescence merely because he does not dispute its correctness while his interests are reversionary, especially where he is not in full possession of the facts. *Inglis v. Beaty*, 2 A. R. 453; *Smith v. Smith*, 23 Gr. 114.

It is not necessary that acquiescence on the part of a *cestui que trust* in an improper investment should be evidenced in writing, if otherwise proved. *Macleod v. Annesley*, 16 Beav. 600, 96 R. R. 278.

Where on an interim audit the executor's accounts shewed that he had retained in his hands securities not of the nature or character of those in which executors are authorized to invest, and the beneficiaries under the will then made no attempt to hold him responsible for any loss sustained up to that time, and raised no objection to his continuing to hold such securities, they were held estopped from doing so on the final accounting. *In Matter of Douglass*, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 64.

Where a trustee is authorized to invest in either of two specified modes, and by mistake he invests in neither, the measure of his liability is the loss arising from his not having invested in the less beneficial of the authorized modes. *Paterson v. Lailey*, 18 Gr. 13.

Where a *cestui que trust* is of full age and competent to act for himself, and gives his sanction to an unauthorized investment, he cannot afterwards seek to make the trustee liable. Under these circumstances there is no duty cast on the trustee to advise against such an investment. *Harrison v. Harrison*, 14 Gr. 586.

Sec. 29.—(1) A trustee may deposit money with any of the societies or companies hereinafter mentioned, or may invest any money which it is his duty, or which it is in his discretion, to invest at interest, in terminable debentures or debenture stock of any such society or company, provided that such deposit or investment is in other respects reasonable and proper, and that the debentures are registered, and are transferable only on the books of the society or company in his name as trustee for the particular trust estate for which they are held, and that the deposit account in the society's or company's ledger is in the name of the trustee for the particular trust estate for which it is held and the deposit receipt or pass book is not transferable by endorsement or otherwise:

- (a) An incorporated society or company authorized to lend money upon mortgages on real estate, or for that purpose and other purposes, having a capitalized, fixed, paid up and permanent stock not liable to be withdrawn therefrom of not less than \$400,000; and a reserve fund of not less than 25 per cent. of its paid-up capital, and the stock of which has a market value of not less than 7 per cent. premium; or
- (b) Any society or company heretofore incorporated under Chapter 164 of the Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1877, or any Act incorporated therewith, or under Chapter 169 of the Revised

Statutes of Ontario, 1887, having a capitalized, fixed, paid up, and permanent stock not liable to be withdrawn therefrom of not less than \$200,000, and a reserve fund of not less than 15 per cent. of its paid-up capital and the stock of which has a market value of not less than 7 per cent. premium.

(2) Clause (a) shall not apply to any society or company which has not the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council as one coming within the provisions of that clause, and as one in the debentures or debenture stock of which trustees may invest or with which they may deposit money.

(3) Such approval shall not be given with respect to any society or company which does not appear to have kept strictly within its legal powers as to borrowing and investing.

(4) An Order-in-Council made under the authority of sub-section 2 may at any time be revoked.

The following is a list of Loan Corporations approved by Order-in-Council in the debentures of which trustees may make investments:

British Mortgage Loan Company of Ontario.

Canada Landed and National Investment Company, Limited.

Crown Savings and Loan Company.

Canada Permanent Mortgage Corporation.

Central Canada Loan and Savings Company.

East Lambton Farmers Loan and Savings Company.

Guelph and Ontario Loan and Savings Society.

Great West Permanent Loan Company.

Hamilton Provident and Loan Society.

Huron and Erie Loan and Savings Company.

Industrial Mortgage and Savings Company of Sarnia.

London Canadian Loan and Agency Company.
Landed Banking and Loan Company, Hamilton.
Lambton Loan and Investment Company.
Land Security Company.
London Loan and Savings Company of Canada.
Midland Loan and Savings Company.
Ontario Loan and Debenture Company.
Oxford Permanent Loan and Savings Society.
Royal Loan and Savings Company.
Southern Loan and Savings Company.
Toronto Savings and Loan Company.
Toronto Mortgage Company.
Victoria Loan and Savings Company, Lindsay.

The Chapters referred to in the sub-section (b) are the Acts respecting Building Societies.

Sec. 30. A trustee may from time to time vary or transpose any securities in which money in his hands is invested, whether under the authority of this Act or otherwise, into or for any other securities of any nature authorized by this Act.

The English Act, after specifying the authorized investments, adds: "and may also from time to time vary any such investments." In *Re Dick, Lopes v. Hume* (1891), 1 Ch. 423, 1892 A. C. 112, it was held that these words are not confined to investments made under the power given by the Act, but extend to any investment, whenever made, whether before or after the death of the testator, upon any such stocks, funds or securities as are mentioned in the section.

In *Re Owthwaite* (1891), 3 Ch. 494, it was held that the power given to invest trust funds in any of the stocks therein mentioned, does not extend to authorizing trustees to set apart or appropriate any of such stocks to answer a particular purpose, as, for instance, to provide for an annuity given by a will, so as to facilitate the distribution of the rest of the testator's estate. It was suggested that the same result might

be arrived at by the exercise of the power to vary investments, but Kekewich, J., said: "If I am right in regard to the inability of the trustees to appropriate under the powers of the Act, I doubt whether they could first invest in a stock expressly authorized by the will and appropriate that for the annuity, and then, under the power of variation given by the Act, reinvest in a stock authorized by the Act. However, it is unnecessary for me to decide that question now."

The Court has no jurisdiction to sanction an agreement by which executors propose to concur in converting into a limited company a business in which the testator was a partner, where, by the terms of the agreement the testator's share in the business will be exchanged for shares and debentures which the executors are not authorized by the will to hold. "In substance it amounts to one of two things: either it is a sale of an investment of the proceeds in unauthorized securities, or it is an exchange of property of the testator for other property which the trustees are not authorized to hold." *In re Morrison* (1901), 1 Ch. 701. And see *Worts v. Worts*, 18 Ont. R. 332.

A testator gave all his estate to trustees upon trust to sell, call in and convert the same into money, and out of the proceeds to pay debts, etc., "and invest the residue of the said moneys with power for my trustees from time to time to vary such investments as they may think fit." At the time of the testator's death there were a number of investments, some within the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1893, and some not. It was argued that the words "as they may think fit" applied to the trust to invest as well as the power to vary investments, but Eve, J., held that these words applied only to the power to vary investments, and the trustees should confine themselves to investments authorized by law for the investment of trust funds. It was further held that, in the existing circumstances, the Court would authorize the retention of those which were not trustee investments for the duration of the

war, and for six months afterwards, subject to the proviso that the trustees must not neglect any opportunity for disposing of them at a reasonable price. *In re Hazeldine* (1918), 1 Ch. 433.

A testator by his will expressly authorized his executors to invest his personal estate "by placing the same with the firm of Baker, Tuckers & Co. should they be willing to accept that interest," if not, then on usual securities. The testator had deposits with Baker, Tuckers & Co. at the time of his death, which the executors continued after his death, and after there had been, to the knowledge of the executors, from time to time changes in the membership of the firm. Romer, J., held that the loan to the firm was only authorized so long as it was constituted as at the time of the testator's death; and that, on the membership of the firm becoming changed, it was the duty of the executors at once to have called in the money, and their not doing so was a breach of trust which rendered them liable for any loss accrued to the estate. *In re Tucker* (1894), 1 Ch. 724.

The testator directed his trustees to invest and keep invested his estate in "such bonds issued by railway companies in the United States of America as return an interest of not less than 4 per cent. at the time of investment." The trustees invested in New York City bonds and in First Liberty Loan bonds. The Court held that the provisions above quoted were mandatory, and the investments by the trustees in N. Y. City bonds was unauthorized. "The remaining undisposed of part of the second objection of the special guardian relates to the investment in First Liberty Loan bonds and brings up a most important question for consideration. A strict and liberal interpretation of the law, under normal conditions, would require an adjudication that such investment was unauthorized. But these are abnormal times. Our country is engaged in a great war and needs the undivided support, aid and loyalty of every citizen.

Under these circumstances the Court should not be bound by narrow and restricted rules of law which affect the welfare of our country, but should exercise its best and widest discretion. The investment by the trustees in these Liberty Loan bonds was in aid of our government in its hour of need, and they should be commended rather than condemned therefor." *In re London Estate* (1918), 171 N. Y. Supp. 981.

Sec. 31. A trustee lending money upon the security of any property upon which he may lawfully lend shall not be chargeable with breach of trust by reason only of the proportion borne by the amount of the loan to the value of the property at the time when the loan was made, if it appears to the Court that in making the loan the trustee was acting upon a report as to the value of the property made by a person whom the trustee reasonably believed to be a competent valuator, instructed and employed independently of any owner of the property, whether such valuator carried on business in the locality where the property is situate or elsewhere, and the amount of the loan does not exceed one-half of the value of the property as stated in the report and that it was made under the advice of the valuator expressed in the report.

This section corresponds with section 8 (1) of the English Act, except that the latter permits a loan up to two-thirds, where our Act limits it to one-half of the value as stated in the report. The English Act requires the report to be made by "an able and practical surveyor and valuer," where our Act speaks of "a competent valuator." In other respects there is no difference.

In *In re Solomon* (1912), 1 Ch. 261, Warrington, J., said: "It has been recognized in several cases, and amongst them I will only mention the case of *In re Stuart* (1897), 2 Ch. 583, before Stirling, J., that this provision of the Trustee Act . . . was intended to relieve trustees from a burden previously cast upon them by the Court, and which the Legislature con-

ceived was too heavy a burden to be cast upon them, in other words that the Act was intended to be a relieving Act, and as such Act, it ought to be construed liberally in favour of the persons whom it is sought to relieve, and adopting in effect what was said by Jessel, M.R., in *In re Speight* (1883), 22 Ch. D. 727, 746, I think the Court ought not to be astute to find means of excluding trustees from the relief which the Legislature has thought ought to be extended to them."

In *Palmer v. Emerson* (1911), 1 Ch. 758, it was held that the section being a relieving one, it does not impose a statutory obligation upon trustees to take a valuation, and the neglect to do so does not exclude them from the benevolent operation of section 3 of the Judicial Trustee Act, 1896, corresponding with sec. 37 of our Trustee Act.

But *prima facie*, the requirements of the Trustee Act constitute a standard by which reasonable conduct is to be judged, although non-compliance with these requirements is not necessarily a fatal obstacle to an application for relief; it is also a matter for consideration whether the trustee would have acted in the same way if he had been lending money of his own. *In re Stuart, supra*.

Notwithstanding that this section authorizes a loan to the extent of one-half of the value as stated in the report of the valuator, trustees are not authorized in lending to that extent on unproductive or speculative property. Where the property is exclusively or mainly used for the purposes of trade, no prudent investor can be in a position to judge of the amount of margin necessary to make a loan for a term of years reasonably secure, until he has ascertained not only its present market price, but its intrinsic value apart from those trading considerations which give it a speculative and, it may be, a temporary value. *Learoyd v. Whiteley* (1887), 12 A. C. 727.

Before the Act it was held that trustees should not lend as much as one-half on buildings used in trade.

Stickney v. Sewell (1835), 1 M. & Cr. 8, 43 R. R. 129; or for manufacturing purposes. *Royds v. Royds* (1851), 14 Beav. 54, 92 R. R. 18.

“It has undoubtedly become the practice of valuers, thinking they are thereby complying with the requirements of the Act, to advise practically in every case that trustees may safely advance two-thirds of the value, and that practice appears to be based on the fact that, so far as the liabilities of the trustees are concerned, the Act makes no distinction between one kind of property and another; it only requires that they shall not advance more than two-thirds part of the value of the property. That, I think, is a mistake. It is the duty of the valuer to consider not only the value of the property, but the proportion which, in his opinion as an expert and a practical man, the trustee would in each particular case, be justified in advancing.” *In re Solomon* (1912), 1 Ch. p. 261. In this case it was held that it is not improper for trustees to lend on property let on weekly tenancies, but the amount which they may safely lend on such properties must depend on the circumstances of each particular case.

Trustees may lend on unfinished buildings if due security is taken for their completion, but the buildings should be of the character which experience shews will be constantly let in the neighbourhood, and not buildings of an experimental character. *Rae v. Meek* (1889), 14 A. C. 558.

Where a loan was made on cottage property in a town, the value of which depended on shifting circumstances, Fry, L.J., said the fact that at the time of the mortgage some of the houses were unfinished and unlet strongly corroborated the view that the investment was improvident. *In re Salmon*, 42 Ch. D. p. 370. In *Shaw v. Cates* (1909), 1 Ch. p. 396, Parker, J., said: “I am not prepared to lay down any general rule that trustees ought not to invest on the security of newly erected houses in a residential neighbourhood or on houses which are not quite completed, though these

circumstances may, and indeed ought, to be taken into account in determining the amount which may properly be so invested."

Where a trustee was directed to invest the trust funds "in his own name or under his legal control," and he invested it in a contributory mortgage, this was held to be a breach of trust, and not protected by the Act. *In re Dive* (1909), 1 Ch. 328. Trustees not having any power expressly given them, are bound to invest on a mortgage where they have the entire control in their own hands, and where they can exercise their own discretion for the benefit of their *cestui que trust*, and not where they are bound to consult others, or where, if they do consult others, they are bound to act for others as well as for themselves. It robs them of that control which is an essential part of the propriety of the security. *Webb v. Jonas*, 39 Ch. D. 660.

For the same reason a trustee is liable for any loss occurring by investing trust funds on a second mortgage. *In re Roach*, 92 Pac. 118.

"I must not be understood to say that a power to invest on leasehold securities would not authorize trustees in any case to advance money on the security of an underlease, but I do say that when trustees are proposing to advance on such security it is a question for their serious consideration whether it is prudent to advance trust money on security of such a character that they are liable to be embarrassed and possibly exposed to loss by the acts or defaults of the original lessee, a person over whom they have no control." Per Warrington, J., in *Re D'Espinoux's Settlement* (1914), 1 Ch. 890.

In *Budge v. Gummow*, 42 L. J. Ch. 22, L. R. 7 Ch. 719, it was held that, in the circumstances of that case, that a loan on hotel property was not a proper investment. "The value of a hotel is necessarily of a very speculative character, and may, like the property in *Stickney v. Sewall*, 1 My. & Cr. 8, arise from accident." Such property is probably more speculative in Ontario

than in England. See also as to hotel property: *In re Partington, Partington v. Allen*, 57 L. T. 654, where a loan on hotel property proved disastrous and the trustees were held liable.

Where a trustee, in making a loan seeks the protection of the Act, section 31 requires that he acted upon the report of a person whom the trustee (1) reasonably believed to be a competent valuator; (2) that the valuator was instructed and employed independently of any owner of the property; (3) that the loan does not exceed one-half of the value of the property as stated in the report; and (4) that it was made under the advice of the valuator expressed in the report.

(1) It will be noticed that the section dispenses with the necessity of employing a valuator carrying on business in the locality where the property is situate or elsewhere. But the fact that a valuator has no local knowledge is a circumstance to be considered on the question of the trustees' reasonable belief in the valuator's competency. *Bicknell & Kappele*, Prac. Stat. 403. See also *Budge v. Gummow*, L. R. 7 Ch. 719; *Fry v. Tapson*, 28 Ch. D. 279. A reasonable belief would be a belief formed by the mind of a reasonable man—a belief founded on reason. *U. S. Express Co. v. Donahue*, 14 O. R. 333. See also *Peek v. Derry*, (1887), 37 Ch. D. 541, 14 A. C. 337.

In re Chapman (1896), 2 Ch. 763, Lindley, L. J., said: "It is true that the trustees did not consult professional surveyors or valuers; but there was nothing special in the nature of the property, as there was in *Learoyd v. Whiteley*, 33 Ch. D. 347, 12 A. C. 727, to render the assistance of an expert really necessary for the guidance of a prudent man. A man need not be a special surveyor or valuer to form a trustworthy opinion of the value of ordinary agricultural land, and the law is not so stringent as to compel us to say that the trustees were guilty of dereliction of duty in not

seeking advice from such a person." This, however, was a case of trustees retaining securities authorized by their trust, and the statement, so far as it relates to investments made by the trustees themselves, can be considered only as *dicta*.

The words "believed to be," in section 31, do not govern the words "instructed and employed independently of any owner of the property;" and therefore, in order to entitle a trustee lending money on the security of property, to the protection of the statute, he must be able to shew that the valuator on whose report he acted was in fact so instructed and employed. *In re Somerset* (1894), 1 Ch. 231; *In re Walker*, 59 L. J. Ch. 386.

(2) Prior to the Trustee Act the duties of trustees investing trust money were well known. They were entitled to rely on expert advice as to the value of the property, but if they did so, it was their duty to see that the expert was properly instructed—that he knew for whom and with what object he was advising, and that he was acting independently of the mortgagor, these being precautions which a prudent man of business might reasonably be expected to take in the conduct of his own affairs. Having thus been advised as to value, they had themselves to determine, and could not delegate it to a third party (even an expert) to determine what amount they could prudently advance on the security in question. *Shaw v. Cates* (1909), 1 Ch. 389.

In *Ingle v. Partridge*, 34 Beav. 441, Sir John Romilly, M.R., said: "A trustee cannot, with propriety, lend trust money upon mortgage on a valuation made by or on behalf of the mortgagor. If he does, and the valuer has *bona fide* valued the property at double its value, the trustee must take the consequences; he ought to have employed a valuer on his own behalf to see to it."

Where a valuator was selected by a firm of solicitors who acted for the mortgagor, and his fee was paid

by the mortgagor, it was held the valuator was not instructed and employed and acting independently of the mortgagor. *Shaw v. Cates, supra.*

“What is meant by ‘instructed and employed independently of any owner of the property?’ I think it means this: that the relation existing between employer and employed must exist as between the trustees and the valuer, and between them only—that the valuer must be entitled to look for his remuneration to the person who employs him, and, on the other hand, must be responsible to that person only for the due performance of his duty as valuer. When you have that he is responsible and employed independently of the owner. I do not think it is incumbent on the trustee to enquire into all the previous business transactions of the valuer and to find out whether he has at any time recently or long before advised or acted for the mortgagor:” Per Warrington, J., *In re Solomon* (1912), 1 Ch. p. 281.

A trustee is not entitled to the protection of the Act unless the report or valuation which ultimately proves insufficient, was made upon his own instructions and directed to the particular investment. Nor is the trustee entitled to such protection unless the investment which has proved deficient, was a proper investment at the time in all respects other than value. *In re Walker*, 59 L. J. Ch. 386, 62 L. T. 449. See also *Blyth v. Fladgate*, 63 L. T. 546 (1891), 1 Ch. 337.

In *In re Partington*, 57 L. T. 654, trustees loaned money on hotel property and cottages and houses which were principally let at weekly rents. Valuers were employed and the particulars of the several properties as furnished by the mortgagors, were submitted to them, but the trustees did not make enquiries for the purpose of verifying the statements as to the value, income, etc. In their instructions to the valuers, they told them the mortgagees were trustees, but they did not tell them, according to the rule laid down for trustees in lending on the security of house property,

that they did not desire to lend more than one-half of the value. Neither did they call the attention of the valuers to circumstances which might affect the value. They also omitted to instruct the valuers to ascertain whether the particulars were correct, or what were the outgoings or average amount of repairs. It was held that the investment was improper and the valuers not properly instructed.

The selection of a valuator should not be left to the solicitors employed by the trustees. It is not the part of the ordinary business of a solicitor to choose a valuator for trustees intending to invest trust money on mortgage. If asked to name a valuator the ordinary course is for the solicitor to submit a name or names to the trustees, and to tell them everything which the solicitor knows to guide their choice, but to leave the choice to them. Where trustees did not exercise their own judgment as to the choice of the valuer, but accepted the suggestion of their solicitors that a city surveyor who had introduced the security to them, and was in fact the agent of the mortgagor with a pecuniary interest in the completion of the loan, should value the property, it was held the trustees were liable for a loss on the loan, and it was no defence that they had acted on the advice of their solicitors. *Fry v. Tapson*, 28 Ch. D. 268; *In re Stuart* (1897), 2 Ch. 583.

In *Marquis of Salisbury v. Keymer*, 1909, W. N. 31, Warrington, J., said it is a reprehensible practice, and one which might get trustees into difficulties, for the valuator's fee to be contingent on the mortgage investment going through. It is obvious that in such a case it is to the valuator's interest to make such a report as will enable the transaction to go through, whereas it is his duty to report to the trustees independently and without reference to his fees.

Before the Trustee Act it was held that if trustees lent money on mortgage and employed the same solicitor as the mortgagor, they were bound to take the utmost precaution; if they trusted implicitly in the

solicitor, however high his reputation, they were responsible for any loss occasioned by his fraud, and the indemnity clause usually inserted in the trust deed did not protect them. *Sutton v. Wilders*, L. R. 12 Eq. 373; *Frech v. Graham*, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 522.

(3) Whether a trustee is liable for lending more than one-half the value of the property as stated in the valuator's report, does not appear to have been expressly decided. In England, before the passing of the Trustee Act, certain well-defined rules, limiting the amount to be advanced on mortgage, had obtained. For instance, it was laid down that in the case of ordinary agricultural land the loan should not exceed two-thirds of the value, whereas in cases where the subject of the security derived its value from buildings on the land, or its use for trade purposes, the margin ought not to be less than one-half. But it was held these were not hard and fast limits up to which trustees would invariably be safe, and beyond which they could never safely lend, but as indicating the lowest margin which in ordinary circumstances a careful investor of trust funds ought to accept. *Learoyd v. Whiteley*, 12 A. C. 727. Where land was valued at £7,000, and a trustee loaned £400 more than the two-thirds, Bacon, V.C., refused to hold him liable. *In re Godfrey*, 23 Ch. D. 483.

In a subsequent case the same Judge said: "There is one clear, homely, intelligible, but inflexible rule which has never been departed from in times ancient or modern, viz., that a trustee is bound to act in the execution of his trust as a prudent man would in dealing with his own property. Applying that rule to the present case, can it be said that any prudent man, having to invest nearly £7,000 upon leasehold property with a view to present income, would venture his money to the extent of more than one-half the estimated value of the property, when the property consisted of houses recently built, unoccupied, not wholly finished, producing no fixed certain rents, etc." And

the trustees were ordered to make good the loss. *Smethurst v. Hastings*, 30 Ch. D. 490.

And where trustees loaned less than one-half on the security of a freehold brickfield, with buildings, machinery, etc., and there was a loss, the trustees were made liable because the value of the property depended mainly on the success of a speculative and fluctuating business, a business largely dependent on the energy and solvency of those working it. *Learoyd v. Whiteley*, 32 Ch. D. 196, 12 A. C. 727. See also *Stickney v. Sewell* and *Fry v. Tapson*, *supra*.

But where trustees slightly exceeded the amount, but acted honestly and as prudent men would have done in dealing with their own funds, they were protected by the Court and allowed their costs. *Jones v. Lewis*, 3 DeG. & Sm. 471; *Re Godfrey*, *supra*; *Re Pearson*, 51 L. T. N. S. 692.

"I dissent entirely from the position taken up by some of the defendants' expert witnesses, that once they have ascertained the value of the property they are, whatever its nature and whatever method of valuation they have adopted, at least *prima facie* justified in advising an advance of two-thirds of its value. Such a position in my opinion defeats the object of the section by making what the Legislature has recognized as the standard of the minimum protection which a prudent man will require into a standard of the normal risk, which, whatever the nature of the property, a prudent man will be prepared to run; and it deprives the expert advice on which the trustee is to rely as to the margin of protection to be required of all its value. It is true now as it was before the Act that the maximum sum which a prudent man can be advised to lend upon a mortgage depends on the nature of the property and upon all the circumstances of the case. If the property is liable to deteriorate or is specially subject to fluctuations in value, or depends for its value on circumstances the continual existence of which is precarious, a prudent man will now, as much

as before the Act, require a larger margin for his protection than he would in the case of property attended by no such disadvantages, and an expert who does his duty will take this into consideration." Parker, J. *Shaw v. Cates* (1909), 1 Ch. pp. 398, 399.

The object of trustees must ever be to make a permanent investment, that is, one which will be maintained for a considerable period, and which will not only during that period yield the stipulated income, but will ultimately and whenever required, realize the full sum advanced. In *Learoyd v. Whiteley*, 12 A. C. 732, the Lord Chancellor dwells on the importance of securing the capital sum, but did not intend to place in the background the importance also of securing the income, which may be, and often is, as essential to the welfare of the remainderman as it is to that of the tenant for life. Trustees, therefore, must regard any advice given to them respecting value from this double point of view, and cannot be absolved from liability for loss arising in a particular transaction by shewing that their advance was within the allowed limits as regards capital, if they were exceeded as regards income, and the income was insufficient to pay the stipulated interest. *In re Somerset* (1894), 1 Ch. p. 247.

There is no fixed rule that in all cases, where a portion of the mortgaged premises is utilized for business purposes, trustees would be guilty of a breach of trust in advancing more than one-half the value of the property; but if the mortgaged premises and the business are so inseparable that the discontinuance of the business may result in depreciation of the premises, trustees ought not to advance more than one-half. If the security is really a business plus the premises upon which it is carried on, trustees are well advised to have nothing to do with it. *Palmer v. Emerson* (1911), 1 Ch. 758.

(4) Since the Act a trustee has been, and is, justified in acting on expert advice, not only as to the value of the property, but also as to the amount he may

properly advance thereon, provided the advice be given in such manner, and by such person, as is contemplated in the section, and that, whatever be the nature of the property, the amount advanced is not more than two-thirds (in Ontario one-half) of its value. The principle involved seems to be that within the limits of what is often called the "two-thirds" rule a prudent man may, as to the amount which can properly be advanced on any proposed security, whether the property be agricultural land or houses or buildings used for trade purposes, rely on expert advice obtained with certain precautions, it being of course assumed that in giving the advice the expert will consider all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the property, and will not advise a larger advance than under all the circumstances can prudently be made. *Shaw v. Cates, supra.*

This was followed in *In re Solomon* (1912), 1 Ch. 261, where the trustees were charged with not having themselves made any inquiries as to the details regarding the nature of the property, the amount of the outgoings, etc. Warrington, J., said: "Now with reference to that matter, I think that, before the Act, it would have been the duty of the trustees to satisfy themselves as regards all those matters, and, as I have already said, it is hardly contended that, but for the Act, they would not, in these respects, have been guilty of negligence, the consequences of which might have been visited upon them. But since the Act, I think the trustees are in a very different position, and that they are justified now, as Parker, J., said in *Shaw v. Cates*, in assuming that the valuer, whose duty it is to advise them, will satisfy himself of the facts which are necessary in order to enable him to make a proper valuation, and that the trustees are therefore relieved from that part of the burden which was cast upon them by the Court before the Act was passed."

The valuator's report should state the value of the property, and not merely the sum the trustees are

entitled to advance on the property. If a portion of the value is made up of buildings, the value of the land and buildings should be stated separately; and if the value includes any sum for plant, machinery, goodwill, etc., these should be specifically mentioned and full particulars given. *In re Stuart* (1897), 1 Ch. 583; *In re Whiteley*, 33 Ch. D. 347.

Where the proposed security consists of house property, or other buildings, the report should shew the average rentals or other income, and all the outgoings, including taxes, insurance, probable repairs, etc. The section clearly indicates that the report is to be in writing, and not a mere verbal statement.

It has been held in cases of trustees acting under trust deeds containing indemnity clauses as wide as the provisions of this Act, that such indemnity clauses afford no protection to trustees, who from motives laudable in themselves act in plain violation of the duty which they owe to the individuals beneficially interested in the funds which they administer. They do not protect against positive breaches of duty. *Seton v. Dawson*, 4 Ct. Sess. 2nd series, 310; *Knox v. MacKinnon*, 13 A. C. p. 765; *Rae v. Meek*, 14 A. C. 558.

These cases were referred to and discussed in the House of Lords on an appeal from the Court of Session. Three persons were trustees of a fund set apart to answer a life annuity. The trust deed contained an immunity clause as follows:—

“My trustees shall not be liable for the intromissions¹ of such factors . . .; neither shall they be liable for any agent who, in transacting the business of this trust, shall receive any part of my said estate into his hands.”

¹ In Scotch law an “intromission” is the assumption of authority over another's property, either legally or illegally. The irregular intermeddling with the effects of a deceased person, which subjects the party to the whole debts of the deceased, is called “*vitious intromission*.” Kames, Eq.

In English law the term signifies dealings in stock, goods or cash of a principal coming into the hands of his agent, to be accounted for by the agent to the principal: *Stewart v. McKean*, 24 L. J. Exch. 145.

The sum of 3,700 pounds, part of the fund, was invested on a heritable bond, and the trustees allowed their law agent to receive the money, and to retain it in his hands for over six months. The House of Lords reversed the judgment of the Court of Session. Lord Davey said: "The trustees might properly employ their law agent to receive the money from the mortgagees, but it was their duty to see that the money, when received, was immediately re-invested or placed on deposit in their own names and under their own control. . . . If trustees think fit to delegate their duties to their law agent in a matter in which they cannot properly authorize him to act for them, or to treat him as their banker, they are not, in my opinion, protected by a clause of immunity from liability for the intromission of factors or agents. . . . I am rather surprised to find it stated in the evidence in this case that it is the practice of Scottish solicitors to place funds in their own names for 'behoof of the trustees,' instead of placing them in the names of the trustees themselves. I am not aware that such a practice has ever been directly made the subject of judicial decision. If the case ever arises it will have to be considered whether such a practice is consistent with the primary duty of trustees to retain the funds in safety under their own control." *Wyman v. Paterson* (1900), A. C. 271.

How far trustees, investing trust funds on mortgages on real estate, can rely on the personal character or means of the mortgagor, seems open to question. In *In re Somerset*, 1894, 1 Ch. at p. 247, Kekewich, J., said: "On the question how far, if at all, trustees may properly rely on the position of the borrower, there is, as far as I am aware, no authority. Men of ordinary care and prudence managing their own affairs would, no doubt, take this into consideration, and, in the mercantile world, it is frequently treated as equally important with the value of the security. It is impossible, I think, to exclude it from

the consideration of trustees, who are bound to have regard to all the circumstances connected with any proposed advance on security, and it would not be difficult to put cases in which the solvency or insolvency of the borrower would properly influence them in making an advance somewhat in excess of the limits generally allowed, or declining the transaction altogether; but where the object is to make a permanent investment of trust money on mortgage on real estate it seems to me wrong to advance a sum largely in excess of what is otherwise right, because it is believed that the borrower is now, and it is anticipated that he will remain, capable of paying the principal and interest, or such part thereof as cannot be realized from the security."

In *Shaw v. Cates*, *supra*, where the loan was made on house properties, some only partly finished, Parker, J., seems to have thought it was an element to be taken into consideration. He says: "On the other hand, at the date of the mortgage he was, or at any rate was reputed to be, a man of substance, able to undertake, and from time to time undertaking, large contracts, and not financially dependent on borrowed moneys." In *In re Solomon*, *supra*, it was contended that the trustees failed to take into consideration the personality of the mortgagor, and Warrington, J., expresses the opinion that that was a question for the valuer to determine upon, and that since the Act the trustees are entitled to assume that the valuer has considered the personal equation in arriving at the value.

Sec. 32. Where a trustee has improperly advanced money on a mortgage security which would, at the time of the investment, have been a proper investment in all respects for a less sum than was actually advanced, the security shall be deemed an authorized investment for such less sum, and the trustees shall only be liable to make good the sum advanced in excess thereof with interest.

Corresponds with section 9 of the English Act. See *Shaw v. Cates* (1909), 1 Ch. 389. This section points

to an investment which would have been proper in all other respects, except as to the amount advanced. Such an investment stands on an entirely different footing from an investment of an unauthorized description, which the *cestui que trust* must either accept or reject. *In re Salmon, Priest v. Uppleby*, 42 Ch. D. 351.

If the *cestui que trust* ratify an unauthorized investment it becomes a part of the trust estate and the trustee will be exonerated; if he reject it he may assert a lien upon it for the trust money invested therein, and after realization compel the trustee to make good the deficiency. *Thornton v. Stokill*, 1 Jur. N. S. 751.

The mode of enforcing liability for a deficiency on an insufficient security depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In some cases justice will be done by realizing the security and making the trustee pay the deficiency; but in some cases it may be right to make him pay at once the whole sum improperly invested, and let him take the benefit of the security. *In re Salmon, Priest v. Uppleby, supra*.

The rule of equity that trustees who have caused a loss by investing trust funds on an unauthorized security cannot be required by the *cestui que trust* to make good the loss without having the security transferred to themselves, does not apply where the *cestui que trust* is an infant, and by reason of his infancy cannot make the transfer; he being entitled to have the trust fund made good by the trustees notwithstanding the security cannot be transferred. *Head v. Gould*, 1898, 2 Ch. 250.

Sec. 33. Sections 31 and 32 shall apply to transfers of existing securities as well as to new securities, and to investments made as well before as on and after the 4th day of May, 1891, unless some action or other proceeding was pending with reference thereto at that date.

4th May, 1891, was the date "The Trustee Act, 1891," was assented to.

Sec. 34. A trustee shall not be chargeable with a breach of trust by reason only of his continuing to hold an investment which has ceased to be an investment authorized by the instrument of trust or by the general law, and this provision shall apply to cases arising either before or after the passing of this Act.

Same as the English Act, as amended by the Trustee Amendment Act, 1894. There appears to be no reported decision where this section has been under discussion. In *Re Nicholls, Hall v. Wildman*, *post*, Latchford, J., said the section had no application to that case, and on appeal the point was not raised or discussed. There are, however, many cases where executors have been authorized by the will to retain investments, and it has been held that such authority is not absolute protection where they have not acted prudently or reasonably.

A general power to retain stocks in which the testator has already invested, does not differ in its scope from a general power to invest in these stocks. What the trustees can do in one case by making a new, they can effect in the other by retaining the old, investment. *Fraser v. Murdock*, 6 A. C. 855, 877. And a direction in a will, or other trust instrument, to retain investments, places them in the list of authorized investments. *In re Bates* (1907), 1 Ch. 22.

A mortgage security is unlike an ordinary instrument, inasmuch as it consists of a debt which can be enforced by action, and also of a security which can be realized by sale or foreclosure. A trustee of a mortgage security is, therefore, liable for loss sustained by his wilful default in not obtaining payment in either of these ways. But a trustee is not a surety, nor is he an insurer; he is only liable for some wrong done by himself, and loss of trust money is not *per se* proof of such wrong. *In re Chapman* (1896), 2 Ch. p. 774.

There is no rule of law which compels the Court to hold that an honest trustee is compelled to make good

loss sustained by retaining an authorized security in a falling market, if he did so honestly and prudently, and in the belief that it was the best course to take in the interest of all parties. Trustees acting honestly, with ordinary prudence and within the limits of their trust, are not liable for mere errors of judgment. Any loss sustained by the trust estate under such circumstances falls upon and must be borne by the owners of the property—i.e., the *cestuis que trust*—and cannot be thrown by them on their trustees, who have done no wrong, though the result may prove that they might possibly have done better. *Learoyd v. Whiteley*, 33 Ch. D. 347, 12 A. C. 727, is a clear authority to this effect; so are *Buxton v. Buxton*, 1 My. & Cr. 80, 43 R. R. 138; and *Marsden v. Kent*, 5 Ch. D. 598. *In re Chapman*, *supra*, p. 776. See also *Rawsthorne v. Rowley* (1909), 1 Ch. 409.

Trustees had advanced £4,160 on a mortgage on leasehold property. Subsequently the trustees had the property revalued and the valuator reported that he considered the property as sufficient security for £3,360 only. Warrington, J., said he considered it the duty of the trustees, acting as prudent men, to call in the security on getting this report. *In re D'Epinox's Settlement* (1914), 1 Ch. 890.

In *In re Medland*, 41 Ch. D. 476, the testator empowered his trustees to continue certain investments as long as they should see fit, with an indemnity against liability if they continued the same in the same state of investment as at the time of the testator's death. There were three mortgages on real estate, the value of which had much depreciated. North, J., held that where the value of the mortgaged property had fallen so that there was not a margin of one-third, it is not the absolute duty of the trustees at once to call in the mortgages, but they have a discretion which they must exercise as practical men with a due regard to all the circumstances of the case, such as the position and solvency of the mortgagor.

In *Re Nicholls, Hall v. Wildman* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 206, the testator died in 1878, giving his estate to executors "upon trust to invest the proceeds thereof in such manner as they shall deem most advisable." Part of the estate consisted of 125 shares of Ontario Bank stock of the par value of \$5,000. In 1882 the par value was reduced one-half, and in 1896 by one-third, and later on an order was made to wind up the bank, and a claim made against the estate for double liability. The executors took no steps to realize upon the stock. The Court held that the power to invest given in this will was equivalent to a power to retain such securities as they might invest in; that the executors acted in good faith, and their discretion to retain the shares was an honest exercise of the discretion given by the will, and they were fairly justified in not selling from 1878 to 1882, but they had not acted reasonably in not selling or endeavouring to sell, after 1882, and were liable to make good the loss to the estate, viz., the par value of the stock after the first reduction.

Where absolute discretion is given to the executors they are not bound by the ordinary rule, and although where the discretion is to be actively exercised it must be honestly and intelligently exercised, yet, where there is a discretion to remain supine, culpable negligence or dishonesty must be shewn to render the trustee liable. *Sculthorpe v. Tipper*, L. R. 13 Eq. 232. But see *Re Johnson*, W. N. (1886), 72, where it seems to be recognized that, even in such a case, reasonable discretion must be exercised.

The mere fact that the investment was one made by the testator himself is no reason for the executor delaying to take proper steps to secure the money. If there is a danger of loss the executor must exercise prudence and watchfulness to prevent loss. *Burritt v. Burritt*, 27 Gr. 143.

In *Re Gabourie*, 13 O. R. 635, the testator at his death held a promissory note against W. bearing a high rate of interest. Instead of calling in the assets,

as directed by the will, the executor retained the note, and renewed it, honestly believing that W. was good for the amount, and that it was in the interest of the estate. W. failed, and the Chancellor held this was a plain breach of trust and that executor was liable, but credited him with the interest received beyond the legal rate.

There is no obligation on the part of trustees to make periodical or further investigations as to either the title of the security or the solvency or sufficiency of the mortgagor; but if there are circumstances which suggest to a reasonable man that the security is in jeopardy, the duty may arise. The liability of a trustee in dealing with an authorized security must really proceed on the footing of wilful default, and not upon the failure to make inquiries when he ought to do so. *Rawsthorne v. Rowley* (1909), 1 Ch. 409.

CHAPTER XXVII.

INTEREST—CHARGING EXECUTORS WITH.

There are two grounds on which an executor or administrator may be charged with interest: 1st. That he has been guilty of negligence in omitting to invest money for the benefit of the estate; 2nd. That he himself has made use of the money, or has committed some other misfeasance, to his own profit and advantage.

With respect to neglect, on the part of an executor in not investing balances, it must be observed that it frequently may be necessary and justifiable for an executor to keep large sums in his hands to answer the exigency of the testator's affairs, especially in the course of the first year after the decease of the testator: in which case such necessity is so fully acknowledged, that according to the ordinary course of the Court, the fund is not considered distributable until after that time. But if the executor keeps money dead in his hands without any apparent reason or necessity, then it becomes negligence and a breach of trust, and the Court will charge the executor with interest. *Wms. on Exors*, 1750.

Although a year is allowed to an executor or administrator for getting in the assets, paying claims, and settling the accounts of the estate, it is his duty to prosecute a settlement of the estate with all reasonable diligence, in default of which he will be charged with interest on the presumption that he has used the funds. *Lyles v. Hatton*, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 122.

“What will constitute reasonable delay in making a settlement, rendering the executor or administrator liable for interest, must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The inquiry is whether, in view of these facts and circumstances, a

prudent man, dealing with his own funds, for his own interest, would have retained the money unproductive, or would have appropriated it as it was *prima facie* to be appropriated. The pendency or the just anticipation of suits which, if the event of them was unfavourable, would seriously diminish the assets, complicating the accounts if there was a distribution, may be a good reason for delaying the settlement, and during the period of reasonable delay, may justify keeping the moneys without a liability for interest; or, if the amounts involved in such suits are not large, compared with the assets, the keeping without a charge for interest of a sum sufficient to answer the judgments which may be rendered in them. Or, it may be that a part only of the assets has been reduced into money, leaving, without fault of the personal representative, a part uncollected, and it would not be prudent to subject the estate to the costs of a partial settlement and distribution. These and other causes developed by the particular facts of the case may excuse a delay in making settlement and relieve from liability for interest. But when no circumstances exist justifying the retention of the moneys unproductive, the personal representative must answer for interest. Diligence in making settlements or accounting to those entitled to receive it for the moneys received is as high a duty, as imperatively demanded by law, as diligence in the collection, or reducing to money by appropriate proceedings, when a legal necessity exists for the reduction of the property, real or personal, subject to administration." *Clark v. Knox*, 70 Ala. 607.

In cases where the executor or administrator has not actually received interest or used the funds of the estate for his own purposes, but has permitted them to be idle where they might have been productively employed for the benefit of the estate, it is a matter of discretion with the Court, on consideration of all the circumstances of the case, whether interest shall be charged. *Litton v. Litton*, 1 P. Wms. 543; *Morris v.*

Dillingham, 2 Ves. 170. And this discretion will be exercised in favour of the executor or administrator where it appears he was acting in good faith in the endeavour fairly to perform the duties of his office. In *Gwynn v. Dorsey*, 4 Gill & J. 460, it was said that “whenever an administrator manifestly intends fairly to do his duty, the rule should be not to hold him liable upon slight grounds.” This principle was adopted in *Chase v. Lockerman*, 11 Gill & J. 207, where the Court was considering how far executors were responsible for interest on moneys in their hands. And in *King v. Berry*, 3 N. J. Eq. 261, the Court said that where the exact line of duty was not clear, and the executor has acted in good faith, under the advice of experienced counsel, and has not attempted to make any profit to himself, interest ought to be charged against him.

In cases of simple neglect to invest, in order to give a claim for interest there must be a clear case of improper retention of balances to a considerable or substantial amount. In *Miles v. Durnford*, 2 Sim. (N.S.) 241, 89 R. R. 274, the balance amounted to £96, and the Court refused to charge the executor with interest. In *McLennan v. Heward*, 9 Gr. 178, \$400 was considered a reasonable sum for this purpose. In *Thompson v. Fairbairn*, 11 P. R. 333, after an administration order appears to have been made, the executors retained \$1,100 in their hands to meet claims against the estate, and were not called upon to pay it into Court. It was held the amount was not unreasonable, and that the executors were not chargeable with interest in respect of it.

Under the changed conditions of the present time, when banks are so readily available and willing to pay interest on current balances, there is no reason why bank interest should not be earned on all balances in the hands of trustees, notwithstanding these decisions.

Where the will contains no trust to invest, and the money is subject to distribution at any time, executors are justified in depositing moneys in a bank, and will

be charged with bank interest only. *Re McIntyre* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 548.

But where moneys are left by will to be invested at the discretion of the executor, he does not conform to his duty by depositing the funds in a savings bank: and his neglect to invest exposes him to pay the legal rate of interest for the money. Where the beneficiaries are infants the acquiescence of the guardian, not being for their benefit, does not bind them. *Spratt v. Wilson*, 19 O. R. 28; *Re Knight's Estate*, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 412.

In *Re Honsberger* (1885), 10 O. R. 521, the Master had charged executors with interest at 6 per cent. per annum, with annual rests upon moneys belonging to the estate in their hands. On appeal, Boyd, C., said: "The more modern rules developed in the English Courts relating to the award of interest against executors and trustees appear to proceed upon these main lines: (1) When the money is kept in the executors' hands without sufficient excuse, the offence is deemed an act of negligence, and the usual Court rate of interest will be charged at four per cent. (2) When the executors are not only negligent but commit an act of misfeasance by expending the funds for their own benefit or in any other way using them, the higher rate of five per cent. will be charged. (3) If the act of misfeasance is of such a character as to lead to the conclusion that more than this rate of interest has been made out of the money, as for instance, if it is employed in ordinary trade or in speculation, the beneficiaries will be allowed the option of either having an account of the profits or having the interest taken with rests. *Burdick v. Garrick*, L. R. 5 Ch. 241; *Liquidators of Imperial, etc., Association v. Coleman*, L. R. 6 H. L. 209. The latest English rules of decision were in effect adopted by our Court of Appeal in *Inglis v. Beaty*, 2 A. R. 453, and the result has been to modify some of the earlier decisions on questions of interest in the reports. It is very distinctly laid down that the

punitive element in awarding interest is now to be discarded and the compensatory principle is declared to be that which governs. *Gilroy v. Stephen*, 30 W. R. 745; *Re Jones*, 49 L. T. N. S. 91; *Price v. Price*, 42 L. T. N. S. 626.

“The gradation recognized in English practice may, however, be approximated here in some such way as this: by charging an executor who negligently retains funds which he should have paid over or made productive for the estate at the statutory rate of six per cent.; by charging him who has broken his trust by using the moneys for his own purposes (though not in trade or speculation) at such a rate of interest as is the then current value of money; and by charging him who makes gain out of his trust by embarking the money in speculation or trading adventures, with the profits or with compound interest, as the case may be.

“The evidence in this case shews that the executors not only kept considerable and constantly increasing balances in their hands from year to year, but also allowed the acting executor to use that money as he pleased. It was not employed in trade nor was it proved that any profit was made out of it. There is, however, no special evidence to shew what were the current rates of interest during this period; it appears that the notes and mortgages held by the executors bore interest for the most part at six per cent. If any evidence had been given that money was worth more than this, I should have charged the executors at the higher rate, but at present I see no safe ground on which to place the interest at more than six per cent. yearly. Some of the earlier authorities might have warranted the Master in awarding compound interest, but I think that such a charge is opposed to the spirit of the decision in *Inglis v. Beaty*, *supra*, and could only be upheld as being in the nature of a penalty imposed on the executors.”

Since *Re Honsberger* was decided the legal rate of interest has been reduced to five per cent. except as to

liabilities existing at, or prior to, 7th July, 1900. R. S. C. ch. 120, sec. 3.

In a case coming within the third branch of the rule laid down in *Re Honsberger*, where an executor is charged with profits, it is not the course of the Court to charge him also with interest on such profits. *Silkstone & Haigh Moor Coal Co. v. Edey* (1900), 1 Ch. 167, a case of setting aside a sale by the trustee of trust property to himself, the trustee being charged with rents and profits, but not with interest thereon.

Inglis v. Beaty, 2 A. R. 453, contains an elaborate review of the authorities. It is there laid down that the principle upon which the Court acts in charging executors with interest is not that of punishment, but of compensating the *cestui que trust*, and depriving the trustee of the advantage he has wrongfully obtained; that an executor will not necessarily be charged with compound interest in all cases, except those in which there is neglect to invest; that where an executor retains a portion of the trust money under an honest belief that it is his own he will be charged with simple interest only unless he has used the money in trade. Moss, C.J.A., delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "The cases I have cited from our own Court effectually dispose of the contention that the charge of compound interest depends upon a mere rule of practice: The Court is to be governed by the English decisions, with due regard to the circumstances of the country. The rule is one of law, as contradistinguished from one of practice, just as much as is the principle upon which damages should be assessed in an action at common law."

In *Boys' Home of Hamilton v. Lewis*, 4 O. R. 18, Boyd, C., said: "The next ground of appeal is on the question of interest. By the usual course of the Court, interest is not chargeable against an executor till after the end of the first year. *Prima facie*, the fund is then distributable, and if he keeps moneys

thereafter in his hands without reason he will be charged with interest. The pendency of an administration suit (*Holgate v. Haworth*, 17 Beav. 259, 99 R. R. 147), the retention of the moneys though the executor has not used the fund in business (*Dawson v. Massey*, 1 B. & B. 230), the withholding on the ground of uncertainty as to claims upon the fund, or as to who is entitled to it, and giving notice to beneficiaries who abstain from asking for an appropriation or an investing of the money (*Melland v. Gray*, 2 Coll. 295, 70 R. R. 229; *Mousley v. Carr*, 4 Beav. 49, 55 R. R. 13), readiness and willingness to pay, but inability to do so till it should be ascertained by decree of the Court who are the parties entitled (*Sutton v. Sharp*, 1 Russ. 146): none of these exempt the executor from paying interest on moneys which he has kept unproductive to the beneficiaries. In *Re Evans Estate*, *Evans v. Evans*, 1 W. N. 1876, p. 205, administrators who claimed to be beneficially entitled to funds in their own hands and failed for want of evidence, were charged with interest. In cases of improper retention of balances the Court awards interest, when the sums are of a considerable or substantial amount. *Jones v. Morrall*, 2 Sim. N. S. 241. There is no good reason for not charging the executors with interest in this case upon the residue in their hands after the time where it was distributable. As the residuary estate was ascertained or got in from time to time it became money in their hands held for the use of residuary legatees. The annual rate of interest should be charged upon it from the time it might properly have been distributed or appropriated down to the time of its actual payment, or if not yet paid, down to the present time."

But an executor retaining money in his hands under a *bona fide*, though mistaken belief, that it is his own, may be exonerated altogether from payment of interest. *Bruere v. Pemberton*, 12 Ves. 386; or he may be ordered to pay simple interest. *Inglis v. Beaty*, *supra*. But in *Meander v. McCready*, 1 Moll. 119, the executor

was charged where he retained a balance under a fair misapprehension of his right to it.

In *Taylor v. Gerst*, Mosely, 99, it was said that if money placed out at interest be called in by an executor without any cause, he shall pay interest for it. But in *Newton v. Bennett*, 1 Bro. Ch. C. 361, Lord Thurlow said that an executor had an honest discretion to call in a debt bearing interest, if he thought the same in hazard. See also sec. 30 of the Trustee Act, and *Smith v. Roe*, 11 Gr. 311.

If an executor has employed trust money in trade or in speculation, the *cestui que trust* has the option of taking either interest or the profits which have arisen from the trade or speculation. *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 22 Beav. 100; but he must elect to take either the profits for the whole period, or the interest for the whole period. In *Vyse v. Foster*, L. R. 8 Ch. 309, a case in which a daughter of the testator, a beneficiary under the will, was asking for an account of profits, having been credited with interest at 5 per cent. on her share of trust moneys, which consisted of the ascertained share of the testator left in breach of trust in the business in which he had been a partner, James, L.J., says: "It has been distinctly laid down that a plaintiff cannot claim both interest and profits in respect of the money employed in trade, but must elect between them, and it might be a grave question whether the plaintiff must not either adopt or repudiate the terms on which the successive partnerships were willing to hold her money. If she repudiate the arrangement, it might be considered that she would have to elect between interest and that share only of the profits made in respect of her capital which actually came into the hands of her trustees, as appears to have been held in *Jones v. Foxall*, 15 Beav. 388. The application, however, of that rule as to election between interest and profits to the case of an actual loan by a trustee in breach of trust to himself and others, would,

we think, require very full consideration before the Court came to a final decision on it.”

An executor, who, being a trader, mixes the trust moneys with his own in his bank account, and uses this fund for business purposes, must be considered as having employed the money for his own profit, and will be charged accordingly. *Treves v. Townshend*, 1 Bro. Ch. C. 385; *Rocke v. Hart*, 11 Ves. 61.

A trust company was held not chargeable with interest on the theory that it mingled trust funds, where it appeared that it was one of the executors and accepted the estate funds on deposit in the course of its ordinary banking business, paying the ordinary rate of interest therefor. *In re Moore*, 211 Pa. St. 348, 60 Atl. R. 991.

Where the Master charged a trustee with legal interest on yearly balances, on appeal, *Moss, J.A.*, held that in view of the manner in which the trustee dealt with the estate, keeping no accounts and making no endeavour to keep separate the plaintiff's money, but making use of all that came to her hands and dealing with it and treating it as her own, the Master was justified in holding her to account on the footing of interest, at the legal rate, upon the yearly balances in her hands. *Zimmerman v. Willcox*, 35 C. L. J. 688.

Where trust money has been loaned to one of the executors, the executors will be charged with the highest rate of interest that could have been obtained for the money. *Smith v. Roe*, 11 Gr. 311.

The widow of the intestate married again and allowed her husband to use the moneys of the estate in her hands. The Master charged her with interest at ten per cent., but the Court reduced it to simple interest, it not being shewn that more could have been realized on investment. *Fielder v. O'Hara*, 14 Gr. 223.

In *Sovereign v. Sovereign*, 15 Gr. 559, it was held that executors may be charged with interest as well as principal in respect of sums lost through their mis-

conduct, though the principal never reached their hands. *Vanston v. Thompson*, 10 Gr. 542, and *Blain v. Terryberry*, 12 Gr. 222, were not acted upon.

Executors paid a legatee certain sums on account, and, on a further demand for payment, denied having funds sufficient to pay the balance. On taking the accounts many years afterwards it was found the executors had sufficient funds for the purpose, and they were ordered to pay the legatee the accrued interest on the legacy. *Sovereign v. Freeman*, 25 Gr. 525.

An executor who transfers funds of the estate from a bank where they are bearing interest to his own bank where they do not draw interest will be charged with the amount of interest lost by the transfer, but he is not answerable for profits. *Dick's Estate*, 183 Pa. 647.

The loss of interest arising from a debtor's refusal to pay a debt to an executor before probate is too remote a consequence of a delay in proving the will to render the executor liable to account on the footing of wilful default. *In re Stevens* (1897), 1 Ch. 422. In this case the executors did not take out probate until seven years after the testator's death.

The failure to charge an administrator with interest on funds distributed among the heirs, on the first accounting after the distribution, does not preclude the Court from charging him with interest thereon on the final accounting. *Britton v. Brewster*, 113 Mich. 561.

An executor who unreasonably resists payment of a legacy will not be given credit for interest accumulating during the litigation and paid by him. *In re Peters* (Mo. App.) 107 S. W. 406.

An administrator is not chargeable with interest on money retained to pay heirs, if they failed to call for it. *Jacob v. Emmett*, 11 Paige 142. Nor where executors hold a legacy for an absent legatee until the expiration of the seven years requisite to raise the presumption of his death, unless they used or made a

profit out of the fund, or it earned interest. *Lake v. Park*, 19 N. J. L. 108. Nor where the distribution is not made because the beneficiaries are not known. *Roper v. Burton*, 107 N. Car. 526. If there is no one legally qualified to receive the balance in an administrator's hands, and it is not incumbent on him to invest it, he is not chargeable with interest if he did not convert the money to his own use. *Rowland v. Isaacs*, 15 Conn. 122.

None of these cases afford any excuse for an executor or administrator who fails to deposit the trust funds of a bank, where bank interest might be paid during the delay.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

EXECUTORS' COSTS.

“Nothing ought, I think, to be adhered to more sacredly than the general principle, which is that a trustee or executor having done his duty, having faithfully accounted, and having brought forward the estate committed to his charge, should not be deprived of his costs “upon light grounds.” Per Lord Westbury, *Birks v. Micklewait*, 34 L. J. Ch. 364.

The following have been held to be included in costs, charges and expenses: Costs of proceedings by an administrator against a defaulting solicitor, taken *bona fide* for the benefit of the estate. *Re Davis*, 57 L. T. 755; the costs of an action properly defended by a trustee. *Re Llewellyn* 37 Ch. D. p. 327; costs of a sale properly made by trustees under a power. *Re Mansel*, 54 L. J. Ch. 883; costs of former trustees paid to the executors of the survivor in consideration of his paying over the trust money. *Harvey v. Oliver*, 57 L. T. 239.

An executor on passing his accounts is not entitled without question to sums paid by him to his solicitor for costs; and the bill, although not submitted to a regular taxation, can be moderated by the Judge by disallowing such items as are irregular or excessive. *Johnson v. Telford*, 3 Russ. 477, 27 R. R. 116; *Allen v. Jarvis*, L. R. 4 Ch. 616; *McCargar v. McKinnon*, 17 Gr. 525. And an executor will not be allowed the charges of his solicitor for doing things which the executor ought strictly to do himself, such as attendances to pay premiums on policies, attending at the bank to make transfers, attendances on valuers, auctioneers, legatees and creditors. *Harbin v. Darby*, 28 Beav. 325, 126 R. R. 150.

“Executors are undoubtedly entitled to the advice and services of counsel and attorneys in matters where it is necessary to invoke their professional skill, and to the allowance of reasonable payments in the compensation of such gentlemen; but they will not be allowed for payments to attorneys for work done that does not require professional skill, and which the executors themselves may as capably do. If executors, without prudent scrutiny, pay extravagant bills for legal services, they will not be allowed, upon their accounting, more than a sum that would have reasonably compensated for the services.” *Hurlbut v. Hutton*, 44 N. J. Eq. 302, And see *In re Murray's Estate*, 82 N. Y. S. 394.

“An executor is not warranted in paying out moneys of the estate which he represents for the performance of duties which are not purely executorial. He has no right to employ counsel at the expense of the estate to do what he himself should do, and for the doing of which he is compensated by his commissions. The commissions are allowed an executor as compensation for his services in the execution of the trusts. Where an executor employs an attorney to perform services which devolve upon the executor to perform, the disbursements made on account thereof do not constitute a proper claim against the estate, although contracted in good faith.” *In re Lester* (1916), 188 N. Y. S. 763.

In order to make an estate liable for solicitor's services rendered whilst there is no personal representative, it must be shewn, not only that the services were for the benefit of the estate, but that they were rendered under a contract with someone who subsequently by obtaining letters of administration became authorized to bind the estate, and ratified the contract. Before letters of administration were applied for a solicitor, acting under instructions of E., a relative of the deceased, did work as a solicitor in respect of the administration and for the benefit of the estate. Sub-

sequently P. obtained letters of administration and refused to pay the costs of this solicitor. It was held that P., as such administrator, was not bound to pay such costs. *In re Watson, Ex p. Phillips* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 116, 19 Q. B. D. 234.

Where costs have been *bona fide* paid to a solicitor he cannot be made to refund them if it turns out that the executor cannot get them out of the estate. *Re Blundell*, 58 L. T. 933; *Brinsden v. Williams* (1894), 3 Ch. 185.

Fees paid to counsel for legal advice, on matters affecting the estate, is a proper allowance to an executor. *Hayes v. Hayes*, 29 Gr. p. 99; so too a retaining fee paid to solicitors in a proper case. *Chisholm v. Barnard*, 10 Gr. 479.

Where in an action between a trustee and his *cestui que trust* the Court, in the judgment drawn up, makes "no order as to the costs of the action," such adjudication is final, and the trustee cannot afterwards retain his costs of the proceedings out of the trust estate. Lindley, L.J., said: "It seems to me that this is a common form of order perfectly familiar to us all, and it means that the Judge, having had his attention called to the matter, and being asked to make an order for the payment of the costs, declines to do so. It is not the same as if he had said nothing; and the effect is that each must pay his own costs." *Re Hodgkinson* (1895), 2 Ch. 190.

In *Story v. Dunlap*, 13 Gr. 375, Mowat, V.V., seems to have gone a step further and held that where the executor seeks to retain such costs out of the estate the judgment or order in the action should contain a reservation to that effect. It will be noticed that in *Re Hodgkinson*, Lindley, L.J., said: "It does not mean the same as if he had said nothing." In *Story v. Dunlap* an executrix appealed against a Master's report, and being successful in part only, the appeal was allowed without costs, and there was no reserva-

tion of costs as against the estate. On further directions the Court refused to order the costs payable out of the estate, the V.C. saying: "If I made the order now asked for I would be giving costs which another Judge of co-ordinate authority has refused to give." It will be noticed that, in this case, all the proceedings were in the same action.

The recent case of *Re Dingman*, 9 O. W. N. 272 (1915), 35 O. L. R. 51, requires careful consideration when considering the effect of the foregoing cases. It was an appeal from the Judge of a Surrogate Court under section 34 of the Surrogate Courts Act. The appellant had brought an action against the executor and recovered \$1,000 and costs. As far as the report of the case shews the judgment in that action made no reference to the executor's costs by reservation or otherwise. On the audit of the executor's accounts the Surrogate Court Judge allowed the executor his costs of defending the action as well as the costs paid to the plaintiff, and it was in respect of these items that the appellant complained. Riddell, J., delivering the judgment upon appeal, said it was one of the disadvantages of an executor's position that if he defend an action brought against him as such executor and fail, he may be forced to pay the costs out of his own pocket: *Macdonald v. Balfour* (1893), 20 A. R. 404; but he is entitled to be allowed all reasonable expenses which have been incurred in the management of the estate, and these include the costs of an action reasonably defended. Of course he could not be allowed the costs of improperly defending an action: *Chambers v. Smith* (1846), 2 Coll. 742; *Smith v. Chambers* (1847), 2 Ph. 221; but to disentitle him there must be something proved to shew the unreasonableness. "The fact that there was no provision in the judgment in the Supreme Court for the defendant's costs is *nihil ad rem*—it is the usual thing to order the defendant, executor though he be, to pay the costs of the successful plaintiff: formerly it was a very common practice to direct that the

costs so paid and his own might be retained by the executor out of the estate. That practice is not now so common; and, at least since the Surrogate Courts Act, sec. 19, it may well be doubted that such a direction is valid. But, in any case, these are not costs in the action at all, as was pointed out by Lindley, L.J., in *In re Beddoe* (1893), 1 Ch. at p. 555: "When you ask a Chancery Judge to allow those costs to the defendant who has been unsuccessful, those costs immediately assume the character of charges and expenses." Substitute for "Chancery" the word "Surrogate," and we have our case—the Surrogate Judge, when asked to allow those costs, must deal with them not as costs but as charges and expenses. He must exercise his independent judgment, and no direction of a trial Judge can bind him." See also *Granger v. O'Neill*, 35 C. L. J. 249.

It does not follow that because an action is advised by counsel it is always and necessarily one which trustees may properly bring, and consequently one the costs of which are properly payable out of the estate. The advice of counsel is not an absolute indemnity though it may go a long way. *Stott v. Milne*, 25 Ch. D. 710.

In *Re Williams*, 22 A. R. 196, the administrators for the deceased assignee for creditors defended in good faith an action brought by his successor in the trust to recover damages for breach of trust by the intestate. They were unsuccessful, and had to pay the costs of the plaintiff's solicitor and of their own solicitor. They were held entitled to credit for these costs in passing their accounts. Where it is plain that a dispute can be settled only by litigation it is not necessary for a trustee to ask the advice of the Court before defending. See also *Griffith v. Patterson*, 20 Gr. 618; *McKeller v. Prangle*, 25 Gr. 545.

Executors were given the costs of opposing an unsuccessful appeal, out of the estate, in the event of

their not being able to make them out of the appellant. *Re Cassie*, 7 P. R. 402.

The general rule is that in the absence of misconduct a trustee shall be recouped his costs, charges and expenses out of the trust estate, even in cases of unsuccessful litigation. *Smith v. Beal*, 25 Ont. R. 368; *Pitts v. La Fontaine*, 6 A. C. 482; and even if the trustee proceeds without the sanction of the Court, yet the costs will be allowed out of the estate if it appears that the defence or action would have been authorized had prior application been made. *In re Beddoe, Cottam v. Beddoe* (1893), 1 Ch. p. 557. But one of two executors has no right to commence and prosecute an action which may involve the estate in costs without consulting his co-trustee or the beneficiaries. And he cannot shelter himself behind the opinion of counsel, more especially if he has not directed counsel to the real point at issue. *In re England's Settlement Trusts* (1918), 1 Ch. 24.

This rule presupposes a fund in the trustee's hands out of which costs could be paid. Where an executor, without direct authority or obtaining indemnity, brought an action to recover a sum of money alleged to be due to the testator, and the action was dismissed with costs, the personal estate being insufficient to pay the costs of the defendant, it was held that the executor could not resort to specifically devised estate. *In re Champagne* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 537.

The rule that a trustee's costs are payable as between solicitor and client is not confined to cases where he is brought into Court against his will. *Blakeley v. Ingram* (9 C. L. Times, 143).

An executor has a right to have his accounts taken in Court, and the mere neglect, as distinguished from pertinacious refusal, to render his accounts, is 'not sufficient to deprive him of his costs. *White v. Jackson*, 15 Beav. 191, 92 R. R. 379; *Gresham v. Price*, 35

Beav. 47, 147 R. R. 16; *Heugh v. Scard*, 24 W. R. 51. See *ante* under "Duty to Keep Proper Accounts."

The mere fact of executors being charged with interest on balances in their hands, or any mere negligence, is not of itself a sufficient ground for visiting them with the costs of an action, or even refusing them costs. *Flanagan v. Nolan*, 1 Moll. 84; *Travers v. Townsend*, 1 Moll. 496; and an executor who has not been guilty of dishonesty, and who has made good to the estate the deficiency arising from an improper investment made by him, will not be ordered to pay costs. *Peacock v. Colling*, 54 L. J. Ch. 743; *Re Whiteley*, 33 Ch. D. 347.

But if the executors' accounts are falsified, or they have been guilty of gross or wilful negligence, or have acted from fraudulent or interested motives, they are generally ordered to pay costs, or so much of it as has been occasioned by their misconduct; or may be disallowed their costs. *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 290 16 R. R. 124; *Gilbert v. Lee*, 13 W. R. 1012.

If the inquiry has been occasioned by the executor not keeping accounts, he must pay the costs. *Pearse v. Green*, 1 J. & W. 135, 20 R. R. 258; or he may be refused costs. *Payne v. Evans*, 18 Eq. 356.

Where the action would have been necessary independently of an alleged breach of trust, and the executor a necessary party, he may be allowed his general costs, though he may have to pay the costs occasioned by the breach. *Pride v. Fooks*, 2 Beav. 430, 50 R. R. 227; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, *supra*. But where the sole object of the action is to make the executors answerable for a breach of trust, and the judgment is against them, it will be, almost invariably, without costs. *Earl Poulett v. Herbert*, 1 Ves. Jr. 497; *Whistler v. Newman*, 4 Ves. 129. If, however, the action has enabled the Court to administer the estate, or the audit has resulted in a proper passing of the executors' accounts, the executors may be allowed their costs, less the costs

directly attributable to their conduct. *Taylor v. Haygarth*, 8 Jur. 135; *In re Honsberger*, 10 Ont. R. 54.

If executors by their unfounded claims, or by their supineness, negligence or misconduct, occasion an administration suit to be brought, they *prima facie* subject themselves to liability for the general costs of it. *McGill v. Courtice*, 17 Gr. 271; see also *Simpson v. Horne*, 28 Gr. 1, where an executor was refused costs down to the decree and ordered to pay the subsequent costs.

Where administration proceedings were rendered necessary by gross and indefensible neglect of the trustees to deliver accounts, they were ordered to pay all the costs of taking the accounts. *In re Skinner* (1904), 1 Ch. 289; *Eglin v. Sanderson*, 3 Giff. 434, 133 R. R. 156.

Where a trustee had taken a wrong view of his position towards his *cestui que trust*, and had put him to expense and delay by an indefensible course of conduct in the taking of an account, and the result of the taking of the account was unfavourable to the trustee, it was held that the Court must not only deprive the trustee of the costs but must order him to pay them. *In re Holton's Settlement* (1918), 62 S. J. 403.

Where rents were allowed to fall in arrear in consequence of disputes between the trustees, the Court made them pay the costs of a suit by the tenant for life for payment of the income. *Wilson v. Wilson*, 2 Keen. 249, 44 R. R. 238.

In an administration action executors were charged with so much of the expenses of the reference as was incurred in the Master's office in establishing charges which they disputed. *Stewart v. Fletcher*, 18 Gr. 21.

Where executors are brought into Court to determine the rights in a fund, or otherwise, they will be allowed their costs, although they make a claim, if it is merely by way of submission. *Rashleigh v. Master*, 1 Ves. Jr. 201.

As between executors and creditors, the executors are entitled to their full costs, charges and expenses out of the estate in priority to the payment of debts, although the estate is insolvent, unless they improperly deny assets. *Lodge v. Pritchard*, 4 Giff. 294, 141 R. R. 213; *Dodds v. Tuke*, 25 Ch. D. 617.

Where two or more executors are implicated in a breach of trust, the Court, in making an order for costs, will not distinguish between the relative degrees of culpability. *Lawrence v. Bowle*, 2 Ph. 140, 78 R. R. 54. But a solicitor-trustee to whom the management of the trust has been left as the acting trustee, is liable to indemnify his co-trustee against the costs of an action caused by his negligent conduct. *In re Linsley* (1904), 2 Ch. 785.

Where executors are allowed costs out of the estate such costs are allowed in the ordinary way, i.e., as between solicitor and client, unless it is established that they have been guilty of some misconduct which would justify the Judge in depriving them of costs. And this rule applies where the executors are entitled to two sets of costs, as in *Re Love*, 29 Ch. D. 348, where one executor brought an action against his co-executor for administration, no misconduct being alleged against the defendant.

An executor is not entitled to credit for services rendered by a solicitor in advising him concerning his right to compensation, because such service is for the personal benefit of the executor and not for the estate. *In re McAlpin*, 8 Ohio Dec. 654.

Credit will not be allowed a personal representative for expenditures made in connection with a contest over the will which is still pending, as liability for such expenditure cannot be fixed until the contest is determined. *Titlon's Estate*, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 625.

Where executors assent to specific legacies of shares or mortgages, the costs of transfer, including the executor's own costs in connection therewith, must

be borne by the specific legatees. *In re Grosvenor* (1916), 2 Ch. 375.

The costs of proceedings in an unsuccessful attempt to remove a co-executor were disallowed. *In re Archer*, 51 Misc. (N.Y.) 260.

Executors supporting a will, and failing, should ordinarily pay costs personally and look to those who have indemnified them for reimbursement, if indemnified as they should be; but, whether indemnified or not, should not have costs out of the estate ordinarily. *Lloyd v. Robertson* (1916), 35 O. L. R. 264. And a nude executor who propounds a testamentary paper, of the validity of which there is no reasonable *prima facie* probability, cannot escape from the liability of being condemned in costs by the fact that he takes no interest under the paper. *Roberts v. Cowmeadow*, 21 L. T. N. S. 367. But where an executor propounded a will in the interest of infant children, and did not become aware, until after the suit was instituted, that it had not been duly executed, the Court held that he was entitled to his costs out of the estate. *Davies v. Rees*, 13 L. T. 609.

See also *Broughton v. Knight*, 42 L. J. P. 25, 3 P. & D. 64; *Hill v. Hill*, 6 O. R. 244; *Gilbert v. Ireland* (1904), 9 O. L. R. 124; *Re Mathe* (1910), 2 O. W. N. 327; *McAllister v. McMillan* (1912), 25 O. L. R. 1.

Residuary legatees may apply for taxation of bills of costs rendered to executors for services to the estate; for they come within sec. 40 of the Solicitors Act, as being "liable to pay," i.e., by the lessening of the amount of the residuary estate. *Re George A. Skinner*, 13 P. R. 276, 447; *Sandford v. Porter*, 16 A. R. 565. And it would appear that the limit of twelve months in sections 36 and 42 of the Act does not apply to an application by a *cestui que trust*. *In re Welborne* (1900), 1 Ch. 857.

CHAPTER XXIX.

SOLICITOR-EXECUTOR.

Section 67 (4) of the Trustee Act provides as follows:—

Where a barrister or solicitor is a trustee, guardian or personal representative, and has rendered necessary professional services to the estate, regard may be had in making the allowance to such circumstances, and the allowance shall be increased by such amount as may be deemed fair and reasonable in respect of such services.

The “allowance” here referred to is the compensation to which a guardian or personal representative is entitled to for his care, pains and trouble, and his time expended in and about the estate. Although the statute says that regard *may* be had to these circumstances, the word “may” is here used to give an authority and not a discretion. *Fensom v. New Westminster*, 5 B. C. R. 624, 2 C. C. C. 52. Where a statute confers an authority to do a judicial act upon the occurrence of certain circumstances, and for the benefit of a certain party, the exercise of the judicial authority so conferred is imperative and not discretionary. *Atcheson v. Mann*, 9 P. R. 473; *Fonscea v. Schultz*, 7 Man. R. 464; *Darby v. Toronto*, 17 O. R. 554.

Mr. Holmested, in his Ontario Judicature Act, says:

Having regard to the provisions of the Trustee Act and the Solicitors Act above referred to, it would seem to be clear that the former rules prohibiting solicitor-trustees, or mortgagees, from recovering profit costs from their *cestuis que trust* or mortgagors are, in effect, abrogated, and this right to remuneration being now recognized by statute, the quantum will be the ordinary taxable charges.

But see pg. 434 first paragraph In re McNeil

There is, however, a broad distinction between the provisions of section 68 of the Solicitors Act and section 67 (4) of the Trustees Act. A solicitor-mortgagee is "entitled to receive the same charges and remuneration as he would be entitled to receive if such mortgage had been made to a person not a solicitor." In other words, in the case of a solicitor-mortgagee, as far as costs are concerned, the solicitor is entitled to recover his charges as if the relation of solicitor and mortgagor did not exist. Such costs and charges can be taxed under the Solicitors Act the same as any other bill of costs. In the case of a solicitor-trustee, the solicitor does not recover for professional services as in the case of solicitor and client. His fees would appear not to be subject to the provisions for taxation found in the Solicitors Act. All the Trustee Act does is to enable the Surrogate Court Judge to have regard to the necessary professional services the executor has given to the estate and increase the allowance by a fair and reasonable amount for such services. In ascertaining what "may be deemed fair and reasonable in respect of such services," there appears to be no other guide than the tariff allowed to solicitors for similar services.

The position of a solicitor-executor is referred to by Boyd, C., in the recent case of *Re Smith*, 38 O. L. R. 67. The testator carried on a retail liquor business at the time of his death, and appointed his widow and a solicitor executors. The widow carried on the business, being advised by the solicitor from time to time, and the result of the business was to greatly increase the assets of the estate. On the audit of the accounts the Judge allowed \$4,650.52 to the executors as compensation. The widow, who was sole legatee and devisee, objected to the solicitor-executor receiving more than \$1,000. The Chancellor said:—"Besides the preparation of the papers in connection with the sale, a good deal of miscellaneous legal business was done and advice given by Burns, for which he might have

made professional charges but for his position. This is a matter which is also to be taken into account when the value of the executors' services is to be estimated. See the Trustee Act, sec. 67 (4). Where a barrister is personal representative and has rendered professional services to the estate, regard may be had to the allowance, and it shall be increased by such amount as may be deemed fair and reasonable in respect of such services. The Surrogate Judge has not made any separate finding as to this aspect, but he has, I think, taken it into his account in his estimate." The appeal was dismissed.

Section 67 (4) of the Trustee Act came into force on 12th June, 1903 (3 Edw. VII., ch. 7, sec. 27). The law before this enactment is concisely stated in *In re Williams* (1902), 4 O. L. R. 501, as follows: "The general rule is that a trustee-solicitor is not entitled to charge the estate with any professional services, for to allow him to do so would be to violate the rule that a trustee is not to be placed in a position where his duty and his interest conflict. An exception, however, which is not to be extended, has been established by the decision of Lord Cottingham in *Cradock v. Piper* (1850), 1 M. & G. 664, under which a solicitor-trustee who brings or defends proceedings in Court for himself and his co-trustee is entitled to recover profit costs and therefore to charge such costs to the estate, but such costs are not to be increased by the fact that he is himself a party beyond what they would have been had he acted for his co-trustee only. This exception is not to be extended to proceedings for professional services rendered to the estate out of Court: see *In re Corsellis*, *Lawton v. Elwes* (1887), 34 Ch. D. 675; *Broughton v. Broughton*, 5 D. M. & G. 160; *Re Doody*, *Fisher v. Doody* (1893), 1 Ch. 129, 138, 139, 141; *Re Mimico Pipe & Brick Mfg. Co.*, 26 O. R. 289; Lewin on Trusts, 10 ed." See also *In re Leckie Estate*, 36 C. L. J. 136.

It does, however, extend to summary proceedings in the Surrogate Court, *e.g.*, preparing the accounts of

trustees and attending the audit thereof. *In re McNab* (1899), 19 C. L. T. 74.

In England, when a solicitor is named as executor, it is usual to insert a clause in the will empowering him to charge for his professional services. In *Re Fish* (1893), 2 Ch. 413, where the will contained such a provision, it was held that the executors could not settle the amount payable out of the estate for such services to one of themselves, so as to bind the *cestui que trust* and preclude his right of taxation. Where the parties are *sui juris* there is nothing to prevent them agreeing on the amount to be retained by the executors as compensation; but the Court would view such an agreement with suspicion where a portion of the allowance consists of claims for professional services, where the *cestui que trust* has no independent professional advice.

In *Re White* (1898), 1 Ch. 297, an executor was empowered by the will to charge for his professional services. The estate proved insolvent and it was held his right to charge for his services was in the nature of a legacy, and could not be asserted in competition with creditors. See also *In re Brown* (1918), W. N. 118. In Ontario, the remuneration being by way of extra allowance for care, pains and trouble, it would be a preferential lien. *Harrison v. Patterson*, 11 Gr. 105.

The principle of *In re White* was followed in a recent case. By her will a testatrix gave legacies amounting to £63,000, while her estate amounted to £56,000 only. One of the trustees was a solicitor, and the will contained a declaration that every trustee of the will who was a solicitor should be entitled to make and be paid usual professional charges. The question argued was as to the abatement of the profit costs of the solicitor. Eve, J., held that the effect of the declaration in the will enabling the solicitor to charge for professional services was a bequest to him of a legacy conditional upon him doing the work; the amount of the

legacy to be ascertained when the work had been done and the profit costs arrived at. It was nothing more or less than a bequest to the solicitor of that sum, ultimately to be ascertained, and, in the case of an insufficient estate, such a legacy stands on the same footing as other legacies in the same degree. *In re Brown, Wace v. Smith* (1918), W. N. 118. The principle of this case would probably be held to apply in Ontario where a legacy was given in lieu of compensation, because where the will provides a method for fixing the compensation the executor must abide by that method. *Bailey v. Crosby* (1917), 226 Mass. 492.

By section 17 of the Wills Act any devise, legacy, interest, gift or appointment to an attesting witness is utterly null and void. Where the will provided that one of the executors, a solicitor, should be entitled to charge and receive payment for all professional services to be done by him under the will, the Court held this was bounty under the will, and he could not charge for such services where he was an attesting witness to the will. *In re Barber*, 31 Ch. D. 665, followed in *In re Pooley*, 40 Ch. D. 1. See also *In re Trotter* (1899), 1 Ch. 764.

It does not follow that a solicitor-executor, who is also an attesting witness to the will, cannot recover compensation for his care, pains and trouble in and about the estate as executor. This compensation is not in the nature of a devise, legacy, interest, gift or appointment; it is not a bounty under the will, but is given to the executor by the statute and not by the provisions of the will. See the remarks of Chitty, J., in *In re Barber*, at p. 670.

A solicitor-executor is entitled to charge only for services strictly professional, and not for matters which an executor ought to have done without the intervention of a solicitor, such as attendance to pay premiums on policies, attending at the bank to make transfers, attendances on proctors, auctioneers, legatees and creditors. When a solicitor is appointed an

executor the Court must necessarily make a distinction between those things which properly belong to his office of executor, and those which relate to his character of solicitor. *Harbin v. Darby*, 28 Beav. 325; 126 R. R. 150; *In re Chapple*, 27 Ch. D. 584. It will be noticed that the section of our Act speaks of the "necessary professional services."

And a provision in a will providing that a solicitor-executor shall be allowed "all professional and other charges for his time and trouble," was held not to authorize him to charge for work which was not professional work, although it was such work as he might have charged for against a client who was not a trustee. *In re Chalinder & Herrington* (1907), 1 Ch. 58. See also *Clarkson v. Robinson* (1900), 2 Ch. 722, and the cases cited in Chapter XXXVIII.

An attorney was appointed administrator and expended a large part of the estate for attorney's fees that he paid to a firm of which he was a member, and these fees were allowed him on an annual accounting. There was no appeal from these allowances, but on the final accounting the Court held these findings were not so conclusive upon the parties in interest that they could not be noticed and taken into consideration in determining the administrator's claim for compensation even though no fraud was proved. *In re O'Leary's Estate* (1916), 193 Mich. 282.

CHAPTER XXX.

MAINTENANCE OF INFANTS.

One of the problems confronting a trustee, whether executor or administrator, is to know how far he is justified in applying money to which an infant may become entitled, in or towards the maintenance of such infant. Where maintenance is given by a will the limit of authority will generally be governed by the terms of the will; when no such authority is given recourse must be had to the law as laid down in the decisions of the Courts. In Williams on Executors the law is thus stated: "It must be observed that generally an executor cannot, without risk, pay any part of a legacy bequeathed to an infant, either to the infant or to any person for his use. Therefore the executor is not, as a rule, justified in applying any part of the capital of the legacy for the maintenance of the child, nor indeed of the interest except under the conditions hereinafter appearing. But the Court will in some cases, upon application being made for its sanction, authorize the application of part of the capital for maintenance, if either the total fund is small, or there is no other means of providing for the support of the child. And it appears that the executor may do the same on his own authority, if he does no more than the Court would have directed if it had been resorted to in the first instance. For the principle is established, that if an executor do, without application, what the Court would have approved, he shall not be called upon to account, and forced to undo that, merely because it was done without application. At the same time it is the prudent course for an executor in every case to apply to the Court before devoting any part to the capital of a legacy to maintenance:" pp. 1264, 1265.

In England the power of applying the interest of a legacy to the maintenance of an infant is now principally regulated by the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, which repealed section 26 of Lord Cranworth's Act. There is no corresponding Act in Ontario.

As a general rule the Court will not allow maintenance to an infant during the lifetime of the infant's father, if the father is able to support the infant. The father's ability must be understood in the sense of ability to maintain and educate according to the fortune and expectations of the infant, and the infant's needs must be considered with reference to the same standard of fortune and expectation. But where the income of a bequest is given by will expressly for the maintenance and education of children during their minority, the income should be paid to their father while the children are maintained and educated by him, though he may be amply able to maintain and educate them out of his own means. *Schofield v. Vessie* (1899), 1 N. B. Eq. Rep. 637.

When maintenance is allowed for an infant, it includes ordinary medical attendance, but not the expense of an unusual or protracted illness. *Smith v. Rose*, 24 Gr. 438; *Howe v. Carlaw*, 15 O. R. 697.

Unless the estate is exceptionally large nothing in the shape of expenditure for luxuries will be allowed. *Bridge v. Brown*, 2 Y. & C. 181; *Zimmerman v. Wilcox*, 35 C. L. J. 688.

As against creditors an administrator cannot be allowed for disbursements in schooling, feeding or clothing of the intestate's children subsequently to his decease. *Giles v. Dyson*, 1 Starkie 32, 18 R. R. 743.

The Court will permit the use of the *corpus* of an infant's estate, or so much of it as may be necessary, where the doing so is for the benefit of the infant; and it will do so where it is proper for past as well as for future maintenance. *In re Howarth*, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 418; *Ashbrough v. Ashbrough*, 10 Gr. 430.

“There is no doubt that the Court has power to employ the *corpus* of an infant's estate for his maintenance; and that the Court exercises this power whenever that course is shewn, to the satisfaction of the Court, to be more for the infant's benefit, than to preserve the property intact until the infant comes of age; and it is the modern doctrine, that payments made by trustees or executors out of the *corpus* without the previous sanction of the Court are to be allowed where the Court considers the payments reasonable and proper; and such allowances may be made whether the payments were for advancement or maintenance, though payments by way of advancement are more readily allowed than payments by way of maintenance. In all cases payments made without previous authority are made at the risk of the parties; and the allowance afterwards is for the discretion of the Court in view of all the circumstances.” *Edwards v. Durgan*, 19 Gr. 101.

This was approved of in *Goodfellow v. Rannie*, 20 Gr. 425, as a general exposition of the law. But in *Edwards v. Durgan*, where a farmer gave to his widow all his goods and chattels absolutely, an annuity, and the use of his real estate during widowhood, and she married again and then claimed to be paid for past maintenance of the infants out of the *corpus* of the estate devised to them, Mowat, V.C., refused to allow the claim. See also *In re Renwick*, *Renwick v. Crooks*, 14 P. R. 361; *Re Blain Infants*, 14 P. R. 220.

But the Court does not sanction the employment of the *corpus* of an infant's estate for maintenance unless satisfied that such a course is more beneficial to the infant than that of preserving his property intact until he comes of age. *Goodfellow v. Rannie*, 20 Gr. 425.

The rule is stated even more strongly by Boyd, C., in *Crane v. Craig*, 11 P. R. 236, where he says: “It is a primary rule that the principal of the infants' estate is not to be encroached upon, unless for unavoidable reasons falling little short of necessity. *Walker v.*

Wetherell (1801), 6 Ves. 473; *Ex p. McKey* (1810), 1 B. & B. 405."

These cases were approved of and followed in the recent case of *Re Rundle* (1914), 32 O. L. R. 312. There an orphan boy became entitled at the age of nineteen to his mother's estate, of the value of about \$9,000. A trust company was appointed guardian of the boy's estate, and during the two years of his minority expended on his behalf for board, education, medical fees, travelling expenses, and paid to him for clothing, pocket-money and other expenses, sums amounting in the aggregate to \$1,100 more than the income of his estate. On the audit of the guardian's accounts the Surrogate Judge allowed these disbursements, but on appeal, Mulock, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "Had the company made application to the Court for sanction to such expenditure out of the capital, previous to its being made, and had frankly informed the Court as to the infant's situation in life, and other circumstances that should be considered, such sanction would, I think, have been refused, except to the extent of a reasonable allowance whilst the infant was at college. The company, however, made the expenditures without previous sanction and at their own risk. A large portion thereof was not necessary or in the infant's interests, but on the contrary, proved hurtful and should not be approved of by the Court. It would be reasonable to sanction payment to the infant during the time that he was at St. Andrew's College to the extent of \$100. With this exception, there should be no encroachment on the capital in respect of the various sums allowed or paid by the company to the infant for maintenance; and to this extent the appeal is allowed." Affirmed 52 S. C. R. 407.

In *Crane v. Craig*, 11 P. R. 236, the intestate left a widow and five children from 3 to 12 years old, and personal estate only, of which the infants' share would aggregate \$11,500. The Master allowed the widow

\$9,504 for five years past maintenance, but on appeal, Boyd, C., reduced this to \$6,600. The mother had employed a resident governess at \$400 a year, had spent \$48 a year on music lessons, and \$500 a year for clothing. The Chancellor said: "Not questioning the propriety of these things if they could be defrayed out of the yearly income of the infants' estate, I think the Court should, in the interest of the infants, proceed upon the basis of a more economic expenditure when the capital has to be reduced."

Where two daughters aged 18 and 16 were entitled to \$1,700 and \$1,900 respectively, and were living with their mother, who had no means of her own, the Court authorized an encroachment upon the *corpus* of the estate, each being "old enough to appreciate the folly of reducing their small means more than reasonably can be avoided." Meredith, C.J.C.P., said: "It is, of course, one of the first and highest duties of a guardian to provide for the maintenance and education of his wards, in a manner befitting their condition in life, limited, of course, by the means at his command available for the purpose, and as much of it as may be needed for the purpose it is his duty to apply to it. In strictness he ought not to encroach upon the principal without the authorization of the Court; but if he do, he may be reimbursed in passing his accounts; in effect that which the Court would have authorized beforehand may be subsequently ratified: the result being that the guardian takes the risk in not getting authorization beforehand. The expenditure should be for that only which is reasonably needed; and it is not needed when otherwise provided; or can, and should be, earned by the infant." *Re Adkins Infants* (1915), 33 O. L. R. 110. See also *Re Chapman* (1918), 15 O. W. N. 3.

In *Re Havey* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 336, two infants were entitled to \$500, their deceased father's share of life insurance; and upon their mother's application, she was appointed trustee of this sum, and it was

ordered that the whole of it should be paid to her, on her undertaking to apply it for their maintenance and benefit.

The Court has a discretion to make an order for payment of infants' money for past maintenance, but such an order will be made only in exceptional cases. *Re Hollis*, 2 O. W. N. 1447; *Re Lloyd*, 31 O. L. R. 476; *Fenwick v. Fenwick*, 20 Gr. 381; *Stewart v. Fletcher*, 16 Gr. 235.

A testator bequeathed to his grandson his farm, implements, etc., and provided that until the grandson attained the age of 21 years the executors should keep, control and manage the farm, and expend the net revenue arising therefrom in the management and cultivation of the land, without accounting to the grandson or anyone else for such revenue. The grandson applied to have an allowance made to him for his support and education. The application was dismissed on the ground that the testator having directed the surplus to be used in the improvement of the farm, the money could not be diverted to another purpose. *Re Estate Waddell* (1902), 35 N. S. R. 435.

The plaintiff was two years old when her father died in March, 1877. Her mother, the defendant, was appointed administratrix and guardian. The plaintiff continued to live with her mother until 1895, when she married. In an administration action the Master allowed defendant for the daughter's maintenance \$60 a year until the plaintiff was twelve years old, \$75 a year for the next four years, and \$35 a year for the following four years, or \$1,040 in all. The plaintiff did the work usually done by a girl of her age living upon a farm with her parents, and for several years there was no hired female assistant, all the women's work being done by the defendant and the plaintiff. The defendant kept no account of her disbursements. On appeal by the defendant it was held that, having regard to the fact that the parties were living together

on a farm for the greater part of the time where the chief outlay would be for clothing and pocket money, and to the facts that the plaintiff attended the public school free of expense, and that the outlay for school books was trifling, the finding of the Master could not be interfered with upon the evidence, although he might well have allowed a larger sum. The Master disallowed \$125, the cost of an organ which the defendant alleged was bought for the plaintiff when she was eight years old. Held, that for an eight-year-old daughter of a deceased farmer, living on the farm with her mother and step-father, an organ costing \$125 was not a necessity. *Zimmerman v. Wilcox*, 35 C. L. J. 688.

In re Brazil, Barry v. Brazil, 11 Gr. 253, the widow of the deceased was appointed administratrix. She got in the personal estate and remained in occupation of the farm, maintaining the infant heirs, to whom no guardian has been appointed. It was held that the personal estate and proceeds or profits of the real estate must be applied first in payment of debts, and then to reimburse the administratrix for sums spent in the infants' maintenance.

It has long been settled that interest as a means of maintenance is payable out of the general residue, upon a legacy which is merely contingent, when the legatee is an infant child of the testator, and no other maintenance is provided. The cases establishing this are numerous and uniform. *Heath v. Perry*, 3 Atk. 101; *Chambers v. Goldwin*, 11 Ves. 1, 8 R. R. 61; *Martin v. Martin*, L. R. 1, Eq. 369; *Binkley v. Binkley*, 15 Gr. 649.

But where the testator is not the parent of, or one standing *in loco parentis* to, the legatee, the general principle is that payment may be made for maintenance out of the income of a legacy only where the legacy is vested in possession: *Collis v. Blackburn*, 9 Ves. 470; not when it is vested and payable *in futuro*: *Descrambles v. Tompkins*, 4 Bro. C. C. 149; nor where it is contingent: *Butler v. Freeman*, 3 Atk. 58.

The rule that a contingent legacy by a parent to a child carries interest during suspense of vesting does not apply where the parent is the mother unless she is actually standing *in loco parentis* to the legatee. *In re Eyre, Johnson v. Williams* (1917), 1 Ch. 351.

In *Re McIntyre* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 548, two infants were given a legacy of \$4,000 each, contingent upon them attaining 25 years of age, and one-tenth of the residuary estate. It was contended that the infants were not entitled to interest on the pecuniary legacies—that the gift to them of a share in the residue of the estate took the case out of the rule of construction above stated, as being a provision for their maintenance. Street, J., said: “No authority was cited in support of this contention, and the case of *In re Moody* (1895), 1 Ch. 101, is a strong authority against it. The question is not whether the infant is entitled to some other fund, either under or apart from the will, which might be made available for the maintenance of the infant during minority, but whether upon the face of the will the testator has shewn a clear intention that the infant shall look for maintenance to some particular fund other than his legacy. If he has not, then the presumption of an intention that he should have interest on his legacy by way of maintenance at once arises.” And the executors were directed to apply the income of each legacy for the benefit of the infants during minority to the extent required for their maintenance.

Where a testator has himself specified the time for the duration of the maintenance, that will be observed; but the right to maintenance and support, when given in general terms, will cease when children attain their majorities, or with the marriage or forisfiliation of a child. A widow ceases to be entitled to maintenance on marrying again. *Cook v. Noble*, 12 O. R. 81.

As to interest on legacies for maintenance, see “Legacies and Annuities.”

CHAPTER XXXI.

RELIEF OF TRUSTEES.

Section 37 of the Trustee Act provides for the relief of trustees committing a technical breach of trust. Under this section of the Act where it appears to the Court that a trustee is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust, whenever the transaction alleged or found to be a breach of trust occurred, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust, and for omitting to obtain the directions of the Court in the matter in which he committed such breach, the Court may relieve the trustee either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same.

This is a reproduction of section 3 (1) of the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896 (England), and the decisions under that Act are applicable to our Act.

This Act was passed to afford greater protection to trustees, was made retrospective, and was "meant to be acted upon freely and fairly in the exercise of judicial discretion." *In re Turner* (1897), 1 Ch. 536.

It is not sufficient that the trustee acts honestly, he must also act reasonably. *In re Barker*, 77 L. T. 712; and the question of reasonableness is where most of the difficulty is encountered. In *Smith v. Mason* (1901), 1 O. L. R. 594, Boyd, C., said that the nearest approach to a working rule is found in the judgment of Lopes, J., in *In re Chapman, Cocks v. Chapman* (1896), 2 Ch. at p. 777, where he says: "It is very easy to be wise after the event; but in order to exercise a fair judgment with regard to the conduct of trustees at a particular time, we must place ourselves in the position they occupied at that time, and determine for ourselves what, having regard to the opinion prevalent at

that time, would have been considered the prudent course for them to have adopted."

In the same case Lindley, L.J., said: "Trustees acting honestly, with ordinary prudence and within the limits of their trust, are not liable for mere error of judgment."

In *Learoyd v. Whiteley* (1887), 12 A. C. 732, the duty of trustees is said to be to use ordinary care and caution, and they must be supposed to possess ordinary care and prudence. The trustee does not entitle himself to relief by proving that he has acted reasonably and honestly. He must shew that under all the circumstances he ought fairly to be excused for his breach of trust.

In cases since the Act the Judges have invariably refused to interpret "reasonably," saying that the course of conduct pursued in each individual case would have to be pronounced upon as it came up. The Court, no doubt, has to be satisfied by sufficient and proper evidence that the trustee has acted reasonably as well as honestly, but that has been by giving evidence of what was done by him, what enquiries he made, the condition of affairs contemporaneously, and other matters to enable the Court to put itself in the situation of the trustee at the time. *Smith v. Mason, supra*. In this case it was held that the Act does not render competent as evidence the opinions of bankers or other financial men as to whether the trustee so acted in the course he has taken or omitted to take in respect of collecting a debt due the estate. The general rule of evidence still applies that mere personal belief or opinion is not evidence, and the test of reasonableness is that exhibited by the ordinary business man or the man of ordinary sense, knowledge and prudence in the conduct of his own affairs.

In one case "reasonably" is defined as "in a reasonable manner: consistently with reason: fairly." *Horn v. Territory*, 56 Pac. 846.

Whether a trustee has acted reasonably must be determined in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, not as they would appear in the eyes of lawyers and Judges, but as they would appear in the eyes of ordinary prudent business men, and if he acted under such circumstances, as they so appeared, as a majority of ordinary prudent men would have acted under the like circumstances, he ought to be held to have acted "reasonably as a trustee." *Dover v. Denne* (1902), 3 O. L. R. p. 677.

The rule is, that where the Court finds that the trustee has acted both honestly and reasonably, there is then a case for the Court to consider whether the trustee ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust, looking at all the circumstances. *Re Nicholls, Hall v. Wildman* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 206.

The burden lies upon the trustee to shew that he has acted reasonably. *Re Stuart* (1897), 2 Ch. 583, 590.

When Relief Granted.

In the following cases the Court granted relief:

Where an executor of a solicitor believing, and on grounds that justified that belief although erroneous, that the deceased had no right of action against a client personally for costs incurred in certain administration proceedings, took no steps to recover such costs. *Re Roberts* (1897), 76 L. T. 479.

An executor paid an immediate legacy of £300 for maintenance to the widow, and allowed her to receive the income from the estate. The assets amounted to £22,000, and the only known debt was one of £100. Six months after the death of the testator an action for an account of moneys received by the testator as plaintiff's agent was commenced and the estate was found indebted to the plaintiff in £26,000. The executor was relieved as to the £300 legacy and the income paid up to the issue of the writ, but not as to sums paid thereafter. *In re Kay, Mosley v. Kay* (1897), 2 Ch. 518.

A testator gave his estate to executors upon trust "to maintain the same and every part thereof in the like mode of investment." Part of the estate was a promissory note for £166 payable on demand. The executors, believing the debtor to be a man of good credit, neither called in nor applied to the Court for directions as to this debt, and the debtor died insolvent 18 months after the testator. Held, that, having regard to the terms of the will and the amount of the debt, the executors might reasonably have thought they were not bound to call in the debt or apply for directions. *In re Grindey, Clews v. Grindey* (1898), 2 Ch. 593.

Where the trustee has acted honestly the terms of the will may be looked at to judge of the reasonableness of his conduct. If an ordinary business man might reasonably entertain a particular view of the construction of the will, and the action of the trustee would have been justified if that view had been the true one, the trustee cannot be said to have acted unreasonably merely because this view of the construction is wrong. *In re Mackay* (1911), 1 Ch. 300; *Henning v. Maclean* (1900), 2 O. L. R. 169, *post*.

In a will directing the sale of real and personal property the words "as soon as may be after my decease" are not peremptory, requiring immediate sale of securities, but leave to the executor's discretion the time of sale within reasonable limits, if he act in good faith and without neglect. Where an executor waited nearly a year to sell securities, which in the meantime owing to the outbreak of the war depreciated so that the estate realized much less than the inventoried values, the executor was held not liable. *In re Varet's Estate* (1918), 202 N. Y. St. 896.

So where trustees erroneously assuming they had power to sell, sold leaseholds and thereby diminished the income of the plaintiff, though the sale would have been a proper one had the trustees in fact possessed a power of sale. *Perrins v. Bellamy* (1899), 1 Ch. 797.

So where trustees, acting on the advice of solicitors, invested on mortgage without an actual valuation, but at a value calculated at a rate at which adjacent property had sold for by auction in a previous year, they were relieved except to the extent of the excess over two-thirds of the actual value. *Waite v. Parkinson* (1901), 85 L. T. 456. But see *Re Stuart* (1897), 2 Ch. 583, *post*.

But in *Re Munroe's Estate*, 9 Kulp. 334, it was held that executors would not be relieved from the effect of payments made under a mistake of law.

Under the Trustee Act the advice of competent counsel and the opinion of the Court, even if erroneous, may afford sufficient protection to the honest trustee. *Elgin Loan Co. v. National Trust Co.* (1903), 7 O. L. R. p. 18. And see *In re Allsop* (1914), 1 Ch. 1, *post*.

In one case it was said that the test is "Did the trustees act as an ordinary prudent man would have done in regard to his own business?" *McDonald v. Trusts and Guarantee Co.*, 1 O. W. N. 886; *In re Turner* (1897), 1 Ch. 536; *In re Stuart* (1897), 2 Ch. 583. But the fact that he has acted with equal foolishness in both cases will not justify relief under the Statute. *In re Lord de Clifford's Estate* (1900), 2 Ch. 707.

Sec. 31 of the Act is a relieving section, and does not impose a statutory obligation upon trustees to take a valuation, and the neglect to do so does not exclude them from the benevolent operation of section 37. *Palmer v. Emerson* (1911), 1 Ch. 758.

Money was advanced by executors to their solicitors to pay necessary debts and disbursements, and for other administration purposes, in reliance on the solicitors' statements that these sums were required for these purposes, and the solicitors did not apply all the moneys received in such payments. The Court found the executors had acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused for making the payments in reliance on the solicitors' statements. *In re Lord de Clifford's Estate* (1900), 2 Ch. 707.

So executors acting honestly and reasonably, upon a mistaken construction of a will, where the trial Judge took the same view of it as they did, were relieved. *Henning v. Maclean* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 169.

One of three executors was a solicitor, and the will provided that in the administration and management of the estate he should be entitled to professional remuneration. The testator had perfect confidence in the solicitor, who up to the time of his death was reputed to be a person of integrity and wealthy. The whole management of the estate was left to the solicitor, and at his death it was found he had, without the knowledge of his co-executors, misappropriated moneys of the estate, and that his own estate was insolvent. The evidence shewed that it was the intention of the testator that the solicitor should continue to manage the estate after his death just as he had managed it in the testator's lifetime, and this intention was communicated by the testator to the executor Denne. Held, that the executor Denne acted honestly and reasonably and was relieved. *Dover v. Denne* (1902), 3 O. L. R. 664.

An executor invested \$1,500 in the stock of the Elgin Loan and Savings Co., and owing to the failure of the company the money was lost to the estate. The Chancellor found that the executor had acted honestly and reasonably as a trustee in making the investment and that his estate ought to be relieved under the Act. A Divisional Court affirmed the judgment. Meredith, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said:—

“This is, no doubt, a very hard case upon the unfortunate plaintiffs, but the statute which the learned Chancellor applied was passed for the very purpose of relieving executors and trustees, who perform very often a very thankless duty, and onerous at the same time, from the obligations under which they rested at law for breaches of trust. I think that in this country that statute ought to be very liberally applied for the

purpose of relieving an executor or other trustee who has acted in good faith and reasonably.

"The learned Chancellor, upon a review of the facts of this case, has come to the conclusion that the trustee acted reasonably in relying upon the advice of Mr. McLean, a prominent citizen and professional man, residing in the city of St. Thomas. There was, at the time the investment was made, not the slightest reason to doubt that the security was an excellent one, from the revenue point of view as well as the substantial character of the investment itself.

"The case of *Perrins v. Bellamy* (1899), 1 Ch. 797, is a direct authority in support of the judgment of the learned Chancellor, unless this case can be distinguished upon the ground that Mr. McLean occupied the position of vendor of the stock, as well as that of solicitor for the executor, and I do not think that it can be so distinguished.

"The executor was a farmer having probably very little knowledge of that kind of business, and I do not think it would be reasonable to say that he should have been aware that it was an improper or unwise thing for him to take the advice, as I have said he did, of a prominent business man of high repute, simply because that man was the vendor of the stock." *Weir v. Jackson* (1905), 5 O. W. R. 281."

It does not appear whether this Loan Co. was one of those in the stock of which a trustee is authorized to invest money pursuant to sec. 29. If not then the decision would seem to go the length of holding that an executor may be relieved where the investment was not authorized by the will or the statute if he acted honestly and reasonably. This would appear to be not in accordance with some of the English decisions hereinafter referred to.

Section 37 of the Trustee Act is not confined to cases where the breach of trust arises from some executive or administrative blunder, but may extend to cases where money is paid to a person not entitled

according to the true construction of the will. Thus in *In re Allsop* (1914), 1 Ch. 1, the trustees acting upon the erroneous advice of their solicitor as to the effect of the will, paid the income to a person not entitled. Warrington, J., took the view that relief ought to be confined to cases where there has been an error merely of administration, and ought not to be extended to a case where money due to one person has been wrongfully paid over to another. The Court of Appeal reversed this judgment. Cozens-Hardy, M.R., said: "I can see no ground for narrowing or limiting the application of the wide words of the section. 'Any breach of trust' are emphatic words. The statute was obviously designed to protect honest trustees, and ought not to be construed in a narrow sense. I shrink from holding that, where trustees have divided an estate between A. and B. after taking competent advice that A. and B. are alone entitled, they cannot plead this section in answer to a subsequent claim by C. So to hold would be to render the relief given by the section almost nugatory. There have, however, been several authorities to which it is necessary to refer. Kekewich, J., in *Davis v. Hutchings* (1907), 1 Ch. 365, says: 'If a trustee has, without any default of his own, employed a defaulting agent, whom he believed to be a competent man, to do certain work, and, whether competent or not, the agent turns out to be fraudulent and gets the trustee into a scrape, the trustee cannot shelter himself behind that. Why ought he to be let off? A trustee who employs an agent must, according to the ordinary rules of law, be responsible for the acts of the agent. I do not believe it was the intention of the Legislature that he should be let off that. This case occurs to me: A question arises on the construction of a will whether, on a gift to nephews and nieces, the nephews and nieces of the wife as well as of the testator are intended to be included. The trustee takes the opinion of eminent counsel, and is advised that the class is restricted to the nephews and nieces of the

testator. No doubt he might take the opinion of the Court, and perhaps be held liable for omitting to take it; but does the taking of the opinion of eminent counsel save him from any liability if, in the event, it be determined that the nephews and nieces of the wife, on the proper construction, are included in the gift? I cannot conceive that the Act was intended to apply to a case of that sort.' With great respect I am unable to accept this view. The decision upon the facts of that particular case may have been right, but the general principles thus laid down cannot, I think, be supported. It is somewhat strange that Kekewich, J., in support of his view referred to a case in the Privy Council of *National Trustees Co. of Australia v. General Finance Co.* (1905), A. C. 373, which turned upon a section of a Colonial Act corresponding with the section now under discussion. There a company, whose business it was to act as trustees for reward, divided an estate wrongly upon the advice of their solicitor. It was first held that the advice of the solicitor was not a defence to the action, and the Court then proceeded to consider all the circumstances and in the exercise of their discretion declined to relieve the trustees. In my opinion that case is an authority that the Court has jurisdiction to relieve when payment has been made to a wrong person, although the Court declined to exercise that jurisdiction, otherwise the inquiry into the circumstances would have been irrelevant. In *In re Kay* (1897), 2 Ch. 518, Romer, J., took a wider view and held that executors, who had paid beneficiaries certain sums which an unpaid creditor sought to make them liable for, were entitled to be relieved. It is true that this was not a question of the construction of a written document, but it was in some respects stronger, for the creditor had a claim prior to any of the beneficiaries. Parker, J., in *In re Mackay* (1911), 1 Ch. 307, used language which I respectfully desire to adopt: 'If an ordinary business man might reasonably entertain a particular view of the con-

struction of the instrument and the action of the trustee would have been justified if that view had been the true one, that trustee cannot be said to have acted unreasonably merely because this view of the construction of the instrument is wrong. Even where a trustee has distributed an estate on an erroneous construction of a will he has been relieved under the Act.' It may be that there is no reported case in which this has been done, but in the opinion of all the members of the Court this may be done in a proper case. Warrington, J., held that the Act has no application where a trustee has misconceived his duty and paid moneys to a person not entitled. With great respect I think he was wrong in this. The jurisdiction is from its very width one which must be exercised with great caution. It certainly is not enough for a trustee to say 'I thought A. B. entitled and I paid him accordingly.' He cannot be considered to have acted reasonably if he has neglected to obtain skilled advice. In considering what is reasonable, regard must be had to the estate of which he is trustee. In a large estate it may be only reasonable that he should consult counsel of the first rank or apply by originating summons for the direction of the Court, whereas it would not be reasonable to insist upon all this where the estate is small."

Where Relief not Granted.

Where loans were made on unauthorized securities. *Chapman v. Browne* (1902), 1 Ch. 785; *In re Dive* (1909), 1 Ch. 328; *In re Turner* (1897), 1 Ch. 536.

Where trustees paid the share of a beneficiary to their solicitor in reliance upon his statement that he was the assignee of the share and without calling upon him to prove his title. The solicitor had an assignment, but it created a prior charge which would have been discovered if they had examined the deed of assignment. *Davis v. Hutchings* (1907), 1 Ch. 356.

Trustees, under the advice of their solicitors, paid two-thirds of a fund to the children, when in fact the whole fund was the property of the husband. The fact that such payment was made through the bad advice of the solicitors was held no defence. And where the trustees had made no attempt to replace the fund in whole or in part, nor explained the reason for their abstention, the Court refused relief. "It is very material circumstance that the appellants are a limited joint stock company, formed for the purpose of earning profits for their shareholders; part of their business is to act as trustees and executors; and they are paid for their services in so acting by a commission which the law of the Colony authorizes them to retain out of the trust funds administered by them, in addition to their costs. . . . Without saying that the remedial provisions of the section should never be applied to a trustee in the position of the appellants, their Lordships think it is a circumstance to be taken into account." *National Trust Co. of Australasia v. General Finance Co. of Australasia* (1905), A. C. 373. But the liability of a trustee would appear not to be increased by the fact that he is paid for his services. *Jobson v. Palmer* (1893), 1 Ch. 71; *Shepherd v. Harris* (1905), 2 Ch. at p. 318.

In the matter of investments, *prima facie* the provisions of the Trustee Act (sections 28-32) constitute a standard by which reasonable conduct is to be judged, although non-compliance with these requirements is not necessarily a fatal obstacle to an application for relief. A trustee in lending money on mortgage security, should not act upon the opinion of his solicitor alone in a question of the value of the security, nor on the opinion of a valuer who acts for the mortgagor alone; and where this was done the Court refused relief. *In re Stuart* (1897), 2 Ch. 583; *Shaw v. Cates* (1909), 1 Ch. 389.

So where executors distributed the assets without proper advertisement for creditors' claims the Court

refused relief. "I think it would be most dangerous to hold that an executor acted reasonably and ought fairly to be excused, if he distributed the assets among the beneficiaries without taking the steps always taken by the Court and by careful executors, to give an opportunity to creditors and others having claims on the estate to bring forward their claims." *Stewart v. Snyder*, 30 O. R. 110, 27 A. R. 423.

A trustee who does nothing, accepts without enquiry what is said by his co-executor, and is satisfied with any explanation given by him, does not act "honestly" within the meaning of the Act. *In re Second East Dulwich Building Society*, 68 L. J. Ch. 196. Even though the co-executor is a solicitor and has been nominated by the testator. *Re Turner* (1897), 1 Ch. 536.

A testator died in 1878 owing 125 shares of Ontario Bank stock of the par value of \$5,000. The executors had power "to invest the proceeds in such manner as they shall deem more advisable." In 1882 the par value of the stock was reduced by one-half; in 1896 it was further reduced, and subsequently an order was made for the winding-up of the bank. The Court held that the will authorized the retention of the shares as an investment, but the executors had not acted reasonably in not selling after 1882. *Re Nicholls, Hall v. Wildman* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 206.

An executrix without consulting a solicitor, but on the advice of a commission agent who had been a friend and adviser of her deceased husband, postponed for fourteen years the sale of some shares instead of selling them within the year after the testator's death. Her conduct was held not reasonable and relief was refused. *Re Baker* (1898), 77 L. T. 712.

In *In re Brookes, Brookes v. Taylor* (1914), 1 Ch. 558, a trustee held property in trust for two families of beneficiaries. In part it consisted of a mortgage which came into the hands of the trustee on the death of the

testator, and on which interest was regularly paid. There was nothing to suggest that the security was in jeopardy, but as a matter of fact the mortgagor had allowed the mortgaged premises to fall into decay and become practically worthless as a security. The trustee, without inspecting the mortgaged premises (which were ten miles distant), or securing a new valuation, appropriated this mortgage at par to one of the families. In this action it was sought to make the trustee liable for his breach of trust in handing over practically the entire estate to one family. The trustee relied on *Rawsthorne v. Rowley* (1909), 1 Ch. 409, where it was held that where you are dealing with an authorized investment there is no obligation or duty on the part of trustees to make periodical or further investigations as to either the title of the security or the solvency or sufficiency of the mortgagor. Astbury, J., said: "I do not, and could not, decide anything contrary to that judgment. The present defendant is not attacked for retaining the mortgage, but because he has chosen without any inquiry as to the value of the securities to hand over what was in fact the whole estate to one family, leaving the other family with a security of no value whatever. For this breach of trust he is clearly liable, and I do not think he has acted reasonably and ought fairly to be excused under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896."

As to the power of executors to appropriate specific assets to legatees or heirs, see *In re Lepine* (1891), 1 Ch. 210.

Trustees had power to invest in such securities "as they should think fit." They invested upon the security of debentures constituting a floating security on the undertaking and assets of a limited company, and for making the investment one of the trustees was paid a commission or bribe of £300. The other trustee made the investment *bona fide* and believing it to be good; he had died, and the action was against the living trus-

tee and the executors of the deceased trustee. Kekewich, J., held that the large discretionary powers contained in the words "shall think fit" must be read as meaning "shall honestly think fit," and that in the absence of evidence that the deceased trustee did not act honestly his estate was not liable; but, with regard to the other trustee, the circumstance of his having accepted a bribe precluded the idea that he had acted honestly, and he was held liable for the loss of the estate and, in addition, was bound to account for the £300. *In re Smith, Smith v. Thompson* (1896), 1 Ch. 71.

CHAPTER XXXII.

PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY.

Sections 35 and 36 of the Trustee Act limit the extent of the liability of trustees in certain cases, and deserve attention. Section 35 is as follows:

35. A trustee shall be chargeable only for money and securities actually received by him, notwithstanding his signing any receipt for the sake of conformity, and shall be answerable and accountable only for his own acts, receipts, neglects or defaults, and not for those of any other trustee, nor for any banker, broker or other person with whom any trust money or securities may be deposited, nor for the insufficiency or deficiency of any securities, nor for any other loss, unless the same happens through his own wilful default; and may reimburse himself or pay or discharge out of the trust property all expenses incurred in or about the execution of his trust or powers.

This section is from Lord St. Leonard's Act, and is now embodied in sec. 24 of the English Trustee Act, 1893. It adds little or nothing to the security of a trustee, as before the Act the provisions of this section were virtually implied. *King v. Hilton*, 29 Gr. 381, 384. The effect of the section seems to be to shift the onus of proof. If a case comes *prima facie* within this section, the onus is thrown on the person attacking the trustee to shew that he is liable. *Re Brier*, 26 Ch. D. 238.

In most of the cases it will be found that the result hinged on whether "wilful default" was proved. If wilful default on the part of the trustee is once shewn, and loss has happened to the estate by reason of such default, the section affords no protection. In several cases "wilful default" has been defined. Thus in *Elliott v. Turner*, 13 Sim. 477, 60 R. R. 381, it was said

that neglect or default may have been wilful though it may have been unintentional and have arisen from forgetfulness. Wilful means—not arising from external circumstances over which there is no control—and therefore the default may be wilful, although merely passive. And in *Connelly v. Connelly*, 17 Ir. Ch. R. 208, it is said that mere negligence or imprudence may be wilful default. It does not imply deliberate or intentional default. In *Blount v. O'Connor*, 17 Ir. L. R. 620, it is said that wilful default is improper failure to realize assets, and that mere loss without negligence would not be wilful default.

“Default is purely a relative term, just like negligence. It means nothing more, nothing less, than not doing what is reasonable under the circumstances—not doing something which you ought to do, having regard to the relations which you occupy towards the other persons interested in the transaction. The other word which it is sought to define is ‘wilful.’ That is a word of familiar use in every branch of law, and although in some branches of the law it may have a special meaning, it generally, as used in courts of law, implies nothing blameable, but merely that the person of whose action or default the expression is used, is a free agent, and that what has been done arises from the spontaneous action of his will. It amounts to nothing more than this, that he knows what he is doing, and intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent.” Bowen, L.J., *In re Young and Harston's Contract*, 31 Ch. D. 174.

A testatrix left £150 to her cousin, “J. G. of Vancouver, B.C.” J. G.’s sister having informed the executors that his address was “Portland, Oregon, U.S.A.,” they despatched a banker’s draft to J. G., to that address without further inquiry. The money having got into the hands of the wrong person. Held, that the executors had not acted with that care that might reasonably be expected from a careful man in the prudent discharge of his own business; that they

were consequently guilty of negligence amounting to wilful default; and that they must make good the loss out of their own pockets. *In re Gunning. Little v. Governors of County Down Infirmary*, [1918] 1 I. R. 221.

In *King v. Hilton*, 29 Gr. 381, H. and C. were executors. H. took upon himself the actual management of the estate with the knowledge and consent of, but not under any express agreement with, C. H. applied a sum of money to his own use, without C.'s knowledge. The will contained an indemnity clause to the effect of sec. 35. It was held that C. was not liable for the sum appropriated by H.

An executor is not liable for a loss under these circumstances, provided he has not intentionally or otherwise contributed to it; the testator's misplaced confidence as to one shall not prejudice the other. He is not responsible for the assets come to the hands of his co-executor. If indeed he does any act, for instance, handing over the assets in his hands, to his co-executor, who then misapplies them, he will be generally responsible for them, just as if he had handed them over to a stranger. But if he is merely passive, by not obstructing his co-executor from getting the assets into his possession, he is not responsible. If by *agreement* among the executors, one is to manage one part of the estate, and the other another part, each is answerable for the whole. Here each receives a part by agreement with the other; and it is the same as if both had received. *Gill v. The Attorney-General*, Hardr. 314. And so where all join in the sale of a testator's goods, and one was allowed to receive the money, the others were liable. *Burrows v. Walls*, 5 D. M. & G. 233, 104 R. R. 95. And where several took out administration to an intestate, and united in appointing one to be the acting administrator, and directed the debtors to pay their debts to him, and he became insolvent, the others were made liable for the loss to the estate. *Lees v. Sanderson*, 4 Sim. 28. In all these

cases there was an active intermeddling with the estate, and the defaulter had been enabled to receive the assets by their agreement for that purpose.

If having the means of knowledge by the exercise of ordinary vigilance, one executor stands by and permits a breach of trust to be committed by a co-executor, he is liable. *Sovereign v. Sovereign*, 15 Gr. 559.

In *McCarter v. McCarter*, 7 O. R. 243, the will contained an indemnity clause providing "that each of the executors should be responsible for his or her acts only, and irresponsible for any loss unless through wilful neglect or default." The three executors sold real estate, and C., one of the executors, who was entitled to the annual income of the proceeds, took the most active part in the management of the estate, and employed a solicitor who received the purchase money. Both of the other executors lived at a distance, but they were aware of the employment of the solicitor and that the purchase money was in his hands. The money remained in the solicitor's hands several years, when he absconded and there was a loss to the estate of \$1,960. Boyd, C., held all three executors liable. The co-executors knew the money was in the hands, or under the control of their co-trustee to be invested, and they allowed it to remain for years without any inquiry or any assurance that the trust was being properly administered. This was wilful neglect and default which they would not have been guilty of in the management of their own affairs.

McCarter v. McCarter was discussed and distinguished in *Re Crowter*, 10 O. R. 159, where all the executors in some degree acted in their executorial capacity, but by tacit consent one of them took the active management of the estate and received the proceeds of a sale of land. H., one of the executors, joined in the conveyance for conformity, but did not receive any of the purchase money, and did not know there was any balance in the hands of the active execu-

tor after paying debts, etc. It was held that H. was not guilty of wilful default and not liable.

Archer v. Severn, 13 O. R. 316, was before the same Judge (Ferguson, J.), who heard *Re Crowter*, and when the latter decision was pressed upon him he said: "In that case I was somewhat troubled by authorities as to the rule where one executor has enabled another person wrongfully to get money." In *Archer v. Severn* one of two executors used a portion of the personal estate in his own business. His co-executor knew of this and took no steps to have the personal estate placed in better custody and invested according to the directions contained in the will. He was held to have acquiesced in the acts of the other executor and jointly liable. So in *Bacon v. Clarke*, 3 My. & Cr. 294, a trustee was held liable for loss when he had allowed trust money to remain in the hands of his firm, though there was a provision protecting him, except in case of wilful default or neglect.

In *Robdard v. Cooke*, 36 L. T. N. S. 504, 25 W. R. 555, the will contained a clause providing that the trustees should be responsible only for such moneys as they should actually receive, and not for any involuntary loss of any part of the trust funds. Two trustees received certain funds which were duly deposited and credited to the trust account. One trustee was, however, given power to draw upon this account, and drew and misapplied a considerable sum. It was held that the clause in the will did not relieve the co-trustee as the loss was not involuntary but had arisen from his giving the defaulting trustee improper power.

In *McPhaden v. Bacon*, 13 Gr. 591, S., one of two executors, was indebted to the estate on a mortgage given to the testator. B., the other executor, was aware of this, but allowed S. to retain the mortgage deed and took no steps to compel payment, and S. executed a discharge of his own mortgage and registered it. B.'s duty was to secure the asset, and to realize it, and not leave it with his co-executor, whose duty

and interest were in direct conflict, and not having done this he was liable. See also *Candler v. Tillett*, 22 Beav. 257; 111 R. R. 361, where the facts, and the result, were somewhat similar.

It is the duty of executors to keep a check on each other's conduct, and an executor is chargeable with neglect in allowing a part of the estate to remain outstanding in an improper state of investment, whether the party in whose hands it is outstanding is a co-executor or a stranger. In *Styles v. Guy*, 1 Mac. & G. 422, 84 R. R. 111, two of three executors knew there were unsettled accounts between the testator and the third executor, and they had reason to believe that the latter was indebted in a considerable sum to the estate, but they took no effectual steps to compel him to account and pay or secure the balance. Several years after the death of the testator this executor became insolvent and the other executors were unable to prove that an earlier attempt to recover the money would have been fruitless, and were held liable for the loss to the estate.

A special indemnity clause will often protect an executor from liability for the acts of his co-executor, but it will not protect him from liability for a breach of his duty. *Knox v. McKinnon*, 13 A. C. 753; *Rae v. Meek*, 14 A. C. 558; *Burritt v. Burritt*, 27 Gr. 143, 29 Gr. 321. In the last case the testator expressed the fullest confidence in C. and directed the other executors to be guided entirely by the judgment of C. as to the sale, disposal and re-investment of certain securities and declared that his trustees should not be responsible for loss occasioned thereby. Held, this did not authorize the re-investment of moneys in foreign securities.

In *Wilkins v. Hogg*, 3 Giff. 116, the clause was "that any trustee who shall pay to his co-trustee, or shall do or concur in any act enabling his co-trustee to receive any moneys, shall not be obliged to see to the

application thereof; nor shall such trustee be subsequently rendered responsible by an express notice or intimation of the actual misapplication of the same moneys." One trustee misapplied moneys which his co-trustee had enabled him to receive, but it was held he was saved from liability, though otherwise his negligence would have rendered him responsible. This case was followed in *Pass v. Dundas*, 43 L. T. 665.

In *Candler v. Tillett*, 22 Beav. 257, 111 R. R. 351, it was held that if an executor does an act which enables his co-trustee to obtain sole possession of money belonging to the estate, and the money is afterwards misapplied by the co-executor, both are liable for the loss. But this proposition must be read "who unnecessarily does an act," and such an act is not "unnecessary" if it is done in the regular course of business in administering the property. *In re Gasquoine* (1894), 1 Ch. 470.

In *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265, 30 R. R. 165, two trustees gave to a third trustee a power of attorney to sell certain stock, and he sold the stock and misapplied the proceeds. They were held liable though there was a provision in the trust deed that the trustees should be chargeable only with moneys they respectively actually received, and that one or more of them should not be answerable or accountable for the other or others of them or for involuntary losses. See also *Bone v. Cook*, McClel. 168, 28 R. R. 697.

In *Terrell v. Matthews*, 1 Mac. & G. 433, 84 R. R. 120, it is said that if money be required for the payment of debts or legacies, one executor is safe in joining in the sale of stock or other property, and permitting another executor to receive the proceeds for that purpose, as in *Hovey v. Plakeman*, 4 Ves. 596; but if he joins in such sales when the money is not required, and he had not reasonable grounds for believing that it was not so required, he is liable for the money so received by his co-executor. *Chambers v. Minchen*, 7 Ves. 193, 6 R. R. 111; *Shipbrook v. Hinch-*

inbrook, 11 Ves. 252, 8 R. R. 138; *Price v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 319, 8 R. R. 164.

An executor who sanctions or adopts improper accounts rendered to the beneficiaries by a defaulting co-executor becomes responsible for the statements therein contained. *Horton v. Brocklehurst*, 29 Beav. 504, 131 R. R. 683. In this case the accounts were prepared by L., one of the executors, and they represented that one-third of the net income had been received by the executors and invested by them. The truth was the money had been allowed to remain in the hands of L. until he became bankrupt. The defendant (the other executor) had nothing to do with making up the accounts, and the moneys never came to his possession, but he was present at meetings when the accounts were presented and discussed, and defended the accounts. It is to be noted that the defendant's liability is not placed on the ground of wilful default or anything of that description; but on the ground that the accounts was an admission by the executors to their *cestuis que trust* that they had sums of money in their hands which they ought to have had, and that these sums were retained by them for investment.

Mickleburgh v. Parker, 17 Gr. 503, is an important case because of the common practice, in Ontario, of one of several executors doing all the active work of administration without any supervision whatever by his co-executors. A. and B. were joint trustees, and had trust money to their joint credit. A., the "acting trustee," from time to time brought cheques to B. already signed by A. for the signature of B. B. made no inquiry as to how the funds were to be applied, and A. misapplied them. It was held that B. was liable—that the general rule applied, that trustees must account for the proper application of money in their hands. It was also held that it was no defence on behalf of B. that he only became trustee at the request of the *cestui que trust*, and on the representation that

his name only was wanted, and that A. would do all the business. "It is not uncommon to hear one of several trustees spoken of as the acting trustee, but the Court knows no such distinction; all who accept the office are, in the eyes of the law, acting trustees:" p. 506.

C. and M. were co-trustees. C. allowed M. to have the entire management of the property, and apart from signing releases when he was asked to do so by M., and from time to time asking what had been done with the money, did not interfere in any way. It was held by the Full Court of Nova Scotia that C. was personally responsible for the funds of the estate misappropriated by M. *Crowe v. Craig*, 33 C. L. J. 165.

M. and L. were executors, M. having been the testator's solicitor, and continuing to act as solicitor for himself and his co-trustee. M. represented to L. that he had made a loan on satisfactory security, and L. joined in signing a cheque payable to the order of the alleged mortgagor. M. forged the signature of the payee and absconded. Rose, J., reversed the judgment of the Master-in-Ordinary, and held that L. was not liable. The testator had by appointing M. as an executor shewn that he trusted him as a proper person to act in a fiduciary capacity, and, *semble*, L. had also a right to trust him. *Re McLatchie*, 30 O. R. 179. See also *Dover v. Denne* (1892), 3 O. L. R. 664, and other cases cited under "Honestly and Reasonably."

Where one of two executors resides abroad he is justified in delegating to his co-executor the right to receive money owing to the estate. *In re Huntley*, 7 C. L. Times, 251.

Notwithstanding the provision of section 35 as to depositing trust moneys in a bank, this does not protect an executor who deposits such moneys as an investment and not as a deposit. *Rehden v. Wesley*, 29 Beav. 213, 131 R. R. 530.

36.—(1) Where a trustee commits a breach of trust, at the instigation or request or with the consent

in writing of a beneficiary, the Supreme Court may make such order as to the Court seems just for impounding all or any part of the interest of the beneficiary in the trust estate by way of indemnity to the trustee or person claiming through him.

(2) This section shall apply notwithstanding that the beneficiary is a married woman entitled to her separate use and restrained from anticipation.

This section corresponds with section 45 of the Trustee Act, 1893. It appears to embody what was formerly the rule in equity. In the earlier cases the Court held that the limit of the impounding was the advantage derived by the beneficiary who instigated the breach of trust. *Raby v. Ridehalgh*, 7 D. M. & G. 104, 109 R. R. 46. And in *In re Somerset* (1894), 1 Ch. 231, Davey, L.J., said he could not find any words in the section which have the effect of directing the Court to exercise the statutory jurisdiction on principles different from those on which it acted before the statute: p. 275,

As a general rule a *cestui que trust* who consents to a breach of trust by a trustee cannot complain, as between himself and the trustee, of loss occasioned by that breach of trust. This rule is quite independent of sec. 36 of the Trustee Act; and the rule does not require the consent to the breach of trust to be in writing. *Fletcher v. Collis* (1905), 2 Ch. 24.

In *Bolton v. Curre* (1895), 1 Ch. 544, Romer, J., said this section was intended to enlarge the power of the Court as to indemnifying trustees, so as to give greater relief to trustees, and was not intended and did not operate to curtail the previously existing rights and remedies of trustees, or alter the law except by giving greater power to the Court.

The words "in writing" do not govern or apply to all the three antecedents. They apply only to "consent," and not to "instigation" or "request." Where a trustee for a married woman, a tenant for life restrained from anticipation, advanced part of the

capital to her upon her verbal request and statement that the money was needed to prevent her home from being sold, it was held that the trustee, upon making good to the estate the money so advanced, ought to be indemnified out of the income payable to his *cestui que trust*. *Griffiths v. Hughes* (1892), 3 Ch. 105; *In re Somerset* (1894), 1 Ch. p. 265.

The discretion which the section confers upon the Court of ordering that the interest of the beneficiary be impounded by way of indemnity, ought to be exercised in cases where both the trustee and the instigating beneficiary were aware of the facts which constitute the breach of trust. *Griffiths v. Hughes, supra*.

In *In re Somerset, supra*, an investment of trust funds on mortgage of property of insufficient value was made by the trustees at the instigation and request and with the consent in writing of the tenant for life, but it did not appear that he intended to be a party to any breach of trust, or to an investment without proper inquiry, and in effect he left it to the trustees to determine whether the investment was a proper one for the amount to be advanced. It was held the trustees were not entitled to the benefit of this section. Lindley, L.J., said: "In order to bring a case within this section the *cestui que trust* must instigate, or request, or consent in writing to some act or omission which is in itself a breach of trust, and not to some act or omission which only becomes a breach of trust by reason of want of care on the part of the trustees. If a *cestui que trust* instigates, requests, or consents in writing to an investment not in terms authorized by the power of investment, he clearly falls within the section; and in such case his ignorance or forgetfulness of the terms of the power would not, I think, protect him—at all events, not unless he could give some good reason why it should, *e.g.*, that it was caused by the trustee. But if all that a *cestui que trust* does is to instigate, request, or consent in writing to an investment which is authorized by

the terms of the power, the case is, I think, very different. He has a right to expect that the trustees will act with proper care in making the investment, and if they do not they cannot throw the consequences on him unless they can shew that he instigated, requested, or consented in writing to their non-performance of their duty in this respect:" p. 265. To the same effect are the remarks of A. L. Smith, L.J., at p. 270.

The discretion now given to the Court is a judicial discretion, and a trustee ought not to be allowed to deliberately commit a breach of trust at the request or with the consent of a beneficiary in the hope and expectation that the Court will afterwards assist him. *Bolton v. Curre* (1895), 1 Ch. 544.

A trustee, who at the time a breach of trust is committed, merely declines an offer to take a mortgage of the beneficiary's interest by way of security for the breach of trust, does not *per se* waive or abandon his equity. *Ib.*

The Court is not bound to impound the interest of the *cestui que trust*, and will not do so if it would be unjust. *Mara v. Browne* (1895), 2 Ch. p. 94—reversed but on another ground (1896), 1 Ch. 199.

It is the duty of trustees to make balances in their hands productive; and a trustee allowing trust money to remain in a bank will be charged interest thereon; but a *cestui que trust* cannot make a trustee liable for losses occasioned by a breach of trust which he has authorized and consented to. *Chillingworth v. Chambers* (1896), 1 Ch. 685.

Where trustees settled their accounts and paid all the beneficiaries except H., whose share was withheld pending his accounting for moneys of the estate in his hands, and was kept for some years lying in a bank without interest, the trustees were ordered, on the application of H., to bring the moneys into Court without interest. If the trustees were wrong in not placing the moneys where they would produce interest, they had acted honestly and ought fairly to be excused. *Re McNeill Estate* (1911), 19 W. L. R. 691 (B.C.).

CHAPTER XXXIII.

CAPITAL AND INCOME.

Where a will contains a trust for the benefit of several persons in succession, and the trust property is of a wasting nature, or is a future reversionary interest, the trustee must convert the property into property of a permanent and immediately profitable character, unless: (1) the will contains a direction or implication to the contrary; or, (2) the will confers a discretion on the trustee to postpone such conversion, which he *bona fide* and impartially exercises; or, (3) the property in question is specifically settled.

This is known as the rule in *Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth* (7 Ves. 137, 6 R. R. 86), and is only a corollary of the principle that a trustee must act impartially between the beneficiaries. For if wasting property, like leaseholds and terminable annuities, were to be retained, the tenant for life would profit at the expense of the remainderman; and if reversionary property were not converted, the remainderman would profit at the expense of the tenant for life.

A power to retain any portion of the testator's property in the same state in which it should be at his decease, or to sell and convert the same as the trustee shall think fit, takes the case out of the rule. *Gray v. Siggers*, 15 Ch. D. 74; so too a devise to trustees upon trust to sell "when in their discretion they should deem it advisable." *Miller v. Miller*, 13 Eq. 263. Nor does the rule apply where wasting property is given specifically, in the strict sense of the term. *In re Beaufoy's Estate*, 1 Sm. & G. 20, 96 R. R. 300.

The reason of the rule in *Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth* is not generally applicable to an absolute gift subject to an executory limitation. *In re Bland* (1899), 2 Ch. 336; and see *Re Kohler* (1916), 11 O. W. N. 399.

In Underhill on Trusts, the duty of a trustee in relation to the payment of outgoings out of corpus and income respectively, is thus summarized: "Subject to the directions of the settlement, and of particular statutes—(a) The corpus bears capital charges, and the income bears the interest on them:

(b). The income bears current expenses incident to the possessory ownership of property except the costs of repairs.

(c) Where repairs are necessary, or fines become payable for the renewal of leases, application should be made by the trustees to the Court, which will give directions for the raising of money to pay for them in such a way as to distribute the burden equitably between income and corpus.

(d) All costs incident to the protection of the trust property, including legal proceedings, are borne by the corpus, unless they relate exclusively to the tenant for life."

Capital charges which must be borne by the corpus include an annuity charged on the land. In such a case the annuity must be valued, and the tenant for life pays an amount equal to the interest on the valuation at five per cent. per annum. *Jones v. Mason*, 39 Ch. D. 534.

Where the gift is of an annuity, and the disposition of the estate is subject thereto, the charge is upon the corpus. On the other hand, if the gift is of an annuity payable out of income only, the corpus is not charged. *Re Irwin*, 3 O. W. N. 937.

Arrears of interest on incumbrances, accrued in the lifetime of the testator, are a charge on the corpus, the life tenant merely paying the interest on them. *Revel v. Watkinson*, 1 Ves. 93; *Playfair v. Cooper*, 17 Beav. 187, 99 R. R. 90.

Calls on shares, which form a part of the trust estate, are payable out of corpus. *Todd v. Moorehouse*, 19 Eq. 69.

A testator gave his property, including a business, to his executors on trust to sell and pay the income to his wife for life and after her death to the plaintiff. Shortly after the death of the testator P., one of the executors, purchased the business at a valuation. Bacon, V.C., set aside the sale as illegal and held that the profits made by P. in the business must be treated as capital and that the widow was only entitled to the income of it. There was an appeal and the case was compromised, but the Court expressed an opinion that, the sale being set aside, the widow was entitled to the profits as income. *In re Norrington, Brindley v. Partidge*, 13 Ch. D. 654.

By a will the widow was directed to sell and convert into money the testator's business, and she was given the interest on the fund to be realized from the sale. To properly realize the estate it was necessary to carry on the business for some time after the death of the testator. It was held that the executrix was entitled to a reasonable amount for her services for carrying on the business which resulted in large profits, and interest for the period during which the business was carried on to be computed at a reasonable rate on the amount of capital which the business represented at the testator's death, but not to the entire profits as interest; the surplus profits to be treated as belonging to the corpus of the estate. *Re Bean Estate*, 23 D. L. R. 335.

Where settled residue comprised capital left in a business, the expenses of a yearly audit and stock-taking which had been stipulated for by the testator, were held to be payable out of capital. Lindley, L.J., said that an expense of this kind is a part of the costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by the executor in the performance of his duty—that it is for the benefit of the whole estate and should not be thrown wholly on the tenant for life—it is not in the nature of an annual outgoing, *i.e.*, some payment which must be made to secure the income of the property. *In re*

Bennett (1896), 1 Ch. 778. The practical effect of throwing this expense on the whole estate was that the tenant for life lost the income of the sums so expended.

The costs of appointing new trustees come out of the capital. *Carter v. Sebright*, 26 Beav. p. 377, 122 R. R. p. 147.

The costs of investing trust funds are payable out of capital. *Horlock v. Smith*, 17 Beav. 572, 99 R. R. 294.

Costs incurred by a tenant for life in proceedings taken for the protection of the settled estate have been allowed by the Court out of capital. *Re De la Warr*, 16 Ch. D. 587; but not costs of proceedings in respect of his life interest, or for his sole benefit. *Croggan v. Allen*, 22 Ch. D. 101.

Where a business is vested in trustees for successive tenants for life and remaindermen, the net losses in one year's trading must under ordinary circumstances, be made good out of the profits of subsequent years, and not out of capital. *Upton v. Brown*, 26 Ch. D. 588. But this rule does not apply where there is no direction to carry on the business, but it is merely carried on temporarily until it can be sold profitably. In such cases the annual loss or profit ought to be apportioned between capital and income, by calculating the sum which, put out at interest at five per cent. per annum on the day when the business ought to have been sold, if it could have been, and accumulated at compound interest, with rests, would together with such interest and accumulations, be equivalent at the end of each year to the amount of the loss or profit sustained or made during that year, and then charging the sum so ascertained against, or crediting it to, capital, and charging the rest of the loss against, or crediting the rest of the profit to, income. *Re Hengler* (1893), 1 Ch. 586.

Where a will contains a power to postpone the sale of the testator's business, and until the sale the income is given to a person named, the absolute discretion given to the trustee to postpone the sale involves a power to carry on the business during the period of postponement. In *Re Crowther, Midgley v. Crowther* (1895), 2 Ch. 56, the trustees carried on the business for twenty-two years, paying the profits to the life-tenant and the Court refused to interfere. See also *In re Chancellor*, 26 Ch. D. 42. In *Smith v. Arnold* (1896), 1 Ch. 171, the Court refused to sanction a longer period than two years for carrying on the business where the will provided that the business was to be sold with all convenient speed.

In *Re Berkeley's Trusts*, 8 P. R. 193, the income on a \$72,000 estate was payable to the widow for life, and on her death to children. On an interim application to fix the executors' compensation it was contended, for the children, that for the present (at least) the income should bear all the burden of compensation. For the widow it was contended that the true principle was to pay the compensation, or the chief part, out of the corpus, and that in this way the burden would fall in the proper proportion on the tenant for life and remaindermen, as the income would be reduced in the same relative proportion as the corpus. Blake, V.C., allowed \$400 for taking over the trust estate, obtaining proper transfers, opening books, determining investments, etc.; and a further sum of \$50 per annum for general supervision of the estate, payment of taxes, insurance, etc. "These sums, amounting in all to \$1,000, must be borne by the corpus of the estate, as they represent charges for the preservation of the estate itself." On \$20,000 of income received the executors were allowed 4 per cent. payable out of income; and it was suggested that in the future this would not be unreasonable if the trustees charged against the income \$240, and against the corpus \$150, annually, for commission. The costs of the application were

ordered to be borne half by the corpus and half by the income.

The rule appears to be that ordinary outgoings of a recurring nature must be borne by the tenant for life in the absence of any provision in the will shewing a contrary intention. In *Vallambrosa Rubber Co. v. Inland Revenue*, 1910, S. C. 519, the Lord President said: "I do not say that this consideration is absolutely final and determinative, but in a rough way I think it is not a bad criterion of what is capital expenditure—as against what is income expenditure—to say that capital expenditure is anything that is going to be spent once and for all, and income expenditure is a thing that is going to recur every year." In a very recent case the Judge, referring to this observation, said: "I take it, and indeed both sides agree, that no stress is there laid upon the words 'every year:' the real test is between expenditure which is made to meet a continuous demand, as opposed to an expenditure which is made once for all." *Ounsworth v. Vickers* (1915), 3 K. B. 267, 273.

The costs of preparing and rendering a succession duty account in respect of the life-tenant's interest under a will, are payable out of income. *Cowley v. Wellesley*, 1 Eq. 656.

As between the beneficiaries a trustee's costs and expenses are generally payable out of corpus. *Powys v. Blagrove*, 4 DeG. M. & G. 448; *Carter v. Seabright*, 26 Beav. 374, 122 R. R. 147; *Re Wood's Trusts*, 11 R. 11 Eq. 155.

The charge of taxes is one of the things which should be paid by the tenant for life so as to protect the property for the remainderman. As between him and the remainderman the Court will not allow him to receive rents from part of the property while he allows taxes to accumulate in another part. *Re Denison*, 24 O. R. 197; *Re Armstrong* (1904), 3 O. W. R. 627.

A life-tenant is liable for all taxes imposed on the land: *Biscoe v. Van Bearle*, 6 Gr. 438; *Gray v. Hatch*,

18 Gr. 72; but not for repairs necessary to overcome dilapidations: *Patterson v. Central Loan and Savings Co.*, 29 O. R. 134; *Currie v. Currie* (1910), 20 O. L. R. 375; nor for insurance premiums: *In re Betty* (1899), 1 Ch. p. 829; *Re Cunningham* (1917), 12 O. W. N. 268.

A testator directed his executors to invest \$50,000 and pay the income to his widow for life. The estate consisted of income-producing securities of \$30,000, and a large amount of unproductive lands. Street, J., held the executors were bound to reserve sufficient productive assets to secure sufficient income to pay the taxes and the other necessary expenses, and the widow was entitled to a first charge on these lands for the income taken to pay taxes, and to the balance of the income from the productive assets, and to have the principal producing such balance set aside towards the fund of \$50,000 ultimately to be made up as the lands were sold according to the following rules:—As lands were sold the proceeds to be apportioned between capital and income by ascertaining the sum which put out at interest at five per cent. per annum at the expiration of one year from testator's death, and accumulated at compound interest with rests, would, with accumulations, have produced at the day of receipt, the amount actually received from the sale of the lands: the sum so ascertained to be treated as capital, and added to the sum therefore set apart towards the \$50,000: and the residue to be treated as income and paid over to the widow. *In re Cameron* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 756; *Re Clarke* (1903), 6 O. L. R. 551.

A tenant for life is not obliged to pay any part of the principal of incumbrances on the life estate; but he is liable, as between himself and the remainderman, to keep down the interest on all incumbrances out of the rents and profits of the estate. When an estate is settled subject to a charge of legacies, any interest payable on the legacies is payable out of income. *Milltown v. Trench*, 4 Cl. & F. 276.

Where trustees are directed to insure the trust property against loss or damage by fire, the premiums must be borne by income. *Re Redding* (1897), 1 Ch. 876: unless the property is unproductive and incapable of beneficial enjoyment by the tenant for life. *Lonsdale v. Berchtoldt*, 3 K. & J. 185, 112 R. R. 97. And see sec. 23 of the Trustee Act.

Where a settled estate is charged by the settlement with a life annuity, the tenant for life must keep down the instalments out of income, and is not entitled to have an annuity purchased out of capital to satisfy it: *Re Grant*, 52 L. J. Ch. 552; but if the income is insufficient, so that there are arrears at the annuitant's death, the life tenant is only bound to keep down the interest on arrears. *Prince v. Cooper*, 17 Beav. 187.

Where an annuity is charged on both the income and corpus of a residuary estate it is payable primarily out of the income; but if the income is insufficient in any one year to pay the annuity and the deficiency is paid out of the corpus, the tenant for life cannot be called upon to pay such deficiency out of the surplus income of any subsequent year. *In re Croxon, Ferrers v. Croxon* (1915), 2 Ch. 290.

Charges for the services of a guardian *ad litem*, appointed to represent persons unborn or unascertained having possible future interests in a trust fund, are to be charged to capital and not to income. *Re Loring* (1917), 227 Mass. 392.

If there is a simple bequest of an annuity there is no doubt but that the annuity must be paid in full, even though the income is not sufficient to pay the same. *Croly v. Weld*, 3 DeG. M. & G. 993. But the provisions of the will as to the payment of the annuity may show an intention, on the part of the testator, that the annuity shall come out of the income of the fund or estate, and not out of the capital. The general rule is, that if there be a clear gift of a life-interest and a reversion, and the estate proves insufficient, the life-tenant and the reversioner must bear the loss in

proportion to his respective interest; but if there is a gift of an annuity, and a residuary gift, the annuity must be paid in full, even though the capital be encroached upon: *Ib.* See Wms. Exrs. p. 1212, where the cases are collected.

Where an estate is settled by will charged with life annuities which the testator was personally liable to pay, the annuities must be capitalized, and the capitalized value treated as a charge on the inheritance. *Re Muffet*, 39 Ch. D. 534: the life-tenant being only bound to keep down the interest on the capitalized value. *Re Harrison*, 43 Ch. D. 55; *Re Bacon*, 62 L. J. Ch. 445; and if the life-tenant pays any instalments of the annuities he is entitled to a charge for the amount. *Re Harrison*, and *Re Bacon*, *supra*.

A tenant for life is not bound to repair unless he is under some obligation to do so by the terms of the will. In *Re Courtier*, 34 Ch. D. 136, a testator gave his wife certain leasehold properties for life. At his death the leaseholds were in a bad state of repair, and the widow declined to remedy their condition. The remainderman applied for an order to compel the widow to repair so as to satisfy the covenants in the leases and avoid a forfeiture. Fry, L.J., said: "I am unable to find any principle or rule of law which throws any obligations on her to do this; and as there is an entire want of authority in its favour it is clear there is no obligation." Cotton, L.J., said: "There is no rule of law that the tenant for life is bound to do repairs out of the rents and profits." The Court points out that in *In re Fowler*, 16 Ch. L. 723, no question was decided between tenant for life and remainderman. There leaseholds were vested in trustees on behalf of a tenant for life and remainderman, and the Court held it was the duty of the trustees to keep the property free from the risk of forfeiture by breach of the covenants in the lease, and they were entitled to have the rents applied for this purpose.

In *In re Baring* (1893), 1 Ch. D. p. 67, Kekewich, J., said: "We very nearly come to this, that the Court of Appeal did not think *In re Fowler* properly decided. They do not say so in terms, but they alleged that it did not intend to decide the question between tenant for life and remainderman." In the last case the facts were the same as in *In re Courtier*, and Kekewich, J., said: "I should have thought of I had not been instructed by the case to which I have been referred (*In re Courtier*), that she, being tenant for life, ought to keep down these periodical payments which were necessary to her occupation, not because of any liability imposed by express words, and not by any other rule of law than that expressed by the maxim: *Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus.*" And although he reluctantly followed *In re Courtier* he intimated that it was the duty of the trustees, having the money in their hands, to pay the costs of repairs, insurance, etc.

Where the question arises as to the incidence of the cost, not of mere repairs, but of putting property into a better condition than it was originally in, it would seem that no part of the costs falls on income. Thus, the expense of fencing waste lands granted to a trustee for the benefit of the estate, must be paid out of corpus exclusively: *Earl of Cowley v. Wellesley*, 1 Eq. 656. Where it became the duty of trustees, holding a trust fund, to make improvements, the result of which was to benefit both the life-tenants and remaindermen, it was held that under the circumstances the trustees, in paying for the improvements out of the capital of the trust, in the exercise of their discretion properly might include as a part of the expense the loss of rents while the work was in progress, and that an item in their probate account charging to capital a sum representing such loss of rents and crediting it to income should be allowed. *Morse v. O'Brien* (1917), 225 Mass. 345.

In *In re Redding* (1897), 1 Ch. 876, the testator directed his executors to manage his estate, and to retain certain leaseholds and let them on lease, and pay the income derived therefrom to his wife for life. It was held, on the construction of the will, that the "income derived" from the leaseholds meant the net income, *i.e.*, the amount of the rents after deducting all proper outgoings, and that consequently the life-tenant must bear the expense of the proper outgoings in respect of ground-rent, rates, taxes, insurance and other outgoings on the property. In the judgment, Stirling, J., dissents from the view taken of *In re Courtier* by the Court in *In re Baring*. He points out that in the former case the only question for decision was whether the tenant for life was bound to discharge the liabilities in respect of repairs to property which had accrued at the death of the testator.

Somewhat similar is the recent case of *In re Tubbs* (1915), 1 Ch. 540. A testator devised his real estate upon trust to permit his wife to receive the rents, profits and income thereof during her life. The will empowered the trustees to "manage the said estate," and to pay the "costs of management" out of the rents and profits. In 1913 the trustees expended £1,100 in having the estate surveyed and in having repair notices served on tenants. The estate comprised 650 houses and the yearly rents were £2,100. It was held the liability of the trustees formed part of their expenses in managing the estate, and, having regard to the terms of the will they must be paid by the tenant for life out of income. This was approved of by the Court of Appeal (1915), 2 Ch. 137.

A testator gave to his widow "the balance of the rents arising from my homestead farm." It was held that the repairs necessary to keep the buildings and fences in the state in which they were at the testator's death must be paid by executor out of the rents. The executor was obliged to mortgage the farm for \$250

to pay debts of the testator, and it was held that this must be repaid by the widow and the remaindermen in the proportions in which each benefited under the will, and if the amount which each was to contribute could not be agreed upon there should be a reference to determine the same. *Re Brown Estate* (1909), 13 O. W. R. 597.

S. devised lands to H. for life and, after her life, to her children. H. petitioned the Court claiming to be allowed for expenditures for needed repairs and lasting improvements on two houses, and for \$100 paid to a tenant for improvements made by him under a promise of the testator that he should be paid for them. Boyd, C., held that H. might be reimbursed the \$100, that being a debt due by the testator; but that neither this or the other expenditures could be a charge on the land. "The repairs of a tenant for life, however substantial and lasting, are his own voluntary act, and do not arise from any obligations, and he cannot charge the inheritance with them." *Re Smith's Trusts*, 4 O. R. 518. But in *Conway v. Fenton*, 40 Ch. D. 512, Kekewich, J., held that where land and money were vested in trustees of a settlement for the benefit of a husband and wife for their lives, and after their death for their children, the Court had original jurisdiction to sanction the expenditure of part of the money in repairing buildings which were so out of repair as to make them uninhabitable.

Where real estate is given to a tenant for life and is sold by the trustees under a power of sale, the proceeds are capital which must be invested, the life-tenant being entitled to the income only. *Shrewsbury v. Shrewsbury*, 18 Jur. 397, 97 R. R. 868.

Where specific property is settled by will, without any trust for conversion, the life-tenant is entitled to the income actually produced during his lifetime, whether the property be permanent, as in the case of real estate, or of a wasting nature such as leaseholds. *Gibson v. Bott*, 7 Ves. 89, 6 R. R. 87.

A trust for sale of real estate and settlement of the proceeds entitle the life-tenant to the rents until sale. *Fitzgerald v. Jervoise*, 5 Madd. 25, 21 R. R. 268.

The life-tenant of a settled estate takes all casual profits which accrue during the time of his tenancy for life. *Brigstocke v. Brigstocke* (1878), 8 Ch. D. 357, 363. Thus he is entitled to all annual produce, such as fruit and hay: *Campbell v. Wardlaw*, 8 A. C. 645; rent, whether payable quarterly or at longer intervals: *Brigstocke v. Brigstocke*, *supra*; damages recovered from tenants for breach of covenants: *Noble v. Cass*, 2 Sim. 343, 29 R. R. 115; compensation for waiver of restrictive covenants, if imposed on grants by the trustees, though not if imposed on grants by the settlor. *Cowley v. Wellesley*, 1 Eq. 656. Money paid to a life-tenant as a consideration for accepting the surrender of a lease belongs to the life-tenant; it is merely the future dead rent paid in advance for the unexpired term. *In re Hunloke* (1902), 1 Ch. 941.

A tenant for life has no right to take the substance of the estate, by opening mines or clay pits; but he has a right to continue the working of mines and clay pits where the author of the gift has personally done it and such mines or pits had not been abandoned; and for this reason, that the author of the gift has made them part of the profits of the land. *Viner v. Vaughan*, 2 Beav. 466, 50 R. R. 245. So in Ireland it was held that a tenant may have a right to cut and sell turf when bog, or where there is no other mode of enjoying the bog which it appears that the grantor intended should be enjoyed. *Coppinger v. Gubbins*, 3 J. & Lat. 397. The latter part of the proposition furnishes the tests to be applied. It must be shewn, in the first place, that the grantor intended this particular portion of the subject-matter to be enjoyed. Next, it must be proved that there is no other reasonable mode of enjoying it than by treating the produce of it as fruits and profits of the estate. It is not waste to consume a portion of the inheritance, when the portion in

question is evidently intended to be enjoyed, and cannot reasonably be enjoyed otherwise than through such consumption. For instance, a devise of a stone quarry to a tenant for life would be valueless if the devisee could not quarry stone.

A tenant for life has a right to cut trees in the ordinary course of good forestry, and, apart from custom, this is not waste. And the proceeds of a sale arising from periodical cuttings, after deducting the expenses of replanting, are payable to the tenant for life. *Dashwood v. Magniac* (1891), 3 Ch. 306. *In re Trevor-Batye's Settlement* (1912), 2 Ch. 339. But apart from this a tenant for life cannot cut timber. *Honeywood v. Honeywood*, L. R. 18 Eq. 309.

The rule, as far as trees have been blown down, is that in the absence of any improper conduct on the part of the tenant for life, the produce of the trees is treated as capital and the income allowed to the tenant for life. Where there has been irregularity of conduct on the part of the tenant for life, leading to an improper thinning of trees, then the severe rule of the Court has not infrequently been put in force, and he gets no interest for his life, but the whole of the produce is carried to capital, and, no doubt, on the ground that in cases of that kind the capital has been reduced by reason of the cutting before the timber was ripe for the purpose. *In re Harrison's Trusts* (1884), 28 Ch. Div. 220, 228.

By an order of the Court, made in 1890, the trustee of an estate was given liberty to cut and sell timber, wood and underwood "in a due and proper course," the net proceeds of all trees in the nature of timber (except thinnings) to be treated as capital, the income from which was to be paid to the life tenants. Early in 1918 there was a large quantity of larch on the estate, about 30 years old, which in the ordinary course would not be cut for another 30 years. The war authorities required this timber for pit purposes and

were willing to pay a price equal to the value of matured trees. The Court approved of a sale, the wood was cut, and £3,755 paid into Court. The life-tenants claimed the whole of this sum. Astbury, J., said that the order of 1890 must be construed with reference to the "due and proper course" prevalent in 1890, which was to cut trees at their 60 years maturity. The present cutting at half maturity was due to exceptional war circumstances, and was not a normal cutting within the order. Being due to an exceptional and fortuitous event, the cutting was in the nature of a windfall within *In re Harrison's Trusts* and the proceeds must be allocated between capital and income. In the peculiar circumstances of the case the agent's commission on the sale and the costs of replanting were ordered to be deducted out of the sum realized, half the balance to be capital and the other half paid to the life tenants as income. *In re Terry* (1918), W. N. 210, 273.

In *Bartlett v. Pickering* (1915), 113 Me. 96, the Court held that the general rule that trees cut and sold are treated as principal and not income, and that a life-tenant is guilty of waste in cutting trees, is not applicable to trees on wild land which is kept and held merely for the produce of saleable timber. "These lands are held for income-producing purposes, and the only income derivable from them ordinarily comes from the cutting and sale of marketable timber trees. The bequest of the income of the trust estate in this case, consisting, as it did in considerable part, of timber lands, contemplated, we think, that the income should be obtained from the cutting of trees, or the sale of stumpage rights." The Court laid down the following rules:

1. That the income derived from the cutting of trees or the sale of stumpage rights, belongs to the life-tenants and not to the remaindermen.

2. That the trustee is to operate the timber land without strip or waste of the rights of the remainder-

men. He must operate according to the precepts of good forestry and not so as to reduce the quantity of available timber below what it was at the beginning of the trust.

3. That when the trustee cuts trees, so much, and no more, of the proceeds of such cutting in addition to the previous cuttings, as is equivalent to the growth since the commencement of the trust of available market timber, taking the tract as a whole, is income to be paid to the life-tenant.

Except as hereinbefore mentioned minerals stand in a similar position to timber, inasmuch as being imbedded in the soil, they form part of the inheritance. *Campbell v. Wardlaw*, 8 A. C. 645, 649.

A gift for life of things *qua ipso usa consumunter*, as grain and wine, if specific, is an absolute gift of the property; but if residuary, the things must be sold and the interest of the proceeds paid to the legatee for life. *Randall v. Russell*, 3 Meriv. 194. Farming stock and implements of husbandry are not things *qua ipso usa consumunter* within this rule, and the life-tenant is only entitled to their use. *Groves v. Wright*, 2 Kay & J. 347; *Cockayne v. Harrison*, L. R. 13 Eq. 432; *Re Elliott* (1918), 41 O. L. R. 276; *Wakefield v. Wakefield*, 32 O. R. 36.

A wine merchant gave all his property to his wife for life and it was held she took absolutely the wine which the testator had for his private use, but a life interest only in that kept for the purpose of trade. *Phillips v. Beal*, 32 Beav. 25, 138 R. R. 616.

Where a will creates a life estate in chattels, the executor is discharged when he hands over such chattels to the tenant for life. The tenant for life, and not the executor, then becomes liable for them to the person entitled in remainder. *Re Munsie*, 10 P. R. 98. The old practice of the Court of Chancery was to require the tenant for life to give security for the protection of the remainderman, but such security is

not now required, unless a case of danger is shewn. *Conduitt v. Stone*, 1 Coll. 285.

The suggestion relating to chattels settled by way of legal limitations in *Fearne on Contingent Remainders*, 10th ed., vol. 1, p. 414, namely, that on the executor's assent to the possession of the first taker the latter may "be considered as taking it in trust for the ulterior legatees, subject to his own anterior beneficial interest therein," was approved and adopted by Sargent, J., in *In re Swan, Witham v. Swan* (1915), 1 Ch. 829.

Where a trustee has invested in unauthorized investments, and the tenant for life has thereby received a larger income, but the capital is intact, the persons entitled in remainder cannot recover from the life tenant the excess of income which has been paid to him. And this rule applies where the same person is trustee and tenant for life and has himself retained the excess of income. *In re Hoyles* (1912), 1 Ch. 67. So where a trustee uses a part of the capital in his own business and realizes profits in excess of the interest than would have been made on the money, these profits are income and not capital. *Slade v. Chaine* (1908), 1 Ch. 522.

Dividends on stock or shares are presumed to be paid out of current profits, and a life-tenant is entitled to all such dividends. *Price v. Anderson*, 15 Sim. 473, 74 R. R. 124. But dividends declared before the death of the testator are capital. *Re Kerrochan*, 104 N. Y. 618. The life-tenant is also entitled to any bonus declared out of current profits. *Preston v. Melville*, 16 Sim. 163, 80 R. R. 45.

But where the company has the power either of distributing the profits as dividends or of converting them into capital, and the company validly exercises its power, such exercise of its power is binding on all persons interested under the testator, and consequently what is paid by the company as dividends goes to the tenant for life, and what is paid by the company to the

shareholders as capital, or appropriated as an increase of the capital stock, enures to the benefit of those interested in the capital. *Bouch v. Sproule*, 12 A. C. 385.

The last mentioned case was followed in *In re Malin* (1894), 3 Ch. 578, and applied in *In re Evans* (1913), 1 Ch. 23. In the recent case of *In re Thomas* (1916), 1 Ch. 383, it is said that in all cases the Court must inquire whether the benefits are really, and not merely nominally, received in respect of a division of dividend or are really received as and by way of a distribution of capital. In 36 C. L. J. 106, will be found a collection of cases on "New Shares and Bonuses," and see *In re Hatton* (1917), 1 Ch. 357.

A testator died in December, 1913, giving the dividends and income of his estate to his wife for life with remainder to nephews and nieces. The widow died July 24th, 1915. In September, 1915, dividends were declared for the half-year ending June 30th, 1915. Held, that the Apportionment Act, 1870 (see R. S. O. 1914, ch. 156), applied, and the estate of the life-tenant was entitled to the whole of these dividends. Whenever there are periodical payments accruing when the event calling for the apportionment occurs, the Act is at once brought into operation and must be applied, and when, subsequently, the accruing payments become due and payable they must be distributed in accordance with the Act as applied on the occurrence of the event which brought it into operation. *In re Muirhead* (1916), 2 Ch. 181.

An accumulated surplus of undivided profits of a manufacturing corporation, which is distributed among its shareholders by means of a special dividend of \$50 a share on shares of the par value of \$100 each, with the effect of diminishing substantially the present value of the shares, is income and not capital: *Talbot v. Milliken*, 221 Mass. 367. Rugg C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "The rule for

determining the respective rights of those entitled to the income and to the principal of trust funds established a long time ago in this Commonwealth, and constantly followed, 'is to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital:' *Minot v. Savage*, 99 Mass. 101. It is a simple rule, comparatively easy in its application to ordinary cases. It has received illustrations in many instances involving a great variety of facts: *Lyman v. Pratt*, 183 Mass. 58. The Court always looks at the substance of the transaction rather than its form, and does not suffer itself to be tramelled by the names used. If in its essence the payment is one out of capital, then it is treated as such no matter how it may be denominated. But if in truth it is payment of earnings, then it is deemed income. As was said in *D'Ooge v. Leeds*, 176 Mass. 558, 'The simple question in every case is whether the distribution made by the corporation is of money to be spent as income, or is of capital to be held as an investment in the corporation.' It has been held that dividends in liquidation of a corporation are capital: *Gifford v. Thompson*, 115 Mass. 478. Where the surplus or undivided profits already have been employed in the enlargement of the capital investment of the corporation and have become devoted to its physical plant, then a device to accomplish the transformation of such assets into stock obviously for the benefit of existing shareholders commonly will be treated as a stock and not a cash dividend. *Daland v. Williams*, 101 Mass. 571; *Rand v. Hubbell*, 115 Mas. 461."

Where a dividend is declared on shares in a corporation which are held in trust to pay the net income to one for life with an ultimate remainder of the principal to another, and where the vote of the directors of the corporation recited that such dividend was "declared out of accumulated surplus profits of this company," which recital is true, the whole of the dividend must be treated as income and paid to the bene-

ficiaries for life, though the larger part of the dividend is payable in shares of another corporation and the whole dividend amounts in value to \$33.30 on each share of \$100: *Graze v. Hemenway*, 223 Mass. 293.

A testator was the author of certain books upon which royalties were payable to him and his estate from time to time. The trustees received these royalties for fifteen years, and treated them as capital, paying the income to the life-tenants. The latter contended that these payments should be regarded as income. Middleton, J., said: "I have come to the conclusion that neither contention is entitled to prevail, and that the case is one in which the amounts received must be apportioned between capital and income in accordance with the rule laid down in *In re Chesterfield's Trusts* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 643.

"In that case the estate had been given to trustees, with power to convert at such time as they saw fit, and pay income to a life-tenant, and on the death of the life-tenant to divide; and it was held that, when the conversion did not take place within the year, in the exercise of the executor's discretion, the holding being in their opinion in the interest of the estate, when the holding came to be realized it should be apportioned between capital and income in the proportion that capital would bear to an assumed income at four per cent., with yearly rests, from the testator's death. The rule is manifestly fair and has been acted upon in many analogous cases. In our Court the rule has been varied by substituting for four per cent. the legal rate of interest, five per cent.

"Where the assets are in their nature unproductive, the interest has been directed to be computed from the end of the executor's year; but when the assets are income producing, the interest runs from the date of the death.

“Here the testator sold his property for a price payable *in futuro*, and as each sum came in it was partly capital and partly income. If the executors had been able to ascertain the amount to be paid, they, it is presumed, might have discounted it and then invested the sum received. This is precisely what was done by the rule in question. The true capital is the present value of the money received as at date of death.”

On appeal the Court was equally divided, Garrow and Hodgins, JJ.A., agreeing with Middleton, J., while Maclaren and Magee, JJ.A., thought the royalties should be treated wholly as income. *Re Kirkland* (1916), 37 O. L. R. 569.

Bonuses declared by a life insurance company on a policy are capital. *Macdonald v. Irvine*, 8 Ch. D. 101.

Where a loss occurs in trust funds, the income of which is payable to a life-tenant, the loss should be apportioned between the life-tenant and remainderman by adding the amount actually realized from the security to the amount of interest theretofore received by the tenant for life and dividing the whole sum between the latter and the remainderman in the proportion in which they would have been entitled to share if the security had been paid in full, the tenant for life giving credit for the amounts already received, less income tax. *In re Foster, Lloyd v. Carr*, 45 Ch. D. 629, followed in *In re Plumb*, 27 Ont. R. 601.

Where the trust estate consisted of a mortgage on which the interest was regularly paid, and ultimately the security was realized at a considerable loss, Kekewich, J., said he preferred the principle of *In re Moore* (1885), 54 L. J. Ch. 432, to that of *In re Foster*. “I must endeavour to find some principle contained in the cases, or at all events not inconsistent with them, which may be applied to the facts of the present case. I have before me the old case of *Turner v. Newport* (1846), 2 Ph. 14. It was a case of a bond given by will as part of the residue of the testator’s estate. No

principal or interest was paid, and nothing was recovered for many years; but at length something was recovered, and Lord Cottingham said this: 'At length a sum is realized; and then, when the question arises what part of it is, as between the parties, to be considered as principal, the tenant for life is told that, because the gross sum recovered is less than the amount of the original debt, she is to have nothing. Such a proposition is contrary to the plainest principles of justice, particularly when it is considered that the Court itself has restrained her from getting in the debt sooner in the hope that more might be ultimately recovered.' That observation was by the way. 'But the other proposition is equally untenable—that she is entitled to the whole of what has been recovered in respect of interest since the testator's death.' And then he solved it, or rather put it in the way of solution, by referring it back to the master to inquire what was the value of the bond at the death of the testator and to calculate interest, there being an intimation that the sum calculated as interest was to be paid to the tenant for life. That would not work here, because the facts are different, but a principle may be deduced from the case. A sum has been realized which is not sufficient to pay the principal and arrears of interest. The result is that it must be ascertained in some way what is the fair division between those who are entitled to interest and have not received it in full, and those who are entitled to the capital and will not receive it in full. It seems to me that the simplest and most logical way of dealing with that is to apportion the amount which you have actually got between the two estates which are beneficially interested in that amount—the estate of the tenant for life, or successive tenants for life, as in this case, on the one hand, and the estate of the remainderman on the other hand. The real question is what is due to each at the time of realization. Of course, if a tenant for life has received money he must give credit for that; but what

you have to ascertain is what is due at the date when you recover the money. That view, as I understand it, agrees with the decision of Pearson, J., in *In re Moore*. It does not depart from the decision of Kay, J., in *In re Foster*, but the explanation of that decision may be that it is one only to be applied to the peculiar circumstances, and in the case of *In re Barker*, W. N. 1897, 154, Stirling, J., appears to have intimated an opinion that the apportionment in *In re Foster* was intended to be confined to the case of a mortgagee in possession. That distinction does not altogether commend itself to my mind. In the present case the amount which has been recovered must be apportioned between capital and income in proportion to the amounts due at the date when it was recovered in respect of arrears of interest and in respect of principal." *In re Alston, Alston v. Houston* (1901), 2 Ch. 584.

It need scarcely be pointed out that where, on a change of investment, trust securities realize more than was given for them originally, the profit accrues to the capital, and is not considered as income payable to the tenant for life. In the same way, where trustees of a mortgage debt foreclose, and subsequently sell the property for more than the debt, the balance is to be paid to them as an augmentation to the capital of the trust fund. For as any diminution of the trust property would have to be borne by all the beneficiaries, and would not fall on the tenant for life only, so it is only fair that any casual augmentation should belong to all, and not to the life tenant only. *Underhill*, 262.

As to trustees charging against income costs which ought to be borne by capital, see *In re Weall*, 42 Ch. D. 674.

By his will a testator gave his personal estate to A. for life with remainder over to B. Part of the estate consisted of a policy of life insurance on the life of another person, subject to a mortgage to the life insurance company. The executors continued to pay the

premiums and the interest on the mortgage out of the personal estate until the death of the assured, when the insurance money (less the amount of the mortgage debt)—was paid to the executors. It was held that to the extent of the amounts paid out of the income for premiums and interest the fund must be regarded as income and be paid to the tenant for life, with interest on the sums so paid at four per cent. per annum, and that the balance of the fund must be apportioned between income and capital according to the principle laid down in *Re Chesterfield*, 24 Ch. D. 643, viz.: by ascertaining the sum which put out at interest at four per cent. per annum on the day of the testator's death and compounded yearly, would, with such accumulations, after deducting income tax, amount with the accumulations to the amount of such balance, and the sum so ascertained is to be regarded as capital and the residue as income. *In re Morley, Morley v. Haig* (1905), 2 Ch. 738.

Where, after an audit, the executor or administrator has received no further assets, there is no occasion for any further audit: *In re Varét's Estate*, 173 N.Y.S. 559. And where, upon an audit, a Surrogate Court Judge finds a balance in the hands of an executor or administrator, any beneficiary entitled to share in such balance is entitled to bring an action upon the footing of these accounts just as if they were settled accounts, in case due payment is not made by the executor or administrator; or he may make an application for an administration order if the circumstances warrant that course. *Tyrell v. Tyrell* (1918), 43 O. L. R. 272.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

COMPENSATION TO TRUSTEES.

- (1) Generally.
- (2) Legacies in lieu of Commission.
- (3) By whom Paid.
- (4) Amount Realized: How Calculated.
- (5) Amount of Compensation.
- (6) Miscellaneous.

(1) *Generally.*

In England the rule is that executors and administrators cannot charge anything for their services. This is upon the principle of equity, that a trustee cannot profit by his trust. In Ontario the rule was first relaxed in favour of executors and administrators by 22 Vic. ch. 93, sec. 47. This provision is now found in section 67 of the Trustee Act, and has been extended to guardians, and trustees other than personal representatives. The section does not apply where the allowance is fixed by the instrument creating the trust.

Although a next friend is, in some respects, in the same position as a trustee, this section does not cover his case, and he is not entitled to compensation or remuneration. *Vano v. Canadian Colored Mills Co.* (1910), 21 O. L. R. 144. The section applies only to express trustees; and, *semble*, a partner is not a trustee at all. *Livingstone v. Livingstone* (1912), 26 O. L. R. 246, 32 O. L. R. 440; *Mack v. Mack*, 33 C. L. J. 400.

The right to compensation is a statutory one, of which an executor or administrator should not be deprived unless there be serious misconduct or mismanagement. *Simpson v. Horne*, 28 Gr. p. 9. "I do not know that it has ever been determined that where the accounts are in fact accurate, that the form of them

has ever subjected executors to liability, unless the confusion has been designed, or has been such as to necessitate a suit." *McMillan v. McMillan*, 21 Gr. p. 379, per Proudfoot, V.C.

The fact that an executor was unsuccessful in establishing a claim against the estate is no reason why he should be deprived of his compensation where he has faithfully performed his duties. *Magaldo's Estate*, 13 Pa. Dist. 149, 30 Pa. Co. Ct. 97.

An executor will be allowed his commission although he is made liable for a devastavit of his co-executor where he is not a party to the misconduct. *Re Dougherty*, 43 Misc. 468.

There is nothing in the statute rendering it necessary to hold that an executor who does not do his duty properly, has a right to the same compensation as an executor whose conduct is free from blame. But the fact that an executor has retained money in his hands unemployed, while it makes him liable for interest thereon, is no ground for depriving him of his commission. *Gould v. Burritt*, 11 Gr. 523.

In *Kennedy v. Pingle*, 27 Gr. 305, one executor had used \$200 of estate money in his own business, and the other had taken a mortgage of \$900 in his own name without any declaration of trust. The Court, while refusing them their costs of an administration action, allowed them compensation. See also *Inglis v. Beatty*, 2 A. R. 453, and *Re Honsberger*, 10 Ont. R. 521.

In *Sievwright v. Leys*, 1 Ont. R. 375, on an appeal from a Master allowing compensation, Proudfoot, V.C., said: "The reason for objection to the commission is because the defendant has been found in debt to the estate, and that some items of overcharge have been proved against him. The statute does not compel the Court in every case, no matter how flagrant the misconduct, to allow the compensation. . . . I think the course of decision has been that an executor or trustee will be allowed his commission though he may have so managed the estate as to justify the appoint-

ment of a receiver, and to be deprived of and even made to pay costs. There may be cases of such exceptional misconduct as to induce the Court to deprive him of a commission. I do not mean to bind the hands of the Court in such a case. See also the remarks of Spragge, C., in *Simpson v. Horne*, 28 Gr. 1. 'I must, in this case, reiterate my opinion that the principle stated in *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 290, is the sound one; and certainly there is less hardship in applying it in this country, where an executor doing his duty to the estate he represents, is allowed a fair compensation for his pains and trouble; a compensation which he is not deprived of unless there be serious misconduct or mismanagement on his part.' And *Simpson v. Horne* was a case where the dealing of the executor was not only careless but perverse."

The taking of administration proceedings does not deprive executors of their functions, or even suspend them, and a reasonable allowance should be made for moneys received *pendente lite*. *Re Honsberger*, 10 Ont. R. 521. But where an administration action is pending it is improper for a Surrogate Judge to fix the compensation, and his allowance will be disregarded. *Biggar v. Dickson*, 15 Gr. 233; *Cameron v. Bethune*, 15 Gr. 486.

An executor who discharges his duty honestly, but owing to want of business training keeps his accounts loosely and inaccurately, is entitled to compensation, but the amount in such a case should not be relatively large. If an executor takes no care or pains whatever, or so little that the trust estate receives no benefit, or if the care and pains have been employed not for the advantage of the trust but dishonestly and for the trustee's own benefit, then there may be a proper case for disallowance. *Hoover v. Wilson*, 24 A. R. 424. This was approved of in *McClenaghan v. Perkins* (1903), 5 O. L. R. 129, where it is said the effect of all the decisions on the statute is that an executor or trustee is not to be deprived of compensation for

actual and beneficial services, though he may also have been guilty of neglects and defaults more or less grave: p. 139.

In *Graham v. Robson*, 17 Gr. 318, an executor was deprived of his compensation where he unnecessarily sold real estate to pay debts and legacies, there being more than enough money available for these purposes apart from the proceeds of the sale.

Twenty objections were made to the executor's accounts and three of these were sustained, reducing the disbursements by \$3,300 out of an estate of \$87,000. Of the amount struck off his accounts \$2,093 was a mere book-keeping entry, and \$250 paid for legal services. The referee refused the executor compensation and ordered him to pay the costs. On appeal, the Court said: "The executor has not been proved guilty of such fraud or misconduct as justified the imposition of the costs of the reference on him personally, or the loss of his commissions. While his system of keeping his vouchers was confusing and unbusiness-like, it does not appear that he was endeavouring to perpetrate any fraud on the estate, or that his mistakes were deliberate." *Matter of Edelmeyer*, 157 N. Y. App. Div. 773.

(2) *Legacies in Lieu of Compensation.*

Where a legacy is given to an executor named in the will the presumption is that it was intended as compensation, and it is on him to shew something in the nature of the legacy, or other circumstances arising on the will, to rebut that presumption. The fact that legacies are left to other executors of unequal amount is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. *Re Appleton*, 52 L. T. 906, 29 Ch. D. 893.

The presumption is rebutted if it appears, either from the language of the bequest, or from the fair construction of the whole will, that the bequest to the person who is named as executor, is given to him independently of that character. Where a testator

appointed his "friend" P. his executor, and gave him a legacy "as a remembrance," and P. did not act as executor, it was held he was entitled to the legacy without proving the will. *Bubb v. Yelverton*, L. R. 13 Eq. 131. So in *Burgess v. Burgess*, 1 Coll. 367, 66 R. R. 98, a legacy given to executors "as a great mark of respect" for them, was held not to be revoked by a codicil appointing other executors in their room, and giving a legacy of equal amount to the newly appointed executors in similar language.

A legacy "to my friend J. S., banker's clerk and one of the executors of this my will," was held not to be conditional on the acceptance of the office of executor. *In re Denby*, 3 D. F. & J. 350, 130 R. R. 166.

In *Cockerell v. Barber*, 1 Sim. 23, 28 R. R. 181, the provision of the will was—"I give and bequeath to my friend and partner John Palmer." Palmer was one of the executors named in the will. Nothing was given to the other executors, and it was held that the legacy was not bequeathed to John Palmer in his character of executor.

In *McClenaghan v. Perkins* (1903), 5 O. L. R. 129, there was a devise of land "unto my brother George Washington Perkins . . . free from all incumbrances," with a direction that a mortgage on the land should be paid out of the personal estate. MacLennan, J.A., said: "Now taking this will as a whole, I think the presumption that the devise was intended as compensation to the executor is rebutted. In *Compton v. Bloxham*, 2 Coll. 201, it was held by Knight Bruce, then Vice-Chancellor, that the circumstances that the testator did not name Charles Bloxham in his will without calling him his brother, rebutted the presumption that the bequests made to him were made in his character of executor; and that case was referred to without disapproval in *Re Appleton*, *Barber v. Tebbit*, 29 Ch. D. 893. Here the gift is 'to my brother George Washington Perkins,' and I think that is an indication of the testator's motive for the

gift sufficient, having regard to the other parts of the will, to rebut the general presumption."

That the legatee is described in the will as the testator's "wife and executrix" does not of itself indicate that the legacy was given by way of compensation and is to be taken in lieu of commission. *Linnott v. Kenaday*, 14 App. D. C. 27, 27 Wash. L. R. 82.

Legacies on condition that the legatees act as executors are offered as an inducement to acceptance of the trust, because of the peculiar fitness of the legatees for its execution, and the amount is the testator's measure of compensation for acceptance as distinguished for compensation for services which might be required afterward. *Clark's Estate*, 10 Pa. Dist. 378.

The testator by his will gave "to each of my said trustees D. and B. who shall accept of this trust the sum of \$500 each." Held, that the legacies were conditional upon the legatees undertaking the burden of the trust and that they, as executors, were not entitled to take by way of compensation more than the amount of the legacies. *Re Lendrum* (1915), 32 W. L. R. 556.

A testatrix gave "to A. B., one of my executors, \$500, and to C. D., the other of my executors, \$500." The Probate Court of New Brunswick held that the bequests were in lieu of commissions. *In re Chubb*, 32 C. L. J. 294.

In *Denison v. Denison*, 17 Gr. 306, it was held that where a legacy is given to executors as compensation for their trouble, they are at liberty to claim a further sum under the statute if the legacy is not sufficient compensation. In this case the words of the will were "that each of my executors shall be paid the full sum of one hundred pounds out of my estate to see my will fully carried out."

In *Kennedy v. Pingle*, 27 Gr. 305, where executors were given \$40 "in remuneration for their trouble," the Master allowed \$440 by way of compensation in addition to the legacy. Spragge, C., who decided

Denison v. Denison, held they were not entitled to both, and disallowed the amount of the legacy.

In *Roy v. Williams*, 9 Ont. R. 534, the words of the will were: "I hereby authorize and direct my executors to retain for their own use and benefit the sum of \$200 each in lieu of all charges for their services." The executors claimed an additional sum. Boyd, C., said: "Out of deference to *Denison v. Denison*, I have had doubts as to the proper manner of disposing of this case; but my conclusion is adverse to the executor's claim. *Denison's* case may have been properly decided as it was when it was, in 1870, but I should hesitate now to follow it, even in a case where the language of the will was identical with the will there under consideration. Here the testator's language is very precise. It was thought that as the language used in the *Denison* will did not import that "compensation" was thereby intended no such doubtful meaning can be attached to the clause I have quoted. In 1874 the Legislature passed an Act relating to the compensation of trustees and executors [now sec 67 (5) of the *Trustee Act*] in which the principle is laid down that the Court is not to fix the allowance where the testator has himself provided what it shall be. That is a most reasonable rule, and one of general application, one indeed to which the Court should give effect without requiring a parliamentary declaration as to its propriety."

This is the rule followed in the American Courts. *Re Hay's Estate*, 183 Pa. 296; *Fletcher v. Hurd*, 14 N. Y. Supp. 388; *Rote v. Warren*, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. 342.

A testator appointed three executors, and added: "They shall each have \$150." Held, not entitled to further compensation. *Re Holmes*, 10 O. W. N. 354.

A testator appointed C. and G. "to be executors and trustees of this my will for the consideration of eight per cent. of the whole estate as set forth in this my will." It was held that this gave the executors eight per cent. on the whole estate as remuneration for

their care, pains and trouble. *Re Aspel* (1918), 42 O. L. R. 191.

But the limitation of compensation fixed by the will does not apply to a trustee afterwards appointed by the Court, at the instance of the beneficiaries, in place of an original trustee appointed by the testator; and the principle laid down in *Roy v. Williams* is not to be extended to such a state of facts. *Freeborn v. Vandusen*, 15 P. R. 264.

Where a legacy is given to one of two executors as compensation, the other executor is entitled to only his proper proportion of the regular commission. *Edward's Succession*, 34 La. Ann. 216; *Lee v. Lee*, 6 Gill & J. (Ind.) 316.

A legacy by way of compensation precludes any presumption that the executor is entitled beneficially to the undisposed of residue. *Loveless v. Clarke*, 24 Gr. 14. Section 58 of the Trustee Act now provides that the executor shall be considered a trustee of the residue not expressly disposed of for the next of kin "unless it appears by the will that the executor was intended to take such residue beneficially." The section does not prejudice any right in respect of such residue where there is no next of kin. See sub-sec. (2).

Before this enactment, it was the rule at law, from the earliest period, that the whole personal estate devolved on the executor; and if, after payment of the funeral expenses, testamentary charges, debts and legacies, there should be any surplus, it would vest in him beneficially. *Attorney-General v. Hooker*, 2 P. Wms. 340; *Urquhart v. King*, 7 Ves. 225.

If the residue is given by the will to the executor, the Court must decide the effect of the gift upon the construction of the will, and upon general principles applicable to that construction, just as before the statute it would have construed a similar gift of real estate. The statute therefore has, of necessity, no application where there is an express gift of residue. The statute was intended to apply only in those cases

where the rule or presumption of law could be held to operate, and where an express gift of residue is found, the meaning of that residuary bequest must be ascertained by the ordinary rule of construction. *Williams v. Arkle*, L. R. 7 H. L. 606, 616.

This was followed in *Boys' Home v. Lewis*, 4 Ont. R. 18, where it was held that a bequest of a share of the residuary estate to executors was a gift to them personally and not as trustees. It was further held that it was not to be inferred that the bequest was given in lieu of compensation, as in the case of a legacy of a definite sum, but it was one of the elements to be taken into consideration in dealing with the question of the amount of compensation.

An agreement by executors to waive their right to compensation in consideration that they be allowed to probate the will without contest was held to be valid, such contract not being against public policy. *In re Williams Estate* (1918), 170 N. Y. Supp. 80.

By his will the testator gave \$1,000 to each of his executors "for the trouble they will have in carrying out the trusts of this my will." By a codicil to his will he appointed new executors, with this provision: "And I authorize my trustees or trustee for the time being to deduct and retain as remuneration for their services, a commission of five per cent. on all monies which shall be collected by them under my said will." The will then provided, "and I declare that my said will shall be construed and take effect as if the names of the said (new executors) were inserted in my said will throughout instead of the names of the said (former executors). And in all other respects I confirm my said will." The executors contended they were entitled to both the \$1,000 and the five per cent. McColl, J., said: "The same motive is expressed for both the bequest of the \$1,000 by the will and of the commission by the codicil, and I do not doubt that the testator did not intend to give both, and that the codi-

cil should not be construed to have such effect. *In re Bossi*, 5 B. C. R. 446.

An executor named in a will which provides a method for fixing the compensation of the executor, if he accepts the appointment as such executor, has no right to claim a compensation which is fixed in any other manner than that provided by the will. B. was named as executor in his father's will, which provided that his compensation as executor should be such as a majority of the heirs of the testator should award him for his "services in the care of the estate." The majority of the heirs, in a fair and reasonable exercise of the power given them by the will, fixed the amount of his compensation at a certain sum. The State law provides that "An executor . . . shall have such compensation for his services as the Court in which his accounts are settled shall allow." The Court said: "We are of the opinion the statute was not intended to restrain testators from fixing compensation to the exclusion of any statutory allowance." *Bailey v. Crosby* (1917), 226 Mass. 492. See also *Williams v. Bond* (1917) 120 Va. 678.

Where a bequest is given to an executor for compensation, and is followed by a bequest of residue to him *qua* executor "to be at his discretion," he is a trustee of the residue for the next of kin. *Re Howell* (1914), 2 Ch. 173. This case was reversed on appeal, and it was held that the executor took the bequest beneficially: (1915), 1 Ch. 241. The decision is discussed more fully under the chapter "The Residue."

In case of a deficiency of assets a legacy by way of compensation does not abate with other legacies, even though it exceeds the amount the executor would be entitled to under the Statute. *Anderson v. Dongall*, 15 Gr. 405; and it bears interest at the expiration of a year from the testator's death. *Ib.* per Spragge, V.C., on appeal, 14th Dec., 1870.

In *Re Leblond*, 7 O. W. N. 398, the testatrix had used a printed form of will, whereby she gave her

property to her mother as trustee and appointed her executrix. The space following, in which it was intended the whole operative part of the will should be written, was left blank, and no beneficiary was named. The mother claimed that the will indicated she should take the property not only as trustee but as beneficiary. Middleton, J., held that it could not be inferred from the fact that the mother was named as trustee and executrix that she should take beneficially.

Where the executor's compensation is fixed by the will the Surrogate Judge cannot reduce the amount. *Heron v. Moffatt*, 7 P. R. 438.

A provision in a will that the executrix shall maintain herself out of the income of the fund while she is managing the same for the support and education of the testator's children during minority, for whom she is also to act as guardian, does not deprive her of the usual compensation allowed executors. *Thome v. Allen*, 49 S. W. 1068, 20 Ky. L. R. 1728.

In *Fidelity Trust Co. v. Watkins*, 19 Ky. L. R. 957, it was held that a provision of a will requiring that the executors make no charge for distributing the legacies does not disentitle them to a reasonable compensation for services necessarily rendered.

(3) *By Whom Paid.*

It is well settled that the expenses and compensation of executors in clearing, dealing with and generally administering the assets of an estate, are to be borne by the aggregate of the estate, and this necessarily so in order that the residue may be ascertained from time to time according to the nature of the assets, some of which may call for considerable time and trouble in order to handle them or realize them satisfactorily. But where the estate has been cleared, and the residue ascertained, any subsequent compensation payable for the investment of the ascertained share of a beneficiary not presently payable, must be borne by

that share. Such share is no longer property of the executors to be administered, but has reached its destination, though it may not, owing to the terms of the will, or for other reasons, have been actually paid into the hands of the beneficiary. *Re Church* (1906), 12 O. L. R. 18.

In re Berkeley's Trusts, 8 P. R. 193, the income on a \$72,000 estate was payable to the widow for life, and on her death to her children. On an interim application to fix the compensation, for the children it was contended that for the present, at least, the income should bear all the burden of the compensation. For the widow it was contended that the true principle was to pay the compensation, or the chief part thereof, out of the corpus, and that in this way the burden would fall in the proper proportion on the tenant for life and remainderman as the income would be reduced in the same relative proportion as the corpus. Blake, V.C., allowed \$400 for taking over the trust estate, obtaining proper transfers, opening books, determining investments, etc.; and a further sum of \$50 per year for general supervision of the estate, payment of taxes, insurance, etc. "These sums, amounting in all to \$1,000, must be borne by the corpus of the estate, as they represent charges for the preservation of the estate itself."

On \$20,000 of income received the executors were allowed 4 per cent. payable out of the income. "I think in the future it would not be considered unreasonable if the trustees charged against the income \$240, and against the corpus \$150 annually, for commission." The costs of the application were ordered to be borne one-half by the corpus and one-half by the income.

As between annuitants and specific or pecuniary legatees, and residuary legatees, the compensation to executors falls upon the residuary legatees. *Re McIntyre* 1904), 7 O. L. R. p. 556.

For services rendered by way of collecting and paying over the income, the compensation is a first charge upon the income, and is properly deducted from it. In fact, for a trustee under such circumstances to charge his commissions upon the corpus of the trust fund, thereby necessarily decreasing the fund, would be inconsistent with his duty of preserving undiminished the trust capital. *Guarantee Trust Co.'s Appeal* (Pa.), 9 Atl. Rep. 66.

A trustee is not allowed, where there is a remainder after a life estate, to receive out of the corpus of the fund, charges for his services which should have been deducted from the income, unless both estates are owned by the same parties. *Brown v. Grandin* (N.J.), 13 Atl. Rep. 266.

Where a testatrix separated her estate into two parts, bequeathed her personalty to one class of persons and disposing of her realty to another, and one executor solely administered the former and another the latter, and rendered separate accounts, it was held that each class of beneficiaries should bear the expenses of the accounting in regard to the funds in which they were interested, and the executors should have commissions on the fund each represented. *Re Mansfield*, 10 Misc. (N.Y.) 296.

In *Mason Co. Justices v. Lee*, 1 Mon. (Ky.) 247, it was held that the expenses and compensation of an executor for managing and selling real estate devised to be sold for the education and advancement of children ought to be paid out of the proceeds of the lands.

An executor who collected the amount of insurance policies which were specifically bequeathed, was held not entitled to commissions thereon, because his only duty was to transfer them to the legatee. *Platt v. Moore*, 1 Dem. 191. So an executor was held not entitled to commissions on the proceeds of the sale by him of property specifically bequeathed, though the sale was by the direction of the legatee. *Farquharson*

v. *Nugent*, 6 Dem. 296. Although an executor may not be entitled to a commission on the value of specific chattels delivered to the next of kin, a reasonable allowance may be made for his care, pains and trouble in making the distribution. *Glover v. Cheek*, 71 S. W R. 438.

(4) *Amount Realized: How Calculated.*

Where the estate has been converted into cash, and the debts, testamentary expenses and legacies have been paid; or, in cases of intestacy, where the heirs have been advanced out of the residue, the usual method of fixing the compensation of the personal representative is by a commission on the amount of the receipts and disbursements. Where the administration has extended over a number of years, the compensation is sometimes in the shape of a commission on the receipts and disbursements will be found to be allowance for the care, pains and trouble in looking after the estate subsequent to the date of realization. In other cases a lump sum has been allowed as compensation, where a commission basis would not be fair to the personal representative or the beneficiaries. In the great majority of cases, however, a commission on the receipts and disbursements will be found to be the most equitable method of ascertaining the compensation to be allowed.

As to what may be properly considered receipts and disbursements, the decisions are not uniform, and not always consistent. But where, as in Ontario, the Statute does not fix an arbitrary rate of commission, and does not confine the Court to a commission basis, this may not be of much importance.

The terms "receipts" and "disbursements," as here used, ordinarily refer to money actually received and paid out—to such items as properly appear in an executor's account on an audit. The code of Alabama provides for the payment of a commission based on

receipts and disbursements. In *Wright's Administrators v. Wilkerson*, 41 Ala. 268, the Court held that the term "receipts" therein used, means pecuniary assets only, and does not embrace assets which are not money or currency; and that the word "disbursements" means money or currency paid out in extinguishment of the liabilities of the deceased, or the expenses of administration.

So in *Hill v. Nelson*, 1 Dem. 357, it was held that receipts and disbursements, within the rule that executors are to receive compensation based upon receipts and disbursements, means receipts and disbursements having an actual and not merely a constructive existence.

Securities coming into the hands of an executor do not constitute "receipts" until he has converted them into money or they have been accepted by the legatees in payment of legacies. *Matter of McAlpine*, 126 N. Y. 285. But in *Matter of Curtiss*, 15 Misc. 545, it was held that executors who did not convert into money the securities of the estate which came into their hands were nevertheless entitled to commissions on the amount of the value thereof, if a conversion into money was not necessary to pay debts and legacies. The Court said: "It would be impolitic for the law to deny to executors commissions under such circumstances, because to do so would be to invite the disposal of investments judiciously made by the testator for the purpose only of entitling the executors to commissions upon the proceeds. It is the policy of the law to remove this temptation. It must, therefore, be held that the executors have the right to have the securities considered as cash for the purpose of computing their commissions."

In *Hardt v. Birely*, 72 Md. 134, an executor who was directed by the will to keep all the money of the estate invested, was allowed commissions on the amount of securities in which funds of the estate were invested at the testator's death.

Taking possession of a savings-bank book is not the receipt of the money deposited, and therefore does not entitle the administrator to commissions on the amount of the deposit where it has been lost by the subsequent failure of the bank. *Sheerin v. Public Admr.*, 2 Redf. 421.

An executor was not allowed commissions on a debt due from him to the testator and bequeathed by the testator. *Handy v. Collins*, 60 Md. 229; nor on payment to himself of his claim against the estate of which he was executor. *Brown v. Walker*, 38 Tex. 109; but the contrary seems to have been held in *Matter of Mount*, 2 Redf. 405.

The investment of the funds of the estate is not a final disposition of them, and therefore does not entitle the personal representative to commissions thereon as for disbursements. *Taveau v. Ball*, 1 McCord Eq. 456; *Betts v. Betts*, 4 Abb. N. Cas. 317. It will be noticed that Rule 38 (2), in certain cases, requires the accounts to be divided so as to show receipts and disbursements in respect of principal and income separately.

Advancements are not taken into account as disbursements. The only duty of the executor or administrator in reference thereto is to take a receipt, and this is only a constructive receiving for which commissions will not be allowed. *Hill v. Nelson*, 1 Dem. 357; *Barhite's Appeal*, 126 Pa. St. 404.

Where an administrator settles with the heirs who were indebted to the deceased, paying them the amount of their shares, less the amounts of their indebtedness, and taking receipts in full for their shares, he is entitled to commissions on such indebtedness, because, though it was not actually paid into his hands, "it is clear that for all purposes of law and right he collected and disposed of it for the estate and as administrator. To have received it with one hand as assets and paid it back, with more, as distributive share, with the other, would have been an idle and superfluous cere-

mony, which the law would not require." *Elder v. Whittemore*, 51 Ill. App. 662.

In South Carolina, where commissions are allowed only on money received and money disbursed, it was held that the allowance will be made if funds practically pass through the representative's hands, though they do not actually do so. *Tompkins v. Tompkins*, 185 S. Car. 1; *Jones v. Jones*, 39 S. Car. 247. Thus, where real estate of the deceased was sold by the executor and the bonds taken for the purchase money were delivered to and accepted by the heirs in satisfaction of their shares of the estate, commissions were allowed on the amount of the bonds, because it was in the power of the executor to have secured his commissions by collecting the money. *Dears v. Spann*, 2 McCord Eq. 473. So too, where a creditor of the estate was the purchaser and payment was made by crediting the amount of his claim on the price. *Kiddle v. Hammond*, Harp. Eq. 223.

It has been held that an administrator is not entitled to compensation for winding up the affairs of a partnership of which the deceased was a member, because that is the duty of the surviving partner. *Picken's Estate*, 14 W. N. C. (Pa.) 407; *Gregory v. Menefee*, 83 Mo. 413; but see *Bilton v. Blakely*, 6 Gr. 575. Compensation will be allowed for the distribution of any moneys realized from the partnership. *Smith's Estate*, 37 Pitts. Leg. J. 33. And the executor or administrator of the deceased partner would undoubtedly be recompensed for the necessary time spent, and care, pains and trouble exercised in protecting the interest of the estate in the partnership property.

Where the real estate of the deceased is subject to an incumbrance by way of mortgage, and it is sold subject to the mortgage, it is a common practice to shew the whole purchase money as a receipt, and the amount of the mortgage indebtedness as a disbursement. But the receipts and disbursements cannot be

so swollen to increase the amount of compensation. In *In re Sanderson*, 7 Ch. D. 176, Jessel, M.R., said: "When the Court administers the estate of a testator which is subject to a mortgage, that is, an estate in which he has only the equity of redemption, what is administered is not the whole of the estate, but only that which the testator had, namely, the equity of redemption, though in case of a sale being directed the mortgagee may come in and concur, and so get paid. Supposing a man has a property worth £2,000, and he mortgages it for £1,500, all he can get on a sale is £500, for the remainder belongs to the mortgagee. If, then, the action were brought for the administration of his estate, how could it be said that his interest in the mortgaged property was more than he could get, namely, the £500?" This is the rule in the American Courts: *Baucus v. Stover*, 24 Hun (N.Y.) 109; *Buerhaus v. Saussure*, 41 S. C. 457.

Re Surrogate Court of Wentworth and Kerr, 44 U. C. R. 207, is not opposed to this. There Cameron, J., said that in valuing a testator's property, for the purpose of ascertaining probate fees to be paid thereon, its actual cash value must be taken without reference to the incumbrances on it, as it is the entire property that is to be administered. In that case the assets consisted of an interest in a mercantile partnership, and the executor contended that the trade debts should be deducted in fixing the probate fees, and these were the only "incumbrances" against the assets. If the learned Judge intended to imply that an incumbrance in the nature of a mortgage should not be deducted, even for probate purposes, it is submitted the judgment goes too far.

Con. Rule 653 provides that in administration cases "a commission on the amount realized" shall be allowed solicitors in lieu of taxed costs. *In re McColl*, *McColl v. McColl*, 8 P. R. 480, land was subject to a mortgage, and the mortgagee refused to consent to a sale free from the mortgage. Blake, V.C., held that

the Master was right in allowing commission only on the actual value of the intestate in the land, that being the amount realized. He said that had the mortgagee consented to a sale free from the mortgage, then the commission would have been estimated on the full amount.

Where the executor carries on the business of the deceased under the direction of the will, he is not entitled to a commission on the gross receipts realized or the necessary disbursements made by him while conducting the business, but the proper compensation is a reasonable allowance for the time and labour bestowed in carrying on the business. *Lamar v. Lamar*, 118 Ga. 684; *In re Brewster*, 113 Mich. 561; *Thompson v. Freeman*, 15 Gr. 384.

The reason of the law in this respect is illustrated by Aldrich, J., as follows: "Suppose a fishmonger who daily bought and sold \$100 worth of fish, should die intestate, and his administrator, by leave of the Court, should continue the business for forty days. At the expiration of the forty days the administrator will have received \$4,000, and paid away \$4,000, in the purchase and sale of fish. If he should be allowed commissions for receiving and paying out \$4,000 the estate will owe him \$200 as commissions, and the result would be that the administrator could credit his commission account with \$100, the corpus of the estate, and apply the profits of the forty days business, if any, towards the payment of the \$100 still due. If such a principle was recognized it would enable administrators, if so inclined, to actually destroy estates for their own advantage." *Jones v. Jones*, 39 S. Car. 247.

In another case it was said: "The buying and selling incident to the conduct of a manufacturing or other business is, at best, a species of reinvestment of the trust funds. If commissions were to be allowed each time a stock in trade was purchased or sold it is quite probable, as well as possible, for a case to arise

where the executors' commissions would largely consume the body of the estate, especially where the stock in trade is rapidly turned over, and no great profit is realized on the transactions." *Matter of Hayden*, 54 Han. 107, 140 N. Y. 776.

Within the rule limiting the right to commissions to receipts and disbursements, no allowance can be made for property transferred or delivered in specie to legatees or next of kin, unless it is treated as money, or other special circumstances exist which may effect an exception to the general rule. *Gordon v. West*, 8 N. H. 444; *Hall v. Tryon*, 1 Dem. 926.

In *Shepard v. Parker*, 13 Ired. L. 103, it was held that delivering a promissory note, part of the assets of the estate, to an heir as part payment of his distributive share, was an exception to this rule. The Court said that the administrator, by not collecting the note, became chargeable with the amount. If it was collectible and he collected it he would be paid a commission; if it was not good or doubtful, the estate got the benefit of the transaction.

It was held that an executor was entitled to commissions on a bequest of stocks and bonds of a certain amount, but not otherwise specified, whereby there was imposed on him the duty of selecting securities of the required amount. *Thompson v. Pritchard*, 12 N. Y. Wkly. 80.

In one case it was said that the tendency of the decisions is to treat the reception of every variety of assets as a reception of money, and the application of such assets to the discharge of debts and legacies as a disbursement of moneys. *Rowland v. Morgan*, 3 Dem. 289.

As a general rule the executor or administrator is entitled to a commission for paying over legacies and distributive shares as well as debts. *West v. Smith*, 8 How. (U.S.) 402.

Where a testator bequeathed corporate stock to his wife and son, and the survivor of them, in trust for

certain purposes, and the executors transferred this stock to themselves as trustees (their duties as executors being entirely distinct from their duties as trustees), it was held that such transfer was not a payment out. *In re Burden* (1917), 198 N. Y. St. 747.

Remuneration to trustees, if on a percentage of the gross value of the estate, should be allowed on the gross value as at the time when the accounts were passed. *Stephen v. Miller* (B.C.), 40 D. L. R. 418.

(5) *Amount of Compensation.*

"The compensation allowed is not, and should not be, but little, if anything, more than liberal indemnity. The condition and value of the estate should be a controlling consideration in all cases. If the estate has but few undisputed debts, if property consisting most largely of stocks, bonds or solvent securities, involving only ordinary care and attention in their handling and distribution, and of real estate which may be readily rented, and at the proper time divided or sold for division among those entitled, and the value of the estate is large, a liberal compensation may often and should be, less than the maximum statutory allowance, but never greater, even if the administration involves much care, attention and trouble." *Kenan v. Graham*, 135 Ala. 585.

The allowance to be made in all cases is, what is fair and reasonable for the executor's care, pains and trouble, and his time expended in or about the estate.

In *Re Toronto General Trusts and Central Ontario Ry.*, 6 O. W. R. 350, Teetzel, J., said the proper things to be considered in fixing the remuneration of trustees are:

- (1) The magnitude of the trust;
- (2) The care and responsibility springing therefrom;
- (3) The time occupied in performing its duties;
- (4) The skill and ability displayed;
- (5) The success which has attended its administration.

This was cited with approval by Britton, J., in *Re Prittie's Trusts*, 12 O. W. R. 264, and approved of in Manitoba in *Re Sanford Estate*, 18 Man. R. 413.

"The statute has fixed no standard by which the rate of compensation is to be measured, and this imports that each case is to be dealt with on its merits, according to the sound discretion of the Judge, who is to regard the care, pains and trouble, and time bestowed and expended by the claimant. Nor have the Courts laid down any inflexible rule in this regard. While a percentage has been usually awarded as a convenient means of compensating a class of services which do not admit of accurate valuation, yet the adoption of any hard and fast commission (such as five per cent.), would defeat the intention of the statute. . . . Five per cent. may be a reasonable allowance in many cases, but where the estate is large and the services rendered are of short duration and involving no very serious responsibility such a rate may be excessive." Boyd, C., *Re Fleming*, 11 P. R. 426.

In the absence of such standard we can only examine the decisions. I have placed them in chronological order.

McLennan v. Heward (1862), 9 Gr. 178. Five per cent. allowed on all moneys received and paid over and 2½ per cent. on moneys received and not paid over. The report is not clear as to the amount of the estate, time occupied or labour involved.

Torrance v. Chewett (1866), 12 Gr. 407. Four per cent. allowed on all transfers of stocks and all moneys paid in and collected. The report does not give sufficient facts to be of much assistance.

Thompson v. Freeman (1868), 15 Gr. 394. The receipts were \$298,930 and disbursements \$286,798. The Master allowed the same as in *McLennan v. Heward*. A large portion of the receipts and disbursements appear to have been from mortgage investments and reinvestments extending over a period of years. It

was held the commission was too large and it was referred back to the Master. It was pointed out that although five per cent. may not be too large a commission where the sums collected are small, it is too large when the amounts are large. It was also held that where executors convey lands to the beneficiaries they should not be compensated by way of commission, but by a lump sum. As to compensation for investment, see *Re Berkeley's Trusts*, *infra*.

Denison v. Denison (1870), 17 Gr. 306. \$1,500 allowed one executor and \$1,500 to the other two jointly. All the report says is, "there was not only a large estate, but one requiring care, judgment and circumspection in its management."

Re Berkeley's Trusts (1879), 8 P. R. 193. The capital amounted to \$72,000, and the administration of the estate covered 14 years. The income was payable to the widow for life and on her death to the children. On an interim application by trustees to fix their remuneration, Blake, V.C., held: (1) that on trustees assuming the trust estate, a commission is not to be allowed to them for merely taking the same over, as they may hold it but for a day, or they may, holding it longer, so deal with it as to disentitle them to any commission whatever; but that trustees properly dealing with the estate, and handing it over on the determination of the trust, are entitled to one commission for the receipt and proper application of the estate; (2) that trustees are not entitled to commission for the investment or reinvestment of the funds of the estate, as such a mode of remuneration encourages a continued changing of the investments, which may be most injurious to the estate; (3) that the trustees are entitled to a commission on the receipt and payment of the income of the estate, and to the reasonable compensation for looking after the estate; (4) that it is not unreasonable to make some allowance for services not covered by the commission awarded.

The trustees were allowed \$400 for four times taking over the estate as they became entitled to it, examining securities, opening books, determining investments, etc.; and \$50 a year for the general supervision of the estate, paying taxes, insurance, etc. They were also allowed four per cent. commission on receipts of income.

B.
Stinson v. Stinson (1881), 8 P. R. 560. An executor may be allowed a lump sum as his remuneration for the care and management of real estate, if there is evidence to enable the Court reasonably to see the services rendered and to make a proper allowance therefor. He is not limited to a commission on that part of the estate which has become personal property. The responsibility and difficulty of managing a trust estate consisting of stocks and mortgages, are far less than that consisting of unproductive real estate where the receipts may be very small.

Re Batt, Wright v. White (1883), 9 P. R. 447. The receipts were \$9,404 and disbursements \$8,228. These amounts included, on both sides, a sum of \$3,238, representing securities in the hands of the residuary devisee and charged to her, and with which the executors never intermeddled. The Master allowed \$400, being about five per cent. on total receipts, including the \$3,238. On appeal, Proudfoot, J., considered the retention of this sum involved a personal risk to the executors, and necessitated a calculation as to assets and liabilities, for which it was not unreasonable to compensate them; and \$400, being about $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon the receipts, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon the disbursements, was not excessive. The report does not shew the labour involved or the time spent in the administration of the estate. See *Thompson v. Fairbairn*, *supra*.

In re Honsberger (1885), 10 O. R. 521. The Master allowed the executors commission on moneys paid in pending administration proceedings, and on sums charged them for interest upon balances in their hands. The Court refused to interfere.

Thompson v. Fairbairn (1886), 11 P. R. 333. In this case all the work of collecting and paying over was done after the administration order was made, and was done under the advice of solicitors, and in the more important matters, under the direction of the Master. The receipts were \$29,000 and disbursements \$5,000. An item of \$4,684 on each side of the account, consisted of a mortgage transferred to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's solicitor collected \$2,400 and made a payment of \$10,000 for which he was personally liable. The Master allowed \$1,193. On appeal, Boyd, C., reduced this to \$400, because the administration proceedings reduced the executor's responsibility to a vanishing point. Nothing was allowed in respect of the \$4,684. One per cent. was allowed on the \$2,400 and \$10,000, 2½ per cent. on balance of collections, and five per cent. on actual disbursements.

Re Fleming (1886), 11 P. R. 272. The Master allowed five per cent. on \$32,000, receipts from mortgage investments, and one per cent. on \$79,000 on debentures and specific securities. Ferguson, J., increased this by allowing 3½ per cent. on the whole estate. On appeal, the Divisional Court restored the judgment of the Master, holding that if he was wrong he erred on the side of liberality. Little actual work appears to have been done by the executors, that being left to the solicitors.

Archer v. Severn (1886), 13 O. R. 316. The personal estate not specifically bequeathed amounted to \$41,818, and the rents and profits come to the hands of the executors, \$4,052. They expended \$25,100 and \$3,816. The accounts shewed 300 items on one side and 400 on the other, and there had been considerable labour, care and trouble in the management of the estate. Held, that five per cent. on the total receipts was not an excessive compensation, although about \$17,000 remained in the hands of the executors with which they were chargeable.


Re Prittie Trusts (1889), 13 P. R. 19. Trustees exchanged an investment for stock in a land company. Held, that a commission on the value of the stock was not a proper method of remuneration, but they should be allowed a sum for their trouble in making the exchange. The trustees paid an agent for collecting rents. The collections were in large and small sums extending over several years, and involved care and attention on the part of the trustees. It was held they were justified in employing agents to make these collections, and were entitled to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon the rents collected.

In *Re Central Bank* (1892), 22 O. R. 247. This was the case of a claim of a liquidator of a bank. He was allowed $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. on moneys actually collected. On appeal, he was allowed $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. on a sum of \$231,000 consisting of amounts adjusted or set off, owing to the trouble in preparation of accounts, etc.

Re Cursiter (1894), 9 Man. R. 433. Four per cent. was allowed on the amount received and disbursed, and two per cent. on the amount received and still remaining on hand, subject to a further allowance to be made when the estate should be wound up.

In re Wiggins Estate (N.B.), 20 C. L. T. 462. Where trustees of an estate consisting of stocks and mortgages received under a deed of trust a commission of five per cent. on income, a commission on the estate was refused, but a commission of one per cent. was allowed on investments made by them.

Re Moran Estate (N.S.), 38 C. L. J. 215. By the terms of the order of the Court appointing the trustee he was to receive "a commission of five per cent. upon all interest and income which shall be received and paid over." The income, which consisted of rents, etc., was not collected personally by the trustee, but by agents employed for that purpose who paid over the collections directly to the beneficiaries and received a commission of five per cent. therefor.

Held, 1. The trustee had the right to employ agents for the purpose of making such collections and would have been liable to the *cestuis que trust* for the acts of the agents and obliged to make good any loss, but could not be required to pay the agents out of his own pocket. 2. The trustee was entitled to claim commission on the gross amount of income collected and not merely upon such moneys as technically came into his own hands. 3. The trustee was not entitled to interest on commissions which he should have deducted from time to time as collected. But see *Taylor v. McGrath*, *post*, as to double commissions. 

In re Williams (1902), 4 O. L. R. 501. Trustees had from 1891 to 1902 taken care of an estate of \$60,000, received payments of principal and re-invested them, and collected \$39,700 of interest, being an average rate of about 6 per cent. per annum. Held, following *Re Berkeley's Trusts*, *supra*, that an allowance of \$100 a year should be allowed them for taking care of the estate and making re-investments in addition to 5 per cent. for collection and payment over of the interest.

Re McIntyre (1904), 7 O. L. R. 548. The administrators took over about \$60,000 of property, consisting of mortgages, notes, farm property and furniture. They distributed \$29,000 and set apart \$31,000 for payment of annuities, legacies not matured, etc. They collected about \$6,500 of interest. The administration to date had extended over a period of a little more than four years. The estate was not an easy one to deal with owing to conflicting interpretations of the rights of beneficiaries under the will, the nature of the trusts, their number and complications, etc. Street, J., allowed the administrators 2½ per cent. upon such portion of the corpus of the estate as they had taken over and distributed, the same amount to be allowed on the balance of the corpus as it was distributed from time to time. He allowed five per cent. on interest collected, and \$100 a year, in addition, for the

first two years, and \$75 a year for the last two years for management of the estate and services not covered by the other charges, including the care and preservation of the estate. "All these charges are to be made against the residue of the estate, as the legatees and annuitants for whom the investments are made are entitled to receive the provisions made for them in the will without deduction."

Re Farmers Loan and Savings Co. (1904), 3 O. W. R. 837. Falconbridge, C.J.: "The practice in respect of trustees' remuneration is, I think, well settled. It appears to be clear upon the authorities that a trustee (or a person in a position of a trustee), is entitled to a commission upon the corpus which comes into his hands and upon the corpus which is finally distributed by him, but that such commission should be paid when the distribution of the corpus takes place from time to time, and that the trustee is further entitled to a reasonable annual allowance for care and management, and that the Court may, instead of fixing the remuneration by way of percentage, allow one lump sum to include and cover the percentages upon the receipts and disbursements of the corpus, and the allowance for the care and management of the estate. The usual commission allowed is five per cent., exclusive of the annual allowance for care and management, but each case . . . must depend upon its own circumstances."

Re Patrick Hughes (1909), 14 O. W. R. 630. In this case the accounting covered a period of eight years. The estate consisted of store premises in Toronto, and an undivided half-interest in two leasehold properties. The trustees had realized on a sale of the freehold \$31,816, and on one-half of the leasehold properties \$2,500. \$28,000 had been received from revenue, about \$10,000 of which had been collected by a trust company, being paid therefor a commission of five per cent. The receipts from revenue were distributed as

received, but the corpus could not be divided until the death of the testator's widow, which had not yet happened. On these facts it was held that the trustees were entitled to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the revenue receipts except the \$10,000, on which the commission should be one per cent.; and $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on all disbursements of revenue. It was further held that no commission should be allowed on the conversion into cash of the real estate, but an allowance of \$200 to cover their trouble in making the sales. They were allowed, in addition, a yearly sum of \$75 for taking care of the estate and making investments. It was pointed out that on the distribution of the corpus the trustees would be entitled to a further allowance.

Re Griffen (1912), 3 O. W. N. 759, 1049. The estate was \$100,000, consisting of cash on hand, life insurance, stocks, and household furniture. There were pecuniary legacies to fifty-three persons, and six charities. The assets were in Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba, and the executors had to adjust succession duties with each province. The Surrogate Judge allowed \$3,000 for care, pains and trouble. On appeal, Middleton, J., thought one per cent. a liberal commission and reduced the commission to \$1,000. On appeal to the Divisional Court the judgment of the Surrogate Judge was restored. Mulock, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "I am unable to reach the conclusion that the learned Surrogate Court Judge allowed an excessive amount. On the contrary, I am of opinion that, if he erred at all, it was not in allowing a larger sum. I have not overlooked the circumstance that the estate consisted largely of shares in companies which it was argued, were readily convertible; but shares in companies are liable to fluctuation in value, and a loss accruing to the estate because of their falling in value might, under some circumstances, render executors liable therefor, although exercising what they considered good judgment. Such a risk on their

part should not be overlooked when compensation for their services is being fixed."

The case is a good illustration of opposing conclusions drawn by different judges from the same set of facts.

Re Goldchere Estate (1913), 5 O. W. N. 625. The real and personal estate realized \$21,234, and there was paid out thereof \$3,560. The Surrogate Judge allowed the administrators \$625, and, on appeal, Latchford, J., said he could not see that he had erred. The report does not shew the time or labour involved.

In re Sanford Estate, 18 Man. R. 413, the duties of the executors were to realize on real estate in Manitoba and transmit the proceeds to Ontario executors. It took nine years to complete the work, which had been done with faithfulness and success. The amount realized was over \$300,000. R., who had the chief management of the work, had been paid \$19,500 on account. The Court gave R., in addition, two per cent. of the gross amount realized, and the other two executors together, two per cent. It was also held that R. was not entitled to commission as a real estate agent on sales made by him personally, although he might have employed another agent at the expense of the estate to perform such services.

Re Nesbit (1916), 11 O. W. N. 93. The estate consisted of a farm devised to the testator's brother for life and remainder to a niece, with a provision for a sister residing on the farm and being maintained out of its products. The personal estate realized only \$18.75 from the sale of some chattels. The executor disbursed \$695, most of which he advanced out of his own moneys. The administration extended over about a year, and the Surrogate Judge allowed the executor \$300 as commission. On appeal, Sutherland, J., said that, having regard to the estate as a whole, and the small amount of personal estate, and the short period of time during which the executor had the management of the estate, he was of the opinion that \$300 was

excessive, and reduced it to \$125; \$50 as commission and \$75 for care, pains and trouble.

Re Smith (1916), 38 O. L. R. 67. Where executors (the widow and the solicitor) of a retail liquor seller carried on his business for three years after his decease, paid his debts, and sold the business for a large sum, so that the value of the estate was increased from \$26,237 to \$230,126, an allowance of \$4,650.62 to the executors during the three years was confirmed. In estimating the value of executors' services, legal business done and advice given by the solicitor-executor, for which, but for his position, he might have made professional charges, were properly taken into account.

In the very recent case of *Re Hughes* (1918), 43 O. L. R. 594, the facts were as follows: Under a marriage settlement a trust corporation had in its hands a mortgage for \$260,000. The shares of the beneficiaries were vested, and the beneficiaries applied for an order directing the trust corporation to assign the mortgage to the Accountant of the Supreme Court of Ontario. The accounts of the trustee had been taken down to 12th June, 1917, and a commission of \$6,075.96 allowed to that date, but this commission did not include any commission on the money secured by this mortgage. An order was made transferring the mortgage as asked, with a reference to the Master in Ordinary to fix the compensation to be allowed to the trustee "for its care, pains, and trouble, and time expended in and about realizing, managing, administering, disposing of, and settling the affairs of the trust in so far as the same relates to the portion of the trust represented in (the mortgage dealt with in the order), including the transfer of the said mortgage to the Accountant of this Court, for which the said trustee has not been compensated." The Master fixed the compensation at \$1,000, and the trustee appealed. Mr. Justice Rose held that the evidence before the Master did not justify the finding that the trustee

acted otherwise than prudently in its dealings with the estate. He then proceeds:—

“It is true, as the Master in Ordinary points out, that throughout their administration the trustees from time to time consulted the *cestuis que trust* as to questions presenting themselves for determination, and that certain applications were made for the advice of the Court; and in that sense it is true that the trustees did not assume any unnecessary responsibility; but that does not seem to be a reason for cutting down the trustees’ remuneration. Perhaps a trustee who is in a position which compels him to take risks is entitled to more than usually favourable consideration when his remuneration comes to be fixed; but a trustee who abstains from taking unnecessary risks is not, for that reason, to be treated with unusual severity.

“The trustees filed a claim in which it was suggested that the compensation ought to be arrived at by adding together a certain percentage of the \$260,000 for taking over and managing that portion of the estate, a certain other percentage of the same sum for transferring the mortgage to the Accountant, and a certain other percentage of the income received and disbursed; and, upon the argument, there was much discussion as to whether there ought or ought not to be the allowance, sometimes called commission, of the percentages claimed, or of any percentage upon the corpus.

“Upon the one hand it was said that such commission is allowed only when the trustee has ‘distributed’ the estate, and that there has been no distribution here; upon the other hand it was said that the commission upon corpus is allowed to trustees who properly deal with the estate and hand it over, and that the trustees, having handed over the mortgage to the Accountant, as the nominee of the *cestuis que trust*, are entitled to such commission.

“The trustees contrast the expressions used in *Re Berkeley’s Trusts*, 8 P. R. 193, with the expressions

to be found in such cases as *Re Farmers' Loan and Savings Co.*, 3 O. W. R. 837, and *Re McIntyre* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 548, relied upon by the *cestuis que trust*. I incline to the view that if it was necessary to decide whether a commission might properly be allowed the decision ought to be in the affirmative. It seems to me that the word 'distribute,' as the expression is used in the cases cited, is really intended to convey the same idea as the expressions used in *Re Berkeley's Trusts*, and that these trustees have done what has been held in the cases to be sufficient to justify the allowance of a percentage in taking over and distributing the estate. However, I do not think it is really necessary to decide that point. It is true that the calculation of percentages upon the various parts of the estate and upon the receipts and disbursements of income is one of the means very often, perhaps usually, adopted of fixing a trustee's compensation: *Re Griffin*, 3 O. W. N. 759, 1049; *Re Smith* (1916), 38 O. L. R. 67; and perhaps in the majority of cases it is the best means; but neither the trustee nor the *cestuis que trust* have the right to insist upon its adoption; what the tribunal before which the matter comes has to do is to ascertain as best it may what would be a fair and reasonable allowance for the trustee's care, pains, and trouble, and his time expended in and about the estate: The Trustee Act, sec. 67. As pointed out by Ferguson, J., in *Re Fleming*, 11 P. R. 272, 426, at p. 278, the Court cannot be expected to ascertain, weigh and set a value upon the actual work done in connection with the estate and properly so done, and allow such value and no more; regard must, of course, be had to the size of the estate: *Re Toronto General Trust Corporation and Central Ontario R. W. Co.*, 6 O. W. R. 350. A sum which would be a reasonable allowance in the case of a small estate would often be quite unreasonably small in the case of a larger estate, although the work done in connection with the larger estate was no more than,

or even less than, that done in connection with the small estate.

“Now, what is being dealt with in this matter is an estate of considerable size, handled by the trustees, as I think, with all due care and skill. The trustees have been allowed compensation, and I must assume the proper compensation, for their care, pains, and trouble and time down to a certain period, but in respect of a part only of the estate, or, as it may be said, upon the basis of the estate’s being less by \$260,000 than it really is; and I view the question for determination as being: How much more shall be allowed in respect of the parts of the estate and in respect of the services that were left out of consideration in the Surrogate Court; or, in other words, by how much shall the compensation be increased because of the facts that the estate is so much larger than in the Surrogate Court it was treated as being, and that the trustees have had services to perform since the time of the award by the Surrogate Court? The Surrogate Judges allowed $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the realization of certain parts of the capital, 2 per cent. on the realization of certain other parts, 1 per cent. on certain disbursements out of capital, $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on other disbursements of capital, $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on collection, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on disbursements of income, together with a small annual allowance for management, etc. In calculating the amount of that part of the capital which was to bear an allowance of 2 per cent. for realization and 1 per cent. for distribution, there was included the cash realized from the sale of the Yonge street property (the mortgage in question was a part of the purchase price of this property); and in calculating the amount of the income which was to bear the allowance of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for collection and $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for disbursement, there was included the rent from the same property. As I have said, it was strongly urged upon the argument that the orders of the Surrogate Judges established a precedent which

ought to be followed, and that I ought therefore to allow 3 per cent. upon the \$260,000 and 5 per cent. upon the interest collected and disbursed, and perhaps an annual fee. But, as I have pointed out, the Surrogate Judges might or might not have made the allowances suggested. They did not think the allowances ought to be at the same rate in respect of all parts of the estate, as appears by the award of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon the realization of certain parts of the capital and 2 per cent. upon the realization of other parts. Doubtless if they had been dealing with the whole estate they would have allowed a sum in excess of what they did allow, and what it would have been right for them to do it is right to do now; but it does not follow that the scale of the additional allowance has been established. I am therefore unable to adopt the easy course that has been suggested. Moreover, I think 3 per cent. upon the \$260,000, together with 5 per cent. upon the income derived during the period with which I am dealing, would be an unreasonable amount under all the circumstances. The fixing of any sum is more or less arbitrary—it must necessarily be so, even if what is done is merely to fix the rate of “commission” which should be allowed—but I have tried to fix upon a sum which, added to what was allowed by the Surrogate Court, will, on the one hand, serve as a recognition of the faithful administration of a trust of considerable magnitude, but of comparative simplicity, and, on the other hand, will not be more than reasonable *cestuis que trust* ought to be content to pay. Proceeding in that way I have reached the conclusion that \$4,000 would be a proper allowance, and accordingly I allow that sum.” Costs out of the estate.

(6) *Miscellaneous.*

In no case will an executor be entitled to allowance for services performed by an agent, and which were so performed by him gratuitously. *Chisholm v. Bernard*, 10 Gr. 479.

As a general rule an executor should not be allowed a commission on sums which he has not realized, and which he is chargeable with in consequence of his neglect or other misconduct. *Bald v. Thompson*, 17 Gr. 154. But see *Dagg v. Dagg*, 25 Gr. 542, where commission was allowed on such sums.

Where an executor is a residuary legatee no commission should be allowed on the share of the residue which he takes under the residuary clause in the will. *Boys' Home v. Lewis*, 4 Ont. R. 18.

The commission may be apportioned among the executors according to the work done and time expended by them. *In re Williams* (1902), 4 O. L. R. 504; *Re Fleming*, 11 P. R. 272.

In case of successive administrations, that is, where an executor or administrator dies, resigns or is removed while the administration is incomplete, and it is finished by his successor in office, the usual practice is to apportion among the successive incumbents, on equitable principles, the amount of compensation which ordinarily would have been allowed to the original executor or administrator if the entire administration had been conducted by him. There seems to be no fixed rule by which an apportionment of the compensation may be made in all cases. In those jurisdictions where the Court is authorized to allow such compensation as may be deemed reasonable for the services performed, without limitation as to amount, it is obvious that the Court may allow to each of several successive representatives a reasonable compensation for the services performed by him. But where the compensation is measured by commissions on the amount or value of the estate administered, the usual practice is to allow to each representative commissions on that part of the estate administered by him. And where commissions on receipts and disbursements are the proper measure of compensation the simple mode has been followed of allowing commissions to

each on his receipts and disbursements. 11 A. & E. Ency. 1303-4.

The fact that the maximum commission has been allowed to the original administrator does not deprive the succeeding administrator of his right to compensation for his services in administering the balance of the estate. *Lemmon v. Hall*, 20 Md. 168.

The estate of a deceased executor is entitled to commissions on such sums as were received and paid out during his lifetime. *In re Whipple*, 81 N. Y. App. Div. 589.

When an executor dies before the completion of his duties the commission is properly apportioned between his personal representative and the surviving executor. *In re McCormick*, 46 Misc. 386.

The deceased died in July, 1893, and letters of administration were granted the same month to the widow and the defendant. The widow died in December, 1893, up to which time little progress had been made in the administration of the estate. The accounts were twice passed, the whole of the commission being allowed the defendant. The Court, on the application of the representative of the widow, refused to re-open the accounts. *Martin v. Jones*, 87 Md. 43.

Representatives of a deceased executor were held not entitled to commissions where such executor died before any payment was actually made by him. *In re Naylor's Estate* (1917), 198 N. Y. St. 462. The transfer of stock to succeeding trustees is not a "paying out" within the meaning of a statute allowing commissions, so as to entitle a trustee to one-half commission for paying out. *Ib.*

Where there are two or more executors or administrators of an estate, they are usually entitled only to the recompense or commission payable to a single representative. *Phillips v. Richardson*, 4 Marsh (Ky.) 212; *In re Aston*, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 228. And it has been held that where one of two executors is not entitled to a commission because he is a legatee, the other execu-

tor is entitled to only one-half of the regular commission. *Edward's Succession*, 34 La. Ann. 216; *Lee v. Lee*, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 316.

Where an estate is administered by successive personal representatives, the compensation allowed should be apportioned among them according to the services rendered, and the compensation of one will not be increased because his predecessors received no compensation for their services. *Re Depew*, 19 N. Y. St. 902; *Linton's Succession*, 31 La. Hun. 130.

Personal representatives who resign or are removed may be allowed a sum commensurate with the services they have performed, if beneficial to the estate. *Re Douglass*, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 64; but where they resign for their own convenience after having rendered very little service to the estate, it was held they were not entitled to any compensation. *In re Hayden*, 1 Connoly, Sur. (N.Y.) 454.

In fixing the amount of compensation to be allowed an executor or administrator the reasonable efforts made by him to collect worthless debts should be taken into consideration. *John's Estate*, 1 Chest. (Pa.) 281; *Kester v. Lyon*, 40 W. Va. 161.

Where a testator directed that his executor should "be handsomely paid for his services," it was held that only the usual commission would be allowed him unless there had been extraordinary trouble. *Waddy v. Hawkins*, 4 Leigh (Va.) 458. So an agreement to pay an executor a "fair compensation" is a mere promise to pay what may be allowed by the Court. *Ratliff v. Davis*, 38 Miss. 107.

In *Kenan v. Graham*, 135 Ala. 585, the will provided that the executors should be "liberally compensated," and it was held that this means no more compensation than was fair and just.

What is a proper compensation is a matter of opinion, and even if, in granting the allowance, the Court below may have erred on the side of liberality, that

alone is not a sufficient reason for reversing his judgment. *McDonald v. Davidson*, 6. A. R. 320.

Where there is no error in principle, the Court is, on appeal, loath to interfere as to the quantum of the allowance made to executors, even though it seems to be more liberal than the Appellate Court would in the first instance have given. *Re Smith* (1916), 38 O. L. R. 67.

Part of a testator's estate consisted of a dry goods business, which was carried on by his executors for nearly a year before it was sold *en bloc*, one executor doing practically all the work. Upon passing the accounts the Probate Judge allowed a commission of 4½ per cent. upon the whole estate to the executor who carried on the business, and a commission of one-sixth per cent. to the other. No commission was allowed upon sales made in carrying on the business. Upon appeal the Court refused to interfere with the Judge's discretion in apportioning the commission. *Re Manzer*, 42 N. B. R. 257.

An executor was held entitled to the ordinary commission on an estate where he exercised an effective supervision over the business, although he left the details to a clerk. *Hall's Estate*, 8 Pa. Dist. R. 8.

A Surrogate Court on the passing of an executor's accounts should not, under ordinary circumstances, fix in advance the compensation of an executor-trustee for the future work to be performed in getting in and distributing the unrealized part of the estate. *Re Patterson Estate*, 24 Man. R. 217, 28 W. L. R. 177.

The compensation to an executor or administrator may be fixed by agreement between him and the persons interested in the estate. *In re Hamilton*, 29 N. S. Rep. 249; *Newell v. West*, 149 Mass. 520.

In *Taylor v. McGrath*, 10 O. R. 669, it was held that the executors were entitled to credit for a sum paid to a land agent as commission for making a sale of real estate, but that the amount so paid must be deducted from the five per cent. commission paid to executors

for compensation, since double commissions cannot be allowed.

An administrator is not entitled to commission on a fund held by his intestate as a trust fund. *Haines v. Hay*, 169 Ill. 93.

An administrator with the will annexed, who undertakes the administration of the estate of the original testator and that of his residuary legatee as one under an agreement that he shall be allowed a certain commission upon the original estate in full for his services in both estates, is not entitled to an additional commission because a formal accounting in the estate of the residuary legatee is subsequently had. *Re Hamilton's Estate*, 29 N. S. R. 249.

Executors were held entitled to compensation on the income of the estate received and paid out by them for a reasonable time after the death of the testator's widow, at which time they were directed to distribute the estate, where an immediate distribution would have resulted in a serious loss, and the retention of large sums of money by the executors during the time the property remained in their hands was required for the payment of taxes and other expenses. *Re Prentise*, 25 App. Div. 209, 49 N. Y. Supp. 353.

It has been held that the validity of an administrator's appointment cannot be questioned on the accounting, and where he has rendered services as administrator he is entitled to his expenses and compensation. *Carroll v. Hughes*, 5 Redf. Sur. (N.Y.) 337. Nor will the fact that the will under which an executor is appointed and acts is afterwards found invalid, deprive him of his right to compensation for services rendered in good faith. *Comstock v. Hadlyme*, Ecc. Soc. 8 Conn. 254.

Personal representatives have no right to appropriate assets of the estate for payment of their right to commissions until an allowance is made by the Court; but they are entitled to retain in their hands a sufficient fund to recover a reasonable commission

to be awarded on a settlement of their accounts. *Re Furniss*, 86 N. Y. App. Div. 96; *Wheelwright v. Wheelwright*, 2 Redf. Sur. (N.Y.) 501.

In *Heron v. Moffatt*, 8 P. R. 438, the Master held that a trustee is entitled to retain his commission from time to time out of moneys received without waiting for the completion of his trust duties. In that case, however, the trust deed authorized the trustee to retain a fixed commission of four per cent. on all sums received by him. The Master, however, quotes with approval, and follows, a decision of Chancellor Walworth in *Hosack v. Rogers*, 9 Paige, 468, where he said: "Where an executor or trustee who has a large claim against the estate, and is entitled to a preference, receives and applies money in part payment of principal and interest, if the amount so paid is large, it appears to be equitable that his commission on the amount so applied should be first deducted, so as to give him the interest on the balance of the principal of his debt from that time, after deducting the commission on such partial payment. But when that is done, the subsequent commissions should be computed in such a manner that the aggregate amount of the whole commissions allowed will not exceed the statute allowance upon all his receipts and disbursements."

Where an executor is entitled to retain his compensation from time to time out of moneys received and does not do so, he is not entitled to interest on sums which he might have deducted. *Re Moran Estate*, 38 C. L. J. 215.

An executor was instructed in the will to rent a farm belonging to the estate, and it was held he was not entitled to compensation for services performed in managing the farm himself. *Bartolet's Appeal*, 1 Walk. (Pa.) 77.

The indebtedness of an insolvent executor or administrator to the estate constitutes assets of the estate and will be applied in discharge of any compensation allowed him. *Freeman v. Freeman*, 4 Redf.

(N.Y.) 211. *In re Dacre, Whitaker v. Dacre* (1915), 2 Ch. 480.

The compensation to which an executor or administrator is entitled is treated by the Court as a lien or charge upon the estate, and the *cestui que trust*, or his assign, cannot compel a conveyance or transfer of the trust property without first satisfying the trustee's just demands. The compensation is in the same category as any other expenses incurred by him. *Life Assurance of Scotland v. Walker*, 24 Gr. 293.

When an estate was insolvent the Court held that the executor was entitled to his allowance for compensation in preference to all the creditors. It is allowed for his services, and is therefore part of the expenses incurred in administering the estate, and, as such, is one of the primary charges before payment of debts. *Harrison v. Patterson*, 11 Gr. 105.

A solicitor-executor is not entitled to profit costs if the estate proves insolvent, even though the will contains the usual clause empowering him to charge for work done. *In re White* (1898), 1 Ch. 297, 2 Ch. 217. See further under "Solicitor-Trustee."

Where the accounts have been finally passed the executor cannot claim a further sum for compensation because of the distribution of a large sum of money subsequently, without opening the accounts after due notice to all parties interested. *Sinclair v. Graham*, 14 Ohio C. C. 386.

Letters of administration were granted to the widow of an intestate, and she, without any formal appointment as such, acted as guardian of their infant children and received the rents and profits of the real estate, all of which she duly accounted for. The Master in taking the accounts allowed her \$133 as compensation, part of which was for the receipt of such rents and profits, although the administration did not extend to the real estate. On further directions the Court said the case was an exceptional one and refused to

interfere with the allowance. *Doan v. Davis*, 23 Gr. 207.

The amount of compensation allowed to trustees is governed by the law in force at the time of the settlement of the accounts. *In re Daly's Estate*, 165 N. Y. S. 792.

Where an attorney was appointed administrator and paid very large sums for attorney's fees to the firm of which he was a member, which fees were allowed to him on annual accountings without appeal, the Court held these allowances were not so conclusive upon the parties interested that they could not be taken into consideration in fixing the compensation even though no fraud was proved. *In re O'Leary's Estate* (1916) 193 Mich. 282.

The New York Statute provides for the appointment of temporary administrators, but makes no provision for their compensation, but the Courts have held that such temporary administrators are entitled to the same compensation as ordinary administrators. *In re Runk* (1918), 202 N. Y. St. 970.

CHAPTER XXXV.

PRACTICE ON AUDIT.

The accounts of a trustee may be passed before the Judge of a Surrogate Court of a county in which a trustee or a co-trustee is resident, or in which any part of the trust estate is situated; but in the case of a trustee under a will the accounts must be passed in the Surrogate Court from which probate was granted. Sec. 25, the Trustee Act.

One of two executors may be called upon to pass his accounts at the instance of a co-executor who is also a residuary legatee. *Paul v. Nettleford*, 2 Add. Ecc. 237. And there seems to be no reason why one of two or more executors might not submit his own dealings with the estate for approval, independently of the other or others. *Cunnington v. Cunningham* (1901), 2 O. L. R. p. 516. But separate accountings by different executors should not be encouraged. *In re Smith's Estate*, 81 N. Y. S. 1035.

By section 30 of the Surrogate Courts Act the rules of evidence and the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court, except as otherwise provided by said Act, is made applicable to the Surrogate Courts, and such Courts, and the Judges and officers thereof, have all the powers of the Supreme Court and of the Judges and officers thereof.

Con. Rule 417 is as follows: "Where an account is to be taken, the accounting party, unless the Master otherwise directs, shall bring in the same in debit and credit form, verified by affidavit. The items on each side of the account shall be numbered consecutively, and the account shall be referred to by the affidavit as an exhibit, and shall not be annexed thereto."

This rule is applicable to the auditing of an executor's and administrator's account in the Surrogate

Court. The vouchers for disbursements should be numbered to correspond with the items of disbursements. In some counties the practice is to deposit the vouchers with the Registrar when filing the petition and accounts, to enable the parties interested in the estate to examine them. This appears to be the practice in the Master's office in England in administration actions, but is not generally followed in Ontario. No doubt the Surrogate Judge has authority to order them to be so deposited in any case where required.

The account of receipts should shew the names of the parties from whom received and on what account received with sufficient detail to make each item explanatory; and the amount received. The disbursement account should shew to whom the money was paid and on what account paid, with sufficient detail to make the item explanatory; and the amount paid. The accounts should shew the actual date of receipt and payment.

An item for "miscellaneous expenses necessarily incurred in connection with the administration of the estate \$39.73," is objectionable, because it does not set forth the items which make up the whole so as to enable the parties interested to ascertain the necessity or reasonableness of any specific expenditure. *Matter of Jones*, 1 Redf. 263; *In re Hammer*, 157 N. Y. S. 981.

The new Surrogate Court Rules relating to passing of accounts are 36 to 41, both inclusive, and will be found in the appendix. It will be noticed that Rule 38 requires that the accounts shall include:—

- (i.) An account shewing of what the original estate consisted.
- (ii.) An account of all moneys received.
- (iii.) An account of all moneys disbursed.
- (iv.) An account of all property remaining on hand.
- (v.) Such other accounts as the Judge may require.

The account showing of what the estate consisted is not intended to be a mere copy or duplicate of the inventory filed on the application for probate or letters of administration. Such inventory is already available for every purpose. The evident intention of the rule is that the account shall contain a detailed inventory of the estate that came to the hands of the executor or administrator, or which for his default or neglect, should have come to his hands, as will enable the Judge, or the parties interested, to check and verify the account of the moneys received. For instance, "Cash in bank" is not such an account as is contemplated by the rule. The affidavit to be filed for succession duty purposes requires that the name of each bank, and the place of deposit be named, and this account should be as full and detailed as the account required by the Succession Duty Act. In cases where the estate consists of farm stock it should show the number of horses, horned cattle, sheep, etc. In the appendix will be found a form the writer has suggested to solicitors and found of great advantage when passing the accounts.

Where during the administration of the estate there have been investments made by the trustees on mortgages or other securities, such investments should not appear as disbursements, but the income from these investments should appear as receipts. It is always advisable to have such investments appear in a separate account. This enables the Court to trace the administration of the assets, and to fix the allowance to the trustees for their care, pains and trouble in administering the estate.

Where, by the terms of the will, or trust deed, the income of the estate is payable specifically, the receipts on income account should be shewn apart from the receipts on capital account.

Rule 38 (2) now provides that "when by the will or instrument creating any trust estate, principal and interest are dealt with separately, the accounts shall

be divided so as to show receipts and disbursements in respect of principal and income separately." A convenient practice is to have a double ruled column, in one of which is shown receipts on capital account, and in the other receipts on income account.

This is the most convenient practice where the items comprise both capital and income. Where the items of receipts are distinct items of capital or income it may be more convenient to prepare separate accounts shewing the receipts and disbursements on income account.

With the accounts must be filed the petition of the trustee. This should shew all the facts entitling the petitioner to an audit of the accounts. It should shew, by schedule, or otherwise, all the estate undisposed of or unadministered, and the reasons why it has not been administered. It should give the names and residences of all the persons interested in the estate, distinguishing between adults and infants. If there are infants their respective ages should be shewn, if possible. *Re Lopwell*, 6 Terr. L. R. 647. If there are more petitioners than one it does not seem essential that all should join in the affidavit verifying the petition, but it is a prudent practice to have them all verify the petition where possible. The new rules contain forms of petition and affidavit verifying same (numbers 52 and 53), and these will be found in the appendix. In some respects the affidavit is defective; although Rule 38 requires the executor or administrator to file "an account of what the original estate consisted," and the petition refers to this account, the affidavit does not verify it in any way.

The petition, accounts and appointment should be properly indorsed and entitled. They should shew the name and address of the solicitor prosecuting the audit. The carelessness of many solicitors in this respect invites a disallowance of their costs.

The appointment to pass the accounts should be served on all parties interested in the estate. The

audit is binding only on parties who are notified of the proceedings. Sec. 71, Surrogate Courts Act. Where an infant or person of unsound mind is interested a copy of the appointment may be served on the official guardian, except in the case of a person confined in a provincial hospital for the insane, when such notice shall be served on the Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities. *Ib.*

Legatees, whose legacies have been paid in full, are not necessary parties. *Re Griffen*, 3 O. W. N. 759. Where property is bequeathed to one in trust for others, the trustee is regarded at law as the legatee, and his *cestuis que trust* are not necessary parties to be served. *Gaunt v. Tucker*, 18 Ala. 27. A legatee in remainder should be served with a copy of the appointment. *In re Albertson's Estate*, 1 W. N. C. 185; *In re Hunt*, 82 N. Y. S. 538.

By the Charities Accounting Act, 1915, where under the terms of a will or any instrument in writing any property, or any right or interest therein or the proceeds thereof, are given to or vested in any person as executor or trustee for any religious, educational, charitable or public purpose, he is required to give notice thereof to the Attorney-General and the official guardian. Where the Act applies and the executor is passing his accounts, notice of the audit should be given to the Attorney-General, and probably, to the official guardian. Copies of the accounts should be served with a copy of the appointment. See *ante*, Chap. IV.

Rule 16 of the Rules and Regulations of 27th May, 1914, for carrying into effect the Succession Duty Act, requires that in cases where security has been given for the payment of succession duty, notice of any appointment for the passing of the accounts of the executor or administrator, shall be served on the solicitor to the Treasury, together with a copy of the accounts, and the affidavit verifying, seven clear days before the audit of such accounts.

The Official Guardian and Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities, always require a copy of the accounts, and it is usual for the appointment to contain a direction that a copy be served.

Persons interested in the estate residing within Ontario are entitled to not less than seven days' notice of the audit, and if resident out of Ontario shall be entitled to such notice as the Judge shall direct. Sec. 71 (4) Sur. Cts. Act. "Not less than seven days' notice," means seven clear days. *National Inse. Co. v. Egleson*, 29 Gr. 406.

Where interested parties reside out of Ontario the usual direction for service is by registered letter. The time allowed for service should be sufficient to enable the parties so served ample time to be represented on the audit, and will depend on the locality. A person residing in British Columbia should have not less than twenty days, while ten days might be ample for a person residing in Montreal. Where there are several parties to be served in different parts of Ontario, the appointment may provide for service by registered letter unless some good reason is shewn. For instance, a residuary legatee should, if at all possible, be served personally. So if the estate is large, and the accounts voluminous or intricate, the interested parties should be served personally.

Where there is more than one audit the second account should commence with the balance due upon the first audit, to which should be added the receipts, if any, and credits for expenditures, if any. *Nowland v. Rice* (Mich.) 101 N. W. Rep. 214.

As to the effect of an interim audit of the accounts, see *Galloway's Estate*, *post*.

As to surcharging and falsifying accounts, see *ante*, Ch. II.

Evidence on Audit.

A subpoena may properly be issued to compel the attendance of a witness on an audit. *Hannum v. McRae*, 17 P. R. 567.

Where a particular part of the estate cannot be traced, an application to charge the personal representative with it cannot be entertained unless it can be proved that it was received by him. *Shuttleworth v. Bristo*, 12 W. R. 40.

An executor or administrator must account for all the property of the deceased which has come into his hands wherever found or by whatever means collected; and the inventory of the estate constitutes the basis or starting point for such accounting. *Jamison v. Hapgood*, 10 Pick (Mass.) 77; *Dawes v. Boyston*, 9 Mass. 337; *Ella's Appeal*, 68 N. H. 35. An inventory is not, however, conclusive as to the assets for which an executor or administrator is accountable, but he may be compelled to account for assets not inventoried or credited by him. *Field v. Hitchcock*, 14 Pick. 405. It is only as to property which an executor or administrator is entitled to receive in his representative capacity that an account should be taken, and if he receives money or property to which he is not entitled in his representative capacity he cannot be required to account therefor. *In re Soutter*, 105 N. Y. 514; *Watson's Appeal*, 6 Pa. St. 505.

In passing the accounts the parties interested have, as a rule, the right to a strict examination of the same, and also to have the witnesses examined *viva voce* if desired. *In re Winter's Estate* (1900), 7 Terr. L. R. 250.

The affidavits of the executors or administrators verifying the accounts, and the production of the vouchers, is *prima facie* evidence to warrant the Judge in passing the accounts, and where voluminous accounts have been passed the pointing out of one or

two objectionable items was held insufficient to reopen the account. *In re Curry*, 17 P. R. 379, 25 A. R. 267.

Should any item occur which cannot, at the moment, be satisfactorily explained, or the voucher for it produced, it is marked as a queried item for further inquiry; and if the accounting party does not afterwards attend and support the queried items, or obtain further time to do so, such items will be disallowed. Dan. Chy. Pr. 6th ed. 1051.

In taking the accounts the Judge may direct that the books of account in which the accounts required to be taken have been kept, or any of them, be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the truth of the matters therein contained. Con. Rule 418. Where the evidence produced to charge an accounting party consists of entries in books kept by the party himself, the party has a right to make use of entries in the same books in support of his payments. *Darston v. Earl of Oxford*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 10. The books must be adopted altogether or rejected *in toto*. *Kilbee v. Sneyd*, 2 Moll. 193. So when an account furnished by a party before action instituted, is produced to charge him with the items on the debit side, he is entitled to resort to the credit side in support of his items of disbursements. *Boardman v. Jackson*, 2 B. & B. 386.

Entries made by a deceased executor in a private book kept by him were held not admissible in evidence either for or against the other executor. *Camsusa v. Coigdarripe*, 11 B. C. R. 177.

Every sum of \$8.00 and under is allowed without a voucher upon the oath of the executor. *Everard v. Warren*, 2 Ch. Ca. 249; but his oath must be positive and not on belief only. *Robinson v. Cumming*, 2 Atk. 410; and it would seem that the aggregate of such items should not exceed \$400 in amount. *Bennett's* M. O. 86. If receipts or vouchers have been lost, or accidentally destroyed, secondary evidence will be let in. *Ib.*

The word "voucher" is not limited to receipts. *Re McRae*, 26 N. S. R. 219. It may extend to any account book in which charges and acquittances are entered; and signifies any acquittance or receipt in the nature of evidence of payment. *Whitwell v. Willard*, 42 Mass. 216.

The term "voucher" when used in connection with the disbursement of moneys, implies some written or printed instrument in the nature of a receipt, note, account, bill of particulars, or something of that character, which shows on what account or by what authority a particular payment has been made, and which may be kept or filed for the convenience or protection of the party receiving it. *People v. Swigert*, 107 Ill. 494; *First Nat. Bank v. Elgin*, 136 Ill. App. 465.

A voucher is simply evidence of the truth of the fact that certain services have been performed, or that a certain payment has been made; it is not evidence of the legal conclusion of the question whether, assuming the services or expenses have been in fact performed, paid or incurred, are properly allowable when the account for them is presented for allowance. *People v. Green*, 5 Daly 194.

Where a debt is evidenced by a note of the testator or intestate, no voucher is necessary beyond the production of the note and evidence of payment. *Re Robinson*, 45 Misc. 551.

Where something must have been due to servants for wages at the time of the testator's death, and it was reasonable that a person should be put in the house to take care of it, a sum of £27 for wages and £16 for keeping the house, were allowed the executor (the testator's widow) although no vouchers had been produced. *Caton v. Rideout* (1849), 19 L. J. Ch. 408.

On a bill to surcharge and falsify an administrator's former settlement, vouchers that could not be produced, were presumed to have existed, after a long lapse of time. *Campbell v. White*, 14 W. Va. 122.

Where an executor who had paid out money on account of expenses of administration produces a voucher shewing the nature of the disbursement, and stating facts which, if true, shew the same to have been reasonable and necessary for the good of the estate, a presumption is raised in favour of the correctness of the charge which must be opposed by affirmative evidence on the part of one contesting the claim for credit. *Re White*, 15 N. Y. St. 729.

But nothing will be allowed in the account under the name of general expenses; the particulars must be mentioned. So also, where a party discharges himself, upon his oath, of sums under \$8, he must give particulars of the payment, to whom paid, for what purpose, and when paid. Dan. Ch. Pr. 1053.

Where the account is of long standing it seems that the Court will sometimes permit the accounting party to discharge himself, upon oath, by reason of the loss of vouchers. Thus where the account in question was of twenty years' standing, it was ordered that the defendant should prove his account by his own oath, so far as he could not prove it by books or cancelled bonds. *Peyton v. Green*, 1 Ch. Rep. 146; and a similar direction was given where the account was of fourteen years' standing. *Holstcum v. Rivers*, 1 Ch. Ca. 127; *Turner v. Corney*, 5 Beav. 515, 59 R. R. 564.

It would appear that the mere absence of vouchers, or the trustee's inability to produce them, will not relieve him of the duty of proving payments unless he can shew that they are beyond his control through no neglect or default on his part. *Turner v. Corney*, *supra*.

In *Walmsley v. Bull*, 15 Gr. 210, where the estate was small and the executor had allowed the widow to receive and expend the moneys of the estate in support of herself and family, and the plaintiff had allowed fifteen years to elapse after coming of age before bringing action, the Court held the executor was not excused from accounting but said the Master

should act liberally on the rule of the Court that gives him a discretion as to the mode of vouching the accounts in his office.

Where an accounting party destroys the accounts before the matters have been fully adjusted, and still more pending a litigation, the Court will presume everything most unfavourable to him, consistent with the established facts. *Gray v. Haig*, 20 Beav. 219, 109 R. R. 396.

So where the executor's or administrator's accounts are not only untrustworthy, but of the most suspicious character, he is readily liable to be charged with omitted assets against his own statements; though the question is, after all, one of evidence. *Downie v. Knowles*, 37 N. J. Eq. 513. On the other hand, where the representative has acted apparently in good faith and for the best interests of the estate, he deserves protection, whether all his acts were technically legal or not. *Owen v. Potter*, 115 Mich. 557.

In a suit to administer the estate of a testator who had died in Jamaica in 1825, an account was directed against the surviving executor and the representatives of a deceased executor. In taking the account (in 1857) the books of account, which were proved to have been recorded in the Jamaica Court, were allowed to be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the matters therein contained, under 15 & 16 Vic. ch. 86, which was similar to our Rule 418. *Sleight v. Lawson*, 3 K. & J. 292. 112 R. R. 155.

A testator died in 1834 and his trustee kept the trust accounts open to be inspected by the *cestuis que trust*, who all lived together and in communication. In 1855 an examination of the books was made on behalf of two of them. The Court allowed the books to be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the accounts up to the time of that examination. *Banks v. Cartwright*, 17 W. R. 417.

Books of account, kept by a trustee and her agent, were tendered as evidence of disbursements made on

behalf of the trust estate. As the trustee could not produce strict vouchers the chief clerk admitted the books as evidence, and a motion to vary the certificate was refused. *Cookes v. Cookes*, 3 N. R. 97.

The power given to the Master under Con. Rule 418 is not to be exercised until he is satisfied that the means of obtaining the ordinary legal evidence has been substantially exhausted. *Ewart v. Williams*, 3 Eq. R. 476, 7 DeG. & M. 68.

There are many cases in which the Court directs the account to be taken with the admission of certain documents, or testimonies, not having the character of legal evidence. Thus where the parties have been permitted, for a long course of years, to deal with property as their own, considering themselves under no obligation to keep accounts as if there was any adverse interest, having no reason to believe the property belonged to another, though it would not follow that, being unable to give an accurate account, they should keep the property, yet the account would be directed, not according to the strict course, but in such a manner as under all the circumstances, would be fit. Dan. Ch. Pr. 1052, citing *Lupton v. White*, 15 Ves. 432, 443.

Appeals.

Sec. 37 (*d*) of the Supreme Court Act provides for an appeal "from any judgment on appeal in a case or proceeding instituted in any Court of Probate in any Province of Canada other than the Province of Quebec, unless the matter in controversy does not exceed five hundred dollars."

This sub-section was enacted in consequence of the judgment in *Beamish v. Kaulbach*, 3 S. C. R. 407, which held that the Court of Probate in Nova Scotia was not a Superior Court and, therefore, an appeal did not lie in the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in a

matter or controversy originating in the Probate Court.

In *In re Rundle*, 52 S. C. R. 114, it was held that the term "Court of Probate" denotes any Court exercising a general probate jurisdiction, and that under the terms of said section 37 (*d*) an appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ontario in a case originating on the audit of accounts in a Surrogate Court. (See *Re Rundle*, 32 O. L. R. 312).

Section 34 of the Surrogate Courts Act provides as follows:

34.—(1) Any person who deems himself aggrieved by an order, determination or judgment of a Surrogate Court, in any matter or cause, may appeal therefrom to a Divisional Court.

(2) No such appeal shall lie unless the value of the property to be affected by such order, determination or judgment exceeds \$200.

(3) The practice and procedure upon and in relation to an appeal shall be the same as is provided by the County Courts Act as to appeals from the County Court.

(4) A motion for a new trial after a trial by jury under section 28 shall be deemed an appeal and shall be made to a Divisional Court.

(5) An appeal shall also lie from any order, decision or determination of a Judge of a Surrogate Court, on the taking of accounts in like manner as from the report of a Master under a reference directed by the Supreme Court, and the practice and procedure, upon and in relation to the appeal, shall be the same as upon an appeal from such a report.

(6) Sub-sections 2 and 3 shall not apply to the appeal provided for by sub-section 5.

Immediately an order is made removing a matter from a Surrogate Court to the Supreme Court it ceases to be a matter in the Surrogate Court, and an appeal from the order under this section cannot be

entertained. Thereafter the practice of the Supreme Court of Ontario is to be followed. *Justin v. Goodwin*, 18 P. R. 174; *Forbes v. Forbes*, 23 O. L. R. p. 522.

Where the Surrogate Judge has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim, but by consent of the claimant and the executor he does adjudicate thereon, there is no appeal under this section, but there may be under the Arbitration Act. *Re Graham* (1912), 25 O. L. R. 5.

An order was made by the Judge of a Surrogate Court, requiring the plaintiffs in an issue directed to be tried in the Surrogate Court to give security in the sum of \$120. On appeal from this order it was urged that as the amount involved in the order was less than \$200, there was no appeal. The Court held the objection was untenable—that sub-section 2 was not intended to refer to a sum of money mentioned in an order as security for costs, but to property belonging to or in question in connection with the estate itself. *Forbes v. Forbes* (1911), 23 O. L. R. 518.

In *Re Nichol* (1901), 1 O. L. R. 213, it was held that an appeal to a Divisional Court from an order of a Surrogate Court was not properly lodged if security had not been given and an affidavit of the value of the property affected filed as required by Rule 57 of the Surrogate Court Rules of 1892. Now no security for costs is required on appeals from County Courts, and no security would appear to be necessary on an appeal from a Surrogate Court. On p. 136 of Holmsted's Judicature Act, there is a foot-note by the learned author as follows:—"I am informed by Mr. Justice Middleton that it has been ruled in the Appellate Division that the effect of the provision of the Surrogate Courts Act as to appeals is to abrogate the Surrogate Court Rules on that subject, but I have been unable to find the case in which that ruling was made."

All appeals from a Surrogate Court, except as to a decision, order or determination under sub-section

5, are to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the judgment in *Re Alexander*, 31 O. R. 167, where it was held that an appeal lay to a Divisional Court from an order of a Surrogate Court Judge allowing compensation to an executor, it would appear that such appeals are more properly made to a single Judge. An appeal from a Master's report is to a single Judge, and the Appellate Division has no power to hear such an appeal. *Clarke v. Jamieson*, 9 C. L. T. 97; not even by consent. *In re Wilson*, 16 P. R. 150.

Appeals from orders on passing accounts have been heard without objection by the Divisional Courts, also by a single Judge. In a recent case there was an appeal as to the amount allowed executors as compensation, and the appeal came on before Middleton, J., in Single Court. It was objected that the appeal should have been to an Appellate Division, but Mr. Justice Middleton held that it was competent for a single Judge to hear the appeal. *Re Henderson*, 8 O. W. N. 31.

Mr. Holmested, speaking of appeals under sub-sec. 5, says: "Presumably, in order to comply with these Rules, the certificate or order of the Judge appealed from should be filed in the Surrogate Court, and notice of filing served on the opposite party, and seven clear days' notice of the appeal must then be served on the respondent within one month from the date of service of the notice of filing. The appeal in this case is to a Judge of the High Court Division in the Weekly Court, and it would seem that an appeal would lie from his decision to the Appellate Division under the Judicature Act, sec. 26, unless precluded by Jud. Act, sec. 25": p. 135.

See also *In re West*, 14 C. L. Times, 422, where it was held that an appeal to a single Judge is to the Court and not to a Judge in Chambers.

Costs of Audit.

It is by no means a matter of course that the costs of taking and auditing the accounts are paid out of the estate. As a general rule the costs are so paid, but they are discretionary with the Judge, and it is impossible to lay down any rule when the usual course will be departed from. *In Heugh v. Scard*, 33 L. T. 659, Jessel, M.R., said: "In certain cases of mere neglect or refusal to furnish accounts, when the neglect is very gross or the refusal wholly indefensible, I reserve to myself the right of making the executor or trustee pay the costs of litigation caused by his neglect or refusal." This was approved of in the recent case of *In re Skinner, Cooper v. Skinner* (1904), 1 Ch. 289.

Where trustees had refused information and an account of the property to the parties who were interested in the estate, the trustees were ordered to pay the costs of an administration action up to the hearing, and each party his own costs of the subsequent proceedings. *Talbot v. Marshfield* (1868), L. R. Chy. App. 622; *Kemp v. Burn*, 4 Giff. 348.

But the mere fact that an executor neglected to render accounts when asked, is not of itself sufficient to make him liable to costs. *White v. Jackson*, 15 Beav. 191, 92 R. R. 379.

If the costs have been increased by the failure of the executor to keep reasonably accurate entries or accounts of his dealings with the estate, or by inquiries into his improper dealings with and application of the trust estate and funds, these should be deducted from his costs. *In re Honsberger*, 10 O. R. 521; *Zimmerman v. Wilcox*, 35 C. L. J. 688.

The Surrogate Judge is sometimes embarrassed by a number of interested parties, in the same interest, appearing on the audit and asking for costs out of the estate. The practice was laid down very clearly by Jessell, M.R., in *Sharp v. Lush*, 10 Ch. D. 468, in a

clear cut judgment which deserves to be copied *verbatim*:

“As to the costs of attending the proceedings in Chambers, there ought to be no mistake about the practice, as it is a matter of the greatset importance. If I were to accede to this application I should waste half of the estates which are administered before me in this Court.

“The law stands in this way, that any persons interested who ought to be served can, under the general practice, attend, as of course, the proceedings; but that does not entitle them to the costs of attending. That is determined by the Judge in Chambers, who, under a general order (see Con. Rule 406), decides what parties interested in the estate shall attend the taking of the accounts at the costs of the estate; that is the subject of a special application. I cannot prevent any body attending the proceedings; if there were fifty people I could not prevent them instructing fifty solicitors to attend all the proceedings; but if they did, they would not only pay their own costs where I found forty-eight of them unnecessary, but I should make them pay the extra costs occasioned by attending unnecessarily. That has always been the practice in my Chambers since I have had the honour of sitting here.

“I do not believe these numerous attendances in Chambers on taking the accounts, and so on, are of the slightest use. According to my experience, when you have one respectable solicitor taking the accounts adversely on one side, and you have an equally respectable solicitor attending on the other side, the attendance of all other solicitors and clerks is so much money wasted.

“As a rule, I give leave to one solicitor to attend on one side and one solicitor on the other. When the residuary legatee comes in, what I do is this: I let one solicitor take the accounts for the residuary legatee

on the one side, and one solicitor take the accounts for the executors on the other. In the present case, as neither Mr. Ince's clients nor Mr. Davey's clients obtained special leave to attend the proceedings in Chambers, and as I am not satisfied their attendances were necessary, I shall not give them the costs of these attendances."

A solicitor-trustee, acting on behalf of himself and his co-trustee, is entitled to the costs of the audit. So a firm of solicitors, one member of which is one of the executors, is entitled to the usual costs. *In re McNab*, 19 C. L. Times, 74. And see the chapter on "Solicitor-Executor."

Section 79 of the Surrogate Court Act provides that the Board of County Judges may prescribe a tariff of fees and costs to be taken by the registrars and the officers of the Surrogate Courts, and to be allowed to solicitors and counsel practising therein for duties and services in respect of proceedings in such Courts, and to witnesses therein, and no other fees or costs than those so authorized shall be taken or allowed to such registrars, officers, solicitors, counsel and witnesses. The tariff of fees so prescribed will be found in the appendix.

In *Re Morrison*, 13 O. W. R. 767, the Surrogate Judge himself taxed the costs of the solicitors according to the tariff, "except that I allowed certain items not covered by the tariff, and which under the circumstances of this case, could not have been contemplated by the tariff, but in respect to which certain allowances were properly made to the solicitor." On appeal, Riddell, J., said: "I do not quarrel with the statement of the learned Judge that the amounts allowed are reasonable; but I think that the costs in the Surrogate Court must be those found in the tariffs. . . . Not only is there the negative prohibition against the allowance of anything which is not in the tariffs, but there is the positive prohibition in the statute. A taxation which admittedly contains "items

not covered by the tariff" cannot stand. The appeal upon this ground must be allowed, and the bill complained of referred back to be taxed by the registrar in strict accordance with the tariff."

A Surrogate Court Judge allowed, by fiat, a counsel fee to the executors of \$100, and \$50 to counsel for the residuary legatee. On appeal Middleton, J., said the maximum counsel fee was limited by the Rules and could not be exceeded, following *Re Morrison, Re Griffen*, 3 O. W. N. 759.

The late Master in Ordinary, Thomas Hodgins, K.C., refused to tax to a liquidator the premiums paid to a guaranty company, where such liquidator was required to give security under the provisions of the Winding-up Act. This practice has not been followed in the Surrogate Courts of Ontario on the passing of administrators' accounts; and, where an administrator has furnished security in the shape of a bond of a guarantee company, it is usual to allow him the premium paid the company. If the administrator neglects, for an unreasonable time, to pass his accounts so as to relieve the guaranty company, he should not be allowed for premiums paid after the date when he should have had an audit. Such an expense was disallowed by an Arkansas Court. See *Adamson v. Parker*, 85 S. W. 239.

Where an administrator *pendente lite* had been appointed on giving security in the sum of £14,000, he was allowed £50, the sum charged by a guarantee company as surety. *In re G. Harver* (1889), 14 P. D. 81.

In *Orme's Estate*, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 337, a foreign executor was not allowed the costs of a bond obtained by him from a trust company; and in *In re Bryne*, 122 Cal. 260, expenses incurred by an administratrix in her efforts to procure sureties were not allowed in her accounts.

An executor or administrator will not be allowed the sum paid to a professional or other accountant for

making up the accounts for the purpose of the audit. *Taylor v. McGrath*, 10 O. R. 669.

It will be noticed that the new tariff provides that the fees, in cases of an important nature, may be increased by the Judge, but such increase shall be subject to approval by a Judge of the Supreme Court of Ontario upon a report from the Judge. Where the receipts exceed \$100,000, the fees shall be such as the Judge deems fair and proper subject to the approval of a Judge of the Supreme Court. To secure uniformity, until further direction is given, such applications are to be heard by Mr. Justice Middleton. To secure approval the certificate of the Surrogate Court Judge and all papers necessary to enable the matter to be dealt with, should be forwarded to him at Osgoode Hall, with return postage.

Payment into Court. . . . *Trustee Act C. 150, s. 25.*

Where on the passing of the final accounts by the Judge of a Surrogate Court, there is in the hands of the accounting party any money belonging to an infant, or to a lunatic or person of unsound mind, or to a person whose address is unknown, the accounting party is required to pay the money into the Supreme Court to the credit of the person who is entitled to it. The accountant is to be furnished with a certified copy of the order, and the person paying the money in is entitled to deduct \$5 for his cost.

For the purpose of payment in and out of Court, the order should state when the infants interested in the estate will attain their majorities and the amount payable to each of the infants. See sec. 38 of the Trustee Act.

An infant attains the age of twenty-one on the first moment of the day next before the twenty-first anniversary of his birth. Thus, if he were born on 16th January, 1900, he will attain his majority on the 15th January, 1921; and as the law does not recognize fractions of a day, the age would be attained at the

first instant of the 15th. This is the rule laid down in Bl. Com. 463, founded on a dictum in the old case of *Herbert v. Turball*, 1 Sid. 162, 1 Keb. 589. The proposition has been frequently attacked as forming a singular departure both from all other legal modes of computing time and equally from the commonly received notions upon the subject, but it is now unquestionably the law. Jarman, 35; *Grant v. Grant*, 4 Y. & C. 256; Redfield on Wills, 19.

A Surrogate Court has no right to the custody of the property of an infant or lunatic; and the Judge of a Surrogate Court has no jurisdiction to order payment of an infant's money into that Court. *Re Mercer* (1912), 26 O. L. R. 427.

L., a resident of Chicago, died there, and his widow was appointed general administratrix of his estate. A small portion of his estate consisted of personalty in Ontario, of which a trust company was appointed administrator. This company administered the Ontario assets, and had a balance of \$774, on hand, which was claimed by the widow as general administratrix. The Official Guardian, on behalf of the infant heir, contended that the moneys realized in Ontario, or a portion of them, should be paid into Court. Britton, J., held that the passing of the accounts by the Ontario administrator was not the "passing of the final accounts" referred to in section 38 (2) of the Trustee Act. It is in fact only a collection by the Ontario administrator for the home administratrix, to enable the latter to pass the accounts and make final distribution, and the order went for payment to the administratrix. *Re Law* (1915), 34 O. L. R. 222.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

EFFECT OF AUDIT—MISTAKE OR FRAUD.

Most of the learning in the English cases deals with the law and practice in re-opening stated or settled accounts. A *stated account* is an agreement between parties who have had previous transactions of a monetary character, that all items of the accounts representing such transactions are true and that the balance struck is correct, together with a promise, express or implied, for the payment of such balance. Abbott's Trial Ev. 458. Lord Mansfield, C.J., in *Trueman v. Hurst*, 1 T. R. 42, said: "What is an account stated? It is an agreement by both parties that all the articles are true." See also *Union Bank v. Knapp*, 3 Pick. 96.

When the balance admitted upon a stated account is paid, the account is deemed a settled account. Storey Eq. Pl. 798. In dealing with executors' accounts, settled accounts are accounts rendered by an executor to his *cestuis que trust*, or to residuary legatees, upon their releasing him of his accountability to them, and approved and accepted by the *cestuis que trust* or legatees.

The rule in equity has always been that stated or settled accounts cannot be opened or corrected except on the ground of fraud, mistake, omission, accident or undue advantage, and the burden is on the party seeking to impeach the account to prove the existence of such fraud, mistake or the like. Even where these elements are shewn to exist, the courts will not readily set aside a settlement or statement presumably made by the parties after an examination of the state of their mutual dealings; and where the error or other taint does not affect the whole transaction, they will only allow the account to be surcharged or falsified. 1 A. & E. Ency. 461.

Where accounts were impeached the rule was that an establishment of one mistake was sufficient to induce the Court to give a decree entitling the party to surcharge or falsify an account. *Lawless v. Mansfield*, 1 D. & War. 557; *Davies v. Spurling*, Tam. 199; *Gething v. Keighley* (1878), 9 Ch. D. 547. This proceeded on the principle that if an account stated or settled be proved to be fraudulent there is nothing on which it can stand; the transaction itself is void; then, if the transaction is void, there is no question that can remain about an account partially settled, or settled so far as error may not be proved. *Allfrey v. Allfrey*, 1 Mac. & G. p. 93, 84 R. R. 20.

In *Vernon v. Vawdry*, 2 Atk. 119, it is said that "if there are only mistakes and omissions in a stated account, the party objecting shall be allowed no more than to surcharge and falsify. But if it is apparent to the Court that there has been fraud and imposition, the decree must be that the whole shall be opened, notwithstanding it was a stated account of twenty-three years' standing, and he who was guilty of the fraud was dead."

In *Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux*, 4 Cranch, (U.S.) 306, Marshall, C.J., said; "No practice could be more dangerous than that of opening accounts which the parties themselves have adjusted, on suggestion supported by doubtful or by only probable testimony. But if palpable errors be shewn, errors which cannot be misunderstood, the settlement must so far be considered as made upon an absolute mistake or imposition, and ought not to be obligatory on the injured party or his representatives, because such items cannot be supposed to have received his assent." The same principle is stated by Lord Redesdale in *Drew v. Power*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 182: "One rule material to observe in all cases of account is, that where there has been a settlement of accounts, either the account has been signed or a security taken upon the footing of the account, a Court of equity does not open that trans-

action and throw it again between the parties as if no such transaction had happened, unless the evidence which is produced (and that evidence founded on charges in the bill) shews the whole transaction to be so iniquitous that it ought not to be brought forward at all to effect the parties so to be bound. If the account impeached be a settled account, or if an instrument has been executed upon the foot of it, the Court expects that the errors should be specified in a bill and proved as specified; otherwise it would be easy to overthrow the fairest account and those settled in the most solemn manner, when there happens to be any complication in their nature."

In *Williamson v. Barbour*, 9 Ch. D. 529, the Master of the Rolls said that if the accounts shew errors of sufficient number and sufficient magnitude they may be re-opened although fraud is not shewn, and whether they are errors caused by mistake, or errors caused by fraud, the Court has a right to re-open the accounts. He also points out that a less amount of error will justify the Court in opening the accounts where the accounting party occupies a fiduciary position than in cases where persons do not occupy that position.

An elaborate investigation of the powers of the prerogative Court and the diocesan courts in England was made by Mr. Justice Daly in *Re Bricks Estate*, 15 Abbott's Prac. 12. He there cites a large number of cases in support of his statement that though these courts "were not courts of record and never had the broad general powers to review and correct their proceedings possessed by courts of that high character, still, as indispensable to the administration of justice, they had and exercised, . . . to a certain limited extent, the right of revoking acts done by them, as where a decree is obtained by collusion or fraud. . . . The whole may be summed up briefly in the statement that they may undo what has been done through fraud or upon the supposition that they had jurisdiction

... or correct mistakes, the result of oversight or accident.” In *In re Wilson and Toronto General Trusts Corporation*, 13 O. L. R. 82, Meredith, C.J., said that these conclusions of the learned Judge are fully supported by the adjudged cases to which he refers.

It is further to be observed that the Surrogate Courts of this Province are now courts of record; R. S. O. 1914, ch. 62, sec. 3, and therefore possess the broad powers to review and correct their own proceedings spoken of by Mr. Justice Daly as being possessed by courts of record.

A Surrogate Judge acting as the Surrogate Court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order which he has been induced to make by fraud of the applicant, and also to set aside or vary an order which he has made by mistake, though not to correct errors made in the judicial determination by him of any question; thus it was held he had jurisdiction to vacate an order made by himself upon the taking of executors' accounts and re-open the accounts and further investigate them without reference to the order made. *In re Wilson and Toronto G. T. Co., supra*. The acts of the Surrogate Judge in passing the accounts of executors are those of the Court and not of the Judge as *persona designata*. *Ib*.

In the last mentioned case the Surrogate Court Judge had passed the executors' accounts in January, 1905, and in February, 1906, the wife of the testator presented to the Judge of the Surrogate Court a petition alleging that she had since discovered that the executors had bought mining stock with trust funds, that they had charged interest on overdrawn balances, that they had sold estate property without consulting her, had spent large sums in unnecessary and expensive litigation, etc., and asked to have the order vacated and the accounts re-opened. It will be noticed that neither fraud or mistake was charged, and counsel for the petitioner argued that the Surrogate Judge had power to open the accounts on such allegations

“otherwise the petitioner would have had to bring an action in the High Court with the onus on her to prove mistake or fraud.” The Surrogate Judge did re-open up the accounts to a limited extent and a Divisional Court held he had jurisdiction to do so.

Section 71 (1) of the Surrogate Courts Act is as follows:—“Where an executor, administrator, trustee, under a will of which he is an executor, or a guardian, has filed in the proper Surrogate Court an account of his dealings with the estate, and the Judge has approved thereof, in whole or in part, if he is subsequently required to pass his accounts in the Supreme Court, such approval, except so far as mistake or fraud is shewn, shall be binding upon any person who was notified of the proceedings taken before the Surrogate Judge, or who was present or represented thereat, and upon every one claiming under such person.”

It is only *so far as* mistake or fraud is shewn, and not *where* mistake or fraud is shewn, that the binding effect of the approval is taken away; and the language of the section plainly indicates that it was not intended that the whole account should be opened up, but that the account should be opened up so as to remove from it anything which, owing to fraud or mistake, had not been charged or had been allowed to the executor, administrator or guardian. *In re Wilson and Toronto G. T. Co.*, 15 O. L. R. p. 616.

The judgment in the last mentioned case was the aftermath of the same case reported in 13 O. L. R. *supra*, and Meredith, C.J., said: “It is unnecessary to determine whether, if this exception to the binding nature of the accounts had not been contained in the section, and the order approving the accounts were to be treated as a judgment or decision of the Surrogate Court, upon the case made by the appellant, as to the two matters as to which she has succeeded in shewing that the accounts were incorrect, she would be entitled to have the accounts taken *de novo*, but, as at present

advised, I do not think she would be entitled to that relief, but only to have the accounts corrected in those respects in which it is shewn that they are incorrect. The principle applicable to the opening of an ordinary stated account, and the consequences of such an account being opened, do not, I think, apply to an account taken by the Court in the presence of the parties where the persons to whom the accounting is being made are brought before the Court for the purpose of enabling them to challenge, if they will, the correctness of the account."

The effect of this section is not to abridge the inherent jurisdiction or power of a Surrogate Judge to re-open accounts upon which he has already passed. It would seem, however, to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to re-open such accounts "except so far as mistake or fraud is shewn." What is meant by the words "if he is subsequently required to pass his accounts in the Supreme Court?" Does this limit the right to re-open the accounts where, an audit being had, an administration order is subsequently made and a reference ordered? In *Shaw v. Tackaberry* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 490, the sole beneficiary, alleging that one of the executors had himself become the real purchaser of a part of the trust estate at an under-value, brought an independent action in the Supreme Court and succeeded, and a reference was directed as to profits and rents. It is not easy to see how, in that case, the action could have been framed so as to open up matters decided on the audit without asking for a new account, either in form or substance. But is this what is meant by "pass his accounts," in section 71 (1)? On p. 498 Riddell, J., speaking of the defence afforded by this section, says: "The defence under the statute may stand or fall with the main defence—if there was no mistake or fraud in the defendant asserting that the land had been properly sold, realizing \$2,200 only, it may be that the statute applies."

In refusing to open up items of an account which have been adjudicated upon the statute gives effect to the old maxim of law: *Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.*'' If an action be brought and the merits of the question be discussed between the parties and a final judgment obtained by either, the parties are concluded and cannot canvass the same in another action.

A judgment obtained by fraud could always be set aside by means of an action analogous to the former Chancery suit to set aside a decree obtained by fraud. *Wyatt v. Palmer* (1899), 2 Q. B. 106; *Flower v. Lloyd* (1877), 6 Ch. D. 297. And the Court could set aside a judgment on the ground of mistake as well as fraud, but the application must be made within a reasonable time. *Cannan v. Reynolds*, 5 El. & Bl. 301, 103 R. R. 491.

A mistake is some unintentional act, omission or error arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence. 1 Story Eq. Jur. 110. That result of ignorance of law or fact which has misled a person to commit that which, if he had not been in error, he would not have done. Jeremy Eq. Jur. 358. A mistake exists where a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does or omits to do some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence. Bispham's Eq. 185.

Mistake within the meaning of equity and as the occasion of jurisdiction, is an erroneous mental condition, conception or conviction induced by ignorance, misapprehension, or misunderstanding of the truth, but without negligence, and resulting in some act or omission done or suffered erroneously by one or both of the parties to a transaction, but without its erroneous character being intended or known at the time. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 299, approved in *Pearson v. Dancer*, 144 Ala. 427.

Under the rule that equity will relieve against a judgment for "mistake," the erroneous advice of counsel is not such a mistake as will entitle a party to relief: *Donovan v. Miller*, 88 Pac. 82.

A mistake may be a mistake consisting of ignorance or forgetfulness of a material fact, or arising out of the belief in the existence of the subject matter of a transaction where it has ceased to exist, or of some fact which forms the basis of the transaction which is not true. Beyond this, however, it is impossible to give a complete definition of mistake as the courts have always refrained from attempting to do so. 21 Halsbury 2.

In *Barrow v. Isaacs & Son* (1891), 1 Q. B. D. 420, Lord Esher, M.R., said: "I can find no definition of what 'mistake' is; but if you treat mistake in its ordinary sense in the English language, is mere forgetfulness a mistake? Can you, in English, say, 'I forgot,' and is that the same thing as saying 'I was mistaken?' I think not. Both these questions depend on something happening in the mind of the person, and you have to see what it is that happens in his mind. If he merely forgets, he does not assume that one state of things exists whereas some other state of things exists; it is a mere passive state of mind; he has forgotten—he has not thought that one thing was in existence, whereas something else was in existence. I should say, that mere forgetfulness is not mistake at all in ordinary language. I cannot find any decision in Courts of Equity which has ever stated that mere forgetfulness is mistake against which equity will relieve."

It would appear that these remarks were not concurred in by Lopes and Kay, L.JJ., the other members of the Court, and in *Hood of Avalon v. Mackinnon* (1909), 1 Ch. D. 476, Eve, J., after quoting the above citation, said: "With the greatest possible respect to Lord Esher, I do not quite follow that. It seems to me that when a person has forgotten the

existence of a pre-existing fact, and assumes that such fact did not exist, he is labouring under a mistake, and he acts on the footing that the fact did not pre-exist; and, venturing to criticize the language of Lord Esher, I should have thought that a man makes a mistake in forgetting an existing fact quite as much as he does in assuming a state of things to exist which does not in fact exist." See also *Kelly v. Solari*, 9 M. & W. 54, 60 R. R. 666; *Baker v. Courage* (1910), 1 K. B. p. 65.

Relief will not be granted on the ground of mistake if the mistake is one of law as distinguished from one of fact. The distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact has never been clearly defined by the courts, but it may be taken that to exclude the right to relief the mistake must be one of general law, such, for example, as the legal interpretation of a contract. *Wilding v. Sanderson* (1897), 2 Ch. 534.

Thus the above rule does not apply to ignorance of a private right, although the private right is the result of a matter of law, or depends upon rules of law applied to the construction of legal instruments; nor does it apply to ignorance of a right which depends upon questions of mixed law and fact, and a statement of fact which involves a conclusion of law is still a statement of fact and not a statement of law, while mistake as to the law of a foreign country which is clearly, in one sense, a mistake of law, is held in this country to be a mistake of fact. 21 Halsbury, 4.

Fraud, in the sense of a Court of Equity, properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. 1 Story Eq. Jur. 187.

Fraud, in the contemplation of a civil Court of Justice, may be said to include properly all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed,

and are injurious to another, or by which an undue advantage is taken of another. All surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and other unfair way that is used to cheat anyone is considered as fraud. Fraud in all cases implies a wilful act on the part of any one, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by illegal or inequitable means, of what he is entitled to. Kerr on Fraud, 1.

Fraud is not mistake or error in interpreting a contract; fraud is something dishonest and morally wrong, and much mischief is done as well as pain inflicted by its use where "illegality" and "illegal" are the really appropriate expressions. *Washburn v. Wright*, 31 O. L. R. 138, where it was held that the word "fraud" in sec. 3 of the Master and Servant Act means something more than mere mistake or an erroneous mode of interpreting the contract.

"It is now a settled doctrine of the law that there can be no fraud, misrepresentation or concealment without some *moral* delinquency; there is no actual fraud, legal fraud, which is not also a moral fraud. This immoral element consists in the necessary guilty knowledge and consequent intent to deceive—sometimes designated by the technical term *scienter*. The very essence of the legal conception is the fraudulent intention flowing from the guilty knowledge. No misrepresentation is fraudulent at law, unless it is made with actual knowledge of its falsity, or under such circumstances that the law must necessarily impute such knowledge to the party at the time he makes it." 2 Pom. Eq. Juris. 884, cited with approval in *Mason v. Moore*, 73 Ohio St. 275.

Fraud which will vitiate a judgment, must be fraud in procuring the judgment, and not fraud in the account upon which the cause of action is instituted. *Boldenweck v. Bullis*, 40 Colo. 253; it must be actual fraud involving intentional wrong, as distinguished from legal or constructive fraud. *Wagner v. Beadle*, 108 Pac. 859.

In *Duchess of Kingston's Case*, 2 Sm. L. C., it is said that "fraud is an extrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of Courts of Justice. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts." DeGrey, C.J., in that case said: "Like all other acts of the highest judicial authority, it is impeachable from without; although it is not permitted to shew that the Court was mistaken, it may be shewn that they were misled." Lord Coleridge, C.J., in *Abouloff v. Oppenheimer*, 10 Q. B. D. 295, said he believed that the principle has never been either better or more tersely and neatly stated than it was in the foregoing passages.

To set aside a judgment of fraud it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to allege fraud. It is the duty of the Court to receive such evidence, pro and con, as is material to the question whether there really has been, since the former judgment, a new discovery of something material to disturb the former judgment, and the plaintiff must shew a reasonable possibility of the alleged fraud being established, a mere general allegation of fraud, without particulars, cannot avail. *Boswell v. Coaks*, 6 R. 167; *Birch v. Birch* (1902), P. 130, 138.

"It is not too much to require any one who intends to charge another with fraud . . . to take the responsibility of making that charge in plain terms." *Caldwell v. Cockshutt Plow Co.* (1913), 30 O. L. R. p. 262, citing *Low v. Guthrie* (1909), A. C. 278, and *Badenach v. Inglis* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 165; and the person making the charge is confined to the particular fraud charged. *Medcalf v. Oshawa Lands and Investments* (1914), 5 O. W. N. 797; *Washburn v. Wright*, *supra*. There must be a distinct and positive issue presented by the party seeking to set aside a judgment for fraud. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to say to the defendant "You obtained that judgment by fraud." He must state in what the fraud consisted. "You bribed the witnesses, you bribed my solicitor, you bribed my counsel, you committed some fraud or

other of that kind, and I ask to have the judgment set aside on the ground of fraud." Per James, L.J., *Flower v. Lloyd* (1877), 6 Ch. D. p. 302. And see *Wallingford v. Mutual Society*, 5 A. C. 685, 701.

In *Brooke v. Lord Moyston*, 2 D. J. & S. 373, 139 R. R. 134, a compromise was grounded on the supposed insufficiency of real estate to pay certain legacies. It appeared that at the time of the inquiry as to the compromise being for the benefit of one of the legatees, an infant, a document relative to the valuation of the estate rendering it doubtful whether the valuation, which throughout the inquiry was treated as correct, was not based on erroneous principles, so as to give an undervalue, was in the possession of the owners of the estate, but was not laid before the Master. The compromise was set aside. Turner, L.J., treated this as fraud, "meaning by fraud not moral fraud, but what in the eye of the Court is considered as amounting to fraud." This decision was subsequently reversed, L. R. 4 H. L. 304, but the reversal did not affect the law as laid down here.

One of two executors induced his agent to purchase a part of the trust estate at an auction sale for \$2,200, and then re-sold the land at a profit, accounting on the audit only for the sum at which the land was bid in. "The representing to the Surrogate Court that \$2,200 had been received as the sale price of the land was either a mistake or fraud on the part of the defendant; and, assuming that the Surrogate Court Judge had jurisdiction to pass upon the items, such a decision was not binding." *Shaw v. Tackaberry* (1913), 29 O. L. R. 490. See also *Re Daly, Daly v. Brown*, 39 S. C. R. 122.

Where a solicitor puts in a fraudulent defence for his client, without the client's knowledge, making admissions on which judgment was obtained against the client, it was held this was fraud for which the Court would relieve. *Williamson v. Preston*, 20 Ch. D. 672.

A final settlement will not be interfered with on account of mere irregularities unless they are sufficiently gross to raise the presumption of fraud; nor are mere illegal allowances unless obtained by fraud, ground for impeaching or setting aside a final settlement. 18 C. Y. C. 1198.

It is fraud for an administrator to obtain an allowance to himself for the whole amount of a claim assigned to him by a former administrator of the deceased without deducting the amount for which his assignor is indebted to the estate. He should set off one debt against the other and take credit only for the difference. *Sorrels v. Frantham*, 48 Ark. 386.

The wilful omission or concealment of assets constitutes fraud for which a settlement may be set aside. *Ridenbaugh v. Burnes*, 14 Fed. Rep. 93; *Smiley v. Smiley*, 80 Mo. 44; *In re McNeil*, 68 Pa. St. 412.

It is fraud where an executor or administrator takes a credit to which he is not entitled in any view of the case. *Houts v. Shepard*, 79 Mo. 141. Thus it was held that an administrator was guilty of fraud where he had obtained credit for money which he knew he had never paid out. *Morrow v. Allison*, 39 Ala. 70. So too it was considered fraudulent for an executor to obtain credit for the full amount of a note which he settled at a considerable discount. *Matter of Beach*, 3 Misc. 393.

But it is not fraudulent to obtain credit for disbursements actually made, though they were improper; for instance, where an administrator actually paid taxes without proper authority. *Sorrels v. Frantham*, 48 Ark. 386. Nor is an executor chargeable with actual fraud because he is credited with one or two items not in fact paid, where the account was made up by his attorney in his absence and without his knowledge. *Williams v. Rhodes*, 81 Ill. 571.

If a guardian buys up the incumbrances upon an infant's lands for less than the amount due, it is fraud if he charge the estate more than he actually

paid. *Henley v. —*, 2 Ch. Ca. 245. So a guardian settling accounts as soon as infants come of age, and retaining a gratuity, the settlement was set aside. *Oldham v. Hand*, 2 Ves. 259. See also *Wych v. Packington*, 3 Bro. P. C. 46. And a solicitor dealing with an infant is governed by the same principles which apply to a guardian and his ward. *Revett v. Harvey*, 1 S. & S. 502, 24 R. R. 219.

In some of the cases it seems to have been assumed that mere perjury or falsification of evidence does not amount to that fraud which is sufficient to set aside a judgment. *Flower v. Lloyd*, 10 Ch. D. 327; *Baxter v. Wadsworth*, 67 L. J. Q. B. 301; *Woodruff v. McLennan*, 14 A. R. 242. In Kerr on Fraud it is said: "To set aside a judgment on the ground of fraud, actual positive fraud must be shewn. There must be on the part of the person chargeable with it the *malus animus*, the *mala mens* putting itself in motion, and acting, in order to take an undue advantage for the purpose of actually and knowingly committing a fraud. The fraud must be a fraud which can be explained and defined upon the face of the judgment. Mere irregularity, or even perjury, is not the kind of fraud which will authorize the Court to set aside a judgment." p. 365.

But the better opinion would seem to be that if the perjury was that of the party to the action who obtained the judgment, or of a witness on behalf of such party, made with the knowledge of the party, such perjury amounts to fraud.

In *Abouloff v. Oppenheimer*, 10 Q. B. D. 295, in an action in a foreign Court, a claim was made for the value of certain goods. The plaintiff in that action knowingly misrepresented to the Court that the goods were not then in his possession. This was held to be fraud.

In *Vadala v. Lawes*, 25 Q. B. D. 310, in an action on a foreign judgment, the alleged fraud consisted of the plaintiff placing before the Italian Court bills of

exchange which he alleged to be commercial bills, when in truth and in fact he knew them to be nothing of the sort, but bills for gambling transactions. Held, to be fraud.

These cases were followed by a Divisional Court in *Johnston v. Barkley* (1905), 10 O. L. R. 724, in preference to *Woodruff v. McLennan*. Street, J., delivering the principal judgment of the Court, said: "In coming to my conclusions I follow *Abouloff v. Oppenheimer* and *Vadala v. Lawes*, which draw no distinction between the fraud which consists in presenting perjured evidence to the Court, and that which is collateral to the merits of the case. This distinction is recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Hilton v. Guyot*, 159 U. S. 113, and by our own Court of Appeal in *Woodruff v. McLennan*, but the House of Lords does not seem to have had the question presented to it as yet. Meantime there is no doubt that the wide doctrine which appears to be the result of the English and American cases at present, impairs to a very considerable extent the finality of all judgments."

But a party to an action cannot try over again the very question which was in issue in the original action. Where it is merely a question whether the plaintiff's witnesses or the defendant's witnesses were telling the truth at the trial or inquiry the Court will not re-open the judgment. See per Garrow, J.A., *Jacobs v. Beaver*, 17 O. L. R. 502.

It is clear that the fact that since the adjudication a party has discovered the existence of evidence which might have established his contention will not amount to fraud. *Taylor v. Sheppard*, 1 Y & C. 271.

Where a plaintiff brings an action against an executor or other trustee to which section 71 of the Surrogate Courts Act applies, and seeks to re-open items in the accounts approved of by the Surrogate Court Judge without alleging fraud or mistake, the action will be stayed as frivolous and vexatious, and

an abuse of the process of the Court. In the exercise of its discretion the Court may allow the action to proceed upon security for costs being given. *Smith v. Clarkson* (1904), 7 O. L. R. 460.

An executor duly passed his accounts before the proper Surrogate Court Judge in the presence of the solicitor for the plaintiff, a beneficiary. Subsequently the plaintiff brought an action in the High Court, and without any pleadings being delivered, an order was made, by consent, for the removal of the executor and the appointment of a trust company in his place, and for the passing of the accounts, adopting the common form of the order for such purposes. It was held that, on the taking of the accounts in the Master's Office the accounts taken and passed by the Surrogate Court Judge were under section 71, no mistake or fraud being shewn, binding on the plaintiff, for notwithstanding such consent the judgment must be construed as if made *in invitum*, and the usual rules of law and procedure, statutory and otherwise, applied thereto. *Gibson v. Gardner* (1907), 13 O. L. R. 521.

Where on an interim audit an executor is allowed certain payments the matter becomes *res judicata* and cannot, in the absence of fraud or mistake, be inquired into on the final accounting. *In the Matter of Douglass*, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 64, on the interim audit the accounts shewed that the executor had retained in his hands securities not of the nature or character of those in which executors are authorized to invest, and the beneficiaries under the will then made no attempt to hold him responsible for any loss sustained up to that time and raised no objection to his continuing to hold such securities, and it was held they were estopped from doing so on the final accounting.

Where a beneficiary acquiesces in the misapplication of a fund directed to be paid to him by the order of distribution, he cannot have the account opened for fraud or manifest error. *In re Koehnken*, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. 840.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE RESIDUE.

Section 58 of the Trustee Act provides as follows:

(1) Where a person dies having by will appointed an executor, such executor, in respect of any residue not expressly disposed of, shall be deemed to be a trustee for the person, if any, who would be entitled to the estate under the Devolution of Estates Act in case of an intestacy, unless it appears by the will that the executor was intended to take such residue beneficially.

(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any right in respect of any residue not expressly disposed of to which, if this Act had not been passed, an executor would have been entitled where there is not any person who would be entitled to the testator's estate under the Devolution of Estates Act.

Where a testator gave certain specific legacies, and the residue of his estate, both real and personal, he devised and bequeathed unto his executors "to be by them disposed of in such manner as may in their discretion seem best," it was contended that the executors took the residue impressed with a trust, and because the reference in the residuary clause was to "my executors," and not to them by name, it was not intended that they were "to take such residue beneficially." Sutherland, J., said he was unable to see, from the language used, that any trust had been created or declared, and that the next of kin could not call upon the executors to account for the residue. *Re Miles*, 11 O. W. N. 282.

In *Fenton v. Nevin*, 31 Ir. L. R. 478, it is said: "It is plain that whatever an executor takes as such he takes as a representative, and therefore not benefi-

cially. Accordingly before an executor can take any part of the assets beneficially, he must shew that the testator has given it to him as an individual." N-7

In *In re Howell* (1915), 1 Ch. 241, a testatrix by her will appointed G. B. her executor. Among other pecuniary legacies she gave one to G. B., "my executor," and concluded her will in the following terms: "After the aforesaid legacies have been duly paid the remainder or residue of my property (if any) shall be at the discretion of my executor and at his disposal." The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Warrington, J. (1914), 2 Ch. 173, and held that G. B. took the residue beneficially and not as trustee. Cozens-Hardy, M.R., held that it was a gift to the individual and not to the executor and so did not conflict with the Irish case above referred to; while Swinfin Eady, L.J., appears to have specially approved of the principle of that case.

Where a testator directed his debts, etc., to be paid "by my executor hereinafter named," and then disposed of his estate as follows: "To my sister Mary Ann \$1,000. To my executor G. Woodman the remainder of my estate real and personal after all my just debts are paid by him;" Kelly, J., said the words "my executor," immediately preceding the name "G. Woodman," in the bequest of the residue, are introduced not as meaning that the bequest of the residue was to Woodman as executor *virtute officii*, but rather as descriptive of the person whom the testator intended to benefit, and whom, in the following clause, he identified (in the clause appointing him executor) by mentioning his place of residence and his occupation. The intention of the testator was, that Woodman should take the residue beneficially. *Re Smith* (1917), 12 O. W. N. 393.

In *Williams v. Arkles*, L. R. 7 H. L. 606, it is said that the statute did not introduce any new rule for the construction of wills. See also the recent case of *Re Aspel* (1918), 42 O. L. R. 191.

On the passing of accounts, all debts and charges having been paid and the residue ascertained, the executors become trustees of the testator's estate, and their liability must be determined on that footing. *Dover v. Denne* (1902), 3 O. L. R. p. 689. And as soon as debts have been paid an administrator holds the estate in trust to convert and divide among those entitled under the statute to distribution, in precisely the same way that an executor holds an estate in trust under a will when he is directed to convert and distribute among several residuary legatees. *Re Harris*, 7 O. W. N. p. 598 (1915), 33 O. L. R. 83.

The "residue" of the estate means the estate which remains after payment of the debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and the costs of an administration suit, but not succession duty. *Kennedy v. Protestant Orphans Home*, 25 O. R. 235. A gift of residue "to the amount of \$800" was held to be a gift of \$800 only. *Re Browne*, 5 O. W. N. 466; *In re Nelson*, 14 Gr. 199.

The term "residuary legatee" *prima facie* means the person taking what the law calls the residue of the personal estate; but it is a term which must be fashioned and moulded by the context. But the use of the word "legatee" instead of the more appropriate word "devisee" will not prevent real estate passing under a residuary clause where the intention of the testator, to be gathered from the whole will, was that real estate should pass. *Re Booth and Merriam*, 1 O. W. N. 646; *Patterson v. Hueston*, 40 N. S. R. 4.

When the executor has paid all the debts, the funeral and testamentary expenses, and all the legacies, he must in the last place pay over the surplus or residue of the personal estate to the residuary legatee, if any such be nominated. The residuary legatee has a right to insist that the executor, before the end of the first year after the testator's death, shall, if possible, convert all the assets into money and pay the funeral and testamentary expenses, debts and legacies, and hand over the clear residue to the residuary legatee.

Wightwick v. Lord, 6 H. L. C. 217, 108 R. R. 76. A residuary legatee is entitled to whatever may fall into the residue after the making of the will by lapse, invalid disposition, or other accident, or by acquirement subsequent to the date of the will.

The distribution of the residue of intestate estates is governed by sections 29, 30 and 31 of the Devolution of Estates Act, which are as follows:—

29.—(1) The real and personal property, whether separate or otherwise, of a married woman in respect of which she dies intestate, shall be distributed as follows: One-third to her husband if she leaves issue, and one-half if she leaves no issue, and subject thereto shall devolve as if her husband had predeceased her.

(2) A husband who, if this Act had not been passed, would be entitled to an interest as tenant by the curtesy in real property of his wife, may by deed or instrument in writing executed, and attested by at least one witness, and delivered to the personal representative, if any, or if there be none, deposited in the office of the Surrogate Clerk at Toronto, within six months after his wife's death, elect to take such interest in the real and personal property of his wife as he would have taken if this Act had not been passed, in which case the husband's interest therein shall be ascertained in all respects as if this Act had not been passed, and he shall be entitled to no further interest thereunder.

30. Except as in this Act is otherwise provided the personal property of a person dying intestate shall be distributed as follows, that is to say: one-third to the wife of the intestate and all the residue by equal portions among the children of the intestate and such persons as legally represent such children in case any one of them have died in his lifetime, and if there are no children or any legal representatives of them then one-half of the

personal property shall be allotted to the wife, and the residue thereof shall be distributed equally to every of the next of kindred of the intestate who are of equal degree and those who legally represent them, and for the purpose of this section the father and the mother and the brothers and sisters of the intestate shall be deemed of equal degree; but there shall be no representation admitted among collaterals after brother's and sister's children, and if there is no wife then all such personal property shall be distributed equally among the children, and if there is no child then to the next of kindred in equal degree of or unto the intestate and their legal representatives and in no other manner.

31. If, after the death of a father, any of his children die intestate without wife or children in the lifetime of the mother, every brother and sister and the representatives of them shall have an equal share with her, anything in section 30 to the contrary notwithstanding.

Section 27 provides that an illegitimate child or relative shall not share under any of the provisions of the Act, and that a person born out of matrimony shall not become legitimate by the subsequent marriage of his parents.

The Devolution of Estates Act, passed in Ontario in 1886, makes a change amounting to a new rule in the law as to succession to real estate of persons dying intestate, and declares generally that land shall be distributed as personal property among the next of kin of a person dying intestate. It is sufficiently plain that the provisions of the Statute of Distributions, as to personal estate, are to regulate the distribution of land. The same comprehensive change had been made in many of the Australasian Colonies before this, and the result of such legislation had been construed to the effect above indicated by the Privy Council in *Wentworth v. Humphrey*, 1886, 11 A. C. 619.

In the distribution under this Act of the real and personal property of an intestate, brothers and sisters of the half-blood share equally with those of the whole blood. *In re Wagner* (1903), 6 O. L. R. 680. And where the next of kin were cousins, some of whom were the children of the intestate's father's half-brother, and one of whom was the niece both of his father and mother, it was held that all the cousins took equally—that those of the double blood took no more than the others. *Re Adams* (1903), 6 O. L. R. 697.

J. M. died intestate. Her father and mother were both dead and her nearest relatives were children of the father's sister, and grandchildren of the mother's brothers and sisters. Falconbridge, C.J.: "I am of the opinion that there is no representation of collaterals of this class, and that the two daughters of the deceased sister of the intestate's father take all to the exclusion of the grandchildren of the deceased brothers and sisters of the intestate's mother." *Re McEachern* (1905), 10 O. L. R. 499. And see *Re Hale*, 10 O. W. N. 376.

An intestate left nephews and nieces, and children of a nephew who predeceased the intestate. It was held that the provision in the Statute of Distributions (now in section 30 of the Devolution of Estates Act) that "there shall be no representation admitted among collaterals after brother's and sister's children," excluded the children of the deceased nephew. *Crowther v. Cawthra*, 1 O. R. 128.

Where brothers and sisters are entitled to share on an intestacy, the children of a deceased brother or sister are entitled to share *per stirpes*. *Walker v. Allen*, 24 A. R. 336, overruling *Re Colquhoun*, 26 O. R. 104.

Under the Statute of Distributions the division of personal estate of an intestate is always to be *per stirpes*. The intestate had a son and daughter both of whom predeceased her. The son left three children and the daughter one child. Held, the four grand-

children took *per stirpes*, and not *per capita*. *In re Natt*, 37 Ch. D. 517. This rule seems to be doubted in Williams on Executors, but for the present, the point may be said to be settled in favour of a division *per stirpes* when all the children are dead leaving descendants. Armour on Devolution, 253.

Where some of the children of the intestate are living and some are dead leaving issue, no question arises: The estate is divided into as many portions as there are living children and the deceased children who have left issue—each living child takes one share, and the descendants of each deceased child take the share which their ancestor, the child, would have taken if he had survived. Armour, 258.

Lineal descendants to the remotest degree are entitled to take as representing children. But it is strictly confined to descendants. Where an intestate's son died leaving a widow and child, and then the intestate died, the widow took nothing, the child taking the whole of the father's share. *Price v. Strange*, 6 Madd, 159, 22 R. R. 266, 268.

Section 12 of the Devolution of Estates Act provides that the real and personal property of every man dying intestate and leaving a widow but no issue shall, where the net value of the property does not exceed \$1,000, belong to the widow absolutely and exclusively. Where the net value exceeds \$1,000, the widow is entitled to a preferential share of \$1,000 with interest at four per cent. per annum until payment. The provision of \$1,000 for the widow is in addition to her share in the residue of the estate.

This section does not apply where there is a partial intestacy: *In re Harrison* (1901), 2 O. L. R. 217, where a testator failed to dispose of his residuary estate. See also *Re Twigg's Estate* (1892), 1 Ch. 579. But, in a case within the section, the widow is entitled to the \$1,000 out of the estate in Ontario, notwithstanding that she receives other benefits under the laws of

another country out of her husband's estate in that country. *Sinclair v. Brown*, 29 O. R. 370.

Section 12 of the Devolution of Estates Act corresponds with sec. 2 of the English "Intestates Estates Act, 1890," the amount being £500 instead of \$1,000. In England it was held that a widow's title under the statute may be barred by a settlement before marriage, excluding her from her distributive share in her husband's personal estate; and even in the case of a female infant, she may be barred of her right by such a settlement, made before marriage, with the approbation of her parents or guardian. *Lord Buckinghamshire v. Drury*, 3 Bro. C. C. 492.

Where the settlement is expressed to be "as and for her jointure, in full lieu, bar and satisfaction of any dower or thirds which she could or might claim at common law out of all or any of the estates real, personal, or freehold, of her intended husband," the widow will be excluded from her share under the statute; for the words "common law" must be construed as equivalent to the terms "according to the general law, according to law as distinguished in common parlance from equity." *Gurly v. Gurly*, 1 Cl. & F. 743, 54 R. R. 170.

But where the husband, on his marriage, settles on the wife by making a settlement "in lieu of dower and thirds at common law," she is not thereby precluded from her distributive share in the personal estate. *Colleton v. Garth*, 6 Sim. 19, 38 R. R. 70.

In a case under the English Act the intestate died in 1894, and at the time of his death his estate consisted of assets of the value of £10 and a contingent reversionary interest in certain real and personal property of no market value at the time of his death. Having regard to the probable lifetime of the life-tenant, a valuer estimated the reversionary interest at £388. In 1904 the interest fell into possession and proved to be worth £3,500. It was held that the value of the estate must be taken as at the time of the intestate's death.

and the whole estate passed to the widow. *In re Heath* (1907), 2 Ch. 270.

The following table shews how the estate of an intestate, dying since 1st July, 1886, is distributable:—

If the intestate die leaving: Wife only.	His personal representatives take as follows: \$1,000 under s. 12 as above. Of the residue one-half to wife and one-half to next of kin in equal degree to the intestate, or their legal representatives; or if no next of kin to the Crown.
Wife and child or children.	One-third to wife, residue to child or children; if children dead then to their legal representatives, i.e., their lineal descendants <i>per stirpes</i> . <i>Re Natt, supra</i> .
No wife or child.	All to next of kin and their legal representatives <i>per stirpes</i> .
Child, children or their representatives.	All to such child or children, or to representatives <i>per stirpes</i> .
Children by two wives.	Equally to all.
No child, children or their representatives.	All to next of kin in equal degree to intestate.
Child and grandchildren of deceased child.	Half to child; and half to grandchildren who take <i>per stirpes</i> .
Husband only.	Half to him and half as if he had predeceased his wife.
Husband and child or children.	One-third to husband and two-thirds to child or children.
Father and mother.	Equally to both.
Father, mother, brother and sister.	Equally to all.
Mother and brother and sister.	Equally to all.
Wife, mother, brothers, sisters and nephews, or nieces.	\$1,000 to wife, one-half of balance to wife, and residue to mother, brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces—the nephews and nieces taking <i>per stirpes</i> .
Wife and father.	\$1,000 to wife and residue to wife and father equally.
Wife, mother, nephews and nieces.	\$1,000 to wife. One-half of residue to wife, one-fourth to mother, and one-fourth to nephews and nieces.

Wife, brothers, sisters and mother.	\$1,000 to wife. Half of residue to wife (sec. 30), and one-half to brothers, sisters and mother equally.
Mother only.	The whole.
Wife and mother.	\$1,000 to wife and the residue equally to both.
Brother or sister of whole blood and brother or sister of half blood.	Equally.
Posthumous child and mother.	Equally.
Posthumous child and child born in lifetime of intestate.	Equally.
Father's father and mother's mother.	Equally.
Uncle's or aunt's children, and brother's or sister's grandchildren.	Equally.
Grandmother, uncle or aunt.	All to grandmother.
Two aunts, nephews and niece.	Equally.
Uncle and deceased's uncle's child.	All to uncle.
Uncle by mother's side and deceased uncle's or aunt's child.	All to uncle.
Nephew by brother and nephew by half sister.	Equally <i>per capita</i> .
Brothers or sisters and nephews or nieces.	Equally. The nephews or nieces take <i>per stirpes</i> . <i>Walker v. Allan, supra</i> .
Nephews by deceased brother and nephews by deceased's sister.	Equally <i>per capita</i> .
Nephews and grand-nephews.	All to nephews <i>per capita</i> . <i>Re Carscallan</i> , 13 O. W. N. 80.
Nephews and nieces, and children of deceased nephew.	All to nephews and nieces. <i>Crowther v. Cathra, supra</i> .
Brother and grandfather.	All to brother.
Brother's grandson and sister's son.	All to sister's son.
Brother and wife.	\$1,000 to wife—residue equally.
Wife, mother and brother.	\$1,000 to wife—residue equally.
Wife, mother and children of deceased brothers.	\$1,000 to wife and one-half of residue; one-fourth of residue to mother and one-fourth to children <i>per stirpes</i> .

Wife, brother and children of deceased brother.	\$1,000 to wife and residue divided one-half to wife, one-fourth to brother and one-fourth to children <i>per stirpes</i> .
Brother and children of a deceased brother.	One-half to brother and one-half to children <i>per stirpes</i> .
Grandfather and brother.	All to brother.
Grandchildren of deceased brothers of intestate's mother, and children of deceased sister of intestate's father.	All to children. <i>Re McEachren, supra.</i>

In the case of an illegitimate child who dies intestate, unmarried and without issue, the Crown takes the estate beneficially and is accountable to no one. *Dyke v. Walford*, 5 Moo. P. C. 434, 70 R. R. 75.

Subject to the provisions of sec. 12 of the Devolution of Estates Act, the widow of a person who dies intestate, and without any next of kin, is entitled to a moiety only of his estate, the other moiety belonging to the Crown. *Cave v. Roberts*, 6 L. J. Ch. 4.

If one of the residuary legatees has received only his share, the subsequent wasting of the assets by the executors will not entitle the other residuary legatees to call upon him to refund. The case, however, is materially altered if the executor has dissipated a portion of the assets before any residuary legatees call upon him to account; and it would seem that the rule ought to be that what is available at that time should be equally divisible among the whole of the residuary legatees, *i.e.*, an equal distribution should be made of the estate as it stood at the time of the payment to the residuary legatees. *Peterson v. Peterson*, L. R. 3 Eq. 111; *McMillan v. McMillan*, 21 Gr. 369. *Fenwick v. Clarke*, 6 L. T. N. S. 593, is not adverse to this view. In that case there were several pecuniary legacies, some absolutely, others to tenants for life with remainders over—the assets were sufficient for all. The executors paid the absolute legacies and deposited a sum of money in a bank, awaiting an investment. The bank failed, and the executors were not held respon-

sible, nor the paid legatees bound to refund. The payment to them, when made, was rightful.

An executor agreed with one of the residuary legatees to appropriate to him a mortgage as part of his share, and for that purpose handed to him the mortgage deed, but executed no transfer of the mortgage to him. At the time when this was done the sum secured by the mortgage was not more than the estimated amount of the legatee's share of the residue; but by reason of the subsequent loss of some of the assets the residuary estate was greatly reduced, and the other residuary legatees claimed the mortgage as part of the testator's assets. Held, that the appropriation was complete and that the legatee could not be deprived of the mortgage. *In re Lepine* (1892), 1 Ch. 210. And see *In re Brooks* (1914), 1 Ch. 558.

A testator gave shares of his residuary estate to his three sons. The sons owed the testator's estate for money advanced by their father in his lifetime, but the right of action for the debt was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Court held that in making the division of the residue these debts were to be brought into account as against the respective shares of the debtors, and that the debts must bear interest from the testator's death. *In re Akerman*. (1891), 3 Ch. D. 212.

In *Uffner v. Lewis*, 27 A. R. 242, the executors made efforts to discover the whereabouts of certain persons entitled to share in the residue, and failing to discover these persons, they distributed the residue among the others. The Court held that the executors had not made reasonable efforts to discover the legatees, and in the absence of such efforts the persons who had shared in the residue must refund for the benefit of the persons whose claims were ignored. See however, *Re Ashman* (1908), 15 O. L. R. 42, where Riddell, J., held that executors were entitled to distribute the

estate where a proper advertisement for creditors "and others" had been duly published.

Annuities given by the will are payable out of the income of residue if no other source is specified. *Re Grant*, 52 L. J. Ch. 552.

A fund directed to be set apart to answer ordinary life annuities is residue so far as not required; so that the life-tenant of residue is entitled to surplus income set free by the death of an annuitant. *Gibbs v. Gibbs*, 26 L. T. 865.

Any fund merely required to answer contingent liabilities is in the meantime treated as residue. Hence the life-tenant of residue is entitled to the immediate income of a fund set apart to answer reversionary life annuities. *Cranley v. Dixon*, 23 Beav. 512; or contingent legacies. *Allhusen v. Whittel*, 4 Eq. 295.

Where the interest of a legacy is directed to be accumulated beyond the period allowed by law, the interest accruing after that period on both legacy and accumulations forms part of the capital of residue. *Crawley v. Crawley*, 7 Sim. 427, 40 R. R. 170; *O'Neill v. Lucas*, 2 Keen 313, 53 R. R. 72.

In *Williams v. Headland*, 4 Giff. 505, 141 R. R. 302, in an administration suit, the executors claimed to retain part of the residue as an indemnity against possible liability in respect of unregistered mining shares. The Court refused the claim, but required the residuary legatees to undertake to answer such liability.

A gift of residue to an executor to enable him to carry into effect the purposes of the will does not give him any beneficial interest in the residue, and intrinsic evidence of intention to benefit the executor is not admissible. *Barrs v. Fewkes*, 2 H. & M. 232, 144 R. R. 33. In *Harrison v. Harrison*, 2 H. & M. 237, 144 R. R. 137, it was held the executors took beneficially.

The necessity of retaining funds for a particular purpose furnishes no occasion or excuse for delaying the settlement of the balance of the estate, and the

payment of the legacies which are due; there being sufficient funds for the payment of all legacies, whether due or not. *Brown v. Farren* (N.H.), 58 Atl. Rep. 870.

Executors may appropriate specific assets in payment of residue. A testator gave his residuary estate to his five children equally. Part of the estate consisted of a brewery stock. Before the executors were prepared to make a final division two of the sons applied for advances on their shares. The executors sold some of the stock at 160 and paid the proceeds to one of the sons. The other son preferred to take his advance in stock, and the stock was transferred to him at \$60. The sons were charged with interest on the advances at four per cent. At the time of the final division the stock had greatly increased in value and the dividends were much larger than four per cent., and the other legatees claimed that the estate ought to be distributed in such manner as to produce the same effect as if a proportionate part of the stock had been appropriated to the other shares at the time the son was advanced. North, J., refused to assent to this. There was no reason why the executors should not have distributed the stock among all the residuary legatees before the final division was made but it was not incumbent on them to do so. *In re Richardson, Morgan v. Richardson* (1896), 1 Ch. 512.

When the residue has been once ascertained it should be distributed, or, if the provisions of the will so require, invested. If this is not done and one executor allows the other to retain the ascertained residue in his hands and he becomes insolvent, both are liable as for a breach of trust. *Lincoln v. Wright*, 4 Beav. 427, 55 R. R. 132.

A residuary disposition of all the residue of an estate consisting of money, promissory notes, vehicles and implements, was held to carry land, a devise of which had lapsed, notwithstanding a gift to another of all real and personal estate. *Re Farrell* (1906), 12 O. L. R. 580.

Where land is devised for life, a residuary devise of all the real estate passes the reversion in the land. *Swart v. Gregory*, 15 U. C. R. 335. And where an annuity is given for life a residuary bequest carries the capital. *Re Watt*, 29 N. S. R. 100.

Where a residuary bequest directs the residue to be "divided *pro rata* amongst the legatees," previously named in the will, they share the residue in proportion to the respective amounts of their prior legacies. *Kennedy v. Protestant Orphans' Home*, 25 O. R. 235. An annuitant is a legatee and entitled to share in such a distribution. *Woodside v. Logan*, 15 Gr. 145. But "legatee" may be given a more restricted meaning according to the context. *Edwards v. Smith*, 25 Gr. 159.

An executor or administrator may require a receipt or a release as a condition precedent to the payment of the amount due on a legacy or distributive share. *Sterett v. National Co.*, 10 App. Cas. (D.C.) 131; *In re Fortune*, Ir. R. 4 Eq. 351. But he cannot require the legatee or heir to pay the costs of such release. *In re Fortune*, *supra*.

So a legatee for life may be required as a condition precedent to the executor's assenting to or delivering the legacy to him, to sign an inventory of the chattels admitting their receipt, and that he is entitled to them only for life, after which they belong to the remainderman. *Howell v. Howell*, 38 N. C. 522.

The rule that where two clauses in a will are repugnant and incapable of reconciliation the later must prevail applies to inconsistent residuary clauses. But, if there are two gifts in the same instrument, each sufficient to include the residuary estate, in a case where lapsed shares of the first gift would leave something for the second gift to operate upon, the first of the two gifts is preferred—i.e., the "rule of thumb" is not applicable because a meaning can be attributed to the last clause which removes the apparent repugnancy. *Re Nolan* (1917), 40 O. L. R. 355.

After giving many substantial specific legacies, a testator in his will said: "The residue of my estate to go to the deserving poor of F." Then followed this clause: "Balance of my estate divided between those in the will *pro rata*." Middleton, J., decided that the two clauses were hopelessly inconsistent, and effect must be given to the last gift as the last intention of the testator. *Ib*.

An executor proposed to pass his accounts, whereupon the beneficiaries agreed to take from him an affidavit verifying the accounts and to take over their share of the estate, and give him a release. This was done, and some 17 years afterwards one of the beneficiaries brought an action against the executor, alleging that the accounts were not proper. As a matter of fact the executor had made a mistake and paid to other beneficiaries under the will monies that formed a part of the plaintiff's share. It was held, by the Appellate Division, that innocent error was sufficient to invalidate the release, following *In re Garnett* (1885), 31 Ch. D. 1. But it not being alleged or proved that the executor was guilty of fraud, or that he had retained or converted to his own use any of the trust property, he was entitled to the benefit of his plea of the Statute of Limitations, R. S. O. 1914, ch. 75, sec. 47. *Lees v. Morgan* (1917), 40 O. L. R. 233.

So far we have proceeded on the assumption that the intestate was at the time of his death, domiciled in a place where the Statute of Distributions is the law of the land.

The rule is, that the distribution of the personal estate of an intestate is to be regulated by the law of the country in which he was a domiciled inhabitant at the time of his death without any regard whatsoever to the place either of the birth or the death, or the situation of the property at the time. It is not, however, correct to say, that with respect to the distribution of the personal property, the law of England gives way to the law of a foreign country; but that it is part

of the law of England, that personal property should be distributed according to the *jus domicilii*. If, therefore, a man die domiciled in this country, and administration be taken out to him here, debts due to him, or other of his personal effects, in Scotland or abroad, shall be distributed according to the law of England; for the *lex rei sitae* is not to be recognized. On the other hand, if a man domiciled abroad die intestate, his whole property here is distributable according to the laws of the country where he was so domiciled. Wms. on Exors. 1387.

No principle can be better established than that the administration of the personal estate of the deceased person belongs exclusively to the country in which he was domiciled at his death. The Courts of that country must decide who is entitled, and from their decision there is no appeal. *Dogliani v. Crispen*, L. R. 1 H. L. 301.

Neither English legislation nor our own was intended to displace the general law recognized in all civilized nations, condensed in the words *mobilia sequuntur personam*, which means that personal property is subject to the law which governs the person of the owner. If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which he happens to be, but the law of the country of his then domicile, which governs. Lord Selborne in *Freke v. Lord Carbery* (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 461, 466, shews that "domicil is allowed in England to have the same influence as in other countries in determining the succession to movable estate." The Latin maxim embodies the law of the civilized world, and is founded on the nature of things. The Courts have regard to it, not by any special law of England, but by the deference which, for the sake of international comity, the law of England pays to the laws of the civilized world. Per Boyd, C. *Re Dartnell* (1916), 37 O. L. R. 483.

"Domicil" and "residence" are not synonymous. The domicile is the home, the fixed place of habitation,

without any present intention of removing therefrom; while residence is a transient place of dwelling. A person may have more than one residence, but he cannot have two domicils for the same purpose. *Cartwright v. Hinds*, 3 O. R. 395 ; *Wanzer Lamp Co. v. Woods*, 13 P. R. p. 515, Dicey, 98.

The word "home" denotes a merely natural and untechnical conception, based upon the relation between a person's residence and his intention as to residence. The term "domicil" is a name for a legal conception, based upon and connected with the idea of home, but containing in it elements of a purely legal or conventional character. Whether a place or country is a man's home is a question of fact. Whether a place or country is a man's domicil is a question of mixed fact and law, or rather of the inference drawn by law from certain facts, though in general the facts which constitute a place a man's home are the same facts as those from which the law infers that it is his domicil. Dicey, 2nd ed. 93.

A child born during his father's lifetime has his domicil of origin in the country where the infant's father is domiciled at the time of the birth (whether born in that country or not), "for the law attributes to every individual as soon as he is born the domicil of his father, if the child be legitimate." *Udny v. Udny*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. p. 457. An illegitimate or posthumous child has for his domicil of origin the domicil of his mother at the time of his birth. Westlake, 4th ed. 323. A foundling, *i.e.*, a child whose parents are unknown, has his domicil of origin in the country where he is found. Dicey, 107.

The domicil of origin must prevail until the party has not only acquired another, but has manifested and carried into execution an intention of abandoning his former domicil and acquiring another as his sole domicil. The acquisition of a new domicil involves two facts—residence in a new country and an intention

permanently to reside there. *Magurn v. Magurn*, 3 O. R. 570, 11 A. R. 178; *Bonbright v. Bonbright*, 1 O. L. R. 629, 2 O. L. R. 249.

If the intention of permanently residing in a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention will establish domicil. *Bell v. Kennedy*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 307. The process by which this new domicil is acquired has been thus aptly described: "A change of the domicil of origin can only be effected *animo et facto*—that is to say, by the choice of another domicil evidenced by residence within the territorial limits to which the jurisdiction of the new domicil extends. A person in making the change does an act which is more nearly designated by the word 'settling' than by any one word in our language. Thus we speak of a colonist settling in Canada, or Australia, or of a Scotsman settling in England, and the word is frequently used as expressive of the fact of change of domicil, in the various judgments pronounced in our Courts." *Udny v. Udny*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. p. 449.

The residence which goes to constitute domicil need not be long in point of time. "If the intention of permanently residing in a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention, however short, will establish it." *Bell v. Kennedy*, *ante*.

The residence must, however, be in pursuance of, or influenced by the intention, because mere length of residence will not of itself constitute domicil. This is well illustrated by the case of *In re Patience*, 29 Ch. D. 976. P. was born in Scotland in 1792, that being his domicil of origin. In 1810 he joined the army and was in foreign service until 1860, when he retired, and from 1860 until his death in 1882 he resided in lodgings, hotels and boarding houses in various places in England, dying there a bachelor and intestate. From 1810 until his death he never revisited Scotland. Chitty, J., held that P. had never changed his domicil of origin.

For an exhaustive treatment of the law relating to domicile, see Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. 82, and 10 A. & E. Ency. 6.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the distribution of the real estate of an intestate is governed wholly by the law of its *situs* and not by the law of domicile. For the purpose of distribution leasehold property is considered real estate and is not effected by the intestate's domicile. *Freke v. Lord Carbery*, L. R. 16 Eq. 461; *Duncan v. Dawson*, 41 Ch. D. 394.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

ADVANCEMENTS.

Before an administrator proceeds to the distribution of the estate of the intestate he must consider whether any child of the intestate has been advanced in the father's lifetime. By ch. 56, sec. 35 of 10 Edw. VII., the Act respecting the Distribution of Intestates' Estates was repealed, and the statutory law governing advancements is now comprised in the Devolution of Estates Act. Section 28 of the latter Act is as follows:

28.—(1) If any child of an intestate has been advanced by him by settlement or portion of real or personal property, or both, and the same has been so expressed by the intestate in writing, or so acknowledged in writing by the child, the value thereof shall be reckoned, for the purposes of this section only, as part of the real and personal property of such intestate to be distributed under the provisions of this Act; and if such advancement is equal to or greater than the amount of the share which such child would be entitled to receive of the real and personal property of the deceased, as so reckoned, then such child and his descendants shall be excluded from any share in the real and personal property of the intestate.

(2) If such advancement is less than such share such child and his descendants shall be entitled to so much only of the real and personal property as is sufficient to make all the shares of the children in such real and personal property and advancement to be equal, as nearly as can be estimated.

(3) The value of any real or personal property so advanced shall be deemed to be that, if any, which has been acknowledged by the child by an

instrument in writing; otherwise such value shall be estimated according to the value of the property when given.

(4) The maintenance or educating, or the giving of money to a child without a view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed an advancement within the meaning of this Act.

In *Re Hall*, 14 O. R. 557, Boyd, C., said: "The English cases I have consulted exhibit a very peculiar and anomalous state of the law. It seems to be held that for the purposes of distribution, loan, gift and advancement may be treated as almost interchangeable terms. That which is originally a debt may, by the act of the father, be converted afterwards into an advancement, and that which is a gift may afterwards be taken into account as part of the son's share of the father's estate: *Gilbert v. Wetherell*, 2 S. & Stu. 454, is one of the earliest, and *Re Blockley*, 29 Ch. D. 250, one of the latest decisions. But our statute requires that some certainty of definition be given to the term 'advancement,' by the very fact that it is to be evidenced by writing. This writing may be either an expression by the intestate that the donation is by way of advancement (which I take it is to be made contemporaneously with the transaction) or an acknowledgment to the same effect by the child. The intention of the parent at the time of the donation is the all-important point, and the character of the dealing at that time must remain fixed unless it be changed with the concurrence of both parties.

"Under our law an advancement is neither a loan or debt to be repaid, nor an absolute gift. It is a bestowment of property by a parent on a child on condition that if the donee claims to share in the intestate estate of the donor, he shall bring in this property for the purposes of equal distribution. Here the only writing between the father and son is the promissory note

given by the son which is held by the father's estate. This writing imports that the original dealing was one of loan or debt between the parties, and as such does not satisfy the statute. It appears to me impossible to give a double effect to the security so as to make it on the one hand represent a legal claim upon which an action may be brought to recover the amount advanced, and also to regard it as an acknowledgment in writing by the son that the \$500 was an advancement to be accounted for under the statute."

In *Re Lewis Estate*, 29 O. R. 609, Ferguson, J., said: "An advancement has been perhaps fairly well defined as being a payment or appropriation of money or a settlement of real estate made by a parent to or for a child in advance or in anticipation of the distributive share to which such child would be entitled after his death. Yet there are many cases in which the payment or appropriation has been held to be an advancement in which it does not appear from the perusal of the decisions that it was done in anticipation of a distribution after the death of the parent." He quotes, with approval, the definition in 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. 760: "An advancement is a transfer of property from a person standing *in loco parentis* toward another, to that other, in anticipation of the share of the donor's estate which the donee would receive in the event of the donor's dying intestate."

"Whenever a sum is paid for a particular purpose, which is thought good and right by the father, and which the son himself desires, if it be money which is drawn out in considerable amount, and not a small sum, it must be treated as an advance. The payment of the money is the important thing—the Court does not look to the application." *Boyd v. Boyd*, L. R. 4 Eq. 305. This was followed in *In re Blockley*, 29 Ch. D. 250, where a sum advanced by a father to his son to enable a son to pay a debt was held to be an advancement, and the contrary opinion in *Taylor v. Taylor*, L. R. 20 Eq. 155, dissented from.

The word "advancement" standing by itself has a narrow and restricted meaning, and is a word appropriate to an early period in life. It may not be easy to define with precision what is meant by "advancement in life," since the meaning may depend, to a greater or less degree, on circumstances; but it seems to point to some occasion out of the every day course, when the beneficiary has in mind some act or undertaking which calls for pecuniary outlay, and which, if properly conducted, holds out a prospect of something beyond a mere transient benefit or employment. Thus, if the beneficiary were going to enter into business, or to get married, or to build a dwelling house, or to make some unusual repairs or renovation, it would be a proper occasion for a trustee to use his discretion. *Bailey v. Bailey* (1888), 14 Atl. R. 917, approved of in *Brooke v. Brooke*, 3 O. W. N. 52.

While it is a difficult matter to frame such a definition as will cover every possible case, there are certain essential elements which every advancement must possess: one of which is that it must have been a part of the intestate's estate, which upon his death would descend to his heirs but for the fact that it has, by the act of the intestate in making the gift, been separated from or taken out of the estate, or it must be something which is purchased with the funds of the intestate in the name and for the benefit of the child. It must be a completed transfer of the property, and as such must be perfected during the donor's lifetime, and it must be perfected by the donor himself. *Murrel v. Murrel*, 2 Strobh. Eq. (S. Car.) 151; *Ison v. Ison*, 5 Rich. Eq. 15; *Bailey v. Bailey*, 6 Conn. 308; *Edwards v. Freeman*, 2 P. Wms. p. 443.

In order that a child might be obliged to bring his advancement into hotchpot, it was said at one time that there must have been an actual intestacy; and that when there was an executor, and therefore a complete will, and the executor was declared a trustee for

the next of kin, the latter took not by intestacy, but by the will, as if the residue had actually been given to them. *Walton v. Walton*, 14 Ves. 324.

But in recent decisions the older authorities have been exhaustively reviewed, and it has been pointed out that in these there was a failure only of a *part* of the testamentary disposition; and, therefore, they were no authority for the proposition that where the will fails altogether (as through the death of a universal legatee), leaving no executor, there is not an intestacy. On the contrary, it is thought that an equitable intestacy, or an intestacy as to beneficiaries, the executor being the legal owner and taking under the will, is sufficient to make the statute apply. *Armour on Devolution*, 266.

There appears to be no authority going the length of deciding that, what Mr. Armour terms an "equitable intestacy," is within the statute. In *In re Ford, Ford v. Ford* (1902), 1 Ch. 218, the testator gave the whole of his estate to his wife absolutely and appointed her sole executrix. The wife predeceased her husband, and after his death letters of administration with the will annexed were granted. Buckley, J., held that the statute applies to an intestacy occasioned by a testamentary instrument becoming inoperative by the death of the universal legatee and executrix in the lifetime of the testator, as well as to a case of actual intestacy occasioned by the non-existence of any testamentary paper, following *Harte v. Meredith* (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 341. This was affirmed on the short ground that as there was no one who could take any benefit under the will, the deceased died intestate, and therefore the statute applied: (1902) 2 Ch. 605.

It must always be borne in mind that our statute requires that the advancement be expressed or acknowledged in writing, which is not in the English statute. In *Filman v. Filman*, 15 Gr. 643, a son of the intestate had been in possession of a farm belonging

to his father for a sufficient time to have obtained a title by possession; the Court held he was not bound to bring the value of the farm into hotchpot, pointing out the difference between the two statutes.

A transfer of property in consideration of a release of all interest in the father's estate will be considered an advancement. A deed to a son in consideration of his renouncing all claims upon the other property of his father is valid. A father can impose, as a condition to conveying the property to his son, the release of all claims to his personal property, though the son claimed—but the father did not concede—that he was entitled to the conveyance as a matter of right. *Kinyon v. Kinyon*, 57 N. Y. 850.

A release in full of all claims against the ancestor's estate, given on the receipt of the advancement, is binding and bars any future claim, and this even though the value of the property received is much less than would be that of a share on distribution. *Quarles v. Quarles*, 4 Mass. 680; *Kennedy v. Tucker*, 8 Mass. 143.

A statement signed by the donee at the time of the receipt of property, that it is taken as an advancement, is binding upon him. *Havens v. Thompson*, 26 N. J. Eq. 353. A statement signed by a son-in-law as follows: "Received of J. S. \$500, it being a part of my wife's portion," found among the intestate's papers, was held a sufficient acknowledgment. *Hartwell v. Rice*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 587.

Mere entries of the transfer of property or payment of money in the intestate's account books, are not sufficient in themselves to shew an advancement. *Benjamin v. Dimmick*, 4 Redf. 7. Where the charges are made in the usual way as between debtor and creditor the presumption is of a debt and not an advancement. *Re Ashley*, 4 Pick (Mass.) 21. But the entries are sufficient if they expressly state that the transfer or payments were by way of advancement. *Clark v.*

Warner, 6 Conn. 355; or are made in family books wherein a record of advancements is kept. *Bulkeley v. Noble*, 2 Pick. 337. An entry as follows: "A. my son, Dr. The following articles that may be charged are to go towards his portion." Held an advancement. *Clark v. Warner*, *supra*. And see *In re Deprez* (1917), 1 Ch. 24, *post*.

It is immaterial that the child had no knowledge of the entry. *Hengst's Estate*, 6 Watts (Pa.) 86. The parent may change the advancement to a gift without the knowledge of the donee. *Sherwood v. Smith*, 23 Conn. 516. He cannot, however, reverse the process and deprive the donee of property already his, by changing a gift to an advancement. *Harper v. Parks*, 63 Ga. 705; *Lawson's Appeal*, 23 Pa. St. 85.

In *Re Hall*, 14 O. R. 557, a son had given his father a note for \$500, and it was held that this evidenced a loan rather than an advancement. The son had predeceased his father, intestate and insolvent, leaving one child. It was held that the grandchild was not bound to bring the \$500 into hotchpot—that the \$500 not being an advancement, and the grandchild claiming under her grandfather and not under her father, the money could not be set-off against her father's indebtedness by deducting it from the amount of her distributive share.

But if a child who has received any advancement from his father dies in his father's lifetime leaving children, such children are not admitted to their father's distributive share unless they bring in his advancement, since as his representatives they can have no better claim than he would have had if living. This proposition was laid down as long ago as 1729 in *Proud v. Turner*, 2 P. Wms. 160, and followed in *Re Lewis Estate*, 29 O. R. 609.

When the advancement is one taking effect *in presenti* it is to be reckoned at its value at the time it is made. If it is to take effect *in futuro* it is, if neces-

sary, to be reckoned at its value at the time the donee comes into actual possession. *Re Lewis Estate, supra*. The accrued value of an estate cannot be charged against the donee. *Beckwith v. Butler*, 1 Wash. (Va.) 224. If the advancement consists of an annuity the value at the time of the grant is to govern; or if it has ceased, the value of the payments received, at the option of the child. *Kirkcudbright v. Kirkcudbright*, 8 Ves. 51, 6 R. R. 216.

Interest is not chargeable on advancements up to the date of the donor's death, even though the advancement consisted of a debt due from the donee. It is to be charged, however, for the period between the death and distribution. *Hilton v. Hilton*, L. R. 14 Eq. 468; *Andrewes v. George*, 3 Sim. 393, 30 R. R. 179; *Field v. Seward*, 5 Ch. D. 538; *Wilkins v. Wilkins*, 43 N. J. Eq. 595.

Where a child has been advanced he cannot be compelled to bring his advancement into hotchpot, but he must do so if he wishes to share in the distribution. And a mere intention to elect to retain advancements and not to claim under the distribution, especially when not acted on to the prejudice of another, will not prevent the one from claiming his distributive share. *Kay v. Jones*, 52 Ala. 328. But an agreement to elect once made is binding. *Smith v. Axtell*, 1 N. J. Eq. 494. And the one advanced must exercise his rights within a reasonable time. *Grattan v. Grattan*, 18 Ill. 167. Even though the one advanced refuses to come in at an original division, he may do so at a subsequent division. *Knight v. Oliver*, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 33.

A donee does not give up his title to property by bringing it into hotchpot. The value of it is brought in only for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not it amounts to the full share of the estate. *State v. Jameson*, 3 Gill & J. 442.

The term "child" in the statute is generally construed to cover "grandchild," and gifts between per-

sons in this relationship are liable to be considered advancements. *Wyth v. Blackman*, 1 Ves. 196; *Royle v. Hamilton*, 4 Ves. Jr. 437; *Beebe v. Estabrook*, 79 N. Y. 246. But it does not include an illegitimate grandchild. *Tucker v. Burrow*, 7 H. & M. 515.

The widow of the intestate has no claim upon what is brought into hotchpot among the children. *Kirkcudbright v. Kirkcudbright*, 8 Ves. 51, 6 R. R. 216. A husband directed his trustees to pay the income of one moiety of his residuary estate to his widow for life, and to divide the other moiety between his children. After the will was made the testator made advances to some of his children, and it was held that such advances could be brought into account for the benefit of the children among themselves, and not for the benefit of the widow. *Meinertzen v. Walters*, L. R. 7 Ch. 670. This was followed in *Stewart v. Stewart*, 15 Ch. D. 539, where Jessel, M.R., said: "I call to my mind the general law as expressed by L. J. James in *Meinertzen v. Walters*, that the whole doctrine (*i.e.*, of advancement) only applies to children; the object is to make children bring into account advancements. The wife is a stranger for this purpose; she does not take advancements for which she accounts, and, therefore, she is not within the meaning of the clause which is to make children account for advancements."

While the doctrine of advancements proper is applied in the cases of intestacy only, it is frequently necessary in settling a testator's estate to construe the term "advancements" as used in the will. The term is not, when thus employed, taken in its technical sense. *Barker v. Comins*, 110 Mass. 477.

It is a general rule that where a will specifies that certain gifts are advancements, they are to be treated as such regardless of their true nature, evidence to prove them otherwise being inadmissible. *Fox v. Fox*, L. R. 11 Eq. 142.

But if property is expressly given as an advancement, but no reference is made to it in the parent's will, the child need not account for the property received during the parent's lifetime. 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. 778.

By a codicil dated 20th October, 1913, the testator directed that "all sums of money appearing in my books of account to have been advanced by me to my son Edmund shall . . . be brought into hotchpot." There were two books of account which contained entries of sums apparently paid by the testator, in respect of land speculations in Canada, to Edmund or to persons for his benefit. Some of the entries were before 20th October, 1913, and some afterwards. Held, that the advances made prior to 20th October were incorporated in the will, but entries subsequently were not receivable either as part of the will or as evidence of advances. The son disputed the accuracy of some of the prior entries and, as to these, there was a reference. *In re Deprez* (1917), 1 Ch. 24.

APPENDIX

Rules of the Surrogate Court, 36 to 41 (inclusive).

FORMS.

Petition to Pass Executors' Accounts.

Accounts of Executors: A—Receipts.

B—Disbursements.

C—Of Original Estate.

Affidavit of Executor Verifying Accounts.

Appointment to Pass Accounts.

Judge's Order on Passing Accounts.

Affidavit for Order to Compel Audit.

Citation to Compel Audit of Accounts.

Surrogate Court Tariff—Solicitors.

Tariff of Fees to Registrars.

Tariff of Fees to Judges.

SURROGATE COURT RULES 36-41.

36. Executors, administrators, trustees under a will and guardians of infants may voluntarily pass their accounts, or they may be called upon to do so on the application of any person interested therein.

(See R. S. O., ch. 121, secs. 25 and 67.)

37.—(1) The petition, inventories and accounts duly verified by affidavits shall be filed with the Registrar, and thereupon the Judge shall fix a time and place for the passing of the accounts.

(2) The Judge shall give all necessary directions for the service of his appointment, and, if he deems it proper, for the service of a copy of the accounts upon those interested therein.

(3) Where an infant or person of unsound mind who has no committee, or absentee is concerned, notice shall be given to the Official Guardian, and he shall be informed of the name and interest of the infant, person of unsound mind or absentee, and be given the address of the person with whom the infant, or person of unsound mind resides, and such information as can be given concerning the absentee.

(4) When a person of unsound mind has a committee, notice shall be given the committee. (See R. S. O., ch. 295, sec. 40, as to insane persons in asylums.)

(5) The accounts shall be passed before the Judge in Chambers.

38.—(1) The accounts shall contain a true and perfect inventory of the whole property in question, and shall include:—

(I) An account showing of what the original estate consisted.

(II) An account of all moneys received.

(III) An account of all moneys disbursed.

(IV) An account of all property remaining on hand.

(V) Such other accounts as the Judge may require.

(2) When by the will or instrument creating any trust estate, principal and income are dealt with separately, the accounts shall be divided so as to show receipts and disbursements in respect of principal and income separately.

39. Upon the passing of the accounts the Judge may fix the compensation or allowance to be made to the executors, administrators, trustees under a will, or guardians, for their care, pains, trouble, and time expended in and about the estate, trust or guardianship.

40. Upon passing accounts the Judge may moderate any bill of costs and charges of solicitors employed by the executors, administrators, trustees, or guardians, or refer the same for taxation, under the Solicitors Act.

41. Every order made upon passing accounts shall be made in duplicate, and one of such duplicates shall be filed with the Registrar, who shall enter the same in full in a book to be kept for that purpose.

Petition to Pass Accounts, etc.

In the Surrogate Court of the County of

In the Estate of deceased.
To His Honour, Esquire, Judge of the
Surrogate Court of the County of .
The Petition of A. B., of the town of , in
the
Sheweth:

1. That the said _____ of the _____ of _____
in the County of _____, _____, departed this life on
or about the _____ day of _____, in the year of
our Lord, 19 _____.

2. That your Petitioner on the day
of A.D. 19 , was duly appointed
of the said deceased.

3. That your Petitioner _____ administered the said estate and effects of the said deceased, to the best of _____ ability, so far as the same can be administered at this time.

4. That your Petitioner hath brought in and filed with the Registrar, a full and correct account of administration of the said estate, showing all the property thereof which ha come into hands as such and also a full and correct account of disbursements as such with a statement of the assets yet undisposed of.

5. Your Petitioner therefore, pray that the said accounts may be audited, taken and passed by and before this Court.

6. Your Petitioner further pray that may be allowed a fair and reasonable allowance for care, pains and trouble, and time expended, in and about the estate of the said , deceased, and in administering, disposing of, arranging, and settling the affairs of the said estate.

7. Your Petitioner has not hitherto been allowed any compensation for the services in the last preceding paragraph referred to, either by this Court or by any other competent Court, except

8. That the only persons interested in the administration of the estate as beneficiaries of the said deceased, with their addresses, are as follows:

and that all the said persons are of the full age of twenty-one years, except

9. THAT your Petitioner know of no creditors of the estate of the said deceased who still have unsettled claims against the said estate, except

and that the only portion of the said estate that remains unadministered by your Petitioner is set forth in a schedule filed herewith:

and that the reason of the non-administration thereof is the following, namely:

DATED this day of , A.D. 19 .

E. F.,

Solicitor for the above named Petitioner.

ACCOUNTS OF EXECUTORS.

In the Surrogate Court of the County of.

In the Estate of A. B., deceased.

This is the account marked "A" referred to in the annexed affidavit showing the receipts of the said estate.

A Commissioner, etc.

No. of Item.	Names of persons from whom received.	On what account received.	Amount.

In the Surrogate Court of the County of

In the Estate of A. B., deceased.

This is the account marked "B" referred to in the annexed affidavit shewing the disbursements made on account of the said estate.

A Commissioner, etc.

No. of Item.	Names of persons to whom paid or allowed.	For what purpose paid or allowed.	Amount

In the Surrogate Court of the County of Grey

In the Estate of A. B., deceased.

This is the account marked "D" referred to in the annexed affidavit, showing of what the original estate consisted.

A Commissioner, etc.

No.	Particulars.	How accounted for.
1.	Household furniture	Specifically bequeathed to widow.
2.	Cash in bank	Item 1 in Receipts.
3.	7 horses	2 specifically bequeathed and delivered to legatees—others sold—see items 7, 12 and 13 of Receipts.
4.	3 cows	Sold—items 5, 8, and 11 of Receipts.
5.	Mortgage made by J. T. for \$2,000 with int. at 6% from 17th May, 1915	Items 3, 6 and 17 of Receipts.
6.	Pro. note of R. F. \$700, int. at 7% from 3rd April, 1915	
7.	Bal. due on pro. note of J. B., int. at 6% from 4th Feb'y, 1915.....	Item 22 of Receipts.
		Items 16 and 27 of Receipts.
8.	Lot 8, con. 3, Township of	Conveyed to L. M., the devisee thereof.
9.	Lot No. 739, Town of....	Sold to C. D. for \$2,200. Item 23 of Receipts.

AFFIDAVIT VERIFYING ACCOUNTS.¹

In the Surrogate Court of the County of

In the Estate of A. B., deceased.

I, _____ of the _____ of _____ in the
County of _____, _____, make oath and say:

(1) That I was appointed by this Honourable Court
of the estate of the said deceased.

(2) That the account now shewn to me marked "A." sets
forth a true and correct account of all the personal estate and
effects, and of the real estate and proceeds thereof, of the said
estate, which have come into my hands or into the hands of
my co- _____ or of any other person or persons on
behalf, so far as I know, and also the names of the parties from
whom the same have been received, and the dates at which the
same were received, to the best of my knowledge and belief; and
that the total sums so received amount to \$

3. That the account marked "B," now also shown to me,
sets forth a true and correct account of all the disbursements
and payments made by me or by my co- _____, or any
other person for and on account of the said estate, to the best
of my knowledge and belief; and that the total sums so dis-
tributed amount to \$

4. That save and except what appears in the said account
marked "A," I have not, nor ha _____ my co- _____ or anyone
on _____ behalf, so far as I know, ever received or got
in any part of the said deceased's personal estate or effects, or
the real estate, or the proceeds thereof.

5. That to the best of my knowledge and belief the available
assets of the said estate still undisposed of and in the hands of
myself and my co- _____ or of any person or persons
for _____, except as hereinafter mentioned, are correctly
set forth in the account marked "C," now shown to me.

(5a) That I have in the account marked "D" hereto an-
nexed set forth a full and accurate account shewing of what
the original estate of the said deceased consisted, and the dis-
position made thereof.

¹ Paragraph 5a is not in the form given in the Surrogate Court
Rules, but has been inserted to make the affidavit consistent with
the requirements of Rule 38 (1).

If there are two or more executors, it is advisable that each of
them make this affidavit, as the affidavit cannot be accepted as
prima facie evidence unless the account of receipts is vouched by
the affidavit of each executor.

6. That I have not received nor been awarded or adjudged any compensation whatever by this Court for the care, pains and trouble expended by me in and about the said estate, except

7. That the only persons interested in the said estate and their proper places of residence and address of such persons are as follows:

8. That the persons whose names are so given are of the full age of twenty-one years, except , as I am informed and do verily believe.

(If there are infants or persons of unsound mind, add a clause giving addresses of persons with whom they reside and any information necessary to enable the required notice to be given. See Rule 37.)

Sworn, etc.

APPOINTMENT TO PASS ACCOUNTS.

In the Surrogate Court of the County of

In the Estate of

deceased.

Upon reading the petition of , of the Estate of the said deceased, and the Petitioner having brought in and deposited with the Registrar the accounts of receipts and expenditures in respect of the said estate, I appoint the day of , A.D. 19 , at o'clock in the noon, at my Chambers in the Court House, in the of , as the time and place for the purpose of examining, auditing and passing the said accounts;

And to fix the compensation, if any, to be allowed to the said for care, pains and trouble and time expended in and about the said estate;

And I do order that all persons who are or may be interested in the estate or the said deceased, do attend at the said time and place if they so desire; and that in the event of their non-attendance, the said matters may be proceeded with in their absence.

And I do order a copy hereof to be served upon (here name the persons interested), as least days before the day so appointed.

Dated this day of , A.D. 19 .

Judge.

NOTE.—The accounts above mentioned may be examined by the parties interested, or their solicitors, at the office of the Registrar, at the of .

JUDGE'S ORDER ON PASSING ACCOUNTS.

In the Surrogate Court of the County of

In the Estate of A.B.

deceased.

I, _____, Esquire, Judge of the said Court, having on the _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____, proceeded to take, audit, and pass the accounts of the _____ of the said estate, in the presence of _____, and after due notice to _____ who have failed to attend.

I find and declare that the total estate and effects of the said deceased, which came into the hands of the said amount to \$ _____.

I find and declare that the said _____ ha _____ properly paid out and disbursed in the due course of administration of the said estate the sum of \$ _____.

And I do hereby order and allow the sum of \$ _____ as a fair and reasonable allowance for _____ care, pains and trouble, and time and personal disbursements expended in and about the administering, arranging and settling the affairs of the said estate to the _____ day of _____, 19____ (and the distribution of the moneys in the hands of the said _____).

And I do order that the costs of taking, auditing and passing the said accounts, and fixing the said compensation, amounting to \$ _____, as taxed by the Registrar, be allowed to the said _____, and having deducted the amount so disbursed and expended, and the said compensation and costs from the amount in the hands of the said _____, I find that there remains in the hands of the said _____ the sum of \$ _____.

Dated this _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____.

Judge.

(If infants are interested in the estate, add the following paragraphs to the above order:

And I find and declare that A. B. and C. D. are infants under the age of 21 years and are entitled to share in the said residue, and that they will respectively attain the age of twenty-one years as follows:—The said A. B. on the _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____, and the said C. D. on the _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____.

And I find that the said A. B. is entitled to \$ of the said residue, and the said C. D. is entitled to \$ thereof; and I order that the Petitioner do pay the said sums into the Supreme Court of Ontario to the credit of the said infants respectively pursuant to section 38 of the Trustee Act).

P.S.—The Petition, Accounts, Appointment and Order should be endorsed and shew the name of the solicitor by whom filed or taken out.

AFFIDAVIT FOR CITATION TO COMPEL AUDIT.

In the Surrogate Court of the County of

In the Estate of A. B. deceased.

I, C. D. (residence and occupation), make oath and say:—

1. The said A. B. died intestate on or about the _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____, and on or about the _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____, letters of administration to his estate were granted by this Court to E. F., who resides at _____.

(Or) The said A. B. died on or about the _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____, having first made and published his last will and testament, and on or about the _____ day of _____, A.D. 19____, probate of the said will was granted by this Court to E. F., who resides at _____.

2. The estate of the said A. B. was inventoried by the said E. F. on his affidavit for grant of administration (or, probate) at the sum of \$ _____; being \$ _____ personal estate and \$ _____ real estate.

3. I am one of the heirs at law of the said A. B., deceased, being a lawful son of the intestate, and am entitled to a share in the said estate.

(Or) I am a creditor of the said estate, the said A. B. being at the time of his death indebted to me in the sum of \$ _____ on a promissory note made by him to me for \$ _____, which indebtedness is still unpaid.

(Or) Pursuant to the provisions of the said will, I am entitled to a pecuniary legacy of \$500, which legacy has not been paid and is now payable; (or) I am one of the residuary

legatees named in the said will, and I have not been paid any sum on account of my residuary share of the estate.

4. I have made application to the said E. F. for a settlement of the said estate, or to have the accounts duly passed and audited, but I have been unable to obtain such settlement and the accounts have not been audited. (Set out any special circumstances shewing the necessity for an audit, or the refusal of the executor or administrator to submit to an audit).

5. Under the circumstances aforesaid, I am informed and believe that I am entitled to have the said accounts passed and audited by this Court.

Sworn before me, etc.

CITATION TO COMPEL AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS.

In the Surrogate Court of the County of

In the Estate of A. B.

deceased.

Whereas A. B., late of the of in the County of (occupation), died on or about the day of , A.D. 19 , having made his last will and testament whereof probate was granted by this Court to E. F. on the day of , A.D. 19 .

(Or) Whereas A. B., late of the of , in the County of (occupation), died intestate on or about the day of , A.D. 19 , and on the day of , A.D. 19 , letters of administration to his estate were granted by this Court to E. F.

And whereas it appears by the affidavit of C. D. filed herein, that he is one of the heirs at law of the said A. B., deceased (or as the case may be), and is entitled to a share of the said estate;

It is ordered that the said E. F. do within ten days after the service of this order upon him cause an appearance to be entered for him in the office of the Registrar of this Court and shew cause why he should not file a true and perfect inventory of all the estate of the deceased which has at any time since the death of the deceased come to the hands of the said E. F., and an account of the disbursements made by him on account of

the said estate, and cause the said accounts to be audited and passed before the Judge of this Court.

Dated the day of , 19 .

Judge.

NOTE.—The affidavit and citation should be endorsed with the name and address of the solicitor for the applicant.

The executor or administrator may in his appearance submit to an audit, in which case he will proceed to file his accounts and take out an appointment to pass them in the ordinary manner. If there is a good reason why an order should not be made for an immediate audit of the accounts, *e.g.*, if the applicant being a creditor, his account is disputed; if it is claimed that the legatee's claim has been paid; or if the estate is in due process of administration as in *In re O'Connor*, 12 Man. 325 (*ante*), the executor or administrator in his appearance will set out the facts, whereupon the matter is brought before the Judge for the mode of determining the question between the parties and deciding whether an order will be made for an audit or not.

COSTS OF AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS.

Solicitors' Costs.

5. On preparing petition, affidavits, accounts and all other necessary papers and services in auditing and passing of accounts of an executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, and including the fixing of the remuneration of such executor, administrator, guardian or trustee:

(a) Where the receipts do not exceed \$2,000...	\$25.00
(b) Where the receipts exceed \$2,000 but do not exceed \$5,000	30.00
(c) Where the receipts exceed \$5,000 but do not exceed \$10,000	40.00
(d) Where the receipts exceed \$10,000 but do not exceed \$20,000	50.00
(e) Where the receipts exceed \$20,000 but do not exceed \$50,000	75.00
(f) Where the receipts exceed \$50,000 but do not exceed \$100,000	100.00

(Any of the preceding fees in cases of an important nature, may be increased by the Judge, but such increase shall be subject to the approval by a Judge of the Supreme Court upon a report from the Judge). (1)

(Where the receipts exceed \$100,000, the fees shall be such as the Judge deems fair and proper. His order allowing the same shall be subject to the approval by a Judge of the Supreme Court upon a report from the Judge). (1)

6. To solicitors for other parties (including the Official Guardian) properly attending on the audit of accounts, a fee may be allowed in the discretion of the Judge, not exceeding in the whole one-half of the above amounts and subject to increase with approval of a Judge of the Supreme Court upon report from the Judge. (1)
8. In addition to the foregoing fees and costs there shall be allowed all proper disbursements made by the solicitor in connection with the foregoing matters.

(1) Where an increased fee is asked for in any of the above cases, and to secure uniformity, until further direction is given, such applications shall be made to Mr. Justice Middleton. To secure approval the certificate of the Surrogate Court Judge and all papers necessary to enable the matter to be dealt with, should be forwarded to him at Osgoode Hall, with return postage.

Registrar's Costs.

Receiving, examining and entering every petition or application for an audit or passing of accounts (27)	\$0.50
Attending on the audit (28)	1.00
Filing vouchers, if directed by the Judge or requested by any party to be filed (not exceeding in all \$1) each (30)10
Every necessary filing (other than vouchers) (26)...	.10
Taxing costs and granting certificate (32).....	1.00
Taking every affidavit or administering oath to a witness (15)20
Search for original will or instrument and inspection (18)30
Issuing every subpoena (24).....	.50
Every necessary letter (25)25
Entering order (31)50

Postage and other necessary disbursements to be added in all cases (38).

(N.B.—The figures in brackets have reference to the items as numbered in Tariff A, Registrar's Fees).

The Judge's Costs.

Special attendance granting appointment to pass accounts	\$1.00
Order for appointment50
On every attendance on appointment when the audit is adjourned (2)	1.00
On every audit where the total of the accounts to be audited does not exceed \$1,000 (3)	1.00
per hour, but not to exceed \$2 on any day.	
On every audit where such total exceeds \$1,000, but is under \$10,000	1.00
per hour, but not to exceed \$5 on any day.	
On every audit where such total is or exceeds \$10,000, but is under \$50,000	1.50
per hour, but not to exceed \$6 on any day.	
On every audit where such total is or exceeds \$50,000	2.00
per hour, but not to exceed \$10 on any day.	
For every day's sittings in contentious or disputed cases, similar fees to those allowed in cases of audit.	

- (2) It is submitted that this item is not taxable in addition to the *per horam* allowance. It is intended as an allowance on the return of an appointment when no evidence is taken or other work done on the audit.
- (3) The "total of the accounts to be audited" evidently means the receipts plus the disbursements. Compare item 5 of the Solicitors' tariff where the amount of the fee is determined by the "receipts."

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